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Progressive Era Influence on West Coast Political Reform, 1937-1942 
 
 
For many year after the almost proximate Progressive and New Deal eras, historians accepted 
strong ‘continuity’ between these reformist periods.  However, in 1955 Hofstadter’s The Age of 
Reform advanced a hypothesis of ‘discontinuity.’  He emphasized backward-looking morality in 
the Progressive era and the forward-oriented pragmatism of the New Deal.  My thesis challenges 
this discontinuity school of thought, and is a contribution to scholarship because Hofstadter’s 
theory established a dominant paradigm about these eras.  Historians as diverse as Graham Jr., 
Weinstein, Worster, and Katznelson have further stressed the differences between the 
Progressive and New Deal eras. 
 
Yet, while the discontinuity message articulated many truths, it obscures an alternative vision of 
the New Deal.  This work demonstrates on the West Coast during the later New Deal, 1937-
1942, Progressive era influence was substantial.  General chapters focus on: the Progressive era; 
the 1920s; the early New Deal.  Detailed chapters about the West Coast, 1937-1942, look at three 
policy areas, and include: conservation and national parks; monopoly reform and distribution of 
electricity from West Coast dams; social justice and responses to Dust Bowl migration.  An 
ideological re-appraisal of the West Coast in the late New Deal is attempted. 
 
Firstly, from a Progressive era ideological viewpoint, issues conventionally judged peripheral in 
the three policy areas are re-conceptualized as significant policy successes.  Secondly individuals 
and organizations shaping and implementing policies locally and nationally were either survivors 
of the earlier era or steeped in its beliefs.  Thirdly, events on the West Coast, 1939-1940, which 
reproduced conditions in the Progressive era, tested whether New Dealers had learned from their 
predecessors’ mistakes.  Consequently, the West Coast region is particularly apposite in a 
considered questioning of Hofstadter’s philosophical divide between the two reform eras.  
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Forward 
 
The present is always a negotiation with the past.  Even when a person apparently reacts 
spontaneously to a situation he or she brings to bear experience or inexperience from the past.  If 
a politician in an earlier incarnation of their career lived through a previous era, or comes from a 
familial and/or political tradition established then, that is a back story which informs their 
present day thought processes and patterns of behaviour.  No more, I believe, are these 
reflections of relevance to US history than over individuals from the Progressive era, or those 
influenced by that era, who played a significant role on the West Coast in the later New Deal.  It 
is the intention of this thesis to show how, in the years 1937-1942, they sought to re-energize 
areas of policy found in the Progressive era, or learn by the mistakes of earlier progressives or 
take their actions a stage further. 
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Introduction  
 
At the end of 1932, an obscure politician from the Mid West coveted a top job in the US cabinet.  
When he was invited to President-elect Franklin D. Roosevelt’s imposing New York City town-
house on 65th Street for a political gathering, he had ‘little hope in his heart’, though, of securing 
the appointment.  After all, he was a 58 year old, unelected politician, and unlike the Democrat 
Roosevelt, a Republican, whose experience in politics was characterized by failure, not success.  
Frances Perkins, the future Secretary of Labor, who saw him at Roosevelt’s home, thought he 
was an incongruous figure, lacking New York elegance and style.  In truth, he must have been 
out of place, and said nothing to the others present.  He had never met Roosevelt before.  Perhaps, 
it came as a surprise then that, as he was about to leave, Roosevelt called him into his study and 
addressed him thus: ‘Mr. Ickes, you and I have been speaking the same language for the past 
twenty years.  I am having difficulty finding a Secretary of the Interior...and I have about come 
to the conclusion that the man I want is Harold L. Ickes of Chicago.’  With this unexpected 
announcement, Ickes was handed one of the most prestigious cabinet positions in Roosevelt’s 
government.1 
     This episode creates a deceptively straightforward link between two great reform periods in 
American history, the Progressive era (1900-20), and the New Deal (1933-40).  In effect, on the 
eve of the New Deal, FDR viewed Ickes as a political soul-mate, because of common beliefs, 
which dated back to the heyday of progressivism.  They would implement their Progressive era 
beliefs in the next seven years, while FDR worked with others who held similar beliefs, although 
not necessarily veterans of the Progressive era.  For many years, historians broadly accepted this 
interpretation of the New Deal.  The historian Arthur S. Link, for example, who specialized in 
the Progressive era, understandably championed his chosen period as the inspiration for New 
Deal liberalism.2  Henry Steele Commager, though, was equally emphatic that progressivism, 
                                                 
1 Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes: The First Thousand Days, 1933-1939 (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1954), IX; Graham White and John Maze, Harold Ickes of the New Deal: His Private Life and Public 
Career (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1985), 98. 
2 Arthur S. Link, American Epoch: A History of America Since 1900 (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1955) 
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with its near-contemporary movement Populism, spawned the New Deal.  Commager wrote: 
‘After the lapse of a decade and a half, Franklin Roosevelt took up once more the program of the 
Populists and Progressives and carried it to its logical conclusion.’3 
     In 1955 Richard Hofstadter’s The Age of Reform transformed understanding of the 
Progressive era, and the New Deal.4  Never again would historians or political scientists breezily 
assume an affinity between the two periods.  Hofstadter employed highly persuasive, polemical 
prose to argue that ‘the spirit of the Progressive era was quite different from that of the New 
Deal.’5  According to Hofstadter, Progressives were essentially conservative reformers, who 
wanted to restore an old morality to American life.  They urged action to combat wrongs which 
they saw as emerging from late 19th Century society: endemic poverty, unfair competition in 
business, and wastage of American land.  In Hofstadter’s phrase, Progressives ‘traffic(ked) in 
moral absolutes’, allowing them to occupy the intellectual ‘high-ground’ against their 
opponents.6   Conversely, for Hofstadter, New Dealers should be viewed as more radical, modern 
reformers, because they were experimenters with American society, who did not want to restore 
a status quo ante.   Indeed, their opponents accused the ‘innovative’ New Deal of immorality.7  
New Dealers were flexible ‘pragmatists’ driven by a desire to deliver practical results benefiting 
the American people, and themselves.  The influence of Hofstadter was profound in academia, 
colouring the opinion of subsequent generations of historians.  As he was a product of the New 
Deal, it perhaps follows that he wished to stress its uniqueness, and repel any suggestion that the 
New Deal was in large part derivative. 
     It is Hofstadter’s ‘discontinuity’ school of thought about the Progressive and New Deal eras 
which I wish to challenge in this thesis.8  Naturally, in the light of more recent research, 
Hofstadter’s argument has been modified, but its main message, that a disjunction exists between 
the Progressive era and New Deal, because the former was backward-looking while the latter 
                                                 
3 Henry Steele Commager, The American Mind (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), 337. 
4 Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to FDR (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955) 
5Ibid., 19. 
6Ibid., 315. 
7 Ibid. 
8  Otis Graham suggested the designation ‘the discontinuity school’ for historians who supported Hofstadter on the 
disconnect between the Progressive era and the New Deal, Otis L Graham Jr., An Encore For Reform: The Old 
Progressives and The New Deal (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 227. 
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looked to the future, remains ‘conventional wisdom’.  Clearly, I would be over-ambitious in 
attempting a wholesale challenge to the ‘discontinuity’ argument, and, of necessity, my aim is 
more limited.  This thesis does aim to show continuity between the Progressive era and the New 
Deal at a national level, but its main purpose is to demonstrate that process in a more localized 
setting, using primary and secondary source material.  Therefore, the issues of conservation, 
monopoly reform, and social justice, which connect strongly to the Progressive era, will be 
considered during the later New Deal on the West Coast, with a view to showing continuity. 
     To begin with, we need to consider the literature that has built up from Hofstadter onwards, 
which has established and entrenched the ‘discontinuity’ argument.  In doing so, a number of 
misconceptions and confusions that impede understanding of continuity between the two eras are 
going to be discussed, along with the rationale behind this thesis, especially why particular issues 
have been chosen, in a specific region, during the final years of the New Deal.  Relevant works 
from the ‘continuity’ school of thought about the Progressive era and New Deal are reviewed, in 
opposition to discontinuity arguments, to bring out salient points about the minority viewpoint, 
which I hope to build on.  By covering important findings of both the ‘discontinuity’ and 
‘continuity’ traditions in the historiography, I want to establish where my thesis will be situated 
in the literature.  Afterwards, the methodology of the thesis is explained.  Finally, a brief digest 
of the PhD is included to show the way forward for the reader.  
                                                  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _                                                                  
     Ever since Hofstadter’s pronouncements on the Progressive era and New Deal, historians of 
these periods have tended to be devotees of his ideas, or worked in their shadow.  Otis Graham 
was a disciple of Hofstadter, and in An Encore for Reform demonstrated that by the mid 1930s 
surviving old Progressives mostly disapproved of the New Deal.  As he put it: ‘To find this 
preponderance of progressive sentiment against the New Deal is to become conscious of 
considerable differences between the two reform movements of the first half of this (20th) 
century.’9 The two most celebrated general narrative histories of the New Deal, which 
established a ‘benchmark’ for later works on 1930s US politics, further reinforced Hofstadter’s 
thesis.  Successively, books by Arthur Schlesinger Jr., including: The Age of Roosevelt: The 
                                                 
 9 Ibid., 178. 
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Crisis of the Old Order, 1919-1933, and William Leuchtenburg’s Franklin D. Roosevelt and the 
New Deal, 1932-40, bolstered Hofstadter’s ‘discontinuity’ argument.10  Leuchtenburg gave 
explicit support for discontinuity, while Schlesinger showed that the Progressive era background 
to the New Deal was far removed from its ideological atmosphere.11  Later, Kenneth Davis 
carefully chronicled FDR’s Progressive era background, but made no attempt to show his 
Progressive era ideology and morality carried through to the New Deal. 12    Conversely, Frank 
Freidel acknowledged the early New Deal included a significant Progressive era input.13  
However, Freidel judges New Dealers, and their leader FDR to have been ultimately pragmatic 
innovators rather than holding to the beliefs of old Progressivism.*  
     Unsurprisingly, Hofstadter’s views have been challenged as a result of further research, but 
even where writers appear to be making new departures in progressive or New Deal 
historiography, their work frequently bears the imprint of Hofstadter’s thinking.  New Left 
historians, like Gabriel Kolko, seemed to be re-casting understanding of the Progressive era, with 
the concept of ‘political capitalism’, whereby business used politics to attain its goals. 14  James 
Weinstein’s description of ‘corporate liberalism’ presented a more nuanced version of the same 
line of thought.15 Yet, on closer inspection, the work of these historians is an elaboration of ideas 
found in Hofstadter.  The moral thrust of Progressivism, in Hofstadter, ultimately was defensive, 
fighting to reclaim the past, not making way for the future.  Progressives, often from the old 
monied class, felt threatened by emerging socio-economic groups, like nouveau riche 
                                                 
10 William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-40 (New York: Harper and Row, 1963) 
chapter XIV. 
11 Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., The Age of Roosevelt: The Crisis of  the Old Order, 1919-1933 (London: Heinemann, 
1957) 
12 Kenneth S. Davis, FDR: The Beckoning of Destiny, 1882-1928 (New York: Random House, 1979), 225-237, 344-
349. 
13 Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Launching the New Deal (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973), 64, 
65, 71, 163, 304, 340, 429. 
* Freidel arrives at this conclusion, (pages 434 to 435), because he sees the Progressive era as producing two 
ideological strands – New Nationalist regulation and New Freedom trust-busting, associated with Presidents 
Theodore Roosevelt and Wilson respectively.  He notes that from the outset of the New Deal FDR was not wedded 
to either approach.  As FDR pragmatically fluctuated between these two ideological strands Freidel considers he was 
neither a Progressive era-inspired follower of Wilson nor Theodore Roosevelt.  Yet, it will be argued that in practice 
Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson both pursued regulation and trust-busting, making FDR’s behaviour 
consistent with Progressive ideology. 
14 Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism: A Re-interpretation of American History, 1900-1916 (Chicago: 
Quadrangle Paperback, 1967), 3. 
15 James Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State: 1900-1918 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), XV.  
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industrialists, and socialistic labour.  To contain this ‘status revolution’, Progressives called for 
consensus across classes, and reforms in society, which would limit the power of big business, 
and remove the need for a powerful labour movement. 16  New Left historians refined this 
argument, to incorporate big business as part of a defensive alliance with Progressive politicians, 
which aimed to render a labour movement unnecessary, and recognized that while controls on 
big business were unavoidable, they did not necessarily involve disadvantaging big business 
against their smaller competitors.  Wiebe further widened this defensive alliance to include the 
family and professions.17 
     Therefore, Hofstadter’s views have significantly shaped the thinking of historians of the 
Progressive and New Deal eras, either obviously, or in a more subtle manner, as with Kolko.  
Indeed, Hofstadter’s ‘discontinuity’ argument achieved such a dominant historiographical 
ascendancy from the 1960s onwards that many historians of the two reform periods have 
accepted its assumptions by default.  Whether writing about old Progressives or New Dealers, 
they use the intellectual framework of keeping the two periods separate, with dissimilar 
preoccupations, and do not explore commonalities, even where strikingly apparent.  Increasing 
specialization by academics encouraged this trend, assisted possibly by their reluctance to 
become entangled in thickets of controversy concerning whether the two eras are linked, when 
each can be regarded as satisfactorily self-sufficient.  In the 1970s the study of progressivism 
became conspicuously inward-looking.   Peter Filene’s article, ‘An Obituary for “The 
Progressive Movement”’, denied the reality of a Progressive ideology, obviating its applicability 
to other eras.18 As a result, researchers became less interested in the ideological aspects of 
progressivism, and more concerned about the varied experiences of different groups within the 
Progressive years defined by race, gender, and class.   In the next two decades biographers John 
Milton Cooper, Kendrick Clements, and Lewis Gould indicated the importance of ‘pragmatic’, 
as opposed to ‘moral’, behaviour among Progressive era presidential leaders.19   However, none 
of these historians has used his work to argue that, by demonstrating the Progressive era was 
                                                 
16 Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, 135-166. 
17 Robert Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967) 
18 Peter G. Filene, ‘An Obituary for “The Progressive Movement”,’ American Quarterly Vol. 22 No 1 (Spring 1970) 
19 John Milton Cooper, The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1983); Kendrick A Clements, The Presidency of Woodrow Wilson 
(Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1992); Lewis L. Gould, The Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt 
(Lawrence, Kansas : University of Kansas Press, 1991) 
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more pragmatic than Hofstadter alleged, the Progressive era deserves re-location closer to the 
‘pragmatic’ New Deal. 
     Nevertheless, at the outset, it is sensible to acknowledge the force of Hofstadter’s original 
argument.  The weight of historical opinion has accepted his opinion as the correct interpretation 
of the Progressive era and New Deal, even allowing for major qualifications.  Clearly, moral 
certainties, especially overtly Christian ones, were more pronounced in the Progressive era, in 
conformity with Hofstadter’s arguments.  FDR’s speeches, unlike Theodore Roosevelt’s in 1912, 
were not announced to the accompaniment of ‘Onward Christian Soldiers’.  Even so, there was a 
strong moral aspect to the New Deal.  It did not merely consist of objective experts, as 
Hofstadter suggested, running bureaucracies according to pragmatic principles.20  Indeed, the 
Progressive era, arguably, gave the New Deal a ‘value system’ that equated to an ideology.  In 
the New Deal, the need to protect American soil in conservation had a definite moral and 
ideological dimension, as did the rectitude of improving the lot of economically desperate small 
farmers and industrial workers in social justice reform.  Likewise, monopoly reformers in the 
New Deal still possessed more than the embers of moral fire that burned fiercely against 
exploitative big business during the Progressive era.  
     Conservation, monopoly reform, and social justice are the central issues which will be 
considered in this study, to illuminate understanding of continuity between the Progressive and 
New Deal eras.  The choice of these policy areas is not random, or tendentious, and the reason 
for their selection deserves some comment.  In the Progressive era there were many other reform 
areas which had great significance in changing America.  Progressive moves to increase 
democracy provide a good example.  The introduction of the initiative and power of recall at a 
state level were all attempts to make democracy more direct.  Similarly, direct election of US 
senators, and primaries, came about during the Progressive era.  The crowning achievement of 
this process of democratization was the winning of women’s suffrage towards the end of the 
Progressive age.  Yet the New Deal paid little attention to increasing political democracy in 
America, and, in the Supreme Court dispute (1937), and executive re-organization, critics of the 
New Deal argued FDR was seeking to stifle democracy.  In certain cases, the New Deal 
                                                 
20 Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, 320-322.  Hofstadter on page 322 contrasts ‘the pragmatic and opportunistic tone 
of the New Deal with the insistent moralism of the Progressives.’ 
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indisputably reversed Progressive reforms, as with Prohibition – implemented by Progressives in 
1919, repealed by New Dealers in 1933.  Therefore, the three issues being used to connect the 
Progressive era to the New Deal are justified as being fundamental tenets in the thinking of both 
eras.  Of course, the old Progressives and New Dealers introduced ‘era-specific’ reforms, but 
these are not my concern. 
     Misconceptions and confusions perpetrated by Hofstadter and his followers, about the 
Progressive and New Deal eras also demand adequate discussion; otherwise they seriously 
impede understanding of linkage between the 1910s and 1930s.  Misconceptions relate especially 
to Hofstadter’s ‘segregation’ of historical periods.  His fixation on the separateness of the two 
historical periods, such a prominent feature of The Age of Reform, is a flawed concept.  
Historical periods are surely not discrete entities, but should be regarded as a series of 
imbrications, where one era is partially overlapped by its predecessor, and, in turn, partially 
overlaps its successor.  Of course, each era has distinctive features, but these are a synthesis of 
old and new influences, rather than a free standing product of the era in question.  Consequently, 
the Progressive era may have been moralistic, but its defining characteristics, as with any age, 
were a complex mixture of the old and new.  Progressive behaviour exhibited palpable traces of 
19th century morality.  However, the Progressive era both accepted and rejected 19th century 
ideas.  One could argue that Progressives defiantly refused to acquiesce in the 19th century status 
quo, both the corruption of the Gilded Age, and, despite its moral certitude, the exaggerated 
individualism of older American society, which precluded government intervention.  While 
Progressives invoked the morality of the past, having broken free of traditional party political 
beliefs, they looked to the future with a more flexible mind.  In this way, Progressive reforms 
were as much focused on future possibilities as past certainties.  From this state of affairs, we 
might expect old Progressive morality to have lived on into the New Deal, and it should hardly 
surprise us if New Deal pragmatism originated in the Progressive era. 
     A confusing aspect of Hofstadter’s work relates to periodization, because he actually expands 
and contracts the boundaries of the Progressive era to suit the discontinuity argument.  At one 
stage, Hofstadter argues that Wilson’s internationalism, especially his desire for America to 
participate in the League of Nations (1919-20), brought to a close the Progressive era.  Wilson’s 
moral crusade for Americans to abandon their narrow self-interest, in favour of internationalism, 
14 
 
stretched the progressive impulse to breaking-point.21  Hofstadter’s judgement, that the 
Progressive era finished in 1920 seems eminently reasonable, as it coincides with the end of 
progressive presidential rule, and Wilson’s defeat over a recognizably progressive foreign policy 
issue, albeit one that bitterly divided Progressives themselves.  
     However, at another stage, in The Age of Reform, Hofstadter decides to back-date the end of 
the Progressive era to before America entered World War I, April 1917.  He presents an 
argument that the ‘business self-government’ of the National Recovery Administration (NRA) in 
the First New Deal, where big business attained considerable autonomy, was not inspired by 
Theodore Roosevelt’s New Nationalism campaign. Previous writers argued that the New 
Nationalism policy of 1912 had been the inspiration behind the NRA, because it tolerated 
regulated monopoly capitalism.  Instead, Hofstadter contends that the NRA stemmed from 
Wilson’s World War I organization of big business (1917-18).22  As he now judges that 
America’s participation in World War I fell outside the Progressive era, Hofstadter has 
apparently disproved continuity between the Progressive era and the New Deal.23 In fact, he has 
arrived at this outcome merely by changing the end date of the Progressive era from 1920 to 
before April, 1917.  To question further Hofstadter’s argument, many historians argue that 
Wilson’s World War I organization of the economy was itself derived from New Nationalism.24  
In these circumstances, it makes most sense to use the years 1900-1920 for the Progressive era, 
thereby avoiding Hofstadter’s premature termination of the period, which was imposed, in part, 
perhaps to serve his discontinuity argument.  By making this logical extension of the Progressive 
era, a number of continuities between the 1910s and 1930s become readily apparent. 
     Although misconceptions and confusions are clearly discernible in The Age of Reform, they 
have not decisively affected the standing of the book.  Hofstadter’s desire to emphasize the 
uniqueness of the New Deal, and his success in pointing it firmly to the future, still resonate 
strongly with current writers concerned with the 1930s.  To many liberal historians and political 
scientists, FDR is, very often, at the very pinnacle in a pantheon of political heroes.  When an 
historian as respected as Arthur Schlesinger Jr., designates Roosevelt ‘one of the immortals’ of 
                                                 
21Ibid., 277-279. 
22Ibid., fn, 304. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Cooper, The Warrior and The Priest, 212. 
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US presidential history, we have a right to feel uneasy at this reverential judgement.25  Like 
Hofstadter, Schlesinger’s formative years spanned the New Deal, and, understandably, FDR’s 
remarkable project became integral to Schlesinger’s identity and very being.  However, 
academics who are products of more recent decades should be receptive to hypotheses that might 
challenge the uniqueness, and superiority of Roosevelt’s New Deal.  There may be a case for 
saying that much of the New Deal derived from the Progressive era, even if, at times, Roosevelt 
seemed to be straying from an ideology of consensus to one tending towards a polarization of 
American politics.  In the end, though, FDR does not require intellectual bodyguards.  The New 
Deal’s social justice or environmental reforms, its emergency unemployment measures, which 
helped restore belief in democracy, and Roosevelt’s wartime leadership, secure the importance of 
his presidency in American history.  The understandable desire to protect the political reputation 
of FDR and the New Deal by some liberal academics should not come at the expense of 
devaluing the Progressive era.     
     The recent trend by a cohort of academics to focus on the significance of the later New Deal 
to post World War II America – both politically and economically – while providing a fresh 
perspective, at the same time, conforms to Hofstadter’s paradigm of a forward-looking New Deal.   
As the later New Deal is the time period of my study, their work merits close scrutiny. Alan 
Brinkley has shown in a thought-provoking book, The End of Reform that the later New Deal 
began to re-orientate the relationship of interventionist government to big business.26   This 
process finally resulted, after World War II, in government and business recognizing the mutual 
advantages of a welfare state and deficit spending to create an affluent mass consumer society.27  
Hopes, dating from the Progressive era, of regulating, or re-shaping, the economy, Brinkley 
maintains, became obsolete in this new economic atmosphere.28  Interestingly, and indicating 
that Brinkley’s argument is not straightforwardly pro-discontinuity, he seems to imply that the 
New Deal’s gradual renunciation of the economically reformist progressive agenda was a long-
                                                 
25 Arthur Schlesinger Jr., ‘Rating the Presidents: Washington to Clinton’, Political Science Quarterly 112, 2 (1997): 
179-190. 
26 Alan Brinkley, The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1995) 
27Ibid., 268-269.   
28Ibid., 6-7. 
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term loss to American liberalism.29  Reviewers have criticized Brinkley for underestimating the 
lasting legacy of New Deal anti-trust powers, curtailing big business, which one reviewer 
described, in the context of the mid 1990s, as still ‘a potent gun behind the door’.30  In reference 
to the easing of regulation in the late 1990s and the financial disaster of 2008, these matters have 
a new and resounding relevance.  Nonetheless, as New Deal monopoly reform powers were 
influenced by Progressive era values, and Brinkley argues later New Dealers neglected them his 
work tends to strengthen the discontinuity argument. 
     In the same vein as Brinkley, and more recently published, The New Deal and the Triumph of 
Liberalism contains chapters that emphasize the New Deal’s future significance, to the detriment 
of the ‘regressive’ Progressives.31  Morton Keller writes: ‘The New Deal, and not Progressivism, 
came to be the true watershed dividing the American political and governmental past from the 
regime under which we live today’. 32  Keller cites the core New Deal voter constituency 
composed of ethnic groups and organized labour, developed after 1937, as being a crucial point 
of departure, carrying enormous import for post-war pluralist society.33  Crucially, he ignores 
Progressive era precedents, though, and while he might consider them unrepresentative, they 
should be taken into account. 
     In particular, Keller disregards the work of Michael Rogin, the political scientist, on Hiram 
Johnson’s election campaigns in California during the 1910s.  Analyzing voting patterns, Rogin 
discovered, at least in California, Johnson had created a voter coalition composed of non-WASP 
labour unionists.  Johnson achieved this voter coalition by introducing social justice reforms.  
Rogin’s finding challenges the discontinuity argument about the Progressive era and New Deal, 
and argues for continuity.  Tellingly, he suggests: ‘The incorporation of workers into a liberal, 
                                                 
29Ibid., 271. 
30 Thomas K. McCraw, Review of ‘The End of Reform,’ Journal of American History Vol. 82 No 3 (December 
1995) 
31 (Ed) Sidney M. Milkis and Jerome M. Miller, The New Deal and the Triumph of Liberalism (Amherst and Boston: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 2002) 
32 Ibid., chapter by Morton Keller, ‘The New Deal and Progressivism: A Fresh Look’, 315. 
33Ibid., 319-320. 
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middle class American politics, a major achievement of the New Deal, may have had its 
beginnings in the Progressive era.’34  
     Another chapter from The New Deal and the Triumph of Liberalism, by Sidney Milkis 
himself, supplies a sophisticated supplement to the discourse on Progressive-New Deal 
discontinuity.  Milkis, a political scientist, is by no means a partisan opponent of continuity.  
Indeed, he has written an article previously, with David Tichener, about the importance to the 
American future of Progressive era social justice ideas, during the 1912 election campaign.35  In 
The Triumph of Liberalism, Milkis explains how FDR was able to embed New Deal social 
reforms into American society during the later New Deal, and create conditions for further 
reform.36  He shows that FDR was responding primarily to a particular set of circumstances in 
the 1930s, and whatever the influence of the Progressive era in his thinking – which Milkis 
allows for – it was finally of peripheral importance in his decisions to transform presidential 
power and the Democratic voter base.  FDR sought to increase presidential power after bruising 
encounters with Congress and the courts, over First and then Second New Deal legislation, 1935-
37.  Although defeated in the first instance, a compromise version of Roosevelt’s highly 
controversial Executive Organization Bill was passed during 1939, enhancing presidential 
powers in elections.37  The Ramspeck Act (1940) helped preserve New Deal values in a more 
politicized civil service.38  Essentially, successful elections created a reform momentum, carried 
out without civil service opposition.  In agreement with Keller, Milkis shows Roosevelt 
cultivated a partisan labour union and non-WASP voter base, which gave reformist Democrats a 
permanent, and growing, constituency for their beliefs.  That constituency became the basis of 
the Democratic Party’s future after 1945. 
     Brinkley, Milkis, and Keller point the New Deal towards the future, not the past.  Most 
recently, Ira Katznelson has produced perhaps the apotheosis of Hofstadter’s forward-looking 
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New Deal.  He has re-envisioned the New Deal as effectively sustaining itself deep into the post 
war world, up to 1953.39  Arguably, Brinkley’s consumer-driven society, inspired by the New 
Deal, and Milkis’ self-perpetuating liberal state, forged by FDR, forced a liberal consensus on 
even right-wing Republicans after World War II.  Milkis and Brinkley also accentuate that 
hugely significant changes wrought during the later New Deal, and World War II, occurred 
almost entirely because of what happened in those years, in which the Progressive era was 
largely irrelevant.  Katznelson shows the New Deal bestriding Twentieth Century America.  In 
this way, these writers re-state, yet again, the discontinuity school of thought for a new 
generation of scholars and general readers. 
     In line with the discontinuity argument, it is necessary to concede that partisan behaviour on 
the part of FDR, partly prompted by an embittered opposition, ran counter to Progressive era 
values.  For instance, western Progressives favoured an evenly balanced voter base of rural and 
urban groups.  However, the Progressive era had ended in defeat, and progressives had been 
forced to stand by while many of their policies were reversed during the 1920s.  In this context, 
we can speculate that FDR, originally a Progressive era politician, had time to ponder for over a 
decade how far he would go to prevent another reformist era from finishing in disappointment.   
Moreover, although a similarly counter-factual point, Progressives in the 1910s might have 
resorted to FDR’s tactics, if confronted with the difficulties he faced.  Setting aside these 
conjectures, though, we can say with absolute confidence that progressivism was opposed to 
polarized politics.  At the heart of the new politics of progressivism was a desire to place public 
trust in ‘disinterested leadership’, ‘a neutral government’, within a ‘general framework of 
“classless politics”’, indeed, ‘a consensus... across competing political...movements’.40  
Progressivism believed in uniting, not dividing, Americans.  In this new environment, 
government should not pander to ‘special interests’ or one economic group or social class, but 
take action, maximizing benefits and prosperity for all the American people. 
                                                 
39 Ira Katznelson, Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time (New York: WW Norton, 2013), 4-5. 
40 Frederick Jackson Turner, The Frontier in American History (New York: Holt, 1920), chapter eleven, ‘The West 
and American Ideals;’ Rogin, ‘Progressivism and the California Electorate;’ Ibid; Marc Stears, Progressives, 
Pluralists and Problems of the State: Ideologies of Reform in the United States and Britain, 1900-1926 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), 50. 
19 
 
     Finally, FDR granted preferential treatment to certain groups, and enhanced his own power, 
so that he possibly threatened the balance of power in American governance.  However, FDR’s 
new progressive developments were taken out of political logic.  They insured the survival of 
New Deal advances, and created the conditions for further reform, even if these actions were 
anathema to certain progressive beliefs. Yet, these facts do not imply, because FDR, on 
occasions, ignored Progressive era beliefs, that he rejected all the lessons of old Progressivism, 
especially its core policy values.  
     Conservation, monopoly reform, and social justice are identified in this work as the core 
policies connecting the Progressive and New Deal eras.  Therefore, it is sensible at this juncture 
to ask whether others from the continuity school have focused on these issues.  Significantly, in 
the first major challenge to Hofstadter’s discontinuity hypothesis, Andrew Scott, as far back as 
1959, discussed these policies.  In an article that concentrated on the Progressive Party Platform 
of 1912, Scott argued that it laid the intellectual and policy foundations for the New Deal.41  He 
made two important points.  First, Scott implied that Hofstadter’s over-concentration on New 
Deal ‘pragmatism’ rested on a misconception.  Hofstadter observed that the New Deal produced 
a paucity of political thought compared with the Progressive era, because New Dealers were 
more interested in practical results than theorizing.42  However, Scott argues: ‘It was because the 
basic thinking had been already done (in the Progressive era) that the general approach to the 
(1930s) crisis, as distinct from particular programmes, could be agreed upon so quickly.’43  
     Second, Scott interprets the Progressive era as being forward-looking, not merely harking 
back to the past.  In his words: ‘The Progressive era...opened the door to the present; the 
Progressives blazed the trail, the New Dealers turned it into a thoroughfare.’  In fact, regarding 
the three core policies, Scott considers the 1912 Platform as radical as the New Deal, perhaps 
more so.  He writes, ‘(In) the section on “Social and Industrial Justice” which bristles with 
(social justice) demands for positive action, a variety of other demands can be seen: 
establishment of a federal commission to supervise ... (monopolistic) corporations engaging in 
interstate commerce...and (federal control of) conservation.’  In connection with the latter, he 
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quotes the 1912 Platform as saying: ‘Natural resources, whose conservation is necessary for the 
National welfare, should be owned or controlled by the Nation.’44 
     Scott’s article, vigorously attacking the discontinuity school, was largely dismissed by pro-
Hofstadter academics like Otis Graham.  He argued that the 1912 Platform was unrepresentative 
of Progressive era thinking, and therefore Scott’s work had been misplaced - a moot point. 45  
Perhaps as damaging to the article’s reputation, Scott ended it by discussing his ideas on 
progressivism in a very diffuse way.46  Had he written a more incisive conclusion, and followed 
up his article by a book on Progressive era continuity in the New Deal, fellow academics may 
have been won over by his otherwise persuasive ideas.          
     Hofstadter’s misconceptions and confusions, no less than the insistent emphasis of his 
followers on a unique, forward-looking New Deal, perhaps can best be counteracted by looking 
at the West Coast in the later New Deal.  Continuity academics, like Andrew Scott, would have 
done well to consider this geographical region to demonstrate the enduring relevance of the 
Progressive era to the New Deal.  The three tenets of progressivism, which arguably constitute 
its core policy values, were of crucial importance there, and this thesis will remedy a significant 
lacuna in the research, relating to ideology in the later New Deal on the West Coast.  
     Yet most previous historians have never considered the West Coast states as a region.  
Richard Lowitt, amongst others, created an historical ‘template’ for West Coast states by 
maintaining that California was fundamentally different from other western states, which 
immediately presents difficulties when grouping California, Oregon, and Washington State 
together. 47   However, in taking the West Coast states as a unit, valuable comparative work can 
be pursued for the core Progressive era policy areas, revealing commonalities.  In many respects, 
Lowitt’s analysis was valid, but has created artificial constraints for researchers. California was 
certainly distinct from other western areas because of its agricultural wealth, population density, 
and large-scale ‘factory farms’.  Nonetheless, in the policy areas being focused on during the 
later New Deal the three West Coast states showed marked similarities.  Consequently, a pre-
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condition for embarking on my research is an acceptance that California can be integrated into a 
Pacific Coast regional identity, something recent historiography is addressing.48 
     Following Hofstadter, the broad swathe of historians looking at the West Coast in the last 
years of the New Deal  have concentrated principally on the pragmatic organizational challenges 
faced by New Dealers, rather than ideology.  Regarding conservation policy, Progressive era 
values afford an invaluable perspective on events in West Coast states during the late 1930s.  
Three issues dominated conservation on the West Coast for Ickes’ Department of the Interior: 
water, forestry and national parks.  As in the Progressive era, federal government action became 
severely conflicted over conservation because the government’s ideological instincts were cross-
pressured by the pragmatic need to avoid alienating economic sectional interests.  Rich corporate 
farmers wanted to tap into life-giving water in the arid Far West from New Deal dam reservoirs, 
and irrigation was a central concern in all three West Coast states, even in water-rich Washington 
State east of the Cascades.  Yet, Progressive era-inspired New Dealers preferred to utilize water 
resources to help the wider community, specifically smaller farmers.  Forestry was partly under 
the jurisdiction of Ickes, or supervised by the Department of Agriculture, for example 
Washington State’s economically vital timber industry.  Big corporate lumber interests resisted 
federal government controls and wished to expand production commensurate with market 
demand.  Against them, Progressive era-influenced New Dealers supported ‘sustained yield’ 
production, to protect forest stocks.  Corporate interests pressed for national parks to allow 
mining, timber felling, and exploitation of electricity potential.  Progressive preservationists 
believed in barring American corporations altogether from national parks as places of recreation.  
These confrontations and the resulting accommodations arising out of Progressive era values 
provide the most illuminating way of understanding what happened in conservation on the West 
Coast in the later New Deal.   
     Conservation has been a big problem area for the discontinuity school.  Significantly, 
Hofstadter’s Age of Reform omits to discuss conservation for the Progressive and New Deal eras, 
perhaps a tacit admission that the discontinuity argument would not be best served by such a 
discussion.  Otis Graham, Hofstadter’s follower, sidestepped the problem, by saying that 
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‘conservation meant many things’, and therefore, presumably, its amorphous nature somehow 
presented an obstacle to useful analysis of continuity between the 1910s and the 1930s. 49   
Graham returned to conservation in his bibliographical essay, and appears fleetingly to support 
continuity in conservation, saying this view ‘seems relatively invulnerable’, but then proceeds to 
undermine it. 50   He quotes Samuel Hays, alleging that, unlike New Dealers, Progressives were 
more interested in efficient use of resources than defending the public against logging, mining, 
and grazing interests.51  Interestingly, this argument portrays Progressives as more pragmatic 
than New Dealers in conservation, and probably its deployment by Graham represents an 
inadvertent contradiction of Hofstadter’s overall theory.  Graham also references Donald Swain’s 
Federal Conservation Policy, 1921-33, to show that the size of the rudimentary progressive 
conservation bureaucracy that existed in the 1920s needed to be increased drastically, before 
ambitious New Deal plans for conservation could be attempted. 
     Despite the contradictions in the Hofstadter school of thought about conservation, its stance 
can be summarized as sceptical about continuity between the old Progressives and New Dealers, 
because the former were more conservative reformers.  In the end, the rich often benefited from 
the reforms, and old Progressives failed to create an adequate bureaucracy for implementing far-
reaching conservation policies.  However, it is legitimate to suggest that the ability of the rich to 
benefit from conservation reforms applies also to the New Deal, and, as in the Progressive era, 
was complicated by economic sectionalism - in fact more so, because of Great Depression 
economic realities.   
     Since the 1950s and 1960s, as in other areas, historians writing about conservation have taken 
forward the research.  Perhaps the most radical re-interpretation of western history in the 1930s 
is associated with ‘new western’ historians.  Donald Worster’s Rivers of Empire, published in the 
1980s, was the ground-breaking work which launched this movement, and it remains highly 
controversial history.  His work ‘foregrounds’ water - the overriding concern in West Coast 
conservation, and the vital pre-requisite for this region’s rapid development during and after 
World War II.  In an audacious argument, Worster holds that the New Deal’s Bureau of 
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Reclamation, part of Ickes’ Department of the Interior, sought ‘environmental domination’ of 
West Coast water supplies.52  In a possibly prescient forecast, Worster believes the resultant 
water depletion will finally bring about environmental catastrophe on the West Coast.  However, 
for all its originality, Worster’s ‘hydraulic society’ theory can be categorized as a variation of 
Hofstadter’s ideas.  Yet again, a bold new interpretation, when scrutinized, operates within 
Hofstadter’s intellectual framework. 
     Worster views the Bureau of Reclamation and corporate farmers as being intent on ‘empire 
building’, deploying the resource of water to establish economic power.  Accordingly, the 
Bureau of Reclamation acquired an organizational identity in which ‘it wanted first to survive, 
and then to augment its power’.53  Its irrigation schemes were admittedly inspired by ‘the spirit 
of the old Progressive reclamation movement’ and, indeed, the blueprint for the vast Central 
Valley Project went back to 1919, the end of the Progressive age.54  However, while the 
Progressive era might have supplied moral and conceptual impetus, it was Ickes’ Bureau of 
Reclamation which realized these water projects through practical solutions and pragmatic 
responses.  In the end, and agreeing with Hofstadter, Worster regards New Deal decisions as 
overwhelmingly pragmatic.       
     My thesis seeks to show that an ideological analysis of conservation discloses strong 
continuities in reclamation, forestry, and national park policies.  For example, regarding national 
parks, recent research by Robert Righter needs to be assimilated.55  The Progressive era 
environmentalist, John Muir, who wielded much influence with policy makers, is often portrayed 
as a typically idealistic preservationist.  However, Righter shows Muir made politically astute 
compromises – proposing limited tourism in the Yosemite National Park – to convey the 
message that, despite his stand against the Hetch-Hetchy dam development, he recognized the 
need for economic benefits from national parks.  Accordingly, Righter strengthens the continuity 
argument, proposing that Progressive era preservationists, like modern environmentalists, 
appealed to wider interests as well as idealism.  In my work, New Deal preservationists are 
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shown making similar strategic compromises about establishing West Coast national parks.  
Over reclamation New Dealers are revealed, notwithstanding Worster, as staying true to a 
consistent Progressive era ideology.   
      From the mid 1930s, New Deal monopoly reform was increasingly preoccupied with large 
private utility companies.  They were regarded with the type of suspicion that railroads had 
provoked in the Progressive age.  When the New Deal was forced to abandon the NRA, and 
initiated its Second New Deal anti-trust phase, private utilities became a prime target for New 
Dealers.  On the West Coast during the late 1930s, the place of private utilities became 
particularly prominent because a series of New Deal dams was nearing completion.  These giant 
dam projects were transformative, revolutionizing energy supply in the West Coast states.  The 
Grand Coulee Dam complex in Washington State became the world’s largest man-made 
structure.56   Arizona’s Boulder Dam, generating electricity to California, was proclaimed ‘the 
greatest power project in the world’. 57  Several others, like the Bonneville Dam, in Oregon, 
added to the New Deal’s hydro-electric power (HEP) portfolio.  As they came on-stream for 
electricity supply, the New Deal was positioned to pursue an anti-monopoly policy over 
distribution rights.  As Harold Ickes, Secretary of the Interior, was in charge of dam construction, 
and the awarding of electricity contracts, he brought Progressive era zeal to his task.  
     Generally-speaking, historians have interested themselves only in the ‘organizational 
behaviour’ of the New Deal in the dam projects, rather than matters of Progressive ideology.  
Arthur Schlesinger Jr.’s The Age of Roosevelt: The Politics of Upheaval, for example, regarded 
dam construction, and electricity distribution in West Coast states, alongside the Tennessee 
Valley Authority in the South, as primarily about federal organization of administrative 
agencies.58  In both regions, he recognized the New Deal’s anti-private utility thrust had a 
Progressive era origin, but does not investigate the way that tradition shaped policy.  Richard 
Ficken’s chapter, in Politics in the Post-war American West, notes Progressive era influence on 
local appeals for lower electricity prices to help poor farmers near the Grand Coulee Dam, but 
ignores a Progressive era factor in the New Deal’s final decision on electricity supply from the 
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Washington dam.59  Instead he views the decision as pragmatic, whereby the New Deal averted 
the risk of inadequate demand for electricity from Grand Coulee by organizing power supplies to 
large urban centres.60   
     Missing in the historiography is a strongly emphasized ideological explanation which shows 
Progressive era influence on the beliefs and behaviour of New Deal protagonists in the main 
West Coast dams during the later New Deal.  Again the continuity argument is buttressed by 
looking at monopoly reform on the West Coast in the late 1930s.  Rather than agreeing with 
Brinkley that anti-monopoly policy was ‘inconclusive’ at this time, I will argue that the bitter 
battles fought between private utilities and public providers during the Progressive era and 
Hoover years came to a crescendo in the New Deal.61  Nowhere were those battles more intense 
than on the West Coast in the late 1930s, partly because of the earlier legacy of conflict, which 
was still ongoing, but also on account of the public power realities created by federal dam 
projects there.  Public power advocates – on a state, regional and national basis – ‘brought to the 
table’ hardened ideological beliefs at the end of the 1930s born of their earlier experiences, 
further complicated by the Republican presidential candidature of Wendell Willkie, a former 
private utility head.     
      In the social justice field, the late New Deal La Follette Civil Liberties Committee, for 
example, investigated the migrant farm labour problems of California.  Several issues relating to 
social justice came to a head in this enquiry (1939-40).  It was prompted by the plight of small 
farmers, who having fled the catastrophe of the Dustbowl became badly exploited farm labourers 
and food processing workers across the West Coast.  Although the majority of them migrated to 
California, sizable numbers settled in all three West Coast states.  This momentous crisis, even 
for Americans today, still emphatically defines the rural Great Depression, largely as a result of 
The Grapes of Wrath, John Steinbeck’s fictionalized account of their ordeal.  Historians have 
viewed the La Follette Committee on the West Coast as a failure.  According to Jerold 
Auerbach’s monograph on the La Follette Committee, the committee’s lack of success was 
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caused by organizational deficiencies. 62   Patrick Maney, La Follette’s biographer, followed 
Auerbach’s approach.63  Both argued that the committee had lost momentum mainly due to work 
fatigue and funding shortage.  In the 1990s, Kevin Starr judged La Follette’s Californian 
investigation a failure because it was reduced to ‘temporary irrelevance’ by the outbreak of war 
in Europe, which caused a re-organization of Roosevelt’s government away from domestic 
concerns to foreign policy. 64   Neither Auerbach, nor Starr, nor even Maney has looked at the 
Progressive era ideological thrust of the La Follette Committee on the West Coast, an especially 
surprising circumstance given that La Follette was the scion of a ‘founding father’ of 
progressivism, the redoubtable ‘Fighting Bob’ La Follette.   
     I will contend that pressures on the West Coast related to unionization, especially concerning 
the communist issue and the Progressive era farmer-labour alliance brought about an ideological 
re-appraisal of the La Follette Committee’s activities, but its new consensus approach was an 
authentic facet of progressive ideology.  New Deal unionization appears to mark a departure in 
progressive social justice policy, but, in reality, the affinities between the eras were pronounced.  
The La Follette Committee was a success in California, if viewed through an ideological prism.  
In fact, on account of the committee’s repositioning La Follette was able more effectively to 
expose the iniquities perpetrated by reactionary forces in California.         
     Having outlined the challenge of this thesis to the prevailing discontinuity school, that it seeks 
to consolidate certain continuity arguments, and dispense with Lowitt’s approach to West Coast 
states, how will I realize these aspirations?  Previous research provides helpful precedents 
regarding methodology.  Russel Nye’s book Midwestern Progressive Politics tackled a larger 
region than the West Coast, and, though tentative about Progressive-New Deal continuity, 
demonstrates the feasibility of such regional studies. 65  Paul Silver’s PhD ‘Wilsonians and the 
New Deal’, assessed Wilsonian Progressives, and supported the discontinuity school. 66  Silver’s 
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evaluation of six people is a manageable number for a doctorate, and although I have chosen 
nine individuals, they are spread across three policy areas.   
     Like Silver, I will look at individuals directly connected to the Progressive era, who were still 
politically active in the New Deal, for example, Franklin Roosevelt, and Harold Ickes.  At state 
level, the work will look at cross-era Senators Hiram Johnson and Homer Bone of California and 
Washington respectively, together with Oregon-born public power leader, JD Ross.  Likewise, 
Governor Culbert Olson of California will be assessed. Unlike Silver, I will be under no 
obligation to confine myself to old Progressives, because I am seeking Progressive era beliefs 
and behaviour in the later New Deal, not necessarily their presence among veterans of the 
Progressive era.  Accordingly, some old Progressives had renounced progressive ideology by 
then, while other individuals, not from that era had taken up the progressive cause.  La Follette Jr. 
of the New Deal Civil Liberties Committee was a politician imbued with Progressive era beliefs, 
but not significantly active in that era.  The 1930s communist Howard Costigan, nominally a 
Democrat in Washington State, will be discussed because notwithstanding his revolutionary 
Marxism up to 1940, he pursued progressive aims.  The radical preservationist campaigner, Bob 
Marshall is also considered as he drew inspiration from the Progressive era, and exerted political 
influence during the later New Deal. 
     In the Papers of these progressives I will explore the instances on the West Coast where they 
demonstrated Progressive era beliefs or behaviour in the core policies, and also situational 
similarities between the two eras, 1937-1942.  Often progressives were interested in more than 
one of the three policy areas, and their interaction across party and state lines is a feature of the 
work.  The politicians in the list were under electoral pressure in the 1938, 1940 or 1942 
elections.  The 1940 election is pivotal in the study, as it ensured the survival of the Roosevelt 
government, and prolonged the New Deal on the West Coast.  Leading up to the 1940 elections, 
crises arose in each of the policy areas which tested Progressive era-inspired reformers.  Those 
elections give a chronological focus to the work, and the doctorate’s concentration on a limited 
number of individuals, in three policies, constitutes a realistic prospectus. 
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The PhD is set out as follows: 
Chapter one: ‘The Progressive Era Background, 1900-1920, to the Later New Deal on the West 
Coast,’ considers ideological influence from two perspectives.  Firstly, the frontier thesis is 
shown as an intellectual treatise for both eras regarding conservation, monopoly reform, and 
social justice.  Secondly, when we look at these policy areas individually, influences from the 
Progressive era significantly shaped the West Coast New Deal.  
Chapter two: ‘The Republican Resurgence, 1920-1933,’ views ‘Hoover’s decade’ in these ways.  
One, Hoover, as a progressive provided a ‘bridge’ between the Progressive and New Deal eras.  
Two, his actions, or inaction, helped radicalize the New Deal.   
Chapter three: ‘Progressive era influence in the New Deal, 1933-c1937,’ ‘unpacks’ the concept 
of an ideological New Deal.  It challenges the historiography which portrays Franklin Roosevelt 
as a pragmatic politician to the exclusion of other attributes, and makes the case for an 
ideological Roosevelt.  The links between the eras are explained and key figures are introduced 
who will be looked at in subsequent chapters. 
Chapter four: ‘Conservation on the West Coast, 1937-1942,’ focuses on Progressive era policy 
influence during the later New Deal.  It shows the interaction of progressives at a federal and 
local level in the areas of forestry, national parks, and reclamation.  The way Progressive era 
preservationist thinking gained an ascendancy over forest wilderness and park policy is discussed.  
It also shows reclamation policy as more consistent with the Progressive era than current 
historiography concedes.  
Chapter five: ‘Monopoly Reform on the West Coast, 1937-1942,’ compares the monopoly 
reform issue of public power in the Progressive era with the years 1937-1942.  The main areas 
covered are: the inter-state, and federal-local, dimensions of West Coast public power; how the 
Progressive era hardened the ideological resolve of individuals associated with this movement in 
the New Deal; and its momentum into war.  
Chapter six: ‘Social Justice on the West Coast, 1937-1942,’ looks at how social justice beliefs 
among individuals and groups in the later New Deal conformed to a Progressive era ideology.  
The chapter revolves around unionization, and interrogates the resulting weaknesses in 
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progressive social justice policy relating to communism, the farmer-labor alliance, and the status 
of the small farmer.  
 
                                                  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _     
      ‘Progressive Era Influence on West Coast Political Reform, 1937-1942’ seeks a new 
understanding of developments that were seminal to West Coast states during the late New Deal.  
Regarding conservation, it gives attention to preservationist views, which were to have a lasting 
influence on the West Coast right up to the present day.  Over monopoly reform, it focuses on 
decisions about HEP dams that changed the standard of living forever in West Coast states.  
About social justice, it emphasizes the La Follette Committee investigation into Dustbowl farm 
labour, whose migration began the surge in the West Coast’s population.  I believe that looking 
at these events in the later New Deal through the lens of Progressive era behaviour and beliefs 
provides the most satisfactory way of comprehending them.  As such, this PhD will strengthen 
the continuity argument between the Progressive and New Deal eras, encourage further study of 
the three West Coast states as a unit, and demonstrate the vital role of the core Progressive era 
policy areas for maintaining FDR in power at the end of the New Deal.   
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 Chapter One: The Progressive Era Background, 1900-1920, to the Later New Deal on the 
West Coast 
 
‘Panic in the New York Stock Exchange.’  ‘Panic…rocked the nation’s economy.’  ‘Scores of 
businesses and industries closed their doors.’  These descriptions do not refer to the financial 
crisis that began in September 2008, and resulted in the so-called ‘credit crunch’.  Neither do 
they allude to the notorious Wall Street Crash of October, 1929, which arguably led to the Great 
Depression of the 1930s.  Instead, they refer to an earlier economic catastrophe, the Panic of 
1893, when stock exchange prices plummeted, leading to a prolonged depression.67   
Unemployment after 1893 stayed at more than 10% for over a decade, and judged against the 
rest of US history the depression of the 1890s is considered ‘second only to the Great Depression 
of the 1930s in severity and duration.’68  As with 1929, and the still-unfolding crisis of 2008 
onwards, the seismic shock of 1893 resulted in serious questions being raised about capitalism, 
leading to popular revulsion against ‘business as usual’ in politics and finance.  The 
‘progressives’, who exerted influence in both the Republican and Democrat parties, emerged out 
of this questioning of the 1890s status quo.  Indeed, two leading historians of the Panic of 1893, 
and its aftermath, assert: ‘The Progressivism of the new century was rooted in the business crisis 
of the 1890s.’69  The subsequent ‘Progressive era’, 1900-1920, produced a profound and long-
term effect on American history and politics.  When economic disaster returned with a 
vengeance during the 1930s, progressivism’s relevance re-asserted itself anew. 
     Historians have recognized that the origins of progressivism were complex.  A single, or first, 
cause hardly suffices to explain the genesis of the movement, notwithstanding the significance of 
the Panic of 1893.  However, a case can be made that a number of factors came together in the 
1890s to generate progressivism.  More than that, it can be contended that each of those factors 
was expressive of a fundamental tenet of progressivism, which endured right through to the New 
Deal era, and perhaps beyond that later crisis.  Therefore, the Panic of 1893 helped instil in many 
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progressives a visceral dislike of irresponsible high finance and monopolistic business, with the 
potential to jeopardise America’s prosperity.  Even so, the 1890s represented more than just a 
business crisis, severe though it was. 
     Agriculture had been in depression for over twenty-five years before 1893.  This agricultural 
depression, as in the 1930s, pre-dated the business slump.  By the 1890s, it resulted eventually in 
the formation of a political movement among farmers- the Populist party (1892) - led by James B 
Weaver of Iowa, with a voter base in the agricultural West and South.  This early ‘third party’ 
experiment, as ephemeral as the later Progressive party, and inchoate in its policies, survived 
only until 1896.  In important respects, though, the Populist party was a precursor of 
progressivism.  While it manifested antipathy towards big business, especially over the 
exorbitant prices imposed by large railroad companies in rural areas, the Populists had a wider 
significance for the future of progressivism.  The Populists proposed to make common cause 
among poverty-stricken farmers, facing foreclosure, and exploited industrial workers, often 
struggling to survive in the teeming urban slums.  Although the Populists failed and faded into 
history, ‘social justice’, derived from many sources, aiding the urban and rural poor, became a 
key objective of progressivism.  In particular, the Populists’ aim of a farmer-labour alliance, 
developed into a strong feature of the progressive movement, notably in the West.70     
      A momentous event for the West, and America in general, occurred in 1890 and bequeathed 
another influence on progressivism.  The Director of the Census announced the frontier was 
closed.  Up to that date, Americans had the option of going west to occupy productive farmland.  
Afterwards, they knew that the best land had been settled, and, for the most part, only semi-arid 
and arid land remained.  The era of restless migration to new farming territory in the West was 
over.  The importance of the frontier assumed great significance when Frederick Jackson Turner, 
reacting to the findings of the 1890 census, contended in his ‘frontier thesis’ that the western 
movement of Americans had been the decisive formative experience in American democracy and 
identity.71  Academic opinion has subsequently judged that he exaggerated the importance of that 
western movement of population, and its supposed abrupt ending, which arrived with the ‘closed 
frontier’.  However, his frontier thesis still maintains its impact when applied to the sobering 
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effects of the closed frontier on the American imagination, and the narrowing of prospects for 
indigent farmers, no longer able to find with ease new land in the West.72   From then on, 
Americans needed to learn to exploit, and perhaps more significantly conserve, existing fertile 
land more efficiently.  Infertile land, which could be made productive, had perforce to be 
improved, while some land of unusual merit could be preserved in its natural state. The urge 
towards conservation was intrinsic to progressive thinking, and had particular practical 
application in the water-hungry Far West.  In the Progressive era, and during the 1930s New 
Deal, Turner’s insights legitimized government intervention to improve or protect the finite 
resources of American land.73  
     Therefore, the decade of the 1890s had shaped progressive thinking decisively.  Progressives 
believed there was a need for government action aimed at: curbing monopolistic business, 
furnishing social justice to a farmer-labour alliance, and intervening to make land productive or 
for its protection.  These aspirations would be converted to concrete legislation and projects 
during the Progressive era- the period of moderate reform in American history 1900 to c.1920.  
The progressive reforms formed the basis of future attempts by government - especially in the 
New Deal - to create a more equitable society. 
     The purpose of the present chapter is to point out continuities between the Progressive era and 
New Deal.  Hofstadter used the designation ‘Populist-Progressive age’ to indicate that the 
Progressive era should be regarded as arising from the Populist age.  This work agrees with that 
conclusion.  However, historians have been far more cautious about attributing the New Deal to 
the Progressive era, after Hofstadter largely rejected that premise.74  It will be shown here that 
the two eras were closely connected.  Firstly, they derived from the same intellectual source.  
Secondly, there was strong linkage between these reforming eras over the three central tenets of 
conservation, monopoly reform, and social justice.  Beliefs, behaviour, and situations, especially 
concerning the West Coast, 1900-1920, were mirrored in the later New Deal.  Therefore, 
ideological continuities were marked.  Equally, Progressive era presidents, and other participants 
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in reform, often demonstrated pragmatism when pursuing ideological objectives.  Accordingly, 
Hofstadter’s contention that the Progressive era lacked pragmatism seems as open to dispute as 
his arguments that Progressive era ideology did not extend into the New Deal. 
The Frontier Thesis 
Frederick Jackson Turner’s frontier thesis was a major intellectual influence on the Progressive 
era.75  His relevance, though, to the New Deal is far more problematic.  Perhaps a first step, in re-
connecting the two eras, should be to demonstrate the importance of the frontier thesis, a 
quintessentially Progressive era tract, to the New Deal.  For progressives, Turner’s work raised a 
number of fears, but, at the same time, was a call to action.  His closed frontier concept 
communicated a fear of regression.  Without the stimulus of an ever-changing frontier, 
Americans would lose their enterprising character, responsible for building a civilization in the 
West from a wilderness, and see their economy go into decline.  However, if new frontiers could 
be created, for example, by government improving the country internally, or expanding 
externally, America would continue to progress by means of individualism.  The government 
could help sustain ‘rugged individualism’s’ buoyant optimism and soaring self-belief for the 
demands of the new century.  Of course, in important respects, government interventionism and 
individualism were opposed philosophically, so Turner’s progressive aim to make them work 
together always represented a formidable task.  Nonetheless, at a practical level, the frontier 
thesis was a catalyst in domestic policy, because it gave impetus to the general progressive urge 
for improving society – socially, economically, and environmentally. 
     Later, in the New Deal, the closed frontier concept appeared to have a renewed application.  
New Dealers used it to legitimize their bold interventionist policies combating the Great 
Depression.  Gerald Nash, the leading Turnerian scholar of the present day, writes: ‘The 
perception that the closing of the frontier had transformed the US into a closed society with 
limited potentials for further growth appealed to New Dealers, because it rationalized their 
advocacy of government compensatory programmes, in the absence of the frontier.’76  Indeed, 
during the 1930s, one of the most prominent US economists, Alvin Hansen, advocated a 
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permanent regime of high government spending, to redress the pessimistic prospect of ‘secular 
stagnation’, which Turner’s closed frontier had implied. 
     Therefore, the Progressive and New Deal eras seemed strongly connected by virtue of 
Turner’s intellectual influence.  However, contradicting this evidence, new interpretations were 
finally super-imposed on Turner’s work, which effectively invalidated its relevance to the New 
Deal.  Around the time of Turner’s death in 1932, and increasingly so after it, his work was 
heavily criticized, querying its applicability to the New Deal, and denying the factual basis of the 
frontier thesis, and within it, the closed frontier.77  The geographer Isaiah Bowman demonstrated 
that frontier conditions had not ended in the 1890s, and still persisted into the 1930s.78  This 
finding undermined the intellectual integrity of the frontier thesis.  As damagingly, Turner’s 
lauding of rugged individualism was construed by informed opinion in the 1930s, as implicating 
him in the disaster of the Wall Street Crash (1929).  Ruthless individualism had created a selfish 
society of mal-distributed wealth where eventually in 1929 supply generated by wealthy 
businessmen and large farmers overwhelmed demand among poorer consumers.  Far from being 
the making of America, as Turner had contended, rugged individualism had been its undoing.  
The historian, Charles Beard bluntly stated: ‘The individualistic creed, (associated with Turner), 
‘of everybody for himself and the devil take the hindmost is principally responsible for the 
distress which Western civilization finds itself.’79  By the end of the 1930s, the connection 
between Turner and the New Deal had been significantly weakened.  The frontier thesis was 
indicted not simply as an obsolete, factually unsafe text, but - in championing unrestricted 
individualism - the antithesis of New Deal values, which had stressed rugged individualism’s 
dangers, and Americans’ interdependence.   
     Only in the last couple of decades, has the frontier thesis been shown to be more nuanced 
about rugged individualism than Turner’s detractors give him credit for.  Notably, John Mack 
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Faragher states: ‘In the essays he wrote during and after World War I, Turner began to argue that 
the new era called for a new spirit80...His original frontier essay...had celebrated the spirit of 
individualism...A quarter century later however he wrote... “The national problem is no longer 
how to cut and burn away...the forest; it is how to save and wisely use the remaining timber.”’81  
If Turner’s doubts about rugged individualism can be shown as more widely-based than Faragher 
suggests – in fact relevant to all three core policy areas that link the Progressive era and the New 
Deal – Turner deserves re-categorization as an intellectual linchpin between the two reformist 
eras. 
     The frontier thesis was enunciated originally in a lecture entitled The Significance of the 
Frontier in American History, delivered to the American Historical Association during 1893.  In 
1920 Turner published The Frontier in American History, his assembled ideas on the theory 
amassed between 1893 and 1920, with the 1893 work forming chapter one of the book.  Critics 
of Turner, and more neutral commentators on the frontier thesis, have not given adequate 
recognition to how his different versions of it provide a fully balanced account of Turner’s 
theory.  Indeed, they reveal an evolution of his views throughout the Populist-Progressive age.  
Turner, ‘always sensitive to contemporary events’, was skilled at evolving his thesis in the light 
of new trends, for a generational period exceeding twenty-five years.82  In a Darwinian manner, 
he adapted the frontier thesis, partly to ensure its survival, infusing it with the lessons of the 
Populists and Progressives.  
     Although the ending of the frontier was not as abrupt as Turner portrayed in 1893, even so by 
then new fertile land was in short supply.  Consequently, Turner’s closed frontier immediately 
recognized limitations on the exercise of rugged individualism.  Stemming from Turner’s closed 
frontier was a doubt that large-scale internal migration, stimulated by economic problems, and 
imbued with individualism, could discover new productive farmlands, as in the past.  During the 
Progressive era, Turner’s ideas inspired government to provide social justice measures to small 
farmers, constricted by poverty and the closed frontier.  The essential accuracy of the closed 
frontier was confirmed when large numbers of Mid West farmers fled the 1930s Dust Bowl and 
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failed to find new land in the Far West.  Appreciation of their plight, in the context of the closed 
frontier, informed New Deal policy responses. 
     Faragher, of course, points out Turner’s doubts about the unalloyed advantages of 
individualism concerning forest conservation.  However, more extensively and earlier than 
Faragher suggests, Turner in the frontier thesis envisaged a role for government intervention 
when the limits of individualism became apparent.  For example, in 1909, Turner praised Henry 
Clay for ‘breaking the Allegheny barrier by a national system of roads and canals.’83  During the 
1830s federal government undertook, or aided, large-scale civil engineering projects, cutting 
through mountain barriers, to facilitate the sale of the West’s farming surplus in the Eastern 
states.  Turner had understood that westerners had sought, and would seek, recourse to national 
government financial resources, which alone could overcome the harsh physical and climatic 
problems of the West.  
     In 1903, and doubtlessly influenced by the work of John Wesley Powell, Turner applied this 
same rationale to the Far West.84  He asseverated: ‘When the arid lands...of the Far West were 
reached, no conquest was possible by the old individual pioneer methods.  Here expensive 
irrigation works must be constructed, co-operative activity was demanded in utilization of the 
water supply, capital beyond the reach of the small farmer was required.  In a word, the 
physiographic province itself decreed that the destiny of this new frontier should be social rather 
than individual.’85  Applied to West Coast conservation policy specifically, Turner’s views were 
as much an agenda for future government interventionism – during the Progressive era, and, even 
more so, in the late 1930s – as a record or explanation of the past.  
     A work of Turner’s from 1910, which eventually he used in The Frontier in American History, 
articulated growing fears about the power of monopolistic capitalism – whose rugged 
individualism was a danger to democracy. Turner stated: ‘Is there… evolving such a 
concentration of economic and social power in the hands of a comparatively few men as may 
make political democracy an appearance rather than a reality?’86  In 1910-11 Turner entered into 
                                                 
83 Turner, The Frontier in American History, chap.  five, ‘The Ohio Valley in American History’, 172. 
84 John W. Powell, The Exploration of the Colorado and Its Canyons (New York: Dover Press, 1875)  
85 Turner, The Frontier in American History, chap.  nine, ‘Contributions of the West to American Democracy,’ 258. 
86 Ibid., 261. 
37 
 
the contemporary debate on monopoly reform about federal government regulating big business.  
He passed judgement on proposed progressive reforms, by saying that the supporters of ‘ex-
President (Theodore) Roosevelt’ demanded ‘increase of federal authority to curb the special 
interests, the powerful ... monopolies, for the sake of the conservation of our natural resources 
and the preservation of American democracy.’ 87 Significantly, Turner identified the voice of the 
‘insurgent west’ as being behind demands for government action against big business.  Like 
Progressives and New Dealers after them, he seems to have accepted that there was a case for 
federal government to re-order society.  In Turnerian terms, the rugged individualism of the 
majority could be threatened by the rugged individualism of the few.  It could not prosper if 
monopolistic big business stifled competition and shifted political /economic power irrevocably 
towards their special interests.        
     Turner’s emphasis, in The Frontier in American History on the limits of rugged individualism, 
was, perhaps, every bit as significant as his laudatory comments on the merits of this attitude of 
mind.  In his first lecture on the frontier thesis in 1893, he saw presciently that the closed frontier 
would curtail and place in jeopardy the rugged individualism of small farmers.  The position of 
impoverished Progressive era small farmers and the experience of New Deal Dustbowl farmers 
in West Coast states bore out his argument powerfully, whatever academic criticisms were 
directed at the closed frontier theory.  Turner expressed misgivings about the behaviour of 
monopolistic capitalism, with its ability to oppress and crush the rugged individualism of others, 
in the West and elsewhere.  Furthermore, he concluded that the harsh conditions of the Far West 
necessitated co-operative effort by groups, or action by federal government, so that individuals 
could benefit from an improved environment.  These issues - of help to small farmers, whose 
rugged individualism had been constricted by Nature or large operators, the politico-economic 
dangers of monopolistic capitalism, and the need to improve farming land and conserve forests, 
first assumed importance in the Progressive era.  On the West Coast in the 1930s, in harmony 
with Turner’s fully fledged frontier thesis, these social justice, monopoly reform, and 
conservation issues became leading political objectives for the New Deal.  
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     Consequently, in this revised reading of the frontier thesis, over a particular set of issues, 
Turner’s work can be seen as bestowing on the Progressive and New Deal eras a shared 
intellectual foundation.  The frontier thesis was not the outmoded shibboleth that academics and 
politicians needed to strike down or disregard in the New Deal.  Rather, Turner’s thesis, in 
important respects, firmly underpinned the Progressive and New Deal enterprises, and acted as a 
harbinger for FDR’s New Deal on the West Coast. 
                                                  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
     The Progressive era (1900-20), which helped qualify Turner’s views on individualism, was 
dominated by two politicians- the Republican, Theodore Roosevelt, and the Democrat, Woodrow 
Wilson.  Through government action, during this period, at a federal and state level, 
progressivism aspired to bring greater fairness, democracy, and prosperity to American society.  
An early history of the progressive movement considered William Jennings Bryan, in the 1890s, 
to have been a proto-progressive, because he had believed ‘government is to be used, not for the 
few, but for the many.’88  However, at the time, Bryan failed to achieve high office, whereas in 
the new century progressives attained the presidency, and implemented far-reaching reforms.  
Theodore Roosevelt was a man of charisma, impulsiveness, and, in his own words, ‘“strenuosity” 
on the subject of improving American society.’89  He occupied the White House between 1901 
and 1908.  Woodrow Wilson, ex-history professor and erstwhile President of Princeton 
University, combined scholarly ability, with a strong instinct for political survival, which, at 
times, perhaps called into question his high moral stance.  He was US president in the years 
1913-21.   
     Under these reformist presidents America faced severe social, environmental, and economic 
problems.  As late as 1919, non-unionized US Steel workers laboured an 84 hour, seven-day, 
week.90  In 1901, environmental damage had become so widespread that Roosevelt was 
prompted to devote one quarter of his first annual Congressional Address to this subject.91  The 
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push towards monopolies, meant over 4,200 US companies, in the seven years after 1897, were 
transformed into 257 corporations, considerably reducing competition.92   
     Progressive action was inevitably circumscribed by the presidents’ own beliefs about the 
limits of government in a capitalist society, as well as pressure from Congress, business, and 
states, opposed to federal interference.  Nonetheless, ‘reformers believed that a moderate amount 
of government intervention...would adjust the inequities of society, without disturbing the 
fundamental balance of a free economy.’93  However, during the Progressive age, what appeared 
moderate reform to one group of politicians seemed extreme to another.  Therefore, the period 
1900-20, initiated a debate about government intervention- especially regarding where, and how 
far, it was appropriate for federal government to reach- which has continued until the present day.  
That debate took on added significance during the New Deal, the next period of major reform in 
American history.  In both periods presidents needed to weigh ideological considerations 
carefully against pragmatic factors. 
Conservation 
In the Progressive age, Theodore Roosevelt vigorously championed government intervention 
over conservation.  He believed America confronted a critical situation where long-term 
economic security was being jeopardized.  For more than a century, in pursuit of quick profit, 
Americans had profligately despoiled the country of raw materials, timber, land, and water 
resources.  The individuals involved often paid little heed to the threat their actions posed to the 
future prosperity of America.  Roosevelt took the strategic decision to end the policy of 
indiscriminately selling, or giving away, government land.  The old policy had resulted in huge 
tracts of forest being felled and left as wasteland.  American water resources had largely passed 
into the hands of private monopolies which were able to charge the consumer inflated prices for 
water supplies and power.  Oil, and other mineral, extraction from former government land 
brought vast wealth to some individuals, but the general public received few direct benefits.  
Roosevelt decided that, in future, highly productive government land would only be leased to 
those who wanted to log, farm, extract minerals, or supply water and power.  Revenue from 
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leased public land the president intended to spend on the needs of the American people.  
Essentially, Roosevelt wanted to stop, wherever possible, damaging exploitation of land, 
recognizing it as a finite and valuable resource. 
     In the course of his presidency, Roosevelt adopted three approaches to conservation.  He 
intervened to reserve from irresponsible exploitation mainly forested public land, but then, 
pragmatically, often allowed it to be used in a regulated manner.94  Roosevelt withheld land for 
national parks, a non-‘utilitarian’ approach.  Americans would be able to enjoy, not exploit, this 
national resource.  Finally, in his reclamation schemes, a by-product of conservation policy, 
Roosevelt improved land for the use of westerners.  These decisions were characteristic of 
Roosevelt’s ‘stewardship’ theory of presidential rule, in which he intervened to further the best 
interests of American people, including land that Washington held in trust for them.95  Although 
the theory was most clearly enunciated in speeches during 1910, and covered several types of 
policy, it had been a leitmotif of Theodore Roosevelt throughout his presidential rule.96  The 
stewardship theory strongly influenced the ideological stance of his cousin Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
whose ambitious plans during the late 1930s on the West Coast, while partly exemplifying this 
approach to government rule, also strove to learn by its mistakes.  The example of forestry, 
demonstrates the political dangers inherent in Theodore Roosevelt’s conservation policy.  It is 
particularly apt because ‘FDR’, in the 1930s, would be inspired, like ‘TR’, by the arguments of 
forestry expert, Gifford Pinchot.    
     At the outset of the Progressive era – 1900 - four fifths of US standing timber was in private 
hands, and supplies were being rapidly depleted.97  Theodore Roosevelt maintained that only 
‘sustained yield production’ in forestry could preserve the forests as a viable industry, and for the 
recreation of future generations.  Although there were responsible operatives in the lumber 
industry, TR and the Chief Forester- Gifford Pinchot- felt justified in placing vast tracts of forest 
under federal government control, on behalf of the American people.  Accordingly, in his two 
presidential terms, Roosevelt withdrew almost 150 million acres of forest from further 
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unrestricted private use.  The forests were, almost without exception, in western states, and 
Roosevelt’s actions, although well-intentioned, produced an understandably fierce reaction from 
many westerners.98  These critics of Roosevelt marshalled their arguments partly within the 
framework of Turner’s frontier thesis.  They feared that a combination of the closed frontier, and 
federal government withdrawals of land, would halt economic growth in under-developed 
western states.  During Roosevelt’s administrations, this ‘economic sectionalism’ gathered 
strength among western politicians- in both political parties- despite politically pragmatic 
assurances from Pinchot that he was very prepared to be flexible about access to, and use of, 
government land.99 
     In 1907 relations between the president and some western politicians reached a crisis-point.  
Congress was poised to pass an appropriation act, which forbade presidential action to create 
new forest reserves, without Congressional consent.  Audaciously, before Congress had time to 
enact the legislation, Roosevelt, supported by Pinchot, rushed forward the creation of new forest 
reserves in six Pacific Northwest states, through an executive order.100  Although Roosevelt’s 
opponents had focused their anger, in this instance, on the setting up of forest reserves, a wider 
criticism was also directed at Roosevelt’s incursions into agricultural and mineral-rich lands.  
Over his two terms, Theodore Roosevelt withdrew, in all, 234 million acres of land for various 
purposes.101  Economic sectionalism involved many western politicians who considered 
themselves progressives.  The fact opposition was not confined to reactionary politicians proves 
that sectional, or state, progressive perspectives could frequently clash with Washington’s views 
on the reach of federal government, whether in the Progressive era or the New Deal. 
     On the West Coast during the New Deal, federal government needed to take economic 
sectionalism into account, and avoid provoking it, as Theodore Roosevelt had sometimes been 
guilty of. The New Deal administration had to be sensitive about local interests, when it pursued 
sustained yield production, and youth employment schemes in Washington State’s forests, 
bearing in mind the timber industry was crucial to the state’s economy.    
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     Sometimes, TR was able to carry through conservation policies in the West that seemed 
relatively non-controversial.  Reclamation projects, which formed part of his overall 
conservation agenda, were particularly popular in the Far West. They legitimized government 
intervention, because they brought tangible economic benefits, permitting the government to 
unite pragmatism with progressive ideology in the parched Far West.  By Theodore Roosevelt’s 
National Reclamation Act (1902), revenue from any future government land sales in the West 
would be channelled towards irrigation purposes.  Of great significance, access to water from 
these federal irrigation schemes would be confined to small farmers. As a direct result of the 
Reclamation Act, the Roosevelt Dam was built on the Salt River in Arizona.  It transformed a 
desert into one of the most fertile farming regions in the world, thereby giving a huge boost to 
the local economy.102   TR had even more ambitious plans for federal funding of a multi-state 
scheme on the Colorado River, to provide irrigation for states such as California, but Congress 
refused him funds because of the high costs involved.103  During the 1930s, the Colorado River 
scheme was realized, and other irrigation schemes, like California’s vast Central Valley Project, 
became crucial features of the New Deal.   
     Perhaps TR’s treatment of national parks- including the Yosemite National Park in 
California- raised the greatest potential for sectional controversy and opposition.  John 
Burroughs and John Muir had won Roosevelt over to withdrawing land permanently for 
recreational purposes.104  In this case, Progressivism was interested in providing Americans with 
prosperity of a spiritual, rather than material, kind. It was, in some ways, surprising that an 
unsentimental man of action, and keen hunter, like Theodore Roosevelt, believed people needed 
spiritual enrichment from being in the presence of nature.  However, a powerful motivational 
force in Roosevelt’s politics was directed towards developing the character of his fellow 
Americans, and character was developed by spiritual, as well as material, experience.105 
Subsequently, FDR strongly subscribed to TR’s overtly moralistic stance.  Although there was a 
constituency for such views in the West, associated with the ‘wilderness cult’, a more dominant 
western trait favoured practicalities.  Land should be used, not contemplated.  Accordingly, TR’s 
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attempts to wean westerners away from an exclusively material attitude to land soon ran into 
difficulties. 
     In 1907 San Francisco municipality planned to build a dam at Hetch-Hetchy in the Yosemite 
National Park. 106  After the devastating 1906 earthquake, the city required an additional source 
of water and power, in order to recover, and grow.  Initially, Roosevelt supported the plan.  He 
then turned it down, persuaded by the environmentalist argument of keeping national parks intact.  
Finally, Frank Lane, the Secretary of the Interior under President Wilson, gave government 
backing to Congressional legislation allowing the dam in 1913.  Wilson and Lane were 
convinced the economic interests of San Francisco, and political realities, should take precedence 
over any other considerations.  Ultimately, for these Progressive era policy makers, pragmatic 
concessions to sectional interests won out over rigid adherence to the national park ideal.   
     Moreover, as the environmental historian Roderick Frazier Nash showed, the Hetch-Hetchy 
controversy created a ‘schism in American conservationism.’107  ‘Wise users’, like Gifford 
Pinchot, a major influence across the two periods at a national level, and William Kent, a 
progressive Republican in California, stressed the need to satisfy the economic and social 
demands of the majority in San Francisco, North California’s major population centre.  
‘Preservationists’, including John Muir and Robert Underwood Johnson, argued that, barring 
exceptional circumstances, national park land should be protected from development ad 
infinitum.  They felt passionately that Americans had a moral duty to preserve the remaining 
endangered wilderness inviolate as a spiritual space, of the beautiful or sublime.  The defeat of 
the preservationists by the more utilitarian wise users over Hetch-Hetchy created two strands of 
progressivism in conservation policy which carried over into the 1930s. 
     Until the last few years, historians have regarded the battle over Hetch-Hetchy as a binary 
struggle consisting of wise users allied with economic sectionalism, opposed to preservationist 
idealism.108  A recent book by Robert Righter, though, has shown preservationists, like John 
Muir, broadened their appeal to the public and federal government.  He was prepared to make 
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pragmatic concessions – proposing development of tourist infra-structures, including roads, in 
the national park – to demonstrate national parks brought quantifiable economic benefits.109  
Muir’s pragmatic compromises were an attempt to influence policy-makers against the Hetch-
Hetchy dam development.  The Hetch-Hetchy controversy, therefore, indicates Progressive era 
preservationists were strongly committed to preserving national parks against economic activity 
and for the publics’ recreation, but recognized appeals to conservation alone would not suffice.  
Therefore, they presented a convincing economic counter-narrative against resource developers, 
although they lost the argument in this particular instance. Over the creation of two West Coast 
national parks in the late 1930s, the New Deal similarly followed a preservationist approach, 
tempered by economic compromises. 
     During the New Deal preservationists pursued ideological aims in forestry and national parks, 
but, to be successful, made pragmatic concessions.  Likewise, over reclamation policy they 
limited water access from government irrigation schemes to small farmers.  Therefore, New 
Dealers exercised a conservation policy based on Progressive era ideology, despite coming under 
severe pressure to emphasize short-term economic solutions.  Their achievement was in some 
ways more impressive, during the hard times of the Depression, than Progressive era reformers 
who were not under the same economic pressures, because the US economy grew almost 
continuously, 1900-1920. 
Monopoly Reform 
Monopoly reform followed a common ideological path during the Progressive era and the later 
New Deal on the West Coast.  Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and Franklin Roosevelt 
shared serious misgivings about the unbridled power of monopolies in American society.  In 
both the Progressive and New Deal periods, big business endangered US prosperity by absorbing 
smaller companies, to create a ‘sellers market’, where the monopoly could dictate prices, having 
eliminated potentially cheaper competitors.  One historian has noted- in connection with 
Wilson’s decision to endorse Congressional support for the building of a dam at Hetch Hetchy 
by the San Francisco municipal power company: ‘If the Pacific Power and Electric Company’ (a 
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private utility monopoly) ‘had been the initiating party responses would have been more 
hostile.’110  Aside from monopolistic practices in banking, primary industries, food processing 
and manufacturing, progressives were concerned about private utilities which controlled supplies 
of water, gas, and electricity, to the consumer.  Many of these ‘natural monopolies’ over-charged 
the public, in towns, and the countryside.  Regional monopolies, particularly railroads, also 
received considerable attention from progressives, because they often set exorbitant rates for 
passengers and freight.  On the West Coast, Governor Johnson of California stopped a further 
abuse – Southern Pacific Railroad corrupting his state’s political system.  Theodore Roosevelt 
made his name as a ‘trust buster’, by breaking up a large railway monopoly in the Pacific 
Northwest (1904) - Northern Securities Company- which the House of Morgan financial empire 
controlled.111   
     The trend towards monopoly during the Progressive era caused government to confront this 
growing problem.  Gabriel Kolko disputed this opinion in a boldly-written book that takes an 
altogether different perspective.112  He formulated the idea of ‘political capitalism’, amounting to 
a ‘conspiracy theory’ whereby monopolists in the Progressive era utilized national politics to 
attain their business goals.  In Kolko’s view, the House of Morgan, especially, is portrayed as the 
éminence grise of Progressive politics, desiring government regulation of business in order to 
achieve stability in the market, and the elimination of its competitors.  However, Kolko’s 
interpretation, in which TR colluded with the House of Morgan, is probably a misreading of the 
overall situation, although it identifies an important truth, that big business detected advantages 
in government regulatory devices.  A more plausible explanation for Roosevelt’s motives would 
concede that he was suspicious of ‘the huge swollen trusts,’ yet he also displayed pragmatism in 
his behaviour towards them.113  If possible, TR preferred to work with, rather than against, the 
largest monopolies, so long as they abided by the law, because of their sheer strength.  For 
example, the House of Morgan by 1912 controlled $22 billion of capital across the US economy, 
including banks, steel, electrical industries, merchant shipping, farm machinery, and insurance.  
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In fact, the House of Morgan was ‘the largest single factor in (the) American economy, not 
excepting the US government.’114  Roosevelt’s pragmatic approach that avoided dislocation of 
the US economy by merely placing Morgan’s company within the bounds of the law, as achieved 
in the Northern Securities Company case, accorded well with progressive ideology, which 
believed in consensus rather than confrontation in US society.  It is reasonable to assume, having 
‘crossed swords’ with TR over Northern Securities, somebody as shrewd as JP Morgan decided 
to co-operate with the US government, rather than allow any repetition of conflict, and, 
moreover, derive benefits from that co-operation. Significantly, co-ordinated financial 
intervention involving the House of Morgan alongside the US government averted an economic 
catastrophe during the Panic of 1907, often compared in gravity to the Panic of 1893.115   
Whether through Elihu Root, earlier in his presidency, or George Perkins, one-time Morgan 
partner and later Chairman of the Progressive Party National Executive Committee, TR kept a 
valuable line of communication with the House of Morgan.  A reciprocally beneficial working 
relationship between TR and Morgan did not imply that TR was subservient to the interests of 
the House of Morgan, or that he viewed their prodigious power with equanimity.       
     Significantly, the policy preferences of progressive presidents regarding monopoly reform 
were not consistent with their presidential practice.  The policy preferences of the two 
progressive leaders had been defined in the keenly-contested 1912 election, where they vied for 
control of America.   Roosevelt presented himself to voters as a proponent of negotiating with, 
and ‘regulating,’ monopolies, rather than destroying them.  Indeed, his New Nationalism (1912) 
was aimed at that objective, but New Nationalism remained an untried programme, because of 
Roosevelt’s election defeat in that year.116  Fundamentally, Roosevelt felt that large corporations 
had become a fait accompli of American business life.  However, earlier, during his presidency, 
the Northern Securities Company case was the most famous example of a monopoly being 
destroyed in the Progressive era.  In contrast, the victor in the 1912 election, Woodrow Wilson, 
was committed electorally to breaking up monopolies i.e.  ‘trust-busting.’  Undoubtedly, 
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Wilson’s New Freedom policy of 1912 did promote that aim.117  Wilson advised by Louis 
Brandeis, viewed monopolies, inaccurately perhaps, as inefficient.  Yet, eventually during his 
presidency Wilson allowed regulated monopolistic cartels to control US industry during World 
War I.  
     The self-evident sizable discrepancy, between the policy preferences of the Progressive 
leaders and their presidential practices, is puzzling, and merits an explanation.  To some extent, 
the discrepancy is explained by political realities.  For example, the 1912 election caused an 
exaggeration of policy differences between Roosevelt and Wilson over monopolies, as they 
sought to present voters with clear alternatives.  They ‘strained to accentuate their differences,’ 
to create ‘issue space’ or, in modern political parlance, ‘dividing lines’.118  Even so, in office, the 
two presidents discovered inevitably that Congress acted as a major constraint on presidential 
power.  Although TR developed his ideas on New Nationalism between 1910 and 1912, he 
maintained he was merely re-stating the policies he had expressed ‘again and again’ as 
president.119  Therefore, his stated preference for regulation, rather than destruction, of 
monopolies should be clearly discernible in his presidential years, 1901-1908.  However, trust 
busting was the most prominent feature of monopoly policy during his two terms in office.  In 
that time, apart from the Northern Securities Company case, TR’s government attempted similar 
actions, often using the anti-trust Sherman Act (1890), against forty-four corporations.120  
George Mowry has argued convincingly that Roosevelt used anti-trust measures in default of a 
recalcitrant Congress granting him the regulatory or supervisory powers over monopolies he 
wanted.  ‘There was something almost contrapuntal, in Roosevelt’s use of the Sherman Law and 
his demands for federal supervision.’121   
     Similarly, despite Wilson’s pronouncements on trust-busting during the 1912 election 
campaign, and, as president his prosecution of an anti-trust programme, he was not able to 
translate his electoral commitments into successful action in his presidency.122  Once more, 
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Congressional political realities, as with TR before him, prevented Wilson from following his 
chosen anti-monopoly path.123  In 1914 Congressional amendments to the Clayton anti-trust law 
greatly weakened the legislation.124  Therefore, President Wilson switched from backing this act 
to promoting government supervision of monopolies- by setting up the Fair Trade 
Commission.125  Later, this regulatory trend was accelerated during World War I, which caused 
federal government co-operation with regulated big business to deliver increased production 
during the national emergency.  
    It is accurate to say that whatever their policy preferences over monopoly reform, (as stated, 
re-stated, or perhaps over-stated, in the 1912 election), the Progressive presidents were prepared, 
admittedly under duress, to use the diametrically opposite policies of trust-busting and regulation 
of monopolies when in office.  During the New Deal, FDR, a Progressive era-inspired leader, 
followed a similar pattern, switching emphasis in monopoly reform, from regulation to trust-
busting between the First and Second New Deals, in the manner of his Republican and Democrat 
Progressive predecessors, as political pragmatism dictated.  Franklin D Roosevelt’s dramatic 
volte face, from co-operation to confrontation with quasi-monopolies can only be properly 
understood in the context of an ideological framework inherited from the Progressive era. 
     Therefore, TR, WW, and FDR showed wide policy fluctuations in monopoly reform- from 
collaboration with regulated monopolies to destruction of trusts.  In order to make sense of their 
behaviour, which allowed them to adapt so readily to political realities, it is important to 
emphasize the ideological flexibility of progressivism.  As progressivism was not confined 
within the constraints of traditional Democratic or Republican orthodoxies, it could exhibit 
greater innovation and opportunism.  As a consequence, many of its practitioners displayed a 
commensurate flexibility in policy.  Before reaching the White House, the progressive leaders 
had been prepared to change with the times.  In power, they continued to adapt to prevailing 
conditions, unlike traditional Republicans and Democrats, who progressives considered to be 
ossified in their views. Theodore Roosevelt, like Frederick Jackson Turner, was greatly 
influenced by Social Darwinism, and the need for adaption to changing conditions.  Woodrow 
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Wilson, often portrayed as a donnish professor, was, in truth, a shrewd politician with an ‘openly 
avowed regard for expediency.’126  In July, 1916, he uttered a maxim on political survival: ‘I am 
sorry for any President of the US who does not recognize every great movement in the Nation.  
The moment he stops recognizing it, he becomes a back number.’127  FDR showed a similar 
regard for adaptability and political survival.   
     There was a rising demand in American society, at the start of the 20th Century for checks to 
be placed on monopolies, which threatened economic and democratic freedoms.  TR and Wilson 
were prepared to respond to that demand, but were flexible on the means to achieve it.  That 
demand was renewed with the onset of the Great Depression.  TR was a man of action, favouring 
workable solutions, instead of formulaic responses to problems.  Wilson, from his university 
years, had been less interested in theory, than ideas which were rooted in reality and practical 
application.128  This progressive cast of mind applied equally to FDR, and partly explains his 
eclectic approach to monopoly reform, and much else in government.  Like his two predecessors, 
he was prepared to deploy several policies to deal with monopolies, some concurrently, 
emphasizing what was most politically practicable.  Research about progressivism has probably 
not placed sufficient stress on the policy flexibility of progressive presidents, across the 
Progressive and New Deals eras- notably in monopoly reform.  That policy flexibility indicates a 
progressive ideology interwoven with pragmatism.  As regulation of monopolies and trust-
busting both formed part of the ideological lexicon of progressivism, Progressive era politicians 
could flexibly respond in a pragmatic way to changing realities. 
    Notwithstanding Kendrick Clements attempts to minimize inconsistencies in Wilson’s 
position, several historians have noted the discrepancies between the policy preferences of 
progressive presidents in monopoly reform and their presidential practice.129   George Mowry 
focused on the discrepancy in relation to Theodore Roosevelt.130  Kenneth Davis and John 
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Milton Cooper made the same observation about Woodrow Wilson.131  They concentrated 
exclusively on political realities – Congressional opposition and World War I – to explain 
presidential policy fluctuations and inconsistencies.  However, progressivism’s ideological 
flexibility over monopoly reform provides an additional explanation.  It enabled these presidents 
to deploy radically different policies, with apparent ease, in response to political realities.  
Therefore, although cross-pressured by Congress or war-time conditions, progressive presidents 
were able to employ a pragmatic ideology in monopoly reform, which FDR re-produced on the 
West Coast in the later New Deal.    
     Like the Progressive presidents, FDR’s monopoly reform policy had been diverted by 
political realities – in FDR’s case, the action of the Supreme Court in striking down the 
monopoly-friendly National Recovery Administration.  In a Progressive era manner, he was able 
to change course, with apparent ease, towards an anti-trust approach.  As well as regulation, and 
‘trust-busting’ in his Second New Deal, he also used the ‘countervailing power’ method with 
conspicuous success in monopoly reform against private utilities.  For example, it was 
implemented in decisions over HEP distribution to West Coast states from the vast New Deal 
dams in the late 1930s.  The concept of countervailing powers is very much associated with the 
later New Deal, and has continued to be a popular option available to policy-makers after World 
War II.  However, its beginnings go back to the Progressive era, and it was a typical product of 
progressive thinking.  The term countervailing power was coined by the economist JK Galbraith 
in the 1950s, but this doctrine originated with Theodore Roosevelt, and Herbert Croly, his major 
intellectual collaborator.132  Countervailing powers were employed when federal government 
actively encouraged growth in other sectors of the economy, as a counter-weight to monopolistic 
corporations.  By attempting to equalize the influence, for instance, of corporations, labour 
unions, and public bodies, progressives were consciously following their ideological aim of 
creating a balanced society where no group would predominate. 
     Consequently, the Hetch-Hetchy controversy (1913) was not exclusively related to 
conservation, or the needs of San Francisco.  Certainly, it became a cause célèbre on account of 
                                                 
131Kenneth S  Davis, FDR: The Beckoning of Destiny, 1882-1928 (New York: Random House, 1979), 345-346; 
Cooper, The Warrior and the Priest, 211-212, and 261. 
132 John Kenneth Galbraith, American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1952)  
51 
 
its environmental impact on a National Park.  Looked at from the perspective of San Francisco, 
Hetch-Hetchy was always a water and hydro-electric power project.  From the viewpoint of 
Wilson’s government, though, there was an additional dimension to Hetch-Hetchy.  It 
represented an opportunity to encourage countervailing powers.  By supporting the San 
Francisco municipal power company, Wilson was helping to make the public body an economic 
force against over-mighty rivals, the private utility, Pacific Power. 
     Therefore, in monopoly reform, continuity between the Progressive era and the later New 
Deal on the West Coast is clearly apparent.  In the Progressive era governments followed a 
flexible ideology in monopoly reform, allowing a range of pragmatic policy responses to 
political realities.  That ideological flexibility was to continue in the New Deal, but it had the 
unwavering objective of reining in monopoly practice.  In this manner, regarding monopoly 
reform, pragmatism was written into Progressive ideology.  Indeed, between 1937 and 1942, on 
the West Coast, FDR may have completed a policy paradigm reminiscent of Progressive era 
president Wilson, in moving from trust-busting, through countervailing powers, conspicuously 
over public power, to full co-operation with regulated monopolies, producing abundantly for a 
war-time emergency.  The Progressive era’s use of public power as a countervailing ideological 
device began a process that was greatly expanded as a result of the New Deal’s ambitious West 
Coast dams, 1937-1942.   
Social Justice 
Strong parallels exist between the Progressive and New Deal eras in conservation, and monopoly 
reform, so what of social justice policy?  In this area, especially, a note of caution should be 
sounded, as comparative history, even for two closely-related eras in one country, can sometimes 
indulge in strained comparisons, to serve tendentious outcomes.  It is important, therefore, to 
acknowledge clear differences between 1900-1920 and the 1930s, where they are apparent.  Over 
social justice, with some notable exceptions, the aim of Progressive era presidents to provide 
Americans with social justice, in furtherance of a fairer society, remained largely an aspiration.  
Rather, it was Franklin Roosevelt’s Democrat government in the 1930s which gave substance to 
social justice aspirations, by passing federal laws and creating New Deal agencies to carry them 
out.  For example, the calamitous economic blizzard following 1929 forced politicians to come 
up with relief measures on a hitherto unimaginable scale to help the unemployed.  FDR’s 
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government also turned to social justice reform in the mid 1930s to effect a long-term re-
structuring of society and the economy.      
     The issue of unionization amply demonstrates the limitations of Progressive presidents.  
Faced with a business culture that believed unions would stifle capitalism’s rugged individualism, 
federal government found itself unable to bring into being labour unions, which could apply 
sustained pressure on employers to improve pay and conditions for poverty-stricken industrial 
workers.  In the Pennsylvania coal strike (1902), for instance, President Theodore Roosevelt had 
failed to persuade employers that trade unions should be recognized.  His dramatic intervention, 
an early illustration of Roosevelt’s ‘personalized presidency’– inviting the coal miners and 
management to Washington, as equal parties, for talks with him - did, though, help to win the 
coal miners concessions.133   Yet, it was only after Roosevelt’s Secretary of War, Elihu Root, met 
financial titan JP Morgan on his luxury yacht, The Corsair - a world away from the grime and 
conflict of the anthracite mines – that the financier prevailed upon the coal owners to agree on 
mediation.134   As a result, eventually, the coal miners secured short term gains – reduced hours 
and an increase in pay, but the greater prize of being able to join a union eluded them.135  
Similarly, Woodrow Wilson’s major gesture on unionization, in the anti-trust Clayton Act (1914), 
was equally ineffective.  By section 6, the act exempted unions from ‘restraint of trade’ 
provisions of the Sherman Act.136  However, in practice, the new legislation hardly altered the 
position of labour unions, which remained banned throughout much of US industry.137 
     In contrast, Roosevelt’s Second New Deal enacted the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 
of 1935, giving industrial workers the right to unionize, and empowering them to negotiate 
legally binding agreements, including on pay.  In the same manner, the Social Security Act 
(1935), the other major component of Roosevelt’s Second New Deal went well beyond the 
tentative steps of the Progressive era, towards realizing social justice goals.  It provided 
industrial workers with welfare payments when unemployed, and in old age.  Taken together, the 
NLRA and the Social Security Act represented significant progress towards social justice.  They 
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permitted many poorer groups to achieve a degree of financial security throughout their adult 
lives – in and out of a job, and when old.  It is clear these bold New Deal laws surpassed 
anything that Progressive era presidents had attempted, to assist, or empower, industrial workers.  
The differences are real between Progressive era personal intervention by TR, on behalf of coal 
miners, or Wilson’s ineffective pro-union legislation, and the New Deal’s far-reaching 
interventionist laws, under FDR, to help industrial workers.  Even so, there were strong 
similarities between the two periods over social justice, which, if investigated more deeply, 
reveal weaknesses in the practice of progressive ideology.  They relate to: communism, the 
farmer-labour alliance, and the status of the small farmer.   
     Both during the 1910s and 1930s, communism presented a major problem to administrations 
and those attached to them.  At a surface level, progressivism seemed to be an answer to 
communism, because of its commitment to social justice.  In Kolko’s interpretation, progressives 
brought about moderate reform to avert more radical reforms by socialists or communists.138  
Likewise, in the 1930s, the New Deal acted, to some extent, as a bastion of democracy.  The 
Great Depression demoralized American capitalism, and, in the resultant power vacuum, 
communism or fascism might have flourished, had it not been for FDR’s New Deal.  Electoral 
support for the far left was small in the two periods, but communism, and its nemesis, anti-
communism, nonetheless, posed a multitude of dangers to reformist progressive governments, 
1900-1940. 
     In the Progressive era, reformist governments took initiatives and passed reforms which 
perhaps lessened the need for more extreme political solutions.  For instance, Theodore 
Roosevelt declared that an important motive behind his reforms was to head off political 
extremism.139  Obversely, the actions of the progressive presidents whetted the appetite among 
many working class people, and their supporters, for further change in American society.  
Instead of calming society, through righting genuine grievances, progressives may have 
inadvertently stirred up feeling for more thoroughgoing change, and a re-structuring of America.  
While Republican and Democrat progressives in the 1900-1920 period and New Dealers in the 
1930s, often sought to stop injustices and heal class divisions in furtherance of ‘classless’ 
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progressive ideology, their actions might have achieved the opposite result.  In the Progressive 
era, presidential demonizing of monopolists, seizure of land by federal government on behalf of 
‘the people’, and government-sanctioned enquiries revealing dire living and working conditions 
among the exploited working class – all served to foment antagonism towards capitalists.  While 
radical working class responses were largely a result of the anti-union work-place environment 
during the Progressive era, they were also, almost certainly, stimulated by a political climate 
which raised expectations for sweeping change in American society.  In the same way, the New 
Deal tried to prevent political extremism, but, whether through federal action or government- 
sponsored enquiries, New Dealers often exacerbated class animosities. 
     In the Progressive era, it was no coincidence that radical working class organizations emerged.  
During 1905, partly as a result of the atmosphere engendered by the Progressive era, a ‘socialist’ 
union, the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), broke away from the American Federation of 
Labor, (AFL), rejecting its ‘conservative’ and free enterprise values.  During 1905 and 6 the 
IWW became associated with violent strikes, and after World War I, extreme IWW activity with 
communist objectives, on the West Coast, resulted in civil disorder.  Likewise, during the turmoil 
of New Deal reform, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, (CIO), representing unskilled 
workers, broke away from the craft-oriented AFL, and staged violent strikes. These culminated, 
prior to World War II, in civil strife on the West Coast, involving communist-led CIO unions.  
     Notwithstanding these facts, the leaders of the IWW and CIO held very different political 
convictions and aims.  ‘Big Bill’ Haywood of the IWW, who had begun work in a Utah silver 
mine at the age of seven, was a committed communist.  He later emigrated to the Soviet 
Union.140  Firebrand CIO leader, John L Lewis, of the coal miners, despite his willingness to use 
confrontational communist activists, believed strongly in free enterprise, and, indeed, for most of 
his working life was a Republican.  Undeniably, though, both union leaders heightened class 
tensions during their respective periods, which produced fraught situations on the West Coast.  
     In 1919, America experienced the largest number of strikes, before or since, in its history.141  
A combination of events caused this industrial unrest, including a spirit of change fostered by the 
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Progressive era, the ending of war-time restrictions, and the example of communist revolution in 
Russia at the end of 1917.   Appalling long-term working conditions also helped generate the 
strikes and violence.  E.g. In the Progressive era, approximately 20,000 American workers per 
year died because of accidents at work, in heavy industry and the transport system – a further 
half a million per annum were injured or maimed.142  During 1919, the biggest strike took place 
in the steel industry, centred on Pittsburgh (Pennsylvania).  Only a small proportion of the strikes 
of 1919-1920 involved the IWW.  Yet employers widely condemned all strikers as communists.  
Wilson’s government responded to the ‘Red Scare’ in a draconian way.  Attorney General 
Mitchell Palmer launched the Palmer Raids after a bomb, planted by a political extremist, had 
exploded in front of his home, (April, 1919).143   J Edgar Hoover, head of the newly-formed 
(Federal) Bureau of Investigation, in the Justice Department, used the General Intelligence 
Division to round up thousands of communists.  Often suspects were held without regard to their 
constitutional rights.   
     With conditions verging on mass hysteria, a succession of serious incidents occurred on the 
West Coast.  In February, 1919, a shipyard dispute in Seattle (Washington State) escalated into a 
general strike, led by the IWW-dominated Central Labor Council, which brought the city to a 
standstill.  The mayor of Seattle called it an attempt to ‘duplicate the anarchy of Russia’, and 
called in federal troops.144  Lumber owners in Washington State’s key timber industry lobbied 
the Wilson government to deport foreign-born IWW leaders – especially the so-called ‘Red 
Finns’ – under the terms of the Immigration Act (1917).145  The law had given the federal 
government authorization to deport any alien who advocated destruction of property or 
overthrow of the US government.  State authorities in Washington State and California closed 
down the offices of extreme left wing organizations, while vigilante violence against communists 
and socialists became widespread in the West during 1919.  In the most infamous incident at 
Centralia, (Washington State), four members of the American Legion, a right wing veterans’ 
organization, were shot dead trying to storm Centralia’s IWW headquarters.146  When Wesley 
Everest, one of the IWW ‘murderers,’ was put in Centralia’s jail, a vigilante mob arrived at night, 
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and cut the town’s electricity supply.  In the darkness, they seized Everest, drove out of town, 
and lynched him from a bridge over the Chehalis River.  They then riddled his body with 
gunfire.147 Two days afterwards, in Oakland, California, rioters, emboldened by events in 
Centralia, demolished several buildings owned by left wingers. 148   
     Commentators on the Red Scare have found Wilson’s behaviour an enigma.  He had a track 
record of moderation in labour matters.  Yet he allowed the extreme response of the Palmer 
Raids, and vigilantism.  Admittedly, Wilson was largely incapacitated because of a stroke by 
1919.  However, John Milton Cooper, an historian otherwise sympathetic to Wilson, found this 
explanation inadequate.  He writes: ‘Wilson’s failure to stop Palmer or rein him in is not fully 
explicable even by the severity of his illness or the distraction of other events.’149  Surely the 
explanation lies elsewhere?  Before the Palmer Raids, Theodore Roosevelt had praised vigilante 
actions against the IWW, and advocated a government campaign against Bolsheviks – in 
anticipation of the Palmer Raids.150  Perhaps both Wilson and Roosevelt felt communism, 
encouraged by the success of the Russian revolution, posed a threat to American values, and 
approved of vigilantism, in extremis, to defend them.  Turner had written supportively of 
‘frontier justice’, in defence of American values, as a manifestation of rugged individualism, 
when discussing earlier American history.151 
     Almost certainly, TR’s and WW’s anti-communist stance was partially linked to the 
upcoming US elections of 1920, in which both hoped to be presidential candidates.152  In the 
event, Roosevelt died before the election, and Wilson was too ill to consider a third term.153   
Between 1918 and 1920 a wave of anti-communist sentiment was gripping the American public, 
one of the first of many such examples in the 20th Century.  Therefore, TR’s forthright remarks 
(1918-1919) against communists, and Wilson’s studied non-involvement in the Red Scare (1919-
20), need to be seen against the backdrop of anti-communist feeling among the public, and the 
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forthcoming presidential election.  Roosevelt and Wilson could derive political advantage in the 
imminent election from their stances on the extreme left.  In that sense, both progressive leaders 
responded to the Red Scare pragmatically.  For example, Wilson’s politically expedient non-
involvement in the Red Scare neither jeopardized his liberal credentials, nor condemned the 
popular Palmer Raids – which he hoped would redound to his advantage in the 1920 election.  
Meanwhile, Roosevelt’s conspicuous nationalism over ‘un-American’ communists could be 
interpreted as pragmatic, and certainly went down well with the patriotic American public.   
     Of course, the two progressive presidents were also ideologically opposed to communism.  
Progressivism preached a classless democratic politics, communism accentuated class divisions.  
However, there were disquieting affinities between progressivism and communism. Both 
progressives and communists had contributed to class tensions (1900-1920).  Progressivism had 
attacked the abuses of capitalism, and raised expectations among the working class; while 
Marxists consciously inflamed class divisions.  Possibly Roosevelt and Wilson were content to 
keep a safe distance from communists, who, after all, espoused some of the views that earlier 
they had first helped popularize about the misdeeds of capitalism.  A final outrage, by anarcho-
communists, the tragic bombing of JP Morgan’s offices on Wall Street (1920), in which 43 
people died, neatly, but uncomfortably, united earlier Progressive censure of the House of 
Morgan, with this late murderous communist ‘direct action’ against it.154   
     Cooper has noted that the anti-communist environment of 1919 caused a change of behaviour 
by progressive leaders.  He observed that for Progressive era politicians the Red Scare made their 
indictments of capitalism, in the years before America’s entry into World War I, politically 
unfashionable.155  However, there is scope for further development of this point, in a Progressive 
era and New Deal context, which shows how anti-communism caused federal government and 
its representatives to modify their policies and behaviour.  In both eras, progressives needed to 
balance their ideological beliefs about helping the struggling working class – against political 
pragmatism and electoral survival.         
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     A subsequent chapter will explore how Progressive era-inspired politicians on the West Coast 
in 1939-40 reacted to a set of circumstances which strongly paralleled 1919-20.  They too faced 
foreign policy pressures involving Communist Russia, an imminent presidential election, and an 
anti-communist movement combating unionization.  Certainly, FDR’s New Dealers, in 
addressing these realities, were forced to modify their policies and behaviour, but we will 
discover in due course whether they also forswore their enlightened political positions, as 
happened with progressives during the Red Scare.  Undeniably, periodic bouts of anti-
communism among the American public seemed to cause great difficulties for progressive 
politicians in both periods, and threw them onto the defensive.  Progressives held a profound 
sympathy for impoverished working class people, and willingly addressed their grievances, so 
there was a danger the public would conflate them with other pro-worker groups, like socialists, 
or even communists.  That danger could be intensified through malicious anti-communism, 
which sought to bracket all reformist politics together.  Nevertheless, whatever their reservations, 
progressives believed in capitalism, while socialists were sceptical about it, and communists 
antagonistic.  
     In truth, progressivism was always at a disadvantage because it never created a permanent 
third party alternative, or seized enduring control of the Democratic or Republican Party.  
Progressivism remained an ideology in search of a party.  Therefore, its views could not be 
clearly delineated to the electorate over time, or intellectual tensions resolved among 
progressives themselves.  In the reductive language of American politics, where parties polarized 
before elections, progressivism was always in danger of being labelled extremist by reactionary 
forces.156   On the other hand, as Lipsett and Marks make clear, the creation of a third party 
might have been disastrous for progressive aims, by permanently splitting the reformist vote and 
preventing the election of liberal presidents.157  During 1939-1940 on the West Coast, New 
Dealers faced another wave of anti-communism, but they had the distinct advantage of being 
able to apply the lessons of the years 1919-1920, which enabled them to help FDR – a 
progressive president – survive the 1940 elections.   
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     The farmer-labour alliance, originally derived from the Populists, was a social justice belief 
strongly associated with progressivism.  During the Progressive era and New Deal, the farmer-
labour alliance also suffered from the absence of a party to embed this concept in the public’s 
political consciousness, and clarify its ideological complexities to progressives themselves.  
Perhaps over-optimistically progressives believed they could unite people from different classes, 
and groups within classes. 
     Progressive politicians (1900-20) had prided themselves on their classless politics.  In social 
justice reform, they contended it was perfectly possible to create a wide voting base, supporting a 
fairer society, composed of the middle and working class, farmers and industrial workers.  Hiram 
Johnson, a pivotal Republican progressive, was governor of California, 1911-1917, and 
California senator, 1917-45.  He personified these beliefs.  His political career spanned the 
Progressive and New Deal eras, and, arguably, shows that he adhered to the fundamentals of 
progressivism across the eras.  The historian George Mowry viewed the maintenance of 
Johnson’s complex farmer-labour voting coalition on the West Coast, in the Progressive era, as a 
fallacy.158  However, Michael Rogin, the political scientist, persuasively showed that Johnson 
was able to convert a largely rural Californian voting base in 1910, into a predominantly urban 
one in 1914, while by 1916 he created the farmer-labour voting alliance, which would have been 
his ultimate aim.159  He held together that alliance during the 1920s.  Like the Populists before 
him, with their core farming voter base, Johnson wanted to broaden his appeal to urban working 
class voters, partly, no doubt, because he believed they deserved social justice provision.  
Additionally, he understood that US society was moving inexorably towards urbanization.  In 
that context, Johnson recognized there was a mutuality of interest between farming and industrial 
groups, based upon their impoverished status.  As a consequence, in his first gubernatorial 
administration, 1910-14, Johnson passed a series of laws to benefit the urban working class, 
including workmen’s compensation legislation for work-place accidents, and a child labour 
statute.160   
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     A corresponding farmer-labour voter base was developed in other western states during the 
Progressive era.  For instance, ‘Fighting Bob’ La Follette Snr., another seminal progressive 
figure, established the same type of voting alliance in the Mid West state of Wisconsin, which 
his son, Senator Robert La Follette Jr., inherited (1925-47).  The La Follette political dynasty, 
once again, as with Johnson, straddled the Progressive and New Deal ages, providing continuity 
between the two eras.  However, regarding the farmer-labour concept, while small farmers and 
industrial labour could co-exist amicably, if they worked in discrete areas of the economy, e.g. 
Wisconsin steel workers and dairy farmers, there was always scope for conflict if their interests 
clashed.  During the Progressive age, the interface between farmers and industrial workers was 
already causing problems in the area of social justice.  Industrial workers were vital for 
processing and transporting food from farms.  Yet, if they improved their pay or conditions, 
through strike pressure or state legislation, farmers feared that farm incomes would suffer, as 
would the food supply to consumers.  This situation presented a conundrum to Progressive era 
politicians, namely how to satisfy the needs of the industrial worker and farmer, where their 
interests over-lapped. 
     An example from the Progressive era, involving Franklin Roosevelt, typifies the quandary 
that confronted politicians.  While Roosevelt was a New York state senator in1912, a bill was 
presented in the state legislature limiting to 54 hours a week the work of boys aged 16-21 in 
canning sheds, and regulating the work of children in food processing industries.  FDR was 
‘slow to support it’, because the bill had the potential to interfere with the processing of farm 
goods, which would harm economically weak small farmers.161  Ironically, he was prompted to 
back the legislation by Frances Perkins, who was then Executive Secretary of the Consumers’ 
League, and later, during his presidency, the US Secretary of Labor.162  However, the ambitious 
young State Senator Roosevelt relied heavily on upstate farmer votes.  Subsequently, secretary to 
the president, Louis Howe, re-wrote the history of this event, realizing it projected a less-than-
perfect image of Roosevelt.  He invented the story that the bill needed one more vote to pass, and 
FDR had filibustered heroically until the vote was found.  The reality showed a far more 
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intriguing state of affairs – the future president grappling with the difficult choice of assisting the 
social justice needs of small farmers, or those of badly exploited industrial workers, including 
children below age ten working ‘long hours at night.’163  As a representative Progressive era 
politician, FDR was torn between pragmatism and ideology. Support for the small farmers was 
the pragmatic choice to secure votes, but progressive ideology about the farmer-labour alliance, 
and his social conscience dictated he should aid the industrial workers.  It is unclear whether 
FDR, in the event, identified with the apprehensions of the small farmers, or if he sought to 
persuade them that there was an alternative perspective on their problem.  Certainly, the complex 
progressive argument - that creating harmonious working conditions for food processing workers 
would help guarantee farmers’ food supplies – was difficult to communicate.  
     Even during the Progressive era, California possessed the largest food processing industry in 
America.  In the 1910s, West Coast politicians faced a similar dilemma to FDR, on the East 
Coast, when the interests of farmers and food industry workers were in perceived opposition.  By 
the late 1930s, however, across the West - for example, in Mid West states like Wisconsin, 
conflict between farmers and industrial groups had multiplied several-fold due to changes in 
farming and the transformation of unionization.  As will be described later, Progressive era-
inspired politicians discovered that what had been embryonic problems, causing divergence 
between farmers and industrial workers in the Progressive age, had reached a critical juncture by 
the late New Deal, especially on the West Coast.  The stratagems and subterfuges that 
Progressive era-inspired politicians employed at that time in order to protect the farmer-labor 
alliance in the West, reveals how close to breaking-point this concept in progressive ideology 
had come. 
     The status of the small farmer was the third factor that caused progressivism difficulties.          
Small farmers were of immense importance to western progressivism, and their predicament 
deserves attention, when considering a region like the West Coast, in both eras under 
consideration.  The small farmer, since the founding of the American republic, was presented as 
the central figure in American democracy.  Certainly, in the Jeffersonian tradition, with its 
emphasis on ‘states’ rights’ and the agricultural sector, the small farmer had acquired a special 
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mystique, which endured into the 1930s.  At the birth of US democracy, Thomas Jefferson 
viewed the ‘industrious husbandmen’, who would open up the West, and bring prosperity to 
America, as the most valued sector of society.  Jefferson declared, in an exalted manner: ‘Those 
who labor in the earth are the chosen people of God.’  While progressives, of the 1910s and 
1930s, did not hold them in quite such high esteem, nonetheless, small farmers occupied a 
special place in western progressive ideology, as supposed paragons of Turner’s rugged 
individualism, and independent American democracy.  Their western values could be contrasted 
with the Hamiltonian tradition of powerful central government, and Eastern business capitalism. 
     The standing of the small farmer suffered as America changed from a rural to urban society.  
By 1900, if the South is excluded, the US was already a predominantly urban society.  From 
1920, for the first time, the majority of Americans lived in urban environments.  Politicians 
pragmatically sought votes from this numerically dominant group, which became economically 
more powerful e.g. through unionization.  The success of American agriculture in the 20th 
Century also told against small farmers.  As the problems of US farming were connected to over-
production, the small farmer with lower yields was viewed as an almost expendable element in 
the American economy.  In these circumstances, small farmers, 1900-1940, struggled to compete 
with the expanding production of large farmers, and they were increasingly displaced by them.  
After the Progressive and New Deal eras the prestige of the small farmer was further eroded by 
Hofstadter, who wrote in The Age of Reform a devastating critique of the small farmer in 
American culture and politics.164   By doing so, he demolished the ‘agrarian myth’, Jefferson’s 
vision of small farmers as self-sufficient, incorruptible, ideal citizens, who shaped US society.  
Hofstadter reveals commercial farming dominated US agriculture by the end of the Civil War, 
making the small farmer tantamount to a businessman.165   Late nineteenth century settlers in the 
West generally purchased land, rather than being granted it free in 160 acre lots, as stipulated 
under the Homestead Act.166   Land speculation, not raising crops or livestock, became their 
prevailing way of life.    Even when the small farmer approximated to Jefferson’s ideal, 
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Hofstadter unsparingly concludes: ‘The isolated farmstead ... encouraged that... suspicious and 
almost suicidal individualism for which the American farmer was long noted.’167   
     Hofstadter provides a refreshing corrective to over-sentimentalizing small farmers, and tears 
apart the factual foundation of the agrarian myth.  However, once Hofstadter’s argument is 
dissected, and his quondam Marxism, which preached hatred of the petit bourgeois, is discounted, 
a less unsympathetic interpretation of the small farmer can be constructed.  The fact that the 19th 
Century small farmer was forced to buy land rather than receive it free hardly tells against his 
reputation.  He may have indulged in land speculation himself, but the scope to do so greatly 
diminished after most fertile land had been occupied by the Progressive age.  Finally, the 
evidence indicates that in politics during the Populist-Progressive age and New Deal era the 
small farmer was prepared to temper his hard-working individualism with collective action – the 
farmer-labour alliance.  
     The small farmer’s worth is of great importance when considering the West in the 1900s or 
1930s.  For progressive politicians, though, in Mid West states like Wisconsin, or throughout 
areas of the West Coast, the small farmer was part of their everyday experience, not a mythic 
figure or an outmoded concept.  He was a significant presence in states like Oregon, Washington, 
and even parts of California, where small farmers struggled to make a living.  Moreover, in the 
1930s, the Turnerian nightmare of destitute farmers, unable to find land, had materialized on the 
West Coast, especially in California, where thousands of landless, dust-driven small farmers 
arrived from the southern Great Plains.  Their arrival created a socio/economic and humanitarian 
crisis.   
     Hofstadter’s attack on the agrarian myth effectively de-valued the worth of small farmers, as 
had socio-economic developments contemporary to these periods.  Moreover, according to 
Hofstadter, the small farmer interest – which exerted considerable pressure for reform in the 
Populist-Progressive age – was irredeemably reactionary, and therefore, by association, so was 
the Progressive era.  Hofstadter’s opinion of small farmers served his discontinuity argument.  
Although Hofstadter delivered some incisive truths about the small farmers’ proclivity towards 
reaction, he omitted to mention their involvement in progressive reform across the Progressive 
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and New Deal eras.  As will be explained in chapters four, five, and six, where comparisons are 
made between small farmers on the West Coast during the Progressive era and New Deal, their 
progressive capacities were very real.  They vigorously backed irrigation schemes which 
conserved or improved farming land, were often the drivers of public power policy in monopoly 
reform, and pushed for social justice provision.           
     In fact, presidents in both eras viewed them as fellow progressives.  TR framed his National 
Reclamation Act of 1902 in a blatantly ideological way so that water from federal irrigation 
schemes would only go to small farmers.  The radical social justice intent of this act has been 
largely overlooked regarding the West Coast, where land engrossing in California, for example, 
was more advanced than any American state.  Roosevelt’s irrigation law expressed undisguised 
support for small farmers by saying: ‘the aim (of this law) is to ... disintegrate the monopolistic 
holdings of land that prevail on the Pacific Coast.’168  On the other hand, Wilson could only take 
action to back small farmers when pragmatism allowed, challenging again Hofstadter’s notion of 
an un-pragmatic Progressive era.  Lack of capital was a root cause of the problems small farmers 
confronted in trying to compete with large operators.  Gould has observed that, as president, 
Wilson acted on his ideological beliefs about assisting small farmers, only when the need for 
western votes became imperative.169  For instance, in 1916, an election year, and the year before 
America’s entry into World War I, Wilson’s government provided help to small farmers by the 
Federal Farm Loan Act, and the Federal Warehouse Act.  These laws facilitated credits to 
farmers, for crops and farm improvements.170  In the New Deal, FDR continued to expand credit 
to small farmers.  For example, the Farm Security Administration 1937 onwards helped small 
farmers to avoid foreclosure, and tenants in buying their farms.   
     If small farmers are viewed as progressive, we can see how the fall of the Progressive Party 
(1912-1916) impacted negatively on them and progressivism generally.  Similarly, during the 
1910s, the rise of the large farmers’ organization – the Farm Bureau – adversely affected small 
farmer interests.  The importance of the Progressive Party should be considered first, before 
assessing its specific consequences for small farmers. 
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     Not long after Hofstadter established the paradigm of discontinuity between the Progressive 
era and the New Deal during the 1950s, Andrew Scott challenged his hypothesis.  He claimed 
that the Progressive Party’s Platform of 1912 anticipated the New Deal.171  Otis Graham Jr., a 
Hofstadter adherent, dismissed Scott’s criticism of the discontinuity school by saying the 
Progressive Party Platform in 1912 was unrepresentative of Progressive era beliefs.172  This 
judgement is a prime example of an ipse dixit argument.  The evidence is substantial for saying 
that the 1912 election platform and, naturally the Progressive Party, voiced Progressive era 
ideology.          
     After TR refused a third presidential term, the Republicans led by Taft ruled between 1908 
and 1912.  Taft was a more activist trust-buster than Roosevelt, but was accused of failing to 
maintain a progressive policy momentum.  Therefore, TR stood during 1912 as leader of the new 
‘Progressive Party’ – formed from dissident Republicans and Democrats – against Taft, and 
Wilson, the Democrat progressive.  Significantly, TR’s vice-presidential candidate was Hiram 
Johnson, the Californian governor, who brought together a farmer-labor alliance in California.  
The Progressive Party Platform cannot be viewed as the manifesto of a fringe party.  In the 
presidential election, Roosevelt actually won more votes than the Republicans, and only 
narrowly lost to Wilson. 
     The Progressive Party Platform was not an aberration in Progressive era thinking.  In fact, it 
constituted current, and future, plans for progressive presidents.  The Progressive Platform is 
often considered a blueprint for the progressive reforms of Wilson’s first term as president, 
1912-1916. 173  It also envisaged social security legislation that looked forward to the New 
Deal.174  In content and popular appeal the Progressive Party Platform was representative of 
Progressive era thinking.  Furthermore, as the Progressive Party was short-lived, 1912-1916, 
there is a temptation to judge its significance as transitory.  Ickes was on the National Executive 
of the Progressive Party in those years, and therefore had an ‘insiders’’ view of the party’s 
workings.  Even after Progressive Party members had suffered defeat in the 1912 elections, Ickes 
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conveys their great expectations: ‘Believing that they already constituted one of the two major 
political parties of the country, they were confident that in the elections of 1914 and 1916 the 
Republican party would be swept completely off the map, leaving ... the Democratic and 
Progressive parties to contest for ... national office.’175  
     In Ickes’ 1941 account of the Progressive Party’s collapse he still felt anger about what had 
happened, and believed the party’s demise was not inevitable.  Western progressives like Ickes 
never forgot this traumatic experience, and he was still re-living it at the end the New Deal.  In 
Ickes’ opinion, the Progressive Party disbanded in 1916 due to a series of blunders.  Firstly, after 
the 1912 election, Roosevelt repeated a pattern of behaviour when faced with a personal impasse.  
He impulsively sought solace in action, on this occasion an expedition to Brazil, which wrecked 
his health and the future prospects of his nascent party.176  Secondly, without their inspirational 
leader, the National Executive became largely an East Coast organization, disastrously failing to 
keep lines of communication flowing with the West.177  This development represented a serious 
setback for the small farmer interest.  TR was highly attuned to the West, having lived and 
worked there.  He had led the rebellion against the Republican party in thrall to Eastern business 
interests.  His cousin FDR was intellectually engaged with western social and environmental 
problems.  TR would probably have sustained the party’s western organization, and the interests 
of small farmers.  Thirdly, leading up to the 1916 election, Progressive Party members became 
internally divided, and were eventually re-incorporated into the other two parties.178 Had a series 
of errors not occurred, progressivism might have had its own enduring party, which might have 
given small farmers a higher priority in policies.  With its 1912 platform the Progressives had 
wide appeal, rather than as Graham contended expressing periphery views.  Franklin Roosevelt 
remained with Wilson’s progressive Democrats in 1912.  He learned by the new party’s collapse, 
and the Progressives’ failure to hold together their urban/rural and western/eastern components.     
     Without a national party to represent small farmers adequately, they were at the mercy of 
federal government’s shifting political priorities in the Progressive and New Deal eras.  The 
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Democratic and Republican parties, between 1900 and 1942, were complicated coalitions of 
voters and interests.  The Democratic party, for example, in the two eras, relied heavily on the 
support of southern states.  As a consequence, Wilson, a southerner, but also a Democrat non-
southerner like FDR, had to give prominence in policy to large-scale southern farmer interests.  
Both the Democrats and Republicans also recognized the economic power of western corporate 
farmers.  Expressing their views, the Farm Bureau was formed in the years 1911 to 1919.  This 
Progressive era organization exerted enormous political leverage during the New Deal, and 
demanded large farmers should be given the highest priority in agricultural policy.  Therefore, it 
is instructive to bear in mind the lack of an enduring Progressive Party in the 1910s and 1930s.  
Political realities often precluded small farmers being given a high priority in agricultural and 
social justice policy, and certainly they were not primus inter pares.  Overall, regarding   
problems about communism, the farmer-labour alliance, and the small farmer interest, a 
Progressive Party might have provided a surer defence against these ideological weaknesses.  
                                                  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
     More than the historiography shows, Turner’s frontier thesis established an intellectual 
foundation for the Progressive era and New Deal over the three tenets of progressivism.  
Regarding conservation, in practice, Progressive era presidents encouraged wise user sustained 
yield forestry production, but were generally sympathetic to preservationist thinking over 
national park policy.  However, preservationists, like Muir, were prepared to make pragmatic 
concessions when attempting to attain ideological goals over Hetch-Hetchy.  During the late 
New Deal, preservationists, concerned with the West Coast repeated this pattern of behaviour, as 
reclamation followed Progressive precedents.  In monopoly reform, during the Progressive era, 
regulation and trust-busting were not considered ideologically opposed, and the flexible ideology 
of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson was reproduced by FDR, along with 
countervailing powers.  In the later New Deal, the West Coast public power movement provided 
particularly strong cross-era ideological continuity.  Over the social justice policy of unionization, 
the Progressive era was less ambitious than the New Deal.  However, during the Progressive era 
governments contended with businessmen possessing overweening self-confidence at a time of 
economic prosperity.  The New Deal government helped impose unionization on capitalists still 
reeling from the effects of the Depression.  Nonetheless, progressives in both eras faced severe 
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problems stemming from communism, the farmer-labour alliance, and the status of the small 
farmer, which might have been alleviated had an enduring ‘Progressive Party’ existed.  The anti-
communist violence of 1919-1920 exemplified by the Centralia episode returned on the West 
Coast, 1939-1940, and tested whether New Dealers had learned from the mistakes of their 
ideological predecessors.   
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Chapter Two: The Republican Resurgence in the New Era, 1920-1933     
 
In 1920 progressivism, internationally and domestically, seemed a spent force.  Negative 
imagery abounded, about the unwise Carthaginian peace against Germany at Versailles, where 
the possibility of mutuality among nations had soon given way to narrow vested interest, and 
regarding the waning of idealism within America.  The English economist, John Maynard 
Keynes, from the progressive wing of British politics, remarked that after Versailles, ‘We are at 
the dead season of our fortunes’.179  In the US, Hiram Johnson, looking at the post-war situation 
from another perspective, stated: ‘the war has set back the (American) people for a generation.  
They have bowed to a hundred repress ... (ive) acts.’180  One outstanding individual appeared, 
though, to offer progressives a way out of this impasse, and even regeneration – Herbert Hoover. 
     Hoover represented, in many ways, the very best of the old and new in American life.  
Orphaned at a young age, he had become a world-renowned mining engineer, amassing a fortune 
in the process, by dint of individual talent and hard work.  During World War I, he showed 
another side of his personality – a capacity for public service and a strong conviction that co-
operation rather than selfish conflict was the answer to the problems of America and Europe.  At 
the start of the war he had headed the Commission for the Relief of Belgium, which saved 
German-occupied Belgium from starvation.  By the end of the war he was in charge of the 
American Relief Administration that similarly averted mass starvation - this time across the 
length and breadth of war-ravaged Europe.  In between these tasks, he performed impressively in 
America itself, organizing agricultural production and distribution as Wilson’s wartime Food 
Administrator.181  He played an active part at Versailles too, on the world stage, and because of 
his ‘magnanimity and disinterestedness’ Keynes considered him the sole participant who 
emerged from the conference with an enhanced reputation.182 
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     When the ‘Great Engineer’ returned to America in 1920 progressives looked upon him as the 
great hope for the future.  Progressive journals like The New Republic urged him to become a 
presidential candidate.  Intellectuals who had helped shape the Progressive era – Herbert Croly 
and Louis Brandeis – lent their support, while Ickes’ Chicago ally, the social worker Jane 
Addams championed Hoover, as did past and future progressive political luminaries – Franklin 
Lane, Wilson’s Secretary of the Interior, and FDR himself.183  Although Hoover alienated some 
progressives when he entered the race for the White House as a Republican, and soon dropped 
out of contention, the new Republican President Warren Harding in 1921, hardly a progressive, 
was keen to capitalize on Hoover’s popularity by offering him a cabinet position.  Hoover 
accepted the post of Commerce Secretary.  During the unrivalled prosperity of the New Era in 
the 1920s he not only made his department a signal success, both under Harding and Calvin 
Coolidge, but was so governmentally energetic that one observer called him ‘Under-Secretary of 
all other departments’184.  Furthermore, Hoover set out his own political creed in the book 
American Individualism, published during 1922.  It elaborated what one historian has called ‘co-
operative individualism’, or ‘independent progressivism’, and Schlesinger Jr. termed 
‘progressive individualism’.185  Essentially, Hoover believed that individualism should be 
tempered by social responsibility, and a commitment to the wider community.  Responding to 
Hoover’s book at the time, Frederick Jackson Turner enthusiastically endorsed it as ‘the platform 
on which all genuine Americans can stand, a noble statement of the fruits of our past and the 
promise of our future.’186  The seemingly unstoppable upward trajectory of Hoover’s career 
culminated in his gaining the ultimate US political prize, the presidency, 1929-33, after a 
victorious election campaign, which saw the New Era Republicans win a third successive 
presidential election. 
     Posterity records that soon afterwards, the Wall Street Crash and the onset of the Great 
Depression broke Hoover’s government, his political reputation, and perhaps even Hoover’s 
steely self-confidence.  It also presented FDR with a unique opportunity.  Later, in 1937 when a 
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firmly ensconced President Roosevelt began the late New Deal on the West Coast, Hoover 
pleaded pitifully in a letter to the wife of a celebrated 1920s author; ‘Please do not use me as a 
whipping boy for the “New Era.”187  I was neither the inventor nor the promoter nor supporter of 
the destructive currents of that period.  I was the “receiver” of it when it went into collapse’.  
Therefore, were Hoover’s words a futile attempt to extricate his tarnished reputation from the 
disasters of the Wall Street Crash and the Great Depression?  Or, alternatively, do they reveal a 
misunderstood man whose brand of progressivism was discredited by the capricious march of 
events, and the machinations of FDR, an adversary who possessed a superior political brain?  In 
answering those questions, this chapter will establish whether Hoover was a link between the 
Progressive era and the New Deal, or their antithesis.  
     In pursuit of that objective, the New Era years 1921 to 1933 will be surveyed in order to 
arrive at an understanding of what Joan Hoff Wilson has called the ‘Forgotten Progressive’.  
Hoover’s record over conservation, monopoly reform, and social justice is going to be assessed 
for whether a continuum in enlightened policy and ideology exists between the Progressive era 
and the so-called ‘Entr’acte’ of the 1920s.188  Perhaps Hoover was judged harshly by proponents 
of the New Deal, and he has a claim in the three policy areas to providing an ideological link, but, 
at times, Hoover adhered to ideas which the New Deal later rejected.  Therefore, Hoover’s place 
in the continuity argument will be discussed in two ways.  Firstly, Hoover represents a ‘bridge’ 
between the Progressive and New Deal eras, whereby he continued or developed Progressive era 
policies that found expression also in the New Deal.  Secondly, Hoover’s brand of progressivism 
sometimes proved inadequate, and helped radicalize progressive thinking in the New Deal, 
leading to a greater degree of federal government intervention. 
Conservation 
In 1912 Hoover, the businessman was a ‘Bull Mooser’ who had donated money to TR’s 
Progressive party electoral campaign.  That fact is a useful starting-point in any consideration of 
Hoover’s later political career during the 1920s.  In 1920 Hoover went so far as to announce his 
resolve to turn the Republican party into the kind of Progressive party Theodore Roosevelt had 
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once envisioned.189  As a consequence, over certain policy areas – notably conservation – 
continuity between TR and Hoover is clearly apparent, and virtually unmediated by other 
influences, although often Hoover had to wait until he assumed the presidency in 1929 before he 
could act effectively on his ideological beliefs.  Then, for example, in conservation, Hoover 
achieved considerable success.  The environmental historian, Donald Swain judged Hoover to 
have been ‘the first conservationist president since TR’.190  In relation to forestry, national parks 
and water reclamation projects in the West, Swain calls Hoover ‘a key conservation figure’.191 
     To a great extent, in conservation Hoover revived Roosevelt’s ‘stewardship’ concept of 
government.  During his presidency, national parks and monuments, for the physical and 
spiritual enjoyment of the American public, increased by three million acres, or 40%, including a 
new National Park in Death Valley, California.192  The new president appointed Horace Albright, 
a leading conservationist, as Commissioner of the National Park Service.  Hoover matched his 
ambitious expansionist progressive programme with a park service budget increase of 46% in the 
first three years of his administration, and numerous executive orders supporting national 
parks.193  At the same time, and reminiscent of TR, but on a much smaller scale, Hoover 
appropriated forest land for the national preserve.  Altogether, during Hoover’s presidency the 
national forests were expanded by over two and a quarter million acres.194 
     However, Hoover was more than an imitator of Theodore Roosevelt’s progressivism.  He 
showed, for much of his career, a formidable facility for seizing control of crises, and major 
problems, to solve them.  Whether in the role of the Great Engineer or the Great Humanitarian, 
or a mixture of the two, during and after World War I, and in the 1920s, he was able to bring 
divergent people together in the best Progressive era tradition, for the purpose of reaching 
common goals.  Some of his most successful work as a crisis manager occurred in conservation, 
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especially water projects in the West and elsewhere, where he followed in the footsteps of 
Theodore Roosevelt, but went further. 
     Hoover relied on the formula of trying ‘to awaken...the concerned parties to a common 
interest ... (and) suggesting a method for pursuing it – namely co-operation.’195  The Colorado 
River Compact of 1922 exemplified the efficacy of that approach, and is especially relevant to 
this study because of its impact on California in the 1930s.  The seven states of the Colorado 
River wanted to benefit fully from the water supply the river provided.  Yet, any attempt by one 
state to tap into the river’s water by dam construction was rendered null and void because of 
narrow self interested opposition from the others.  When Hoover was appointed by Harding 
chairman of the Colorado Commission, he showed an ability to take up innovative ideas that had 
previously been suggested, and the resolve to put them into practice.  He was able to achieve the 
Colorado River Compact, an interstate co-operative agreement between the states, with only 
Arizona refusing to sign it, and an equitable 50/50% division of water supply among the Upper 
Basin, and the Lower Basin states.  When he responded to the concerns of Hiram Johnson about 
specifications for the future Hoover Dam, construction on the dam began.196 
     It is worth remarking that over such water schemes, which were especially needed in the Far 
West, Hoover’s beliefs, and past and future progressive ideology entirely converged. In reference 
to the past, at the turn of the century Theodore Roosevelt, as mentioned previously, had sought, 
but was refused, funds from Congress to develop the Colorado for irrigation, and other, 
purposes.197  Hoover described his own Colorado River Compact as a perfect example of 
‘constructive conservation’.198  Like Turner, he recognized that capital projects for major dams 
were beyond the financial capabilities of individuals, and Hoover believed federal government 
expenditure was necessary for their completion, because even state funding would be inadequate.  
If Hoover accepted progressive government intervention for dams to irrigate the dry Far West, 
the harnessing of America’s rivers was also often directed towards flood prevention, and averting 
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the social distress flooding caused.  In that respect, these projects appealed to Hoover, the 
humanitarian.   
     The Mississippi flood of 1927 in America’s South gave an urgency to Hoover’s water course 
schemes.  It remains the most disastrous flood in American History.  Hoover was galvanized into 
activity to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe as chairman of the Special Mississippi Flood 
Committee.199  However, he saw beyond the immediate crisis, and used his position to exert 
leverage over a Republican Congress and presidency which had made low spending and small 
government in the 1920s their watchwords.  Hoover succeeded in converting them to an 
expensive long-term flood control programme for the Mississippi.  Significantly, he tried to press 
home his advantage in urging other long-range river projects – often on the West Coast – for the 
Columbia River Basin and California’s Central Valley.  His schemes ‘all fell victim to ... 
parsimonious, and parochial attitudes within the White House and Congress’.200 
     However, significantly, only after the Mississippi flood did Congress pass in 1928 the Swing-
Johnson law allowing the Hoover Dam.  The extent the project was initiated by Hiram Johnson, 
the California senator, is worth discussing.  The dam project originally arose from damaging 
floods in the Imperial Valley, 1905-1906, which resulted from dependence on a cross-border 
irrigation system with Mexico using Colorado River water.201  Throughout the 1920s, Senator 
Johnson and Congressman Phil Swing, the former chief counsel of the Imperial Valley Irrigation 
District, attempted to pass a law giving the Imperial Valley a safer source of water from the 
Colorado River.  In each of the four Congresses between 1922 and 1928 a Swing-Johnson bill 
was introduced.  Senator George Norris commented that Johnson ‘would rather pass the bill than 
anything else and would sacrifice anything for that end.’202  Hoover’s 1922 Colorado River 
Compact was vital for realizing the Swing-Johnson law, and construction on the Hoover Dam 
began during his presidency in 1930.  Even so, Johnson, a politician from the Progressive era, 
should be acknowledged as the most dogged proponent of this project completed in the late New 
Deal.  
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     If Hoover was forced to wait until he became president before launching such schemes, his 
Memoirs make it is clear they attracted his notice partly because of the engineering feats they 
encompassed – for example, the Central Valley Project (CVP).  After the death of his parents 
Hoover spent his childhood and teenage years in Oregon and California, where he was part of 
Stanford University’s first intake of students.203  He describes as a young man doing vacation 
work for the US Geological Survey, and how he had been intrigued at the prospect of a vast civil 
engineering scheme to solve the irrigation and flood problems of California’s Central Valley.204  
In the early 1920s plans were deferred ‘because Mr. Coolidge did not approve of the expenditure 
implied’.205  However, once in the executive office Hoover appointed Governor Young’s 
Commission, which recommended the work should be undertaken under joint federal, state and 
private agencies.206  So, the Central Valley Project (CVP) was forwarded during Hoover’s 
administration and, according to his version of events, the Columbia Basin scheme, based 
principally on a dam at Grand Coulee, would have been implemented had he been re-elected in 
1932.207   
     Therefore, Hoover’s conservation policy on national parks and forestry was derived directly 
from TR, while his flood and irrigation plans contain a greater element of his own progressive 
thinking.  All of them indicate a high level of continuity between the Progressive age and New 
Era.  Clearly, in the dam projects, Hoover’s progressive ideology and humanitarian morality, 
worked with, not against, his pragmatic organizational concerns as an engineer.  Hofstadter 
suggests that the idealistic morality of the Progressive era was somehow at variance with the 
pragmatic organizational traits he associates with the New Deal.  However, in Hoover, at least 
regarding aspects of the conservation field, the two traits were not ‘era discrete’ or mutually 
exclusive, but mutually supportive.  Consequently, perhaps these combined traits, as exhibited by 
Hoover, were not confined to the ‘Entr’acte’, but had a place among politicians of the 
Progressive and New Deal eras. 
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     Finally, regarding conservation, in the years spanning 1900-1942, the limits of federal 
government need to be recognized.  Despite Hoover’s contribution to promoting national parks, 
events at a state level could determine the national debate.  The Hetch-Hetchy controversy 
punctuates the Progressive, Hoover, and New Deal eras.  During 1913 Wilson backed this dam 
development located in California’s Yosemite National Park to benefit San Francisco.  Wise 
users like Pinchot and the Californian progressive William Kent hoped that the O’Shaughnessy 
Dam at Hetch-Hetchy would become part of a water and power system under state ownership.  
However, after World War I, Kent’s bill to achieve this objective failed in the California 
legislature.208  Worse still, in 1925 the San Francisco private utility Pacific Gas and Electric 
gained control of the dam.209  This development was beyond federal government control, but 
became inextricably linked with Hoover’s decade, and radicalized conservation thinking.  Wise 
users became more receptive to preservationist views.  Preservationists, who had lost the 
argument in 1913, felt developments at Hetch-Hetchy vindicated them and were re-motivated to 
achieve their objectives in the future. 
 
Monopoly Reform 
The extent of continuity between Hoover’s New Era and the preceding and succeeding eras is 
further demonstrated by the issue of monopoly reform.  In order to understand Hoover’s attitude 
towards business-government relations, the effect of his World War I experience on the home 
front must be fully appreciated.  It was, after all, his political initiation.  Hoover’s role as Food 
Administrator during the period of ‘war socialism’ crystallized certain beliefs in him from which 
he never henceforward deviated.  To begin with, he feared any repetition of Wilson’s war-time 
‘leviathan’ state would stifle individualism and enterprise in America.  He stated, of the World 
War I years: ‘Federal Government became a centralized despotism which assumed autocratic 
powers, and took over the business of citizens...However justified at the time if continued in 
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peace time it would destroy not only our American system but...our progress’.210  At the same 
time, the war convinced Hoover that government campaigns could educate and shape public 
opinion towards good ends.  For example, so successful was Hoover’s campaign for conserving 
US food stocks during World War I that the term ‘Hooverizing’ was coined to describe 
America’s voluntary rationing.211  However, Hoover was mistaken in thinking that government 
publicity could nurture in business during the 1920s the same sort of altruism which had 
delivered voluntary rationing during the war-time emergency. 
     In 1967, JP Guilford, the psychiatrist, identified two types of mind – the artistic and scientific.  
The artistic mind is characterized by ‘divergent thinking’, where several solutions to a problem 
are envisaged.  A scientific mind tends to be convergent, so, as in mathematics, one solution to a 
problem is expected.212  Hoover, by all accounts, was an archetypical convergent thinker.  
Influenced by his engineering background he assumed that there were ‘right’ answers to 
questions, and then, making use of his war-time experience in disseminating ideas, it was just a 
matter of convincing essentially rational people of incontrovertible truths.   
     In relation to major crises Hoover employed this approach with conspicuous success pre-1929, 
because interested parties were pre-disposed towards consensus in order to achieve a single, 
over-riding objective.  Consequently, Hoover’s formidable organizational abilities as a crisis 
manager were deployed winning over acquiescent groups to deal with, for instance, America’s 
war-time food crisis, or the 1927 Mississippi flood.  However, in monopoly reform the groups 
involved had widely divergent interests and, crucially, ‘rugged individualism,’ during the boom 
years of the 1920s, confidently confronted ‘progressive individualism.’  In reality, large and 
small business was often in conflict, labour and management seldom agreed, consumers 
frequently viewed both business and labour as their foes, big business looked upon government 
with suspicion.  Therefore, progressive consensus agreement which was possible over national 
and regional crises became a much harder task with the fractious elements connected to business.  
Nonetheless, Hoover, the convergent thinker and engineer, was convinced that the progressive 
strategy of consensus and the war-time tactic of government publicity could alter American 
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business norms.  In Hoover’s universe, ‘rugged individualists’ would readily give way to 
‘progressive individualists’.  A more hard-bitten and seasoned politician would have been 
sceptical about using this approach as the mainstay policy to avoid the monopolization of the US 
economy.  Certainly, it should have played a part in a variegated system aimed at curbing the 
worst effects of big business.  Instead, Hoover’s over-reliance on his business reform method 
was a hostage to fortune.  It only stood a chance of succeeding in an unprecedentedly prolonged, 
benign economic environment, where gradual change could be sustained.  When, with the onset 
of the Great Depression, Hoover’s ‘voluntarist’ approach was found wanting, its failure helped 
radicalize New Deal thinking in the monopoly reform policy area.                 
     Prior to becoming president, Hoover, when Secretary of Commerce, saw himself as a ‘hidden 
catalyst’ capable of influencing American business to evolve voluntarily towards progressive 
individualism.213   At Commerce, and as president, Hoover organized three thousand publicity 
conferences designed to gain business support for progressive individualism, encouraging the 
pursuit of fairer competition, higher wages, lower prices, and efficiency.214  Rather than 
government forcing laws on businessmen to control them, government campaigns would win 
over businesses to Hoover’s ‘associationalist’ ideas, and, of their own volition, business could 
then reform itself through trade associations and local committees.  The argument that the 
maintenance of America’s consumer-driven prosperity depended on raising wages, through 
management-worker co-operation, and business combating predatory practices, Hoover believed 
was unanswerable. 
     Furthermore, he considered that, in any case, on account of joint stock companies America 
was evolving towards a more responsible capitalism.215  As business was held increasingly 
accountable by shareholders, business was tending towards a co-operative exercise, rather than 
the ruthless individual struggle of yesteryear.  Therefore, government had only to channel 
business along lines it was already starting to follow for progressive individualism to triumph. 
     However, far from Hoover’s benign government propaganda diminishing the rise of predatory 
business, the 1920s accelerated that process.  Power utilities had long been identified as a 
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looming monopoly threat to the American consumer because they were ‘natural monopolies’, 
providing electricity to whole population areas, due to the logistical impracticality of creating 
local consumer choice in this sector.  Moreover, even during Progressive times, electricity was 
expected to be the dominant energy source in the future.  Theodore Roosevelt warned that the 
prospect of power monopolies was ‘the most threatening that has ever appeared’ in America’s 
corporate history.216   In line with expectations, during the 1920s electricity sales soared, (they 
more than doubled), and there was a concomitant engrossing of power companies by the largest 
concerns.  In 1929 ten great utility companies controlled three quarters of US electricity.217 
These ten utilities were all holding companies, parent companies with numerous subsidiaries, 
and the type of big business that had stimulated the progressives’ original anti-monopoly drive.  
In this atmosphere, utility leaders should not have been seen as passive receptors of Hoover’s 
public relations campaigns, who would compliantly introduce government schemes promoting 
progressive individualism.  Rather, they amounted to an oppositional bloc, engaged in a co-
ordinated counter-campaign for the protection of their vested interests.   
     Significantly, Samuel Insull’s utility empire in the 1920s, based at Libertyville, Chicago 
raised the Progressive era hackles of Chicagoan Harold Ickes, regarding the utility chief’s 
widespread malpractices.  He overcharged the public, bribed the Illinois utility commission, and 
helped corrupt the Chicago police.  Moreover, Insull’s Illinois Committee on Public Utility 
Information became the model for an organization representing utility companies across America, 
the National Electric Light Association (NELA), which lobbied on behalf of the industry.218  In 
these circumstances, Hoover was disingenuous to consider that the 1920s ‘state of the art’ public 
relations and advertising techniques he used to promote progressive individualism could not be 
employed with equal effect by those espousing unrestricted rugged individualism, to nullify his 
efforts.  Consequently, the NELA won over, for instance, state legislators to reduce regulation of 
large utilities, and funded university research which argued in favour of commercial electricity 
distribution, rather than by municipal, state, or federal competitors. 
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     Hoover exaggerated the potential of his publicity campaigns to influence big business, at least 
in the short term.  Ironically, post World War II, federal government-business co-operation and 
exchange of information were to become standard practice.219  At the same time, Hoover should 
have expected recalcitrant opposition, for instance, among utility magnates, whose perspective 
on government-business relations was very different from his own.  In summary, Hoover’s utility 
policy gave too much scope for private power companies to extend their economic and political 
influence, although that is not to say Hoover was entirely ‘Panglossian’ in his attitude towards 
utilities. 
     Consistent with his view that federal government had accrued too many powers during World 
War I, Hoover began devolving decision-making in several policy areas to states.  In monopoly 
reform, he encouraged state regulation of corporations, a clear divergence form TR.  These 
initiatives were aimed at creating a middle way between intrusive and unresponsive federal 
control, and a situation where exploitative individualistic behaviour held sway.  However, in the 
monopoly area Hoover underestimated the capacity of utility companies to corrupt local and 
state authorities.  Senator George Norris, admittedly a partisan opponent of private utilities, 
remarked nonetheless accurately of the power trust, i.e. the private utility interest: ‘It has bought 
and sold legislatures’.220  The issue of ‘power trust’ interference in politics reached a climax 
during the 1930s New Deal, and the corrupting influence of utilities was flagrant in California at 
the end of that decade.  
     Conversely, there is abundant evidence that Hoover was alive to the economic dangers of 
monopolies, including over-concentration by private utilities.  As Commerce Secretary, Hoover 
set up an anti-trust division in the Justice Department in 1920.221  Vitally, after the 1929 Crash, 
Hoover continued to oppose trade associations advocating a relaxation of the Sherman anti-trust 
law.222  Indeed, when he was president the US government pursued a number of high profile 
cases under the Sherman law, for example, against Hoover’s friend Owen Young, owner of 
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General Electric, a major supplier of electrical products to utilities and consumers.223  As several 
historians have made clear, Hoover, ‘true to the old Progressive spirit’, strongly opposed 
abandoning anti-trust legislation, because monopolistic corporations would be able to price-fix at 
will.224  Consequently, Hoover’s monopoly reform policies should not be seen as directly 
anticipating the New Deal’s National Recovery Administration (NRA), where government-
business co-operation involved widespread suspension of the anti-trust laws to assist business 
recovery during the Great Depression.225 
     Hoover’s monopoly reform policy created the most polarized views about him, even more so 
than his response to the Great Depression – recognized as either misguided or woefully 
inadequate.  In the eyes of some people, Hoover’s policy on monopolies helped cause 1929, and 
to others, his policy stance was enlightened.  A number of factors, though, make a definitive 
judgement on Hoover and monopoly reform problematic.  New Deal scholars, like Schlesinger Jr. 
were intent on portraying Hoover as one of three Republican presidents in the 1920s who 
allowed business to career out of control, providing a significant contributory cause of the 1929 
Crash.  Alternatively, progressives, like Charles Beard had a bias in favour of Hoover, who they 
considered true to their values in domestic and foreign policy.  Meanwhile, Hoover’s assessment 
of himself in his Memoirs is sometimes how he wished to be remembered, rather than an 
objective chronicle of events.226 
     Views on Hoover’s relationship with the Federal Power Commission (FPC) amply 
demonstrate these contrary outlooks.  The FPC was established by Hoover to regulate inter-state 
power company practice, while state regulation looked at intra-state utility matters.  Schlesinger 
Jr. intimates Hoover made the FPC subservient to the private utilities.227  Charles Beard 
considered it impartial, staffed by ‘grey’ men not from the utility interests.228  Hoover 
unsurprisingly emphasises his enlightened statesmanship in this area.  In a revealing passage 
from his Memoirs he describes how for three years, as Commerce Secretary, he prevented the 
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FPC granting licences for private utility development of the Colorado River.229  Instead, Hoover 
persisted with his federal scheme, in the form of the Hoover Dam.  In that role, Hoover used 
western progressive rhetoric to describe the ideological purpose of the dam: ‘All this power will 
belong to the people, developed by them, owned by them and for their benefit’.230    
     However, despite his rhetoric, Hoover’s progressive individualism did not allow him to go as 
far in utility reform as many western progressives wished.  In monopoly reform, during the 
Progressive era, western progressivism had been most preoccupied with the issue of railroad 
companies which, across the states of the West, created captive markets for passengers and farm 
goods.  Arguably, in the 1920s and 1930s western progressives were equally exercised by the 
‘captive consumers’ that the large utilities could exploit.  Understandably, these issues 
radicalized western progressive politicians, and, responsive to their electorate, many believed in 
a ‘statist’ solution to utilities.  In 1912, La Follette Sr.’s Progressive League had committed 
Progressives to public control of railroads, before his more radical progressivism was largely 
subsumed by TR’s Progressive Party.  In 1924, La Follette Sr. ran as an unsuccessful presidential 
candidate for a briefly reborn Progressive Party.  A key feature of La Follette’s Progressive Party 
platform was public control of railroads and HEP generation.231  As early as the presidential 
election of 1912 Wilson’s New Freedom anti-trust policy, stood in opposition to TR’s New 
Nationalist regulation of corporations and divided progressives.  However, in 1912, another 
bifurcation occurred, between those progressives who favoured public ownership of vital 
economic activities, in which the public had been deprived of choice, and progressives who 
wanted to retain private enterprise wherever possible. 
     Hoover considered La Follette Sr.’s agenda on public ownership ‘pure socialism’, and his 
antagonism towards the concept is palpable in Hoover’s Memoirs.232  He writes: ‘La 
Follette...raised the issue of government operation of utilities in the Presidential election of 1924.  
I, therefore, took a crack at the whole theory in a public address at the time’.233  Hoover’s words 
are indicative of his different vision of progressivism, but Hoover’s reaction also underscores 
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how much progressivism had become a contested term, which it remains to the present day.  As 
pointed out earlier, the absence of an enduring Progressive Party helped fragment progressivism.  
However, even within governments consisting of a single party during the Progressive age great 
ideological flexibility in monopoly reform was noteworthy, with fluctuations between trust-
busting and business-government co-operation.  Therefore, the disparity of policy between La 
Follette and Hoover is not unexpected, with one representing a ‘statist’, the other a ‘non-statist’ 
solution; of greater moment was whether these very different progressive visions could be 
reconciled.   
     Hoover’s antipathy to La Follette Sr.’s standpoint on utilities should be understood in the 
context of Hoover, a fellow westerner, being a long-time opponent of La Follette Sr., the leading 
western progressive.  Moreover, public ownership, whether by state or federal authorities, ran 
counter to Hoover’s own fully evolved progressivism, his progressive individualism and 
associationalist views.  Hoover wanted ‘a middle way between individualism and collectivism, 
between monopoly capitalism and socialism’.  Quite clearly, Hoover stood in opposition to La 
Follette’s ‘socialist’ and ‘collectivist’ views on utilities.  Could he, though, find a way of 
preventing monopoly capitalism in utilities triumphing over the interests of the American people?  
     Granted that Hoover’s dissemination of benign government propaganda about progressive 
individualism failed to supplant aggressive individualism among utility owners, he had other 
schemes for impressing on utilities their ‘mutuality’ with the rest of American society.  Hoover 
proposed a ‘superpower project’, where the nation’s power systems would be joined together 
into a national grid.234  In order to make this a functioning entity, state regulations would become 
more uniform, giving the public greater electricity access, choice, and lower prices.  Hoover 
believed such advancing technology ‘dissolves monopolies’.235  However, the expense of the 
superpower project federal government ruled prohibitive. 
     Nonetheless, discounting Hoover’s more tentative schemes, in the multi-issue Hoover Dam he 
achieved both tangible success curbing private utilities, and reached a compromise with La 
Follette Snr.’s progressivism.  Hoover passed legislation for the Hoover Dam, whereby federal 
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government was committed to build the powerhouse at the dam site, but California 
municipalities would ‘install the necessary machinery and buy most of the power’.236  A prime 
beneficiary of this law was the Los Angeles Bureau of Power and Light, headed by Ezra 
Scattergood, which the House appropriating subcommittee approved of because its efficiency 
record compared favourably with any private sector concern.  Therefore, as a pragmatic solution, 
Hoover’s proposal made political sense, against the backdrop of a strongly pro-business 
Republican Congress.  In the end, 91% of the water power from the Hoover Dam was allocated 
to publicly owned corporations, demonstrating that this project was an outstanding example of 
countervailing powers.   
     Hoover’s attitude to public power has caused disagreement among historians.  Burner 
considered Hoover was sympathetic to municipal public power.  The most recent biography of 
Hoover by Kendrick Clements, however, judges that although he supported at the Hoover Dam a 
‘limited application ... of public power’ involving municipalities, he ‘had little enthusiasm’ for 
it.237  Significantly, Clements decides Hoover had allowed public power, to win over Johnson.  
Another construction can be put on Hoover’s behaviour; that he wanted an agreement which 
permitted future flexibility, without being bound by Johnson’s public power solution.  Johnson 
saw it as essential to create greater competition against private utilities which opposed the new 
dam with lobbying and political corruption.  In the 1920s, he stated ‘We’re up against the most 
powerful ... and influential trust in the world, the electric power trust’.238  
     Over the Hoover Dam, Hoover both attempted a consensus solution in monopoly reform, and 
pointed the way for future federal government HEP schemes.  He offered La Follette Sr.’s 
radical western progressives electricity distribution, which was locally controlled and publicly 
accountable, a compromise between his ‘statist’ plans and private utility domination.  At the 
same time, federal and state government was excluded from the electricity market, enabling 
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Hoover to promote the progressive individualism of ‘community participation’, where, at a local 
level, individuals would co-operate to achieve prosperity.239    
     Thus, Hoover merited condemnation by New Dealers, and later commentators, for grossly 
over-estimating the willingness of business to reform itself in the ‘get-rich-quick’ climate of the 
1920s.  In other respects, though, he was a true and far-sighted inheritor of progressivism, as 
Turner realized.  Regarding the practicalities of HEP distribution from West Coast dams – 
central to the monopoly question on the West Coast during the late New Deal – Hoover 
represented continuity between the Progressive and New Deal eras, by encouraging utility 
‘countervailing powers,’ in the manner of Wilson.  From a wider perspective, his associational 
beliefs have affinities with the Progressive era New Nationalism and even the First New Deal.  
However, despite the government-business co-operation of associationalism, Hoover was not 
prepared to suspend anti-trust laws, as FDR did in the NRA.  Looking further into the future, 
Hoover’s innovative establishment of channels of communication involving government and 
business entailed a long-term contribution to progressivism that matured after World War II, and 
possibly mitigated some aspects of aggressive capitalism.  In this respect, the New Era was 
forward-looking, indicating that the later New Deal, despite the characterization of Brinkley et al, 
was not exceptional in setting post-World War II trends.  Lastly, it might be added that Hoover 
exhibited the same mixture of ideology and pragmatism over monopoly reform, in his case with 
utilities, which was strongly evident during the Progressive era – contradicting Hofstadter’s 
strictures about progressivism’s supposed inflexibility.  Even so, that is not to say Hoover was 
invariably flexible in responding to policy choices and crises, as the Great Depression was to 
show with devastating consequences.    
Social Justice 
Hoover’s inability to respond adequately to the formidable challenge of the Great Depression 
eclipsed Hoover’s many positive, and progressive, achievements.  Indeed, it rendered well-nigh 
impossible a dispassionate judgement of his record in office.  In no area is this consideration 
more apparent than in social justice.  After all, the Great Depression was the dominant social 
justice (and economic) issue in the inter-war years across the Western World.  Hoover’s failure 
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to supply the necessary leadership and massive aid for millions of Americans afflicted by 
debilitating unemployment and grinding poverty remains a major indictment of his presidency.  
It is the more ironic because, up to 1929, Hoover had excelled when confronted by major crises.  
In relation to the Depression, unlike previous crises, though, Hoover was trapped in the logic of 
his homespun progressivism, and he largely ignored wider progressivism’s essential pragmatism 
and flexibility.  For Hoover, massive federal government intervention to recover the economy 
would undermine progressive individualism among the populace, and inaugurate a tyrannical 
leviathan state.  It mattered little to Hoover’s permanently damaged reputation that, throughout 
the whole 1930s, 1931, during his presidency, was the year the US economy received the biggest 
injection of spending.240  Consistent with Hoover’s policies, state, local, and federal expenditure 
shared the spending load.241  Instead, to most Americans Hoover remained the man who had 
gratingly re-iterated that finding the path to economic recovery was their responsibility, while 
they looked in desperation to Washington for solutions.  That view of Hoover had become 
prevalent in West Coast states too by 1933.  It contrasted with Hoover’s earlier positive image 
there, as a Californian leader, and, to the inhabitants of Washington State and Oregon, a 
sympathetic western president.242    
     In fact, during most of the 1920s Hoover was a true disciple of the Progressive era over social 
justice.  He supported labour unions, and peaceful picketing.243  Throughout the Prosperity 
Decade he had opposed the use of injunctions to prevent strikes, and, as president, signed the 
Norris-La Guardia Anti-Injunction Act.244  When president he also reformed income tax, along 
progressive lines, whereby, over the head of Andrew Mellon, the reactionary Treasury Secretary, 
Hoover reduced income tax proportionately more for low earners than the wealthy. 245 As 
Hoover’s dam projects in the Far West looked forward to the New Deal, so his report on Recent 
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Social Trends, according to Richard Norton Smith, ‘laid the groundwork for unemployment 
insurance, Social Security, and other reforms credited to the New Deal’.246  
     If Hoover was a progressive, and provided continuity, between the 1900s and 1930s in social 
justice generally, up to 1929, what of his record over specifics that we are focusing on for the 
Progressive and New Deal eras?  Regarding anti-communism, Hoover learned by the mistakes of 
the Wilson government in 1919-20, as did the New Dealers after him.  The wave of strikes which 
gripped America during 1919 was widely attributed to communists.  As a result, Wilson’s 
government halted its progressive policies in social justice, and imposed oppressive measures 
over the allied area of civil liberties.  Unequivocally, Hoover condemned the government 
reaction, and stated: ‘Bolshevism is not to blame for American unrest...We shall never remedy 
justifiable discontent until we eradicate the misery which ruthless individualism has imposed on 
a minority’.247  True to his words, Hoover subsequently took action for steelworkers, who had 
been in the vanguard of the 1919 strikes.  As Commerce Secretary, Hoover used his information 
dissemination methods to expose the iniquities of the 12-hour day in the steel industry.  The steel 
owners finally conceded an 8-hour day in 1923, after Hoover had kept the issue ‘boiling in the 
press’ for two years.248  
     Moreover, Hoover resisted the siren voices of far right wing commentators to re-launch Red 
Scares, so useful to American politicians in difficulties, who could divert public discontent onto 
left wing scapegoats.  Hoover appreciated that America’s periodic spasms of anti-communism 
also posed a threat to progressive democratic values.  Throughout 1929, during his presidency, 
Hoover refused to sanction federal government backing of planned ‘red hunts’ put forward by 
the right wing periodical National Republic, and, much later, in the 1950s, as a private citizen, he 
spoke out against McCarthyism.249 
     Nonetheless, like Wilson before him, Hoover was probably forced into Janus-faced politics, 
post-1929, because of progressivism’s desire to maintain electoral support from both the Left and 
Right.  Official government policy under Hoover’s Secretary of Labor, William Doak, had been 
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to deport known Communist aliens, and such a policy headed off right wing accusations that the 
government was tolerating foreign undemocratic elements.  As a result, in violation of their civil 
liberties, some communist aliens were held in Buffalo and Cleveland for as long as eighteen 
months incommunicado, while negotiations were pursued with their reluctant countries of origin 
to accept them back.  When the story leaked out, Hoover expressed outrage about this illegal 
behaviour by the federal government.  Just as there are strong doubts that Wilson, on account of 
illness, was unaware of the Palmer Raid’s excesses in 1919, so Hoover’s heavy work-load during 
the Depression probably does not sufficiently excuse his lack of knowledge about the 
incarcerated communists.  David Burner, a pro-Hoover historian, writes nevertheless with 
scepticism: ‘It is puzzling that Hoover did not receive information about the aliens in Cleveland 
and Buffalo – or, if he did receive it, it is disturbing that he failed to institute some kind of 
inquiry’.250  
     Over the position of small farmers – a crucial group in West Coast states – Hoover 
acknowledged that they had struggled economically since at least 1921.  Significantly, many 
leading western progressive senators, veterans of the Progressive era, like Borah, Johnson and 
Nye, gave their support to Hoover in the 1928 presidential election.  They did so even though 
they harboured reservations about Hoover who had struck hard bargains with farmers as Food 
Administrator during World War I.  In return for farming support, Hoover, after his election, 
called a special session of Congress to discuss the agricultural problem, and social justice for 
farmers.251  As a consequence, Hoover’s government generously funded, to the tune of $345 
million, farm price supports between 1929 and 1931, and loaned farm co-operatives money to 
purchase basic crops.252  However, like his progressive predecessors and successors, he did no 
more than alleviate conditions, especially among poorer farmers.  He was working within the 
tradition of federal government furnishing farm credits, begun by Progressive era President 
Wilson, and later continued by FDR.  Hoover’s encouragement to farm co-operatives can be 
situated within western progressivism, which persisted into the New Deal.  As Hoover put it 
himself, mindful of how the policy combined his beliefs in localism and countervailing powers: 
‘We supported the co-operative movement by farmers...I believed it to be one of the most 
                                                 
250 Burner, Herbert Hoover: A Public Life, 214. 
251 Hoff  Wilson, Herbert Hoover: Forgotten Progressive, 134.  
252 Ibid. 
89 
 
hopeful undertakings, for according to my social theories any organization of citizens for their 
own welfare is preferable to the same action by the government’.253    
     Nonetheless, despite Hoover’s undoubtedly progressive attempts to help farmers in America, 
he was never as committed to the causes of western progressivism as the group of western 
progressive senators including La Follette Jr., who unequivocally supported the small farmer.  In 
many respects, Hoover stood in the tradition of federal government leaders from the Progressive 
age and New Deal, whose support for small farmers was more qualified than western progressive 
politicians rooted in farming communities. Hoover’s attitude, to some degree, was praiseworthy.  
He detected that the clamorous demand for increasing agricultural relief could be attributed to ‘a 
radical fringe seeking special interest legislation’.254  The fragmenting of American society into 
jostling groups competing for preferential treatment ran counter to progressivism’s philosophy of 
fairness and consensus.  On the eve of the New Deal, Walter Lippmann, a political thinker much 
concerned with the future of democracy, had articulated similar sentiments to New Dealer Felix 
Frankfurter, saying that groups like farmers acted as a ‘distorting influence’ on government and 
were ‘selfish and dangerous’.255  
     Yet, Hoover also served in Republican administrations that oversaw, before the catastrophe of 
the Great Depression, a severe decline in prospects for the farmer-labour alliance, and 
consequently the small farmer.  Certainly, farm or union representatives were not indulging in 
spurious calls for federal government help.  Although Hoover’s support for labour unions is not 
at issue, between 1921 and 1929 union membership dropped from 5 to 3.44 million.  So great 
was the fall in trade unionism that the growth of a farmer-labour movement was blighted, while 
‘union membership dropped to the point where organized labour could not function as a 
countervailing force in the economy’.256  At the same time, from 1921 up to, and beyond, the 
Wall Street Crash, agricultural income continued to fall.  Hoover was certainly not responsible 
for these developments, and indeed opposed them, but with their intensification, post-1929, the 
New Deal was emboldened to renounce decisively this aspect of Hoover’s progressivism.  
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Accordingly, FDR’s government embarked on radical intervention for struggling farmers, and 
eventually implemented major legislation to aid labour unions.   
     Although it would be unjust to question Hoover’s integrity about desiring progressive fairness 
for American society - involving a balanced rural-urban population of small and large operators - 
on two counts he was subject to influences which were antagonistic to that aim.  The reactionary 
Republican elements that held such a sway in federal government and Congress often sided 
openly with the large business interest over other competing groups.  Additionally, as a 
Californian politician, he was drawn into the complicated politics of his home state.  He received 
robust support from Harry Chandler, the union-hating publisher of the Los Angeles Times.257   
Not only did Chandler vigorously champion Los Angeles’ position as a non-union city where the 
‘open shop’ operated, but as a Southern Californian Chandler defended the large farmer interest 
against the farmer-labour alliance.  In these contexts, both Chandler and Hoover’s close friend 
Chester Rowell, an old Progressive, opposed Hiram Johnson’s progressivism – pledged to the 
small farmer, the farm-labour alliance, and the unionized city of San Francisco.  258  
     Whereas Hoover did not subscribe to the anti-social justice beliefs of reactionary Republicans 
in Washington DC and Southern California, nonetheless, by proximity, he became identified 
with them.  Furthermore, the business-oriented Republicanism of the 1920s must have exerted 
some effect on Hoover, for instance, in his attitude to small farmers.  In summary, Hoover took a 
progressive approach in social justice over anti-communism, small farmers, and labour unions.  
However, he was not willing to use far-reaching enough interventionism to stop the decline of 
small farmers and labour unions, an attitude which proved his undoing during the Depression.  
 
                                                  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _                                                     
     There were distinct continuities between the Progressive era, the Hoover decade, and the New 
Deal.  In conservation, Hoover continued TR’s policies over forestry, national parks, and 
reclamation, thus representing a ‘bridge’ between the Progressive era and the later New Deal.  
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Regarding monopoly reform, Hoover followed Progressive era orthodoxy in anti-trust action, 
and, indeed, was more ideologically committed to litigation against monopolies than Wilson 
during World War I, or FDR over the 1930s NRA.  At the same time, Hoover was wary of an 
intrusive leviathan state, but his associationalist ideas show he anticipated post-World War II 
developments.  With countervailing powers, his support of municipal public power at Hoover 
Dam, which was re-named Boulder Dam in the 1930s, represented a bridge between the 
Progressive and New Deal eras, even if, unlike Johnson, he underestimated political and 
economic corruption among private utilities.  Superficially, Hoover’s social justice policy was 
also a bridge between the Progressive era and New Deal. He demonstrated Wilson-like 
behaviour over the Buffalo and Cleveland incidents, but eschewed Red Scares.  He continued 
Progressive era support for labour unions, which fed into New Deal unionization policy, and 
improved on Wilson’s credit facilities to small farmers.  However, when the Depression hit 
America, the downside of Hoover’s social justice views was exposed.  Hoover’s reluctance to 
use large-scale federal government intervention in the Great Depression was based on his fear it 
would deprive Americans of their progressive individualism, and to New Dealers formed a 
pattern of behaviour.  They alleged that, in a similar manner, he failed during the New Era to 
reverse declining union membership, and the prolonged agricultural recession.  Consequently, 
Hoover’s decade ultimately radicalized the New Deal in social justice policy.   
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Chapter Three: Progressive Era Influence in the New Deal, 1933-1937  
 
The magnitude of the financial and economic disaster that gripped America from 1929 onwards 
obscured Hoover’s progressivism, and found wanting all those who attempted to overcome the 
crisis with conventional methods.  Unlike the Panic of 1907, the house of Morgan was unable to 
reverse the Wall Street Crash of October, 1929, which occurred when a collapse in company 
profits led to a loss of market confidence.  The intervention of Richard Whitney, Morgan’s 
broker, on the New York stock exchange, bidding high for US Steel stocks in bulk, delivered 
only a temporary respite, and did not produce the hoped-for decisive halt to the downward spiral 
in shares.1  Instead, without the lubricant of investor capital the US economy seized up, and 
unemployment soared.  Two years later, with despair stalking the land, JP Morgan Jr. perceived 
the enormity of the Great Depression.  In Progressive times, his father had seen no apparent 
contradiction in helping to end a prolonged and bitter coal strike while taking a cruise on his 
palatial yacht, The Corsair.  However, in October, 1931, shaken by events, his son wrote to a 
friend with new-found humility, that he would not be sailing The Corsair in the immediate future, 
because ‘it is wiser...not to flaunt such luxuriant amusement in the face of the public’.2 
     When the American people decisively rejected Hoover in the presidential election of 
November, 1932, Franklin Roosevelt was faced with the herculean task of restoring America to 
prosperity.  The sheer scale of the socio-economic disaster that Roosevelt’s incoming 
administration inherited – over a quarter of the workforce unemployed; national income in 1929 
halved by 1933– and his response, involving federal government intervention on an 
unprecedented scale, conveys the exceptional nature of the New Deal era, at least superficially.3   
Moreover, in the short-term, Hofstadter’s argument, emphasizing discontinuity, has a surface 
validity.  Roosevelt confronted in the Great Depression a supreme crisis that demanded 
immediate, practical responses.  The New Dealers in 1933 did not have the advantage of being 
able to formulate policy unpressured by momentous events.  At the same time, America’s 
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political culture did not supply to government a ready-made remedy capable of curing the 
unparalleled economic malady afflicting the economy.  In this charged atmosphere, of necessity, 
FDR’s solutions were borrowed, improvised, and forged from expedient compromises.  As a 
consequence, Hofstadter’s observation that the New Deal was ‘a chaos of experimentation’ 
contains some truth, but also ignores a crucial determinant of FDR’s behaviour.4  Roosevelt was 
not prepared to gamble with America’s political and economic future by employing wild policy 
experiments.  Rather, he stayed within the parameters of Progressive era interventionism, insofar 
as he emphatically upheld capitalism, and strove for a democratic consensus.  New Deal political 
thought, although at times veering towards statism, was never socialist, let alone communist.  
Furthermore, the New Deal lasted seven years, and therefore an ever-clearer ideology had 
sufficient time to take shape.  That ideological direction was naturally born of the New Deal 
finding methods of survival when confronted by economic, constitutional, legislative, sectional, 
and electoral difficulties.  Arguably, New Dealers concerned with the three policy areas found 
Progressive era ideology most effective in meeting these challenges and, as significantly, that 
ideology dovetailed with their own political preferences. 
     This chapter sets out to ‘unpack’ the concept of an ideological New Deal.  Firstly, Franklin 
Roosevelt is often portrayed as a prime example of a pragmatic politician, with little interest in 
ideology, especially one based on moral principles.  It will be contended here that that viewpoint 
represents a misconception, and FDR’s progressive ideology is explained and instances of it 
enumerated. Secondly, the chapter considers each of the tenets of progressivism being focused 
on: conservation, monopoly reform, and social justice.  Connections with the Progressive era are 
discussed, with an eye to showing West Coast dimensions.  Key progressives, who will be 
considered at greater length in subsequent chapters, are brought into the analysis: Bob Marshall 
in conservation, JD Ross over monopoly reform, Robert La Follette Jr. concerning social justice.  
Accordingly, the following chapter seeks to prove convincingly an ideological continuity 
between the Progressive era and the New Deal (1933-c1937).  
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The Ideological Franklin Roosevelt                                                              
Franklin Roosevelt was born into a famous, old stock East Coast family – a branch of which also 
produced Theodore Roosevelt.  He had a privileged upbringing at the family home in Hyde Park, 
above the forested Hudson Valley north of New York City.  Two factors have doubtlessly 
predisposed opinion about the political beliefs of FDR, leading to the conclusion that he lacked 
intellectual and ideological depth, even though few historians doubt his talents as a prodigiously 
effective practical politician.  Firstly, despite being a state senator at Albany, New York (1910-
1913), during the Progressive era, and Assistant Secretary of the Navy in Washington DC (1913-
1921), the young Roosevelt was as much playboy as politician.5  Secondly, raising even more 
serious questions about his ideological gravitas, the much-changed, mature Roosevelt who 
became president in 1933 presented an image of affable charm, but, it seemed to many people, 
manifested little constancy of belief or depth of knowledge.  Keynes visited the White House in 
1934 and witheringly remarked, ‘I don’t think your President Roosevelt knows anything about 
economics’.6  Indeed, along with Hofstadter, other historians frequently associate FDR with 
pragmatism rather than ideological resolve, and, moreover, judge him uninterested in theoretical 
matters.  Therefore, quite clearly, in the interests of establishing him as a politician significantly 
shaped by progressive ideology, FDR’s presidential image needs to be further explored, because 
perhaps it masked unexpected profundities.  Moreover, for his progressivism to become apparent, 
FDR’s beliefs must be pinned down, and distinguished from the New Deal ideas that were 
provided to him by his coterie of intellectuals, advisers, and speech-writers.  
     The impression widely held by historians and his contemporaries, that FDR lacked a clear 
moral and ideological purpose has misdirected thinking on the political complexion of the New 
Deal, especially Roosevelt’s contribution to it.  It arose, in large measure, because those 
observing and studying Roosevelt have often mistaken image for reality in his character.  FDR 
faced an uphill struggle if he were to lead the United States through the Great Depression.  
Another Western leader, Ramsay Macdonald, the British Prime Minister, facing the same 
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economic catastrophe, described ‘the dread realities’ of the situation.7  Unlike Macdonald, 
though, Roosevelt was not overawed by these dire circumstances, so that he severely 
compromised his beliefs.  Actually, the American president’s personal story had cruelly 
equipped him to cope with great crises.  In 1921 Roosevelt was struck down by the grievous 
effects of polio, and lost the use of his legs.  When president, leading New Dealers never ceased 
to be amazed at the extent of Roosevelt’s incapacity; that sometimes he required two burly men 
from ‘the Secret Service detail’ to carry him as they would an ailing infant.8  Roosevelt was able 
to withstand the Great Depression with a personal style which had served him well against the 
other daunting battle he endured – his crippling physical disability.  Partly on account of that 
earlier battle, he had acquired an invincible bonhomie, to conceal the helpless vulnerability he 
must have been always in danger of conveying.  The image FDR projected, honed by his earlier 
personal crisis, proved invaluable against the towering problems of 1930s America.  It also 
meant that as a politician, FDR was difficult to take the measure of.   
     Even his wife, Eleanor, described FDR’s tendency to conceal his feelings.  Roosevelt’s 
speechwriter, Robert Sherwood, found him impenetrable, and talked about his ‘heavily forested 
interior’.9  However, on rare occasions we see beneath FDR’s mask.  For example, one misty day 
at Campobello,* a few months after Roosevelt had become president, a young reporter and his 
girlfriend came upon Roosevelt, by himself, hands held to his face, sitting on a tree trunk.  
FDR’s hands fell, and he is described as staring into space with a ‘kind of...grimace...like a man 
trying to see something in his mind and suffering’.10 FDR, in a later article written by the 
reporter, is called ‘The Enigma,’ a designation which contributed to the myth that Roosevelt was 
ultimately an unknowable political titan.  More mundanely, perhaps FDR sometimes gave vent 
to feelings in private – about his disability and the almost insuperable problems of the 
Depression – which otherwise he kept hidden.  Significantly, the moment FDR recognized the 
reporter his face reverted to its quotidian geniality.  Consequently, with FDR more than most 
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people, we should not be misled by the image he presented to the world, in contrast to his 
authentic character.  
     Judging from FDR’s genial image, he seemed extraordinarily amenable to different political 
ideas.  Freidel describes Roosevelt’s ‘limitless receptivity’, because he cheerfully listened to, and 
entertained, a wide range of opinions.11   In this context, Freidel refers to the New Deal as a 
‘laboratory’ of jostling political ideas.12  Therefore, most of the principal historians of the New 
Deal era, even where they allow for definite Progressive era influence in policy, as for example 
with Freidel or Davis, view Roosevelt as fundamentally different from the conviction-driven 
politicians of that period, insofar as FDR was experimental, opportunistic,  and pragmatic.  Davis 
writes: ‘Roosevelt’s legislative operations were for the most part opportunistic responses to 
unforeseen challenges, very seldom were they expressions of his own deep-laid plans’.13  Of 
course, such views agree with Hofstadter’s contention that the New Deal, personified by its 
architect – Roosevelt – was at root pragmatic and inimical to a moral ideology derived from the 
Progressive era.  Therefore, according to this hypothesis, FDR’s prevailing outward personality 
trait of cheerful, open-minded flexibility was carried over into the New Deal’s policy-making.  
Yet the achievements of the New Deal in the three key policy areas belie an image of FDR 
largely characterized by an ideological void.  Only a president with very decided objectives, a 
clear ideological pathway, and much strength of will, could have changed America so 
considerably, and in ways congenial to Progressive era principles.     
     Indeed, Roosevelt himself was quick to claim Progressive era antecedents for the New Deal.  
His Commonwealth Club address in San Francisco during the presidential election of 1932 
showed that the New Deal would be strongly informed by the progressive historian Turner’s 
closed frontier theory.  FDR stated: ‘With the turn of the century...we were reaching our last 
frontier; there was no more free land...Our task now is the soberer less dramatic business of 
administering resources...of distributing wealth and products more equitably.  The day of 
enlightened administration has come’.14  If his words are broken down, to show the policy areas 
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they cover, Roosevelt envisaged government intervention over ‘resources’ (conservation), 
‘wealth’ (social justice), and in distributing ‘products’ i.e. getting fairness for consumers from 
monopolies.  These views are in line with the continuity argument - on the direct applicability of 
the three Progressive era policy areas to the New Deal, and their connections with the frontier 
thesis.  Of course, they might have come from a Roosevelt speechwriter, rather than his own 
mind.  However, there is good reason to believe that Roosevelt had more than passing familiarity 
with Turner’s ideas.  When he was at Harvard University, FDR attended lectures on the 
‘Development of the American West’ by Turner, who had come to Harvard for a year from the 
University of Wisconsin on a visiting professorship.  One New Deal historian notes that 
Roosevelt missed the first six weeks of the half year course, and therefore is ‘dubious’ that the 
lectures could have had a lasting impact on FDR, and the New Deal.15  A case can also be made 
for the opposite conclusion.  Furthermore, the frontier thesis formed part of an ‘educated’ 
Americans intellectual consciousness.  Knowledge of Turner gave Roosevelt reason to reference 
his frontier thesis during a major West Coast speech on the eve of the New Deal. 
     Of course, to some extent, FDR may have been using the frontier thesis to provide 
‘intellectual cover’ for his planned New Deal.  If so, he conformed to Progressive era behaviour.  
Gerald Nash, the most prominent Turnerian of today, writes: ‘In a manner reminiscent of the 
Progressive era, politicians (of the 1930s)...now utilized the frontier thesis to justify increased 
government intervention’. 16  Equally, FDR might have been absolutely sincere in seeing the 
applicability of the closed frontier theory to the 1930s.  In which case, while he, like his 
progressive predecessors, was employing a theory which tended to overstate American reality, 
that point does not disqualify its relevance as a major influence in both the Progressive and New 
Deal eras.  Moreover, Turner himself considered Hoover’s political testament American 
Individualism an expression of his ideas.  Consequently, there is evidence for saying that behind 
the Progressive age, Hoover era, and New Deal lay a common philosophical source.  It indicated 
above all else that the status quo was inadequate for America’s needs, although how far federal 
government should intervene to revitalize America caused incessant debate across these periods. 
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     If Roosevelt considered his New Deal would involve government intervention to further 
conservation, monopoly reform and social justice aims, where, apart from Turner, had FDR 
derived his ideas?  It is known that the young FDR visited TR several times in the White House, 
and he was suitably impressed by the dynamic personality of his older cousin, and almost 
certainly TR influenced FDR’s politics.  However, Schlesinger Jr., at his most perceptive about 
Roosevelt, offers an intriguing speculation on the burgeoning ideology FDR acquired during the 
Progressive era, which relates also to western progressive preoccupations, and this thesis’ central 
argument.  
     Schlesinger points out that FDR was acutely conscious that 19th Century deforestation at the 
Roosevelt estate in Hyde Park, followed by over-cultivation of corn, had led to disastrous soil 
exhaustion and erosion on the property.  He speculates that FDR’s abiding interest in conserving 
America’s natural resources, above all else its soil, stemmed from his Hyde Park experiences.  
According to Schlesinger, this interest, in turn, probably led to an evolving concern for other 
resources e.g. human resources, and the resource of water generating hydro-electric power.  Yet 
again, pushed to the fore, in a discussion of the years 1900-1940 are the policy areas of: 
conservation (soil resources), monopoly reform (water-power companies), and social justice 
(human resources).17  Furthermore, Schlesinger goes on to enumerate examples of Roosevelt’s 
beliefs in practice during 1912, the pivotal year for old Progressivism.  For instance, State 
Senator Roosevelt showed early political radicalism by asserting in a speech at Troy (New York 
State) that farmers who failed to implement soil conservation should ultimately be forced to do 
so by government.  He maintained ‘community liberty’ must take precedence over ‘individual 
liberty’, if individual recklessness endangered the common good.  As radically, yet again in 1912, 
FDR argued, without success, for a power bill in the New York state legislature whereby the 
state would build power stations, to produce and distribute hydro-electricity.  Furthermore, in the 
radical tradition of western progressivism’s farmer-labour alliance, Roosevelt, who sat for an 
upstate farming constituency, supported industrial labour legislation, though such a stance was 
unnecessary for his electoral purposes.18  In effect, FDR unified Progressive era policy areas 
under the heading ‘resources,’ a claim substantiated by specific examples from 1912.  
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Schlesinger, though, stresses Roosevelt’s Progressive era ideas as essentially a personal 
philosophy, rather than part of a wider ideology. 
     Yet, there is another way of looking at FDR’s progressivism.  Perhaps his ideology was based 
more fully on an awareness of ‘community liberty’ than Schlesinger asserts.  That belief shaped 
his views on social justice, monopoly reform, and conservation, even if his greatest affinity was 
with the latter.  Significantly, Roosevelt’s Troy speech takes as its starting-point working class 
discontent, not conservation.19  He mentions that ‘liberty of the community’ will provide the way 
out of working class difficulties.  Liberty of the community should be understood as a state 
where the majority are not dangerously confined in their liberty by individual action.  Roosevelt 
contends that in modern America individual liberty (Turner’s rugged individualism) is 
inadequate to society’s needs.  He implies that industrialization, urbanization, and the settlement 
of America have necessitated a negotiation between individual and community liberty.  
American democracy will only succeed, and indeed survive, with an accommodation between 
these notions.  Otherwise, individual liberty will finally destroy community liberty, or 
alternatively, a revolutionary seizure of power by the community will result in dictatorship of the 
proletariat.  
     In the Troy speech Roosevelt ranges over the three tenets.  Over conservation, when 
individual farmers ruin the soil, that impacts on the community at large, and the government 
should ‘compel every cultivator to pay something back’ to the land.20  In monopoly reform, a 
trust, in Roosevelt’s view, is not evil on account of its size, but because it constrains the ‘liberty 
of the community.’  For this reason, ‘it will be necessary for ... (the) community to change its 
features.’21  Regarding social justice, an employer must not trample on the liberty of the 
community by denying his workers any power.  The employer and employees should co-operate 
to ensure mutual success.22  Therefore, a good case can be made for an ‘ideological Roosevelt’ in 
the Progressive era related to the three tenets.  However examples of Roosevelt’s interest in the 
three tenets must be detectable later in his political career, if they represent a set of genuine 
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political convictions, and were not merely the outpourings of someone caught up in the general 
ideological euphoria of 1912 – that seminal Progressive era year.  
     To be sure, Roosevelt’s actions after 1912, as a state senator during the 1910s and governor of 
New York State (1928-1933), remained ‘freighted’ with Progressive era values.  In 1913, over 
conservation, State Senator Roosevelt introduced an unsuccessful bill for the ‘Protection of 
Lands, Forest and Public Parks’.23  When governor of New York State, FDR still championed in 
monopoly reform public production of hydro-electric power, ‘if need be’.24  During his 
governorship, where urban, rather than rural, support was more critical, he was known nationally 
regarding social justice as a ‘friend of the (small) farmers, suffering from low prices for their 
produce’.25  It seems FDR’s radical Progressive era beliefs were sustained up to his presidency in 
the 1930s.    
     Nonetheless, the contention that FDR held longstanding Progressive era beliefs requires 
further development.  In particular, why were the radical ideas that FDR held in the 1910s and 
1920s not translated unexpurgated into New Deal policies?  The part played by Progressive era 
consensus in FDR’s thinking is perhaps crucial here, as in both the Progressive and New Deal 
eras the need for democratic consensus, at a presidential level, acted like a filter on radical ideas.  
For FDR consensus was not only important to unite Americans, but also, by winning elections, in 
the creation of an effective reformist political party.  What is more, democratic consensus was 
always an objective of FDR’s politics, at whatever level.  As a New York State Senator, he 
repeatedly stated that ‘your Senator should represent the whole people.’26 Of course, a consensus 
was much harder to achieve nationally than locally.  If Roosevelt’s policy ideas from the 1910s 
and 1920s were further modified during the 1930s, the objective of cultivating a democratic 
consensus nationally, and avoiding an electoral ‘pushback,’ helped produce that result.  
     FDR, as president, expressed a preference for Progressive era consensus, inasmuch as he 
believed that progress was based on harmonizing the interests of the American people.  He said 
mid-decade: ‘The science of politics...may properly said to be...the adjustment of conflicting 
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group interests...in the interests of the largest group of all...(the) one hundred and twenty five 
million people in whom reposes the sovereignty of the United States’.27  This statement of 
consensus politics was surely more than just rhetoric, even if by 1936 opposition to the New 
Deal made its sustainability increasingly difficult.  Throughout the 1930s, Roosevelt stated 
repeatedly his intention to be ‘President of All the People’.28  In the same manner, his vision of 
government involved fusing new ideas from the present, with the past.  It has already been 
argued that Progressive era rule combined elements of the past and present.  FDR called New 
Deal government a ‘combination of the old and new that marks orderly peaceful progress...Our 
new structure is a part of and a fulfilment of the old’.29  At times of instability, 1900-1940, 
Americans wanted the reassurance of tradition, as well as problem-solving innovation.  
Therefore, the New Deal looked to the past like the Progressive era itself, and Roosevelt 
recognized he was building on reformist foundations.  The moderate tenor of this approach to 
group conflict in society, and between the old and new, though, should not obscure 
progressivism’s essential dedication to change, rather than instinctual deference to the existing 
order.      
     Moreover, there is ample circumstantial evidence that FDR, like many New Dealers, reached 
into the Progressive era and Entr’acte for lessons about consensus to put into effect during the 
1930s.  Insofar as he learned salutary lessons from the Progressive era and the 1920s, he was 
typical of many 1930s progressives.  He wished not only to emulate these eras’ successes, but 
also to avoid their mistakes.  In so doing, he became the progressive leader par excellence.  As a 
New York state senator during the 1910s, and later as governor of New York State, in the late 
1920s, FDR had seen how vital consensus was, especially in the second case while negotiating 
the volatile ethnic politics of New York City, and Tammany Hall’s entrenched corruption.  
Conversely, he had witnessed two occasions in his life when the Democrat party had become 
polarized factions, during 1904, between the conservatives and the Bryanites, and 1924, over the 
McAdoo and Smith groupings.30  Both times internecine warfare had made the party unelectable, 
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and these were object-lessons in the absolute necessity of achieving consensus in his party, and 
the country.   
      In a similar vein, during the 1930s FDR’s constant awareness of the need to convince 
Americans of his policies, and carry them with him, was a prevailing characteristic of his age.  
Before becoming president he stated clearly ‘the greatest duty of a statesman is to educate’.31  
Roosevelt’s didactic liberalism indicates a need to persuade voters of his beliefs, rather than 
simply satisfying populist demands.  FDR’s regular radio ‘fireside chats’ encouraged policies 
that were readily articulated and at one with the needs of the American public.  In his press 
conferences, he disarmed hostile pressmen by dispensing with written questions, permitting him 
to be interrogated closely by journalists over policy areas.  As a result, presidential press 
conferences ‘served...as a classroom to instruct the country in the new economics and the new 
politics’.32  In part FDR’s policy and communications approach was prompted by the mistakes of 
previous ‘progressive’ presidents.  The maladroit stances of Wilson and Hoover in particular 
showed FDR the folly of policies which were not, or could not be made, sympathetic to the 
temper of the American people.  Wilson’s faltering personal crusade for an interventionist 
America in world affairs through membership of the League of Nations had been a commitment 
too far for America after the sacrifices of the Great War.  Hoover’s mistimed mission to make 
federal government interventionism a method of last resort domestically, in the name of 
‘progressive individualism’, was out of step with Great Depression America, crying out for 
government action.  Over these areas, the behaviour of Wilson and Hoover had been a 
subversion of Progressive era consensus politics.  In the end, they had tried to lead where the 
American public was not prepared to follow.  At one stage in his presidency, FDR had expressed 
a wish to be a ‘preaching president’ like TR.33  However he was determined to be a preacher who 
retained his congregation.  The electorates’ desertion of Wilson in 1920, and Hoover during 1932, 
highlighted the need in a democracy for progressive policies to be in keeping with the mood of 
the American people.  Yet, where the public remained behind FDR, he showed progressivism 
should not genuflect to tradition.  In 1940 Roosevelt sought re-election as president for a third 
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time, rejecting a long-standing political convention against third term presidencies.  In large 
measure, he was rectifying TR’s mistake in 1908, when he tamely accepted convention and did 
not seek a third term, thereby perhaps distorting the whole evolution of American progressivism.   
     Finally, Roosevelt’s reaction to the economic catastrophe of the Great Depression had a moral 
dimension.  There needed to be a reform of American behaviour, as well as a change in the role 
of government.  Freidel remarks on: ‘The earnestness of the moral fervour running through ... 
(FDR’s 1933)...inaugural address’.34  In it the new president talked about a need to return to ‘the 
precious moral values’ of the past. 35   If Roosevelt was indulging in pious rhetoric about the 
New Deal, then speeches by Progressive era leaders can be likewise termed morally sententious.  
Perhaps more plausibly, FDR felt his fellow countrymen should change their ways as a result of 
a man-made economic disaster – the Depression.  Of course, that change could entail bringing 
back old values as well as introducing new ones. In the same manner, after the Panics of 1893 
and 1907, progressive politicians considered a change of attitude was required by Americans for 
their new reality.  Consequently, progressivism remained throughout the 1900 to 1940 period an 
ideology animated by a moral purpose that looked both backwards and forwards.   
     By this analysis, Hofstadter’s pragmatic New Deal needs major amendment.  FDR’s ideology 
was motivated by his conceptualization of the three tenets as ‘resources,’ his awareness of 
Turner’s frontier thesis, and the Troy speech’s emphasis on ‘liberty of the community.’  As 
president, he retained his strong belief in consensus, and an ideology combining tradition and 
innovation.  He possessed the Progressive era attitude of moral outrage over short-sighted 
individualistic behaviour leading to economic catastrophe.  There is merit in the contention that 
we should not judge FDR’s ideological compass by his non-ideological image.  His ideological 
outlook was qualified by pragmatism, because he had seen that ideological warfare among 
Democrats made them unelectable in 1904 and 1924.  How then did FDR’s ideology shape the 
three tenets of progressivism in the two New Deals?       
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Conservation             
Conservation policy during the New Deal was imbued with Progressive era concerns about 
Turner’s closed society, which conveyed how the frontier’s demise might adversely affect 
Americans.  The experience of America in the 1930s confirmed and intensified Turner’s 
warnings, serving to strengthen the progressive case that federal government intervention was 
essential to avert an unfolding economic and ecological disaster.  For example, under two years 
into FDR’s administration the last of the public domain was closed down.36  This development 
represented the final death knell to 19th Century notions of America as a land of limitless space 
and opportunity, where recklessness over land usage carried few national economic risks.  For a 
growing number of Americans, the US was a ‘closed system’, unable to expand geographically 
and economically, a situation worsened by trade barriers of its own devising, which had resulted 
in retaliatory responses from former trading partners.  In this atmosphere, the Progressive era 
clarion call about preserving, improving and reclaiming the finite land that Americans had power 
over assumed a new and irrefutable relevance.  TR had signalled the primacy of conservation in 
his thinking during a 1908 presidential conference on the subject, when he stated: ‘The wise use 
of all our natural resources...is the great material question of today.’ 37  Conservation was also 
central to FDR’s progressivism.  Renshaw writes conservation: ‘was the political issue “closest 
to FDR’s heart.”’38  Yet, although FDR’s conservation policies invariably demonstrated a 
genuine conservationist sensibility, very often they also offered to the electorate tangible 
economic benefits, the sine qua non of all federal government domestic policy during the 
Depression.  In fact, the characteristic modus operandi of New Deal conservation policy 
comprised action against the Depression with action for conservation. 
     Forestry exemplifies FDR’s approach to conservation.  Au fond, the progressive 
preoccupation with improving land was involved with the soil, whose health was vital to prevent 
erosion and ensure fertility.  Within three years of coming to power, Roosevelt had increased 
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federally-owned national forest land by over 100%.39  Much of this land was specifically for re-
forestation, as it constituted ‘cut-over’ land which had been recklessly felled, exposing the soil to 
erosion and ruination.40  However, to make forest conservation directly relevant to depression-hit 
Americans Roosevelt, after consultation with TR’s chief forester, Gifford Pinchot, won 
congressional approval for the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC). 41  Between 1933 and 1939 it 
employed two and a half million young men in forestry, who by 1936, under the aegis of the 
Forest Service, had planted nearly a billion trees.42  Many members of the CCC were 
unemployed who came from the eastern urban wastelands, and most were employed by the New 
Deal in western states.  In this manner, the CCC satisfied progressive mutuality between the East 
and West of America.  Bearing in mind American localism, though, ‘economic sectionalism’ had 
to be overcome before federal intervention by the CCC gained widespread acceptance.  The CCC 
needed to offer local economic benefits, or the prospect of them.  Therefore, from the outset of 
the CCC, Roosevelt authorized hiring ‘local experienced men’ to supervise CCC recruits, and 
this decision resulted rapidly in 24,000 people being employed.43   
     Many contemporaries recognized Roosevelt’s strong interest in conservation, and comments 
abound about his lively participation in the CCC.  Roosevelt’s personal involvement in the CCC 
projects is considered to have been ‘decisive in their formulation and implementation’.44  FDR 
was so committed to the CCC that head of the Forest Service Ferdinand Silcox, in 1937, 
remarked that Roosevelt’s ‘knowledge of its details is almost uncanny’.45  Self-evidently, the 
centrality of conservation in his intellectual landscape makes FDR’s input over forestry on the 
West Coast in the later New Deal especially significant.  Even so, as forward-looking politicians 
in the Progressive era discovered, FDR had to balance his ‘environmental idealism’ against the 
pragmatic ‘economic sectionalism’ he encountered in areas like the West Coast.  ‘Economic 
sectionalism’ arose not only over CCC deployments there, but also related to forests in Olympic 
National Park, because forestry was vital for Washington State’s economy.  
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     The issue of national parks highlights a Progressive era movement, the preservationists, and 
how they were able to achieve ascendancy over their progressive rivals, the wise users.  As a 
result, they gained great influence with New Dealers during the 1930s.  The Hetch-Hetchy 
controversy in the Progressive and New eras had created such a legacy of bitterness for 
preservationists that they were motivated to develop a well-reasoned strategy that gave them 
decisive intellectual clout in the West Coast in the late New Deal when national park issues arose.  
Significantly, the two national parks established by the New Deal on the West Coast at the end of 
the 1930s were intricately connected to forestry, an aspect of conservation which the 
preservationists focused on particularly, and something we know was of great importance to 
FDR.      
      Several factors enabled preservationists to exert considerable influence on New Deal national 
park policy.  Firstly, the New Deal was receptive to the ideas of preservationists, in large 
measure, because events on the West Coast had vindicated them.  In the original Hetch-Hetchy 
dispute, wise users felt by granting San Franciscans a necessary water reservoir and power dam 
during 1913 they had achieved ‘the highest use of natural resources.’46 It left the rest of the 
Yosemite National Park untouched, and blocked private utility development there.  However, 
their Progressive era argument was largely invalidated in 1925 when Pacific Gas and Electric, a 
private utility, gained control of the dam’s electricity.  This outcome helped radicalize New Deal 
thinking over protecting national parks on the West Coast.  In effect, a dam development at 
Hetch-Hetchy, to benefit San Francisco’s population, notwithstanding the area’s status as a 
national park, had smoothed the path for a utility monopoly.  On account of the Hetch-Hetchy 
saga, wise users themselves were more receptive to the preservationist argument over national 
parks, as events had proved their position a mistake.  By 1933, the leading representatives of 
these groups, Pinchot and Marshall, were amicably exchanging letters. 
     Secondly, preservationists organized themselves into an effective pressure group, the 
Wilderness Society - founded in 1935 - with its power base in Washington DC.  Robert (Bob) 
Marshall, the leading light in the Wilderness Society published The Living Wilderness, a 
magazine that proselytized for the wilderness idea.  Marshall’s Wilderness Society stemmed 
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from the defeat over Hetch-Hetchy, which forced ‘preservationists’ to re-group during the 1920s 
and evolve a coherent set of beliefs based on the intrinsic worth of the American wilderness.47  
The New Deal permitted the Wilderness Society pressure group, which had fashioned itself into 
a countervailing power, to impact on policy decision-making.  At the end of the 1930s, 
preservationists were ready to seize control of the progressive discourse when the New Deal 
founded the Olympic National Park, Washington State (1938), and Kings Canyon National Park, 
California (1940).  Chapter four considers, at greater length, the Wilderness Society and 
Marshall’s contribution to late New Deal policy. 
     Thirdly, among the tactics Marshall deployed, the Wilderness Society harnessed its 
preservationist message to Turner’s frontier thesis, which was enjoying a renewed interest 
among New Dealers.  Turner had concluded that the closed frontier demanded federal 
government intervention to carefully husband finite natural resources.  Re-interpreting Turner’s 
ideas, the Wilderness Society argued the wilderness natural resource of national parks deserved 
maximum federal government protection.  They maintained it was irreplaceable because 
undeveloped land provided Americans with a ‘frontier experience’, according to Turner, the 
main building block of American character.  This dimension of the preservationist message, 
connecting it forcefully to the Progressive era’s moralistic ideology, perhaps merits more 
emphasis in the literature of the New Deal.  Typically, an article in The Living Wilderness stated 
that wilderness was ‘to those in whom the pioneering spirit survives ... a land of exploration 
(and) ... adventure.’ 48 Americans in the 1930s faced a time of heightened anxiety.  In this 
atmosphere, the New Deal wished to alleviate fears that the frontier’s end signified also the end 
of America’s pioneering spirit and economic potential - possibilities which the Great Depression 
had reinforced.  Therefore, what could be more reassuring than the prospect that Americans 
would always be able to rekindle their frontier spirit in the pristine wildernesses of the National 
Parks?   
     Accordingly, forestry and national park conservation should be understood as an ongoing 
discourse which emerged from the Progressive era.  The wise user utilitarian approach in forestry 
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remained ascendant at the start of the New Deal.  Already, over national parks preservationists 
were winning the argument against wise users due to developments in the Hetch-Hetchy 
controversy during 1913 and 1925.  However, they needed to wait until the late 1930s on the 
West Coast to see their ideas implemented.  Reclamation was also dependent on a Progressive 
era foundation and developments during Hoover’s decade. 
     In reclamation, if TR was the originator of federal schemes for ‘making the desert bloom,’ 
Herbert Hoover, in the 1920s, possessed the technical and local knowledge of the West Coast to 
make them a reality.  ‘The Great Engineer’ was a driver of reclamation policy.  Hoover’s 
Colorado River Compact (1922) achieved agreement over irrigation among six of its seven 
‘riparian’ states, which led in 1930 to Hoover Dam providing California with water, power, and 
settlement.  In California, Hoover also brought together federal, state, and private funding to 
forward the Central Valley Project (CVP), which would overcome the flood problems of the 
Sacramento Valley, and supply water to the parched San Joaquin Valley.  The CVP was first 
proposed during the Progressive era (1919).49  California’s legislature gave it the force of law in 
1933.   
     Yet, having acknowledged the Progressive and New Era background of 1930s reclamation 
policy, the New Deal’s own contribution was decisive, although it should be seen as a policy 
continuity, rather than departure.  The old Progressive Harold Ickes, FDR’s Secretary of the 
Interior, firmly put his stamp on reclamation policy, and re-invigorated it.  He reconstituted the 
CVP in 1935 which became a large-scale federal scheme, and completed the Hoover Dam the 
following year.  In so doing, he took significant decisions on access to, and use of, water and 
power for these projects during the late 1930s.  Moreover, Roosevelt’s government began during 
1933 the Bonneville and Grand Coulee Dams in Oregon and Washington State respectively – 
realizing Hoover’s objective of a Columbia River scheme.  These dams were completed at the 
end of the New Deal.  The extent Ickes attained progressive aims in these ambitious projects 
deserves examination, as the New Deal came under pressure from different groups to favour 
their particular interest.   
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     Although, ostensibly irrigation was politically neutral in offering water to dry-lands across the 
West the policy had multiple aims.  Practically-speaking it was hedged about with all manner of 
regulations and traditions, making irrigation politically contentious.  Since frontier times ‘prior 
appropriation’ gave first settlers rights over water in perpetuity, rather than all those who lived 
by the water source – ‘riparian rights’.  Under the Homestead Act of 1862, federal government 
encouraged Jeffersonian small farmers to open up the West.  Therefore, 160 acres was to be the 
maximum sized farm granted to a settler,50 (eventually doubling in size for married couples).  
Crucially, during the Progressive era, TR decided in his Reclamation Act that only small farmers, 
defined by the 160 acre rule, would have access to water from federal government projects.  
Effectively, progressives had broadened the scope of irrigation in conservation policy, so it was 
connected to social justice, and, by discouraging land engrossing, monopoly reform. 
     In New Deal reclamation projects, water could be used to improve existing farming land.  For 
instance, approximately a quarter million acres of land that mainly prosperous farmers owned in 
California’s Central Valley could be irrigated by the CVP, and water from Grand Coulee 
promised radically to improve poorer farms in East Washington State.51  The bulk of water from 
these schemes could do more – convert desert land to fertile farmland.  In the case of California’s 
CVP, creating three million new acres, and by Washington State’s Grand Coulee project 
reclaiming a million acres.52  However, at the end of the 1930s it was unclear who would benefit 
from the farmland created or improved.  In essence, the New Deal had to decide if irrigation 
schemes should be used as a promoter of social justice aims, or whether the economic and 
political importance of large farmers would be accorded a higher priority. Certainly, as a 
politician concerned with all three tenets of progressivism, from early in his presidency, FDR 
envisioned that reclamation as a conservation measure should be used to further wider objectives, 
conforming to his radical Progressive era background.  In 1934, when he visited the Grand 
Coulee site, he expressly connected settlement opportunities on reclaimed land with helping 
solve the Depression’s social justice problems, and giving a new lease of life to Turner’s frontier.  
He assured those in the depressed ‘settled parts of the nation’ that reclaimed land meant ‘you 
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shall have the opportunity of still going West’.53  By the end of the decade, Roosevelt said the 
Grand Coulee project was the answer to resettling Dust Bowl migrants. 
     To summarize, New Deal conservation policy in forestry, and national parks should be 
understood as a Progressive era discourse between wise users and preservationists.  Over forestry, 
wise user beliefs remained predominant during the early New Deal when economic imperatives 
were uppermost in political considerations.  Regarding national parks, preservationists had 
already won the argument with wise users because of prior developments surrounding the Hetch-
Hetchy controversy in the 1910s and 1920s.  However, preservationist thinking achieved major 
success in the later New Deal, not only concerning West Coast national parks but also in forest 
wilderness areas.  At the same time, the influence of a progressive past was resilient in 
reclamation schemes.  The New Deal scaled up, began, or completed West Coast projects, and 
maintained the Progressive era principles of TR over irrigation.  The ‘multiple-use’ approach – 
which encompassed the three tenets – was continued during the late New Deal.  As the next 
chapter details, both the Wilderness Society, and Progressive era-inspired individuals were vital 
on the West Coast for continuing an ideological purpose to New Deal conservation policy. 
Monopoly Reform 
Monopoly reform policy during the New Deal is viewed by historiographical wisdom as counter-
ideological, because FDR seemed to switch from one type of policy to another in response to 
political, economic, or constitutional pressures, rather than ideological conviction.  In doing so, 
he showed the suppleness of his political brain, but not consistency.  The Progressive era had 
given New Dealers choices about how to tackle big business, which tried to rig the market, over-
charge the public, and eliminate smaller competitors.  At the time of the 1912 presidential 
election, Wilson had argued for New Freedom – using the law to break up big business, so-called 
trust-busting.  Alternatively, TR believed in New Nationalism, to regulate monopolies, which 
was aimed at changing their behaviour.  At the start of the New Deal, within the administration 
there were adherents of both types of monopoly reform.  Felix Frankfurter and his protégés, Tom 
Corcoran and Ben Cohen, were Brandeisians, followers of Louis Brandeis, Wilson’s economic 
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advisor over the New Freedom option.  Presidential aide, Raymond Moley, and economist, Adolf 
Berle, represented New Nationalist thinking.  Both sides vied for the attention of Roosevelt.   
     In the First New Deal, (1933-1935), New Nationalist thought seemed to be in the ascendant, 
with the business self-government of the National Recovery Administration (NRA).  It even 
went beyond the government-business co-operation of the Hoover era, because most anti-trust 
measures were suspended during the NRA.  This phase of the New Deal is considered un-
ideological because it made practical sense for government to work with business, as breaking it 
up would only add to America’s unemployment woes.  Conversely, the Second New Deal (1935-
1938) resorted to the trust-busting option.  The historiography judges that the change of direction 
had been motivated by pragmatic considerations – the Supreme Court’s ruling, May, 1935, that 
the NRA was unconstitutional, which forced a change of policy.  Additionally, a more radical 
edge to the New Deal was introduced because FDR, out of expediency, wanted to ‘spike the guns’ 
of political opponents, like Huey Long, who advocated a stepping up of government intervention 
in the 1936 presidential elections.54 
     Typical of New Deal historians, Freidel suggests, from the outset of the New Deal, FDR did 
not view New Nationalism and New Freedom as mutually antagonistic, and had no special 
preference for either.  For these historians, writing at a time when there was a strong awareness 
of how inflexible 20th Century totalitarian ideologies like Nazism and Stalinism had inflicted 
such harm on the world, Roosevelt’s purported unconcern about ideological orthodoxy must 
have seemed modern and liberating.  In effect, pragmatic reasons dictated the policy FDR chose.  
According to Freidel, Roosevelt failed to appreciate supposedly inherent contradictions between 
the two monopoly policy approaches.55  Therefore, apparently, FDR was cast adrift from the 
Progressive era, and the politicians of that time who, in this reading of the situation, had 
resolutely followed one monopoly reform method and abjured alternatives. 
     Indeed, contemporaries like the New Nationalist Moley, expressed exasperation with FDR’s 
apparent lack of ideological consistency.  Moley had left government by the time of the Second 
New Deal, but strongly disapproved of its seeming abandonment of New Nationalist orthodoxy.  
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Like some member of an extreme religious sect of ‘true believers’ he viewed with outraged 
indignation Roosevelt’s willingness to switch from one monopoly reform belief to another, or, 
worse, mix them promiscuously together.  He judged FDR incapable of pursuing a coherent 
policy over big business.  When Roosevelt apparently forsook New Nationalism and intensified 
his New Freedom approach in the final years of the New Deal, the historiography considers he 
turned opportunistically against big business, in order to make it a scapegoat for the economic 
downturn of the so-called ‘Roosevelt Recession’, 1937-1938.56  The resulting Temporary 
National Economic Committee (TNEC) (April, 1938) set up to investigate monopolies was 
headed by FDR’s preferred choice, Senator Joseph O’Mahoney.  O’Mahoney promptly said he 
aimed to ‘set business free from monopoly and government’ - a statement of seemingly opposed 
objectives.  In disgust at this clinching proof of the president’s lack of ideological resolve, Moley 
commented that the TNEC constituted ‘the final expression of Roosevelt’s indecision’.57  Yet, 
Moley’s one-track approach to monopoly reform had little in common with the Progressive era, 
which gave FDR his intellectual template. 
     In fact Roosevelt never viewed monopoly reform from the ‘particularist’ perspective of New 
Nationalism or New Freedom.  Instead, the ideological understanding he inherited from the 
Progressive era allowed him to accommodate both in his thinking.  As we have seen, apart from 
the 1912 presidential election where Wilson and TR exaggerated the New Freedom and New 
Nationalist positions in order to create ‘issue space’ between them, these two policies were never 
mutually contradictory in the Progressive era.  Rather, they were, and remained, simply two 
ways of dealing with a central problem progressivism identified, namely how to curb the 
excessive economic and political influence of quasi-monopolistic business in American life.  It is 
not necessary to reiterate the detail of TR’s and Wilson’s actions in the monopoly field, but 
suffice to say that both presidents willingly employed each other’s monopoly reform policies, 
having failed to gain Congressional consent for their own policy preferences.  In the light of 
what had happened in the Progressive era, FDR judiciously decided not to adopt a fixed view on 
monopoly reform.  At no time did he view New Nationalism or New Freedom as mutually 
hostile anti-monopoly methods, and in that conclusion he reflected the political practice of the 
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Progressive age.  Consequently, FDR’s opinion that the two approaches should be regarded as 
mutually supportive was entirely consistent with Progressive era practice, and connected him 
with that era rather than setting him apart from it.  Opinion which is not fixated on ‘ideological 
particularism’ tends to bear out this contention 
     Hubert Humphrey, writing in 1940, without the influence of subsequent historical 
reconstructions of the New Deal, quotes FDR and endorses his opinion that the two monopoly 
reform methods were not at variance.  Humphrey states: ‘Many of the achievements of the last 
seven years have been, in the words of the President, “the fulfilment of progressive ideas 
expounded by Theodore Roosevelt of a partnership between business and government and also 
the determination of Woodrow Wilson that business be subjected, through the power of 
government, to drastic legal limitations against abuses”’.58  Progressivism in practice bequeathed 
to the New Deal a flexible ideology on monopoly reform, although obviously theorists of New 
Nationalism and New Freedom like Moley or Frankfurter respectively often remained loyal to 
their strand of progressive ideology. However, rather than presenting New Dealers with a stark 
choice between business regulation or trust-busting, if they were to be consistent with 
progressive thinking, Progressive era practice had shown the advantages of both methods. 
     The NRA in the First New Deal sought business co-operation to facilitate economic recovery.  
Although NRA codes regulated companies, they ceded much power to big business in the design 
of the codes.  True to consensus values, the New Deal ‘Planners’ who FDR selected to shape 
policy comprised a Progressive era balance of the enlightened left and right.  Rexford Tugwell 
wanted to use the coercive power of government to reform business away from acquisitive 
capitalism.  Raymond Moley had a Hoover-like faith in persuading business to reform itself 
towards social responsibility.  He even organized dinners with businessmen (1934) in the manner 
of Hoover’s meetings to win them to new ways.59  Accordingly, the First New Deal was a 
Progressive era exercise in consensus politics. It also re-asserted another expression of consensus 
– TR’s and Wilson’s twin track monopoly reform policy, using a mixture of New Nationalism 
and trust-busting. In this context, it is necessary to dispel the impression that the First New Deal 
was occupied exclusively in business-government co-operation.  As in the Progressive era, 
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regulation and trust-busting existed side by side, although trust-busting during the First New 
Deal was on a considerably lesser scale than in the later 1930s, due to the temporary suspension 
of most anti-trust measures under the NRA.  Like the Second New Deal, though, the anti-trust 
action that did take place frequently involved utility companies.  One of the most important cases 
in the early New Deal was taken against the Stone and Webster utility cartel, which was 
dissolved by federal anti-trust regulations in 1934. Stone and Webster were a national company, 
but it was perhaps best known for its ownership of Puget Power, the main utility provider in 
Seattle, Washington.  
     As elements of New Nationalism and New Freedom co-existed in the First New Deal, so the 
Second New Deal transition from government regulation of business to trust-busting in 1935 was 
not the straightforward process sometimes portrayed.  Leuchtenburg shrewdly detected the twin 
track nature of the Second New Deal, stating that, as well as Brandeisian influences, ‘many of 
the NRA emphases persisted’.60  Bearing in mind Progressive presidents accommodated both 
New Nationalist and New Freedom into their thinking then once more Progressive era continuity 
is apparent in the New Deal.  Likewise, trust-busting, conducted during the Second New Deal, 
arose from a gradual build-up of pressure for this policy, not an abrupt policy shift. The issue of 
holding companies exemplifies this point.  We saw in chapter one that TR broke up the first 
holding company – the Northern Securities railroad company in the Pacific North West – and 
also expressed misgivings about the over-concentration of utility companies.  From the 1920s, 
holding companies became dominant in the utility industry, and caused much public and political 
disquiet, because this development coincided with the electrification of America.  Consequently, 
the most celebrated trust-busting law of the Second New Deal – the Public Utility Holding 
Company Act (1935) – was far from being a spontaneous action taken by FDR’s government. 
      Of all the measures from the Second New Deal, 1935-1936, the Utility Holding Company 
Act ‘had the longest gestation period, having begun to be conceived at the very height of the 
New Economic Era.’ 61  Although Hoover during the 1920s remained sanguine about utility 
holding companies, appreciating their contribution to modernizing the USA, the American public 
and their representatives became increasingly disturbed at the corruption of legislatures by 
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utilities in the 1926 mid-term elections, and the over-concentration of companies controlling 
America’s electricity. 62   As a result, investigations into utility holding companies, inaugurated 
by the Senate and House in 1926, were conducted by the Federal Trade Commission and Federal 
Power Commission.  These 1920s investigations, which were still ongoing 1933-5, uncovered 
further serious economic and political corruption during the 1934 mid-term elections.63   
     The rise of large private utility companies needs also to be seen in the context of federal 
expansion of hydro-electricity from major dams in the West and South that politicized electricity 
issues.  Even before the New Deal was underway, Brandeisians and New Nationalists realized 
that control of electricity, especially HEP, would be a major political battleground in the future.  
Prophetically, the Brandeisian Felix Frankfurter wrote to FDR in 1929, setting the scene for the 
HEP struggles of the 1930s.  He stated: ‘Hydro-electric power raises without a doubt the most 
far-reaching social and economic issues before the American people, certainly for the next 
decade.’64  With the Depression deepening, even people sympathetic to large business, like New 
Nationalists, saw the need for action against HEP utility holding company’s excessive economic 
and political influence.  Two days after FDR’s election triumph of 1932, the New Nationalist, 
Berle wrote to Moley of the urgent need for ‘federal regulation of ...public utility holding 
companies’.65  Significantly, the Public Utility Holding Company Act also illustrated 
Roosevelt’s Progressive era ideological intent, because he personally supported having the ‘death 
sentence’ clause included in the legislation.66  By this clause, all utility holding companies would 
be automatically broken up in 1940, unless they could demonstrate to the New Deal’s regulatory 
body, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), a rationale for their existence at a local level.  
Therefore, the Public Utility Holding Company Act, the most far-reaching trust-busting measure 
of the Second New Deal was not just introduced as a pragmatic response to the Supreme Court 
striking down the NRA, or as a way of challenging FDR’s more radical opponents in the 1936 
presidential elections.  On the contrary, whether the NRA had still been in place, or not, the New 
Deal, was both responding to a build-up of support for government action against large utilities 
among the public, and taking action on ideological grounds.      
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     Ideology is vitally important in the third New Deal solution to monopoly reform – 
‘countervailing powers’ – inspired by the Progressive era.  Municipal power companies had 
functioned as a counter-weight to private utilities in HEP since Progressive times.  From the 
Hetch-Hetchy Dam decision of 1913, progressives had encouraged rivals to the big utility 
companies – in this instance, the San Francisco municipal company.  According to one 
interpretation, Hoover, as shown in the previous chapter, favoured municipal power companies.  
He saw them as local, often preferable to ‘statist’ or private utility solutions, and - with a 
progressive concern for the extension of popular will - democratic.  Therefore, the New Deal 
reached back into preceding eras for its countervailing power policy.  Secretary of the Interior 
Ickes actively encouraged the growth of municipal electricity companies in the 1930s, and his 
agenda showed clear policy continuity.67  For example, early New Deal action against Stone and 
Webster (1934) should not merely be categorized as trust-busting, because it can be placed into a 
wider context.  After its break-up, the Stone and Webster subsidiary Puget Power on the West 
Coast needed to be re-organized under local ownership.  City Light, its municipal rival in Seattle, 
benefited enormously from this outcome.  There is the strong suspicion that New Dealers had 
acted decisively to dismantle Stone and Webster to help its local municipal rival, which had been 
struggling in the early 1930s.  Continuity in aiding municipal power companies is illustrated by 
the fact that JD Ross, the head of City Light since Progressive times – 1911 – and a leading 
advocate of public power development, had secured bail-out funding from Hoover in 1932 to 
tide City Light over the Great Depression.  During the later 1930s, he went onto assume a 
leading position for Roosevelt in the HEP field on the West Coast, discussed in chapter five.  
     In summary, monopoly reform in the First and Second New Deal can only be fully 
understood with greater recognition of its Progressive era ideological content.  FDR’s treatment 
of New Nationalism and New Freedom thinking as mutually supportive during the New Deals 
was in keeping, not at variance, with the practice of progressive ideology.  His use of 
countervailing powers over the electricity power issue was inherited from the 1900-1920 period, 
and the case can be made for an unbroken public power lineage that includes the New Era.  
Moreover, in privileging municipal power companies, the New Deal connected itself to 
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ideological preoccupations within progressivism about extending democratic control, and 
avoiding the socio-economic extremes of untrammelled capitalism or state control.  As chapter 
five shows, these viewpoints were strongly held on the West Coast, and became very relevant to 
the big dams there which began producing electricity in the late 1930s.  
Social Justice                                
Social justice in the New Deal was inextricably linked to the first national priority – the economy.  
Therefore, it is best understood as an expression of socio-economic policy.  Faced by the 
unparalleled economic downturn of the Depression, FDR implemented in the ‘hundred days’ an 
extraordinary programme of government intervention.  While this response was aimed 
principally at the economy, it implied from the outset that Roosevelt’s government felt duty-
bound to supply a measure of social justice for the poverty-stricken unemployed.  Accordingly, 
Harry Hopkins’ Civil Works Administration (CWA), 1933-1934, and the Work Progress 
Administration (WPA), 1935-1940, provided direct relief and work creation schemes.  Harold 
Ickes’ Public Works Administration (PWA) re-employed skilled workers building highways, 
railroads and dams.  Old Progressives like Ickes and Hopkins led this New Deal response.  
Politicians from Progressive era dynasties, FDR, and La Follette Jr., were leading exponents of, 
‘big government’ spending on relief.68  This unheard-of federal intervention was, in some 
respects, a policy departure, even if it paled in comparison with government spending during 
World War II. 
     FDR used the mantra ‘relief, recovery and reform’ to describe his New Deal vision.  If relief 
measures to help the unemployed were largely innovations of the 1930s, then New Deal recovery 
and reform initiatives have a greater kinship with the Progressive era.  The policy of directly 
aiding labour unions in New Deal reforms can be readily located within a progressive tradition. 
In the Progressive age, TR unsuccessfully mediated to give coal miners union recognition, and 
Wilson ended a legal impediment to the formation of unions.  During the New Era, Hoover 
succeeded, by government and press propaganda, in securing steelworkers improved conditions, 
and Congress outlawed injunctions against peaceful picketing.  However, labour unions lost 
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membership during the 1920s, and this process was greatly accelerated by Great Depression 
unemployment.  In these circumstances, the New Deal actively stimulated unionization, as a 
social justice policy, and to increase purchasing power in the economy.   
     Even so, the methods the New Deal used proved especially controversial.  In the Progressive 
and New Eras, progressives tried to persuade employers that very limited union demands should 
be met, and moreover removed barriers which had made union activity illegal.  During the New 
Deal government interfered directly in the workplace – the personal domain of the employer.  
Employers were told by New Deal regulation and law to accept unionization and not oppose it.  
Section 7a of NRA codes during the First New Deal (1933) obliged employers who joined the 
programme to recognize unions.  When the Supreme Court struck down the NRA, the Second 
New Deal National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935 went further.  Section 7a in NRA 
codes had sometimes just been ignored, or circumvented by employers who encouraged 
company unions that they controlled, rather than allowing independent unions which could 
foment strikes among workers.  In contrast, the NLRA stipulated every employer must grant 
exclusive negotiating rights to the union that the majority of their workers wanted.  Actually, 
New Deal measures were merely an extra ‘ratcheting-up’ of pressure for unionization, in the 
progressive tradition.  Even so, for many American employers, they were an attack on their 
property rights and the exercise of rugged individualism, especially as the NRA and later the 
NLRA set off a wave of unionization strikes, threatening company profits. 69   At the same time, 
New Deal unionization helped industrial labour achieve a level of social justice e.g. winning 
higher pay because of their strengthened negotiating position. 
     Nevertheless, it is wider context implications of unionization that concern us here, because 
they exposed potential weaknesses in progressive ideology.  The original progressives had feared 
political extremism caused in part by a sense of injustice among the urban and rural poor.  
Progressive era politicians set out to build national unity through removing social justice 
grievances and persuading voters that this outcome would benefit everyone.  Consequently, 
progressivism’s philosophical urge was to make a fair society, which would have unity of 
purpose.  However, its political imperative was the utilization of that unity of purpose across 
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society, and among particular groups, to maximize electoral support.  For progressives, these two 
urges went hand-in-hand – ideology always tended to march in step with pragmatism.  In 
Progressive times, a national consensus appeared possible, which included the rural/urban 
farmer-labour alliance.  During the New Deal, though, unionization threatened to wreck the 
national consensus behind Roosevelt, by stirring up political extremism, fragmenting the farmer-
labour alliance, and further jeopardizing the small farmers’ status. 
     The first ideological weakness that unionization brought to the surface was related to anti-
communism, and the damage it might inflict on a national consensus. The spectre, or reality, of 
Red Scares always threatened to force the New Deal into retreat, as they had the enlightened 
policies of the Progressive era. Complicating matters, in similar fashion to the original 
progressives, the reforms of the New Deal were inevitably going to set in train extremist 
demands for more sweeping changes in American society from communists, and others.   
Reactionary elements were ready to label New Deal measures pro-communist, especially 
unionization, conflating reformers with revolutionaries, because both challenged the status quo, 
ignoring the New Deal’s adherence to capitalism and democracy.  At the start of the New Deal, 
Rex Tugwell’s work on the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) was compared to the 
state socialist schemes of Stalin’s Russia.  In December, 1933, the journalist Mark Sullivan 
wrote a series of columns insinuating that the New Deal was pro-communist.70  In April, 1934, 
the Wirt affair alleged that a conspiracy was being hatched within the New Deal to facilitate 
FDR’s failure so he could be replaced by a Stalin figure.  Though Wirt’s allegation was easily 
refuted, Schlesinger writes: ‘the Wirt affair helped shape a new stereotype – the theory of the 
New Deal as a subversive conspiracy’.71  In fact, the New Deal was regularly accused of 
harbouring, and encouraging extreme left wing views, in an America peculiarly susceptible to 
anti-communism throughout the 20th Century.   Therefore, as with previous progressives, New 
Dealers were vulnerable to anti-communism deflecting them from reform, or targeting them.  As 
suggested earlier, the absence of an established Progressive party, to normalize reform ideas 
among the public, facilitated accusations that reformist governments were subversive of 
American values, and this lurking danger was nowhere more apparent than over government-
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sponsored unionization.  Furthermore, during the Depression many employers quite 
understandably believed strikes and higher wages caused by unionization would wreck chances 
of economic recovery.       
     In 1934 the national consensus was threatened because of events on the West Coast.  This 
time the communist smear had a greater chance of sticking than the Wirt affair.  On account of 
Section 7a of NRA codes, there was an upsurge in unionization activity.  The International 
Longshoremen’s Association (ILA), part of the normally docile AFL union movement, was re-
constituted as a result of the NRA, and argued the case for representing all dock workers in the 
ports of the West Coast. 72  However, the employers had no intention of allowing their pliable 
company union to be replaced by the ILA, whose leader, the hard bitten Australian Harry 
Bridges, was a committed Marxist. 73   For eleven weeks from May, 1934, Bridges held a strike 
in the San Francisco docks over union recognition.74  Bridges’ strike sent shock-waves through 
the Industrial Association, the employers’ organization, because it soon spread to every port on 
the West Coast.75  The situation degenerated into hate-filled violence when the Industrial 
Association attempted to open up the docks at San Francisco, and two strikers were killed in 
clashes on ‘Black Thursday.’76  It also placed FDR in an invidious position, for at the end of June 
he was drafting an executive order to set up the first National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), 
which would help oversee unionization under the NRA. 77   Clearly, if pro-union regulations 
resulted in a state of affairs amounting to class warfare the policy might inflict a heavy electoral 
price on the New Deal at the 1934 mid-term elections.  The crisis came to a head in July with a 
general strike breaking out across San Francisco.78          
     Widespread revulsion was expressed about this unfolding crisis, including from old 
Progressives.  Conflict between the political extremes of communism and anti-communism 
represented the antithesis of Progressive era consensus politics.  Hiram Johnson sent a telegram 
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to his fellow old Progressive Harold Ickes, describing the San Francisco general strike as a 
‘disaster’ and the ‘possible ruin of the Pacific Coast’.79  Historians have noted how, among the 
employer class, ‘all along the Pacific shore’ the San Francisco strike ‘vividly recollected’ the 
Progressive era Seattle general strike of 1919.80  In 1934 extreme violence flared again in Seattle 
when clubs and tear gas were used against pickets.81  Serious damage to the New Deal was only 
averted when after four days the strike ended, and concessions were made on both sides.  
However, these Pacific Coast strikes in 1934 represented an early warning to the New Deal of 
how its social justice reform policies could unleash forces which were anathema to progressive 
values and New Deal electoral chances.  The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) – the 
Second New Deal’s solution to the defunct NRA’s unionization policy – created similar 
problems for Roosevelt, in another incendiary communist crisis for the New Deal on the West 
Coast, 1939-1940, that featured once again Bridges’ union. 
     This later crisis was appreciably worsened by a development coeval with the passage of the 
NLRA in 1935.  That year the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA) changed strategy.  
Up till then, the CPUSA had viewed other left-wing parties as capitalist collaborators.  
Afterwards American communists worked together with them in a popular or united front.  
Attracted by Second New Deal radicalism, communists covertly entered federal government 
agencies, like the NLRB, and were an overt presence in the growing labour movement. Earl 
Browder, the CPUSA leader, attempted to appeal to a wider electorate by arguing that his party 
was an authentically American movement.  He claimed that the CPUSA had been ‘shaped by 
national experience’, and was not the servant of Comintern, the Moscow-based body for co-
ordinating global communism, which had ordered his change of strategy.82   Although the 
popular front phase of communism was superficially more moderate, ultimately it endangered 
the New Deal’s national consensus.   
     In the mid 1930s, the accommodation of popular front communist elements within an 
expanding progressive consensus, whether in the CIO unions or New Deal, appeared relatively 
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innocuous, even though many old Progressives never lost their strong distrust of communism.  
Moreover, expressing the public relations dangers of communism, Senator La Follette Jr.’s 
newspaper The Progressive presciently stated in 1936: ‘it is to be hoped the communist question 
does not become the monkey-wrench in... (the) gears’ of the farmer-labour movement, western 
progressivism’s key electoral grouping, and a potential ‘third force’ in American politics.83   
Finally, at the end of the decade, developments in unionization and the reversion of the CPUSA 
to divisive politics helped revive a fierce anti-communism, particularly on the West Coast.  
Accordingly New Deal forbearance towards popular front communists, or at least that perception 
among the public, and the cumulative effect of specious pro-communist accusations against the 
New Deal, assumed a new significance.  Anti-communists attempted to conflate the New Deal, 
unionization, and the divisive politics re-emerging within the CPUSA.      
     The second ideological weakness that unionization highlighted was the fragility of the 
Progressive era farmer-labour alliance.  Although eventually 1930s unionization helped hasten 
its downfall, at first government-sponsored unionization seemed to strengthen farmer-labour 
unity.  New Deal measures for poorer groups stressed the mutuality of the farmer-labour alliance, 
by encouraging industrial worker unionization, and assisting small farmers.  In raising both 
groups’ purchasing power, economic recovery might be achieved, and the unity of the farmer-
labour alliance consolidated.  Only later in the 1930s did unionization appear counter-productive 
to farmer-labour unity. 
     Roosevelt had said ‘our economic life today is a seamless web’, to underscore how American 
citizens were interdependent, as they confronted the depredations of the Great Depression.84   
The phrase was more than an oratorical device, serving to unite Americans artificially against 
adversity.  There is every indication that he, and other leading New Dealers, sincerely believed it 
to be true.  Appreciating the ‘mutuality’ of groups in society, like the industrial and agricultural 
workforces, they believed, was vital for economic recovery and the furtherance of social justice.  
At the start of the New Deal, Roosevelt acknowledged his hopes for reducing chronic urban 
unemployment depended on a rural measure – the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 1933, which was 
designed to increase the ‘purchasing power’ of small farmers for goods produced by urban 
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workers.85  Senator Robert La Follette Jr., representative of 1930s western progressivism, 
stressed that his support for large scale First New Deal relief programmes to aid the industrial 
unemployed involved a rural sub-text.  By increasing the spending power of the urban working 
class, he asserted, the relief programmes would help recover agriculture.86  His work on the 
Second New Deal Civil Liberties Committee, principally assisting industrial unionization, was 
not only aimed at boosting urban working class pay,  but also raising farm incomes by expanding 
the consumption of agricultural goods.  Therefore, economic and social justice interests were 
congruent, along with the interests of the small farmer and industrial worker. 
     Indeed, Senator La Follette Jr.’s appointment to head the new Civil Liberties Committee in 
1936 was particularly apt.  His home state of Wisconsin, by 1930, was 53% urban, and the fact 
that Wisconsin was an almost equal mix of the agricultural and industrial sectors meant he was 
well placed to carry out the mandate of the committee.87  Furthermore, Wisconsin had its own 
revived Progressive party during the 1930s, led by the senator’s assertive brother, Governor 
Philip La Follette.  Senator La Follette’s support for the farmer-labour alliance, and his strong 
progressive credentials enhanced his suitability to lead the Civil Liberties Committee.  Senate 
Resolution 266, (March, 1936), proposed an investigation into ‘undue interference with the right 
of labor to organize and bargain collectively’.88  The La Follette Civil Liberties Committee 
looked at attempts by employers, between 1936 and 1940, to thwart the right of workers to join 
unions, especially as guaranteed under the NLRA of 1935.  Its most acclaimed work was 
concerned with industrial unions, the direct beneficiaries of the NLRA.  During the final phase of 
the committee’s work between 1939 and 1940, it concentrated on both rural poverty and the food 
processing industries, including a major enquiry in California.       
     To a great extent, the La Follette Committee was a propaganda exercise on behalf of 
industrial labour, to retain public support for unionization, at a time when violence consequent 
on it was causing controversy.  Accordingly, Robert Wohlforth, the La Follette Committee’s able 
secretary, who had a background in journalism, co-ordinated its activities to achieve optimum 
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publicity in newspapers about dire industrial conditions.  The progressive parallels with 
Hoover’s newspaper campaign in favour of oppressed industrial workers are self-evident.  Heber 
Blankenhorn, the liaison between the La Follette Committee and Roosevelt’s government, 
assisted the committee’s news management operation.  In World War I Blankenhorn was a 
founder of ‘psychological operations’ (‘psy-ops’), where he had pioneered airborne drops of 
morale-sapping leaflets behind enemy lines.  During the New Deal, he suggested mass 
psychology techniques to the La Follette Committee.    
     However, while La Follette, his co-chairman Senator Elbert Thomas, and Wohlforth, often 
massaged the facts to strengthen the case for industrial unionization, the stark and sickening 
evidence that they unearthed about widespread employer abuse against workers was not an 
invention.  In many American workplaces, and several of the most lurid examples were in La 
Follette’s Mid West, there was an atmosphere of brooding violence and intimidation towards 
those who joined unions or attempted union action.  Gangsters were employed as strike-breakers 
by management at the Black and Decker plant in Kent, Ohio.89  Republic Steel owned ten times 
more tear gas guns than Chicago’s entire police force.  General Motors in Detroit systematically 
destroyed industrial espionage files, rather than hand them over to La Follette, who was 
investigating the extent the automobile company used spies to disrupt union activity.  Coal 
owners in Harlan County, Kentucky, ‘owned’ the local police and at Louellen their un-unionized 
workforce lived like feudal serfs behind a gate, which barred the only road going into town.  
Permission was even needed from the coal owners for their workers to have outside visitors.90   
     In response to such conditions, the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), the unskilled 
and semi-skilled union movement, began a campaign of unionization, marked by violence.  CIO 
numbers rose to a claimed 3.7 million by the end of 1937.91  Their militant behaviour was 
reminiscent of the Progressive era International Workers of the World, and the CIO were 
suspended by the more moderate American Federation of Labor (AFL) in September, 1936.92  
Certainly, the conciliatory AFL union movement should have been preferable to a progressive 
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like La Follette.  Then again, at the end of 1936, the CIO began using the sit-down strike– 
occupying factories to gain union recognition – a method that often set off pitched battles with 
the employers’ hired guards.93  Contrary to La Follette’s progressive beliefs about compromise, 
the CIO’s action verged on the revolutionary, albeit for industrial rather than political objectives.   
The recruitment of communist organisers, especially in the automobile and steel disputes, further 
conveyed immoderation in the CIO.  La Follette might be expected to have distanced himself 
from this CIO campaign, especially as its aura of anarchy was viewed with revulsion by his 
bedrock supporters, law-abiding western farmers.  Instead, he despatched La Follette 
investigators into the thick of CIO disputes.  
     However, La Follette’s stance becomes more comprehensible in view of the behaviour and 
beliefs of CIO leader, John L. Lewis.  In important ways, the inspirational Lewis, who was able 
to rouse crowds with his evangelical passion, and ‘air of pugnacity even when standing perfectly 
still’, was fundamentally a product of the Progressive era. 94   Like La Follette, though, he had 
been further radicalized by the Depression, and both believed it could only be averted again if 
there was greater ‘purchasing power’ among the industrial workforce.95  Lewis’ unionization of 
workers was predicated on the need for ‘industrial democracy’,’ giving them a right to have 
representatives, that corresponded with their political rights.96   This concept had progressive 
overtones because progressivism had invariably desired to extend democracy in all areas of life.  
Lewis’s ‘industrial democracy’ was based on first-past-the-post elections – as in America’s 
political system – giving power to the union that won the majority of votes.  Perhaps 
significantly, Lewis cited AFL failure in the Progressive era US Steel strike of 1919 to rally 
support for the CIO.97  Conversely, during the New Deal, US Steel, described by Lewis as ‘the 
crouching lion in the pathway of labor’, tamely conceded to a tranche of CIO demands in 1937.98   
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     Even so, Lewis’ sit-down strike unionization drive was only tactically revolutionary, whereas 
strategically it located itself in the American progressive political tradition.  As the sociologist C. 
Wright Mills writes of Lewis: ‘Even as the labor leader rebels, he holds back rebellion.  He 
organizes discontent and then sits on it...He makes regular what might otherwise be disruptive’.99  
Or, as Lewis expressed his progressive goals: ‘there must now be new economic and social 
controls...established in America;’ ... (but) ‘reforms must be worked out in accordance with 
American precedents and ideals’.100  
     If La Follette could accommodate Lewis’ tactics to his thinking, the consequences of CIO 
unionization in the end created insupportable tensions for La Follette’s farmer-labour beliefs.  
The CIO’s unionization campaign galvanized the AFL to similar efforts, during the late 1930s, in 
order to survive as a union movement against CIO success.  In particular the AFL Teamsters 
union, representing truckers, and allied groups, became synonymous with aggressively 
successful organization.  Jimmy Hoffa of the Detroit truckers was infamous for ‘strong arm’ 
tactics.101  On the West Coast, the Teamsters were headquartered in Seattle. Although AFL/CIO 
competition to unionize American workers is no longer considered to have been as intense as 
once thought, the union ‘civil war’ speeded up the rate of unionization, and feelings ran high on 
the West Coast.102   
     Both the CIO and re-energized AFL regarded the food processing industries as the next stage 
in the unionization process during the late 1930s.  Yet small farmers feared unionization would 
disrupt movement of produce and hit farm income.  In Progressive times, as already noted, 
FDR’s progressivism had been pulled in opposite directions when he had been slow to support 
humanitarian New York State legislation to help food processing workers, lest he offend his 
upstate small farmer base support.  During the New Deal, very largely due to federal 
government-condoned unionization, conflicts of interest between small farmers and industrial 
workers multiplied as food processing unionization spread.  To the western progressive La 
Follette such a situation could spell political disaster, because there was a direct correlation 
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between the depth of poverty of Wisconsin dairy farmers, for instance, and their strength of 
support for him.  Wisconsin was a major food processing area, both America’s biggest milk 
producing state, and, by the end of World War II, responsible for a fifth of the country’s canned 
vegetables.103  If La Follette’s duties in the Civil Liberties Committee required him to look into 
the rights of food processing workers, he would be placed in a very awkward predicament 
regarding his key farming base.  Precisely this situation occurred, 1939-1940, when the La 
Follette Committee investigated California’s labour problems, as described in chapter six.  
California was the biggest and most diverse food producing state in the USA.  By the late New 
Deal, unionization was embroiling Roosevelt’s government in a series of Communist 
controversies, and had undermined the farmer-labour alliance. 
     The third ideological weakness unionization contributed to surrounds the political loyalty of 
the small farmer socio-economic group.  As noted previously, the lack of an enduring 
Progressive party since Progressive times meant small farmers were not perhaps granted the 
undivided governmental attention that certain groups enjoyed, like large farmers, big business, 
and increasingly in the New Deal, big labour.  Although western progressivism saw small 
farmers as the time-honoured receptacle of American values and an extant crucial voting force in 
western constituencies, right through the years 1900-1940 presidential leaders did not subscribe 
to their centrality in policy.  In these circumstances, incrementally, as the New Deal unfolded, 
the small farmer group grew increasingly restive, and prone to desert the New Deal for more 
extreme alternatives.   
     True to Progressive era values on ‘mutuality’, FDR recognized that the rural West should 
assist the recovery of the industrial East from the Depression, and vice versa.  He envisaged a 
socio-economic and geopolitical consensus, if you will.  Roosevelt stated:  ‘The East has a stake 
in the West and the West has a stake in the East...the nation...shall be considered as a whole and 
not as an aggregate of disjointed groups.’104  However, he was acutely conscious of the 
limitations placed on the West by Turner’s closed frontier theory, the intellectual thread running 
through the Progressive, New, and New Deal eras.  Therefore, the West, America’s agricultural 
heartland, was no longer a self-regulating organism, where struggling farmers could find new 
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and better land during economic troubles.  Instead, it was viewed as a place in need of outside 
assistance- a society in stasis.   
     Consequently, Roosevelt was mindful of a strong constituency among western farmers which, 
more than any group in society, had vociferously demanded since the 1920s ‘progressive’ 
programmes to remedy their conditions, including federal government intervention.105  In using 
intervention to address the rural West’s socio-economic difficulties, Roosevelt was responding to 
broad-based democratic pressure, but crucially he believed government programmes benefited 
the national community, because boosting agricultural purchasing power would aid industrial 
America.  On this basis, the New Deal ‘government-subsidized scarcity’ programmes, which 
reduced farm production to force up prices, as in the Agricultural Adjustment Acts (1933 and 
1938) and the Soil Conservation Act, satisfied both western progressive electoral pressure and 
Progressive era consensus politics.106 
     However, another Progressive era concern – countervailing powers – disadvantaged small 
farmers.  Since the 1900s, Progressives were preoccupied by the disproportionate influence big 
business exerted on the economy and politics.  Therefore, strong farming organizations had been 
encouraged to re-balance society and counteract big business.  Almost inevitably richer farmers 
came to the fore in progressive calculations.  The Farm Bureau, set up in Chicago during 1919, 
represented large farmers and was important across the West, lobbying vigorously for the 
farming interest.  Large farmers had the time and money to organize effectively.   
     At the start of the New Deal, no farmers were prospering, due to Great Depression contraction 
of the domestic market, protectionism’s impact on international markets, and overproduction in 
farming.107  As with big business co-operation in the First New Deal, Roosevelt’s government 
believed large farmers were the most capable in their socio-economic sector of driving national 
recovery during an unmatched socio-economic emergency.  Therefore, the Farm Bureau held 
greater sway over New Deal farm programmes than the more devolved National Grange, 
representing small farmers.  Similarly, the Farm Bureau pressure group constituted the most 
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viable and robust prospect within rural society for a countervailing power to help re-balance the 
US economy.  Humphrey cites the First AAA to demonstrate its pressure group politics, whereby 
the New Deal responded to the agenda of ‘organized farm groups’.108  
     Despite FDR’s longstanding political support for small farmers, the need to strengthen large 
farmers, on ideological and pragmatic grounds, dictated that New Deal farm programmes were 
‘cut to their cloth’.  The most capable economically and organizationally won out over western 
progressivism’s small farmer, whose interests suffered.  On account of New Deal agricultural 
programmes giving most help to the strong rather than the weak, poorer farm owners were 
compensated less generously by crop reduction payments, so they increasingly sold up to banks 
and large farmers.  Moreover, large farmers, in taking acreage out of production, frequently 
dispossessed small tenant farmers. 
     Bearing in mind these factors, direct help to small farmers, although ideologically well-
intentioned, was grossly inadequate for the magnitude of their problems.  For example, New 
Deal attempts to improve credit facilities for poor farmers followed progressive precedents, but 
like them were insufficiently funded.  Wilson had passed legislation during 1916 to grant small 
farmers credit.  Hoover, the ‘progressive’ in 1923 established twelve Federal Loan Banks, 
supplying credit to poorer farmers grappling with the 1920s agricultural slump.109  From 1937 
Tugwell’s Farm Security Administration (FSA) provided New Deal loans to small tenant farmers, 
so they could purchase their farms.  However, only 1 in 22 applicants received federal funding to 
buy farms under it.110  As with earlier progressive schemes, help to small farmers was a palliative, 
instead of a remedy, partly because ideologically the New Deal would not contemplate the heavy 
spending necessary, which alone could make a significant difference. 
     Of course, heavy spending was not required to further industrial worker unionization.  As a 
consequence, unionization – constantly expanding, government-sanctioned, and successful – 
contrasted starkly with the dwindling fortunes of the small farmer.  It spoke to a rising belief in 
rural communities that the New Deal gave preferential treatment to urban, industrial America.  
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Increasingly, America’s rural heartlands viewed the emergence of a predominantly urban society 
with consternation.  There was widespread resentment in the countryside that the farming 
community was being sidelined by the growing demographic and economic significance of urban 
workers, which the New Deal had stimulated through unionization.111   In these circumstances, 
by the late 1930s small farmers were in danger of deserting the national consensus behind the 
New Deal.  As a political volatile group they might turn to political extremes, in the manner of 
the early New Deal left wing Farm Holiday movement, or they might seek shelter within right 
wing organizations.  The Associated Farmers of California – established in 1934 – was militantly 
anti-New Deal.  At the end of the 1930s, it adapted its policies to win support among small 
farmers in the West Coast states of Oregon and Washington. 
     An added factor made a complicated situation on the West Coast more complex at the end of 
the 1930s.  Déclassé small farmers had become, by circumstances, migrant farm labour.  
Families forced off the land by mechanization, New Deal farm policy, and the Dust Bowl joined 
the rural multitudes that poured westwards into the Pacific states during the 1930s.  These small 
farmers faced in the Dust Bowl an apocalyptic disaster.  Farmers had ploughed up the soil-
binding buffalo grass which originally covered southern Great Plains states like Oklahoma and 
Arkansas, and for years pursued single crop wheat farming.  The Great Drought (1932-1936) 
turned the degraded soil to dust, accompanied by a high wind with a sinister ‘low roaring 
resonance.’112  It was like an avenging angel visited on reckless farming methods, and blew away 
the topsoil and left farmers destitute.  They witnessed farms representing years of ‘toil in the sun’ 
being destroyed, and felt a ‘sorrow that can’t talk’.113  Small farmers fled this ‘dead world of dust’ 
and sought new lives on the West Coast.114  
     Their desperation was only added to by what awaited them on the West Coast in general, and 
especially California.  They first discovered brutal confirmation of Turner’s closed frontier 
theory.  The western migrants were not able to find new, fertile land.  Instead, as migrant farm 
labour, they needed to compete on quasi-monopolized farms with mainly Mexican-American 
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farm labour in field work, and often indigenous white labour throughout California’s food 
processing industries.  Largely because of Great Plains migration, half of field workers were 
white by 1934, ‘and the proportion continued to increase’.115  In the extensive fruit, cotton, and 
vegetable farms of California the supply of labour, swollen by Dust Bowl migration, far 
exceeded demand, driving down wages.  Consequently, conditions for the ‘Okies’ were 
frequently pitiful.  The contrast between the farms where they might find work – a cornucopia of 
lush grapes, oranges, and peaches – and their own dire circumstances must have been almost 
unbearable.   
     In this state of affairs, politicians feared exploited workers would gravitate to political 
extremism, unless their acute social justice needs were acknowledged.  During the early New 
Deal, the Communist Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union (CAWIU) organized 
strikes for the predominantly Mexican American fieldworkers.  In the later New Deal, the 
Communist-led CIO union the United Canning, Agricultural, Packing, and Allied Workers of 
America (UCAPAWA) began a unionization campaign among the fieldworkers, who were 
increasingly Dust Bowl migrants.  Likewise, the Associated Farmers of California were trying to 
recruit members among small farmers in Washington and Oregon.  When La Follette began his 
Civil Liberties Committee investigation of the West Coast at the end of 1939, small farmers, or 
déclassé small farmers, were perceived as in danger of deserting the New Deal and turning to 
political extremism. 
     New Deal social justice policy sheds light on ideological weaknesses within progressivism, 
explored further in chapter six.  At the end of the New Deal, La Follette Jr., in his Civil Liberties 
Committee, which concentrated on unionization, confronted these weaknesses in an extreme 
form on the West Coast.  If he were successful, his Civil Liberties Committee must contain anti-
communism, hold together the farmer-labor alliance, and help prevent small farmers, or those 
formerly in that group, from embracing extremist politics.  Should he fail, 1930s progressivism 
might fail, and with it the New Deal enterprise.     
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                                                  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
     This chapter has attempted to re-interpret the New Deal by looking at it from a Progressive 
era perspective.  FDR has emerged much more ideological than the historiography admits, and 
his ideology was anchored in the Progressive era.  Gary Gerstle, in his article, ‘The Protean 
Character of American Liberalism’ identifies liberalism’s many faces.116  For example, Gerstle 
argues Progressive era moral beliefs underwent a transformation into the economically-oriented 
New Deal.117  However, from another perspective, the Progressive era gave the New Deal its 
belief system.  From the 1910s, Roosevelt conceptualized progressivism’s three tenets by 
regarding them as ‘resources,’ a very economically-oriented view; as areas emphasized in the 
‘frontier thesis,’ and as crucial to his ‘liberty of the community’ idea.  In the three tenets, during 
the Progressive era and New Deal there were normally two strands of belief, one more 
ideological, and the other an accommodation between ideology and pragmatism based on 
recognizing existing economic realities.  Conservation policy witnessed avowedly ideological 
‘preservationists’ jostling for influence with more pragmatic ‘wise users.’  Over monopoly 
reform, ‘trust-busters’ were more ideological, whereas ‘regulators’ allowed for ideology and 
some meeting of minds between reformists and big business.  In social justice, the more 
conciliatory AFL union movement, which matured in the Progressive era, was matched by the 
CIO with at least resemblances to the IWW.  However, it would be inaccurate to say that ‘wise 
users’, ‘regulators’, or the AFL movement, were devoid of an ideological thrust in either the 
Progressive or New Deal eras.  The post-Hofstadter historiography found pragmatic reasons for 
policy in the New Deal even when it pursued a blatantly ideological path, say over trust-busting.  
An alternative viewpoint acknowledges the existence of an ideological New Deal, whose policy 
options and apprehensions were derived from the Progressive era.  The next chapters concentrate 
on the West Coast in the later New Deal, (1937-1942), with a chapter apiece concerning 
conservation, monopoly reform, and social justice.  These areas can be comprehended more fully 
with an appreciation of their Progressive era background.   
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Chapter Four: Conservation on the West Coast, 1937-1942 
 
In 1940 John Huelsdonk, a legendary logger on the Olympic Peninsula in Washington State, 
where he was known as the ‘Iron Man of the Hoh’ opposed an extension to the New Deal’s 
Olympic National Park.  He was reacting to the proposed absorption of the richly forested green 
slopes and valleys of the area into a national park, which would prevent the trees from ever being 
logged.  Bringing his logging experience to bear, he commented laconically ‘that nature never 
preserves anything permanently – when it is ripe it falls and that timber is ripe now.’1  One can 
almost picture him, rubbing his hands together, raising an axe, ready to perform the task. 
     Huelsdonk’s comments focus attention on a continuing division in outlook over conservation 
and American land.  As in the Progressive era, so in the New Deal, there were those who 
believed forestry, national park, and reclamation policy should always be driven by economic 
imperatives, and others who felt social, spiritual, or environmental values should be given 
significant, equal, or greater weighting.  Progressives wanted to give scope to those additional 
values.  The following chapter looks at the later New Deal on the West Coast, and decides 
whether, at that time, Progressive era values – in any meaningful sense – shaped conservation 
policy. 
     In 1955 Richard Hofstadter rejected the strong link between the Progressive and New Deal 
eras, and argued instead that the New Deal was defined by a forward-looking pragmatism, while 
the commanding characteristic of the Progressive era involved an ideology rooted in 19th Century 
morality. 2 According to Hofstadter’s reading of the past, the ‘progressivism’ of the New Deal 
was very different from that of the Progressive era.  Over conservation policy, however, even a 
devoted disciple of Hofstadter, Otis Graham Jr., was slow to deny a Progressive era influence 
during the New Deal, when it seemed so apparent.  In the years that followed, though, the further 
in time the historiography moved from Hofstadter’s 1950s claims, the surer became the belief 
that indeed a disconnect existed in conservation between the Progressive and New Deal eras.  
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This trend is further proof of Hofstadter’s historiographical staying power.  During the 1980s, 
Donald Worster, and his new western history followers, reinforced Hofstadter’s contention of 
New Deal organizational pragmatism, and minimized the scale of Progressive era influence on 
conservation policy, regarding reclamation.3  More recently, perhaps the last redoubt of the view 
that a significant continuity between the periods in conservation is valid – the issue of America’s 
forested wildernesses in National Forests and National Parks – fell to Hofstadter’s paradigm.  
Sutter, in the new millennium, has largely refuted a link between the eras over conserving 
wilderness. 4 So, conservation, on the West Coast during the later New Deal, is a good place to 
begin challenging a historiography that is still expanding consciously, or coincidentally, in the 
direction of Hofstadter’s thinking.  With that aim in mind, the issues of forestry, national parks, 
and reclamation will be successively discussed, showing how an ideological continuum persisted, 
which allowed individuals – both in the political background and foreground of the New Deal – 
to influence policy towards Progressive era beliefs.   
Forestry 
Since the Progressive era, the conservation issue of forestry constituted an abiding concern for 
policy-makers.  In the 1900s, TR used federal government to set aside forested lands, prompted 
by Turner’s warnings that lumbermen were in danger of destroying the wood resources of the US.  
That policy continued during Hoover’s years in the 1920s, and was given fresh impetus under 
Roosevelt’s presidency.  As pointed out in the last chapter, Roosevelt possessed a strong interest 
in forestry derived from his Progressive era past, including his awareness that de-forestation was 
a major cause of soil erosion across America.  He consulted Gifford Pinchot, TR’s Chief Forester, 
on forest conservation during the 1930s, at a time when Pinchot’s views had become more 
radical on account of the Great Depression and developments in the timber industry.  Throughout 
the 1920s, logging interests failed to practice self-regulation or agree on federal regulation.  Even 
before the Depression large surpluses were produced.  By the time FDR was elected to power, 
the collapse of the building industry and domestic consumer demand, consequent on the 
Depression, created a ‘super saturation’ of timber in the market.  The leading ‘preservationist’, 
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and wilderness advocate, Bob Marshall, and the Progressive era’s most celebrated surviving 
‘wise user’, Gifford Pinchot, communicated about the situation in forestry on the eve of 
Roosevelt’s presidency.  Marshall was an important figure in the political background of 
conservation policy up to 1937.  Summarizing the recently published three thousand page 
Copeland Report from the Forest Service, Marshall wrote: ‘Private forest ownership has broken 
down completely and ... the great and immediate need is public ownership of a large share of our 
timber lands.’ 5 Pinchot agreed, and requested more information from Marshall on the report, 
adding ‘Roosevelt is immensely interested in forestry, and I think we have got a real chance.’6 
     Pinchot and Marshall represented different strands in progressive thought that dated back to 
the Progressive era, but, as their correspondence suggests, in fundamentals they were on the 
same side.  Both men recognized the Progressive era necessity of limiting private and public 
logging to a level which would not destroy forest stocks – sustained yield production.  Since 
Progressive times, Pinchot had believed government should control and regulate forest land on 
behalf of the people.  Although Pinchot and Marshall were radicalized by the Depression neither 
deviated from a strongly government interventionist position over forestry.  During the 
Progressive era, though, Pinchot’s ‘wise users’ were perhaps more at odds with ‘preservationist’ 
advocates over ‘wilderness’ – America’s wild public land.  The ‘wise users’’ ideology 
pragmatically allowed some development of forest wilderness, for compelling economic reasons, 
while ‘preservationists’ pursued a more ideologically rigorous anti-development stance, resisting 
timber company demands.  However, that difference in emphasis should not obscure the ‘wise 
users’’ and ‘preservationists’’ common commitment to wilderness protection.  Likewise, the 
Depression of the New Deal era, which reduced demand for timber, and the timber industry’s 
political clout, probably narrowed the ideological space between ‘wise users’ and 
‘preservationists’ over forest wilderness.  It also increased the prospects of ‘preservationists’ 
gaining influence over policy.  Significantly, for the ‘preservationists’, their leader Marshall 
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moved into the New Deal’s political foreground in 1937, when he became the US Forest 
Service’s first Director of Recreation and Lands.7 
     Marshall is worth discussing at some length as an influence on New Deal policy.  Like 
Roosevelt he came from a privileged East Coast family, and as with Pinchot he had a university 
degree in forestry.  Prior to the New Deal, Marshall had worked in the Forest Service.  Between 
1933 and 1937 he was at Ickes’ Department of the Interior, with responsibility for forestry in the 
department’s Bureau of Indian Affairs.  This restless wilderness idealist thought nothing of 
hiking forty miles in a day through the mountainous and forested interiors of the West.  The 
heavy rucksack he carried on these expeditions, which towered above his shoulders, marked him 
out as a man who was not easily discouraged.  Marshall exemplified many of the criteria which 
will substantiate Progressive era-inspired connections with the New Deal.  Firstly, he helped 
found a major pressure group, the Wilderness Society, that worked purposefully for the 
preservation of the West’s forests and which clearly impacted on West Coast conservation policy 
in the later 1930s.  Secondly, from early on in the New Deal, Marshall established good contacts 
with leading New Dealers like Harold Ickes, whose continued support throughout the decade was 
essential for promoting Marshall’s ‘preservationist’ strand of progressive thinking.  Thirdly, 
Marshall conceptualized his conservation views within the philosophical framework of the three 
tenets, aligning him with other Progressive era-inspired reformers. 
     Although many types of terrain existed in wilderness areas, from the inception of the 
Wilderness Society (1935), its journal The Living Wilderness singled out forests as its main 
concern.  It defined ‘wilderness’ to be an area showing no sign of human development, and 
‘extensive wilderness’ areas as where a walker ‘may spend at least a week of travel...without 
crossing his own tracks.’8  Marshall’s Wilderness Society was interested principally in two 
categories of forested public land, designated as wilderness in the vastness of the American 
continent.  By far the bigger share was held in the National Forests, run by the Forest Service, a 
Department of Agriculture agency, and the rest came within the National Parks, part of Ickes’ 
Interior Department.  During the 1930s, Marshall gained experience in both government 
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departments that were interested in forest wilderness.  However, when he was appointed Director 
of Recreation and Lands in the Forest Service (May, 1937), he had charge of 80% of America’s 
forest wilderness.9  Therefore, as the protection of forest wilderness represented the Wilderness 
Society’s top priority, Marshall was in a good position to fulfil their aims.  He articulated the 
importance of forested land in Wilderness Society thinking when he stated: ‘This is the place 
where the majority of wilderness areas must be established if they are going to be established at 
all.’10 
     For our purposes, it is necessary to establish whether Marshall’s Wilderness Society was 
motivated by the same concerns as its Progressive era counterparts.  During the Progressive era, 
wilderness advocates were worried about the blighting of forest wilderness, most obviously by 
the timber industry.  Recent literature by Paul Sutter has stressed, though, that the Wilderness 
Society came into being in the mid 1930s mainly as a response to a separate set of reasons.  Most 
importantly, the interwar surge in automobile ownership led to ‘motorized recreation’, which 
stimulated road building and the construction of tourist facilities in National Parks and National 
Forests. 11 At the same time, the predominant ethos of the Forest Service, aimed at ‘managing’ 
forests, e.g. fire-breaks, look-out posts, and truck roads, helped to degrade wilderness areas.  
Finally, the New Deal itself accelerated these processes by placing emphasis on road building in 
Great Depression job creation projects, and using the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) youth 
employment force to supplement the Forest Service’s management of forests.12  Sutter’s research 
on ‘motorized recreation’, and the like, has certainly helped deepen understanding about why the 
renewed wilderness movement of the mid to late 1930s came about.  Furthermore, by showing 
that Nash’s seminal environmental history Wilderness in the American Mind created a false 
polarity between ‘wise users’ and ‘preservationists’, Sutter has demonstrated their commonalities, 
especially during the New Deal.13  
     Even so, Sutter’s distinction between Progressive era ‘preservationists’ opposed to ‘resource 
development’, and inter-war progressive ‘preservationists’ concerned about ‘motorized 
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recreation’ is perhaps too stark.  Of course, motor car ownership became a new and highly 
significant threat to wilderness areas between the wars that had not existed, to any extent, in 
Progressive times.  In 1910, there was only 1 automobile for every 265 Americans; by 1929 the 
figure has fallen to 1 in 5.  However, this threat was added to that of resource development, and 
did not substitute for it.  Indeed, Wilderness Society literature deems the old issue of resource 
development the greater menace to wilderness, at least on a prima facie basis, giving continuity 
between the Progressive era and the New Deal.  The first copy of The Living Wilderness in 1935 
presents the Wilderness Society’s platform.  Given most prominence in the platform, point one 
claims that man’s ‘mental resource of wilderness’ is as vital as developing ‘timber and other 
(physical) resources.’  Therefore, the Wilderness Society’s journal legitimizes its wilderness 
ethic in opposition to timber ‘resource development’, a backhanded compliment to resource 
development’s centrality as a wilderness threat.  ‘Motorized recreation’ is only dealt with 
afterwards, and implicitly.  Point two refers to wilderness as a ‘public utility’, which must be 
protected from all ‘commercialization’, an inexact term that probably covers ‘motorized 
recreation’, but also ‘resource development.’14   
     Placing Sutter’s argument within Hofstadter’s discontinuity discourse, ‘motorized recreation’ 
was merely an alternative type of recreation to ‘wilderness recreation’.  Consequently, according 
to Sutter’s perspective, pragmatically the New Deal needed to accommodate both in 
conservation policy.  However, in the Progressive era, there was an ideological divide between 
‘resource developers’ stressing economic imperatives in forest wilderness, and ‘preservationists’ 
or ‘wise users’ who were, to a greater or lesser extent, committed to wilderness protection.  If 
Sutter’s own polarity between ‘motorized recreation’ and ‘wilderness recreation’ is questioned, 
and the ‘Progressive era’ divide between progressives and ‘resource developers’ is maintained, 
there was ideological continuity between the eras.  Furthermore, reinforcing the continuity 
argument, Hofstadter’s rejection of a ‘Progressive era’ moral impulse in the New Deal is 
disproved by 1930s preservationist Robert Sterling Yard’s exhortation about a ‘gospel of 
wilderness’.15  In truth, the language of moral uplift present in 1930s wilderness literature harks 
back to Progressive era wilderness advocate John Muir.  For example, a preservationist in 1937 
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wrote of wilderness: ‘To those who have eyes to see it ... it is a universe in which is being 
enacted the sublime drama of creation ..., a realm of ever changing beauty, a stimulus to creative 
thought and effort.’ 16  
     Other considerations help further clarify Wilderness Society thinking.  When the timber 
industry was weakened largely due to the Depression, possibly the threat to wilderness of 
‘motorized recreation’, which was increasing in any case, became relatively, but not absolutely, 
more important.  Also, perhaps, ‘motorized recreation’, or New Deal interventions like the CCC, 
although they posed potential dangers to forest wilderness, did not represent the ‘authentic’ 
enemy of wilderness advocates.  Instead, they might be viewed as part of a bigger progressive 
consensus, which the Wilderness Society sought to work with against their actual opponents – 
private resource developers - the timber industry.  This aspect of the Wilderness Society will be 
explored more fully in connection with national parks.  At this stage, though, the suggestion can 
be tentatively made that the Progressive era divide was maintained in the New Deal between a 
conservationist alliance, and interests representing private resource development.   
     Yet, for Marshall to influence government conservation policy, he required a politically 
sympathetic atmosphere within the New Deal.  Indeed, when Marshall became the Forest 
Service’s Director of Recreation and Lands, he wrote a valedictory letter to Ickes, which shows 
that during his time at the Interior Department, Marshall had influenced Ickes towards a more 
‘preservationist’ path over forest wilderness in national parks.  Marshall wrote: ‘You have 
backed me personally in every proposition in defense of wilderness which I have put up to you, 
even though it meant on several occasions overruling your own Park Service.’17  Therefore, by 
1937, within the government departments responsible for forest wilderness, Marshall had 
secured the allegiance of Ickes at the Interior Department, while he controlled this policy area 
himself in the Forest Service. 
   At a macro-level, there were strong signs too in 1937 that Roosevelt was poised to introduce a 
more co-ordinated policy on conservation. FDR planned to hold a Governors’ Conference on 
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Conservation in that year to help formulate environmental policy.18  This conservation 
conference can be placed within a progressive tradition.  With much the same objectives, 
Theodore Roosevelt held the North American Conference on Conservation at the White House in 
1909, and, similarly, Hoover convened the National Conference on Conservation in 1924.  
Moreover, still riding a wave of popularity from his triumphant 1936 presidential election, 
Roosevelt forwarded a Reorganization Bill in 1937, to convert his government departments into 
stronger units.  As a result, Harold Ickes’ Department of Interior would be transformed into the 
Department of Conservation.  Under this proposal, he would retain the forests of the national 
parks, and acquire the Forest Service from the Department of Agriculture.19  This plan was 
controversial, drawing the fire of Henry Wallace, the Secretary of Agriculture, and Gifford 
Pinchot.  Wallace wished to keep his department intact, while ex-Chief Forester Pinchot, even 
though he criticized the service’s 1930s record on forestry protection, did not desire it to be taken 
over by an over-extended Interior Department.  Nonetheless, for many ‘preservationists’, like 
Marshall, the prospect of having all forestry matters in a conservation department, especially if 
Ickes were minded to promote more forcefully their beliefs, had the great advantage that a single 
forest wilderness strategy could be implemented.  
     In the event, the high hopes of progressives during 1937 were not realized, at least in the 
short-term.  The Reorganization Bill suffered congressional defeat, and had to be re-drafted, 
while the Governors’ Conference was sidelined by other demands on the administration’s time.  
Beyond these setbacks, the ‘Roosevelt Recession’ (1937-1938), and the numerous troubles of 
FDR’s second term, threatened to derail the government’s whole programme.  Many historians 
believe that in the late 1930s the New Deal lost momentum, or even came to a halt.  Not so, on 
the West Coast, where Marshall’s encouragement of Ickes along a more ‘preservationist’ path 
bore fruit, 1938-40, and Marshall’s activities at the Forest Service, 1937-1939, yielded tangible 
results for the Wilderness Society. 
     Marshall’s work, at first, carried on that of Chief Forester Ferdinand Silcox, a strong ally of 
FDR in forestry.  Silcox’s Forest Service had already aided the ‘preservationist’ cause on the 
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West Coast.  During 1934, it set aside as a primitive area one million acres of wilderness in the 
Cascades mountain range of Washington State. 20 Again, in Washington, the following summer, 
under the same designation, a large section of the Olympic mountain forest was reserved.21  A 
‘primitive area’ was the contemporary name for a wilderness area, under Regulation L-20.  This 
regulation strongly favoured protecting areas from development, unless compelling economic 
needs could be proved – a typical arrangement under the Forest Service’s ‘wise user’ ethos.  
During 1937 alone, though, with Marshall and Silcox at the helm of policy, the Forest Service 
established three new primitive areas in the West.  For instance, the Three Sisters Primitive Area 
set in the Oregon stretch of the Cascades consisted of 191,000 acres.22  During 1939, in this 
sympathetic political environment, Marshall was finally able to place Forest Service wilderness 
policy decisively on a preservationist path.  Re-introducing the term ‘wilderness’ for ‘primitive’ 
area, under his U-Regulations, henceforward what was designated as wilderness would be fully 
protected from timber development, forever.23  Importantly, for continuity between the 1900s 
and 1930s, Marshall showed in this measure that he considered ‘resource development’, not 
‘motorized recreation’, to be his chief target.   
     Consequently, within the Forest Service, the ‘preservationists’ had a considerable impact on 
forest wilderness policy in the later New Deal.  The narrowing of ideological space between 
‘preservationists’ and ‘wise users’, that resulted from the timber industry’s relative weakness, 
helped them jointly commit to  greater protection for forest wilderness.  However, the ideological 
sympathetic environment created by the New Deal enabled ‘preservationists’ to exert influence, 
and attain power, over forest wilderness policy.  Moreover, their ideological enemy remained, 
following on from the Progressive era, ‘resource developers’, although as Sutter rightly argues 
‘motorized recreation’ became a significant competing recreational threat.  These truths can be 
applied equally to national parks on the West Coast in the later New Deal.  Furthermore, national 
park policy sheds light on progressivism’s longstanding ideological weaknesses, and the manner 
in which New Deal progressivism learned from the Progressive era in order to survive.   
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National Parks 
Harold Ickes, head of the Interior Department, exercised a guiding hand on national park policy, 
and was inclined towards a ‘preservationist’ stance.  The Living Wilderness approvingly noted 
Ickes saying, ‘I am tremendously interested in parks, particularly in those sections of them which 
are wilderness.  I think we ought to keep as much wilderness in this country ... as we can.’  The 
extent Ickes was influenced by Marshall is a matter of debate.  Much of Ickes sympathy for the 
wilderness ethic was possibly induced by FDR, or self-generated, because of his Progressive era 
background, and, moreover, he inherited a department more open than others to ‘preservationist’ 
attitudes. However, that Ickes was influenced by Marshall towards a more ‘preservationist’ 
stance there is no doubt.  Besides, regardless of the precise origins of Ickes’ preference for 
Marshall’s wilderness approach, it did link him undeniably to a ‘preservationist’ progressive 
tradition. 
     Ickes’ vision for parks increased the likelihood of a ‘preservationist’ agenda.  He stated: ‘I am 
not in favour of building any more roads in the National Parks than we have to build ..... So long 
as I am Secretary of the Interior ... I am going to use all of the influence I have to keep ... (them) 
in their natural state.’  Ickes’s comments on state parks, rather than federal national parks, were 
equally revealing.  He wrote: ‘state parks near centres of population ought to be largely 
recreational, but those farther removed should be cherished for their wilderness character.’24  Of 
course, development of roads and tourist facilities in state parks close to urban centres would 
help divert some ‘motorized recreation’ from national parks.  Nonetheless, Ickes’ counsel that 
state parks deep in the countryside should be protected as wilderness possibly indicates a wider 
commitment to wilderness, beyond his immediate departmental responsibilities.  Certainly, Ickes 
sustained his interest in forest wilderness throughout the New Deal.  For example, Marshall 
wrote to Ickes in March, 1937, asking him to give out a press release on ‘your splendid remarks 
in behalf of wilderness preservation.’25  However, on the West Coast was New Deal national 
park policy in the late 1930s able to translate Ickes’ and the Wilderness Society’s aims into 
reality? 
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     Two national parks were founded on the West Coast in the later New Deal – the Olympic 
National Park, Washington State (1938), and California’s Kings Canyon National Park (1940).  
They are often regarded as isolated examples of success for the New Deal, belaboured by 
opposition.  Indeed, only the active support of Republican minority leader Senator Charles 
McNary of Oregon, who strongly approved of tree preservation, ensured their legislative success.  
As national park measures, Sutter typically considers them exceptional for a Park Service still 
unsure whether to accept fully ‘preservationist’ nostrums.26  However, from the Wilderness 
Society’s perspective, the foundation of these national parks was not auxiliary to its aims, but 
central to them.  Furthermore, in terms of their Progressive era past, their evolution during the 
New Deal, and the issues they raise about progressivism, an analysis of these national parks 
contributes to the continuity argument. 
     The Olympic National Park, west of Seattle, expanded the existing Mount Olympus National 
Monument established by TR in 1909.  During 1935, Washington Congressman Monrad 
Wallgren attempted to steer a bill through the House to create a national park on the Olympic 
Peninsula, but it was held up in Congress.  In important respects, the stalled Olympic National 
Park Bill helped incentivize ‘preservationists’ to set up the Wilderness Society.  The new society 
was in no doubt that the bill was delayed because ‘local lumbermen opposed’, which at once 
alerts us to ‘resource development’ as the main wilderness threat. 27 Thereupon, in The Living 
Wilderness ‘preservationists’ declared a ‘national campaign’ to protect the Olympic Peninsula 
forest wilderness, and argued their case from a number of angles.  For instance, one article at the 
end of 1937 justified the importance of the Olympic forest because the majority of Roosevelt Elk 
– 8,000 animals – grazed in its boundaries – Oregon and California accounted for the 
remainder.28  The original Mount Olympus National Monument was established in large part to 
protect this endangered species, and its natural habitat during the summer – the Olympic 
Mountains.  Extension of the national monument into a national park would encompass the 
mountains forested western slopes down to the Olympic Peninsula, where the herds of Roosevelt 
Elk wintered.   
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     However, an article titled ‘The Third Greatest American Tree’ explained most trenchantly the 
importance of the Olympic forest in ‘preservationist’ thinking.29  The Wilderness Society 
elevated forest wilderness above other wilderness types.  The Living Wilderness article singled 
out three tree varieties and their locations for greatest protection: the sequoia gigantea found in 
Yosemite, Sequoia, and Grant National Parks, as well as elsewhere; the Coast Redwoods of the 
California State Parks, which were under special restrictions; the Douglas fir of Washington’s 
Olympic Peninsula.  As the Redwoods were already protected, the ‘preservationist’ policy 
priority was consolidating the sequoia forest holdings, and placing the Douglas fir forest in a 
National Forest or National Park.  Of the men who set up the Wilderness Society, Marshall, 
Leopold, and MacKaye all had degrees in forestry, and had worked for the Forest Service.  
Robert Sterling Yard, the other founder of the society was keen to protect only the best examples 
of US wilderness – in order to validate its unique status.30  The preoccupations of the founders of 
the society inevitably led to the Olympic Peninsula forest being given their highest priority. 
     In fact, for Marshall especially, the Olympic National Park represented an apotheosis of his 
ideas, which the Wilderness Society duly reflected.  Like Muir before him, Marshall was an avid 
wilderness hiker.  He argued Sequoia and Redwood national or state park land could be ‘walked 
across in at most a few hours.’  Conversely, Marshall wrote: ‘It is only here in the Olympics 
where one can escape for days in the glory of the most magnificent forests ever created.’31  In the 
late 1920s, Marshall had added a PhD in Botany to his forestry degree. Ecology, a branch of 
Botany, had become a prominent academic discipline in the Progressive era.  Victor Shelford’s 
Ecological Society of America (ESA) went back to 1915.  The ESA campaigned on ‘preserving 
representative areas of particular ecological communities.’32  The Olympic Peninsula Douglas fir 
forest was a good instance of just such an ecological community.  Sutter claims the ESA’s 
influence on wilderness policy was ‘minimal.’33  However, the tenor of articles in The Living 
Wilderness, Marshall’s own intellectual interests, and the presence of the ecologically-minded 
Aldo Leopold in the Wilderness Society, suggest ecological concerns were important in the 
Olympic National Park campaign.  An article in The Living Wilderness showed the biodiversity 
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of the Olympic Peninsula forest, two thirds Douglas fir, but there ‘many species meet and mingle, 
each at its maximum height, color and beauty.’34  Marshall and 1930s ‘preservationists’ also 
inherited a Progressive era ‘natural beauty’ aesthetic, for instance, from the American Scenic and 
Historic Preservation Society (ASHPS), which became a national movement during 1900.35  In a 
wider cultural context, the awe-stricken wonder that Progressive era ‘preservationists’ and 
Marshall experienced before the monumental ‘giant trees’ of the West Coast invoked a Native 
American tradition centuries old.  Writing about the Olympic forest area, The Living Wilderness 
described, ‘the unequalled splendour of ... virgin streams rolling in the  ... freshness of nature 
through ... forests towering 250 feet into the air.’36  Accordingly, Marshall’s interest in extensive 
wilderness, unique tracts of forest, and pristine, beautiful settings – ideas which connected him 
with the Progressive era – came together over the Olympic National Park.  The wilderness ideas 
which inspired him were embodied in policy.     
     The legislative path to founding the Olympic National Park was tangled.  Wallgren’s first bill 
in 1935 had called for a 735,000 acre park.  When this proposal provoked widespread local 
opposition, Wallgren, whose constituency included part of the Olympic Peninsula, compromised.  
In his second Olympic Park bill, February, 1937, he envisaged a national park of 648,000 acres.  
However, this bill failed to meet with federal government approval.  Jonathan Pebworth has 
shown how the New Deal administration both manoeuvred Wallgren into introducing the first 
bill, and dissuaded him from sticking to the second bill.37  Therefore, in March, 1938, Wallgren 
introduced a third bill which eventually reproduced the smaller park of the second bill, with the 
‘rider’ that FDR was given the power, by proclamation, to increase the national park to 898,292 
acres.38 This bill became law, and, as subsequent events proved Roosevelt fully intended to use 
its proclamation powers.  Earlier in his life, Wallgren won the US amateur billiards 
championship.39  In the national park legislation that the New Deal secured, Wallgren would 
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have appreciated the preservationists’ skill.  As happens in billiards, they had set one ball rolling 
– the popular smaller park – to strike the ball they wanted to pocket – the larger park. 
     The policy outcome of the Olympic National Park Act was an example of Roosevelt, 
(arguably the Progressive era ideologue), deploying ‘his personal policy-making power in the 
later New Deal era.’40  Pebworth stresses both the commitment of FDR and Ickes to preservation 
throughout the Olympic Park episode, but also the role of the New York City-based Emergency 
Conservation Committee (ECC) in helping to shape policy.41  The ECC provides another 
perspective on the Olympic National Park, although the Wilderness Society, which Pebworth 
does not discuss, enjoyed an expertise perhaps lacking in the ECC.  Rather than mere ECC 
idealists the leadership of the Wilderness Society, while equally dedicated preservationists, 
possessed direct forestry or national park experience.    
     Local opposition remained intense to both the 1937 and 1938 bills, and issues rehearsed in 
1937 were repeated in 1938.  As a generality, the opposition charged that Washington DC and 
rich Easterners were imposing their will on Washington State.  How preservationists reacted to 
this opposition tells us much about what they conceived to be the principal threat to the national 
park.  Inevitably, any major federal government intervention impinged on ‘states’ rights,’ and 
one critic of the Olympic National Park pointed out that already ‘the Federal Government ... is 
holding more than a third of the land of our State.’ 42 Washington’s timber industry was a key 
element in the state’s economy.  Even after decades of extensive logging 22.3% of Washington 
was still forest in 1937.43  Action which jeopardized the state’s premier industry – despite a 
‘super-saturation’ of timber on the market – unleashed a storm of protest from lumber interests.  
Crucially, logging was banned in national parks, so the creation of the Olympic National Park 
would have immediate impact on the timber industry.   
     The Washington Planning Council voiced the opposition’s main concerns.  Washington 
State’s Planning Council – a state government organization – dated back to the early New Deal, 
when economic planning was the vogue in federal and state government.  It held hearings on the 
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proposed Olympic National Park, in an attempt to pre-empt Wallgren’s second bill.  The 
hearings expressed timber industry opposition, but then moved onto another ‘resource 
development’ theme.  Reference was made to ‘numerous great deposits’ of manganese found 
within the borders of the proposed park.  The hearings recorded: ‘Manganese is one of the so-
called strategic metals essential to the ferro-alloy industry and vital to national defense.’44  On 
top of intractable economic depression, late 1930s America confronted disturbing foreign policy 
dangers.  The rise of fascism in Europe, especially Nazi Germany, caused apprehensions.  On the 
West Coast, though, perhaps a greater menace was perceived, across the Pacific Ocean, from the 
aggressive militarism of Japan, and anti-capitalist communist Russia.  Against this background, 
the Planning Council advised prohibiting potential manganese mining areas from inclusion in a 
national park.  As most US manganese supplies were imported, the point made by the Planning 
Council was not frivolous, and continued to be pressed in 1937.  
    During 1937, after Wallgren introduced his second bill, attacks on the proposed park 
broadened.  At first, in March, 1937, state senator James Dailey reinforced the Washington 
Planning Council’s complaints about the ‘resource development’ issues of timber felling and 
manganese mining. 45 However, in May, the Northwestern Conservation League charged that 
influential Olympic Peninsula residents attached to the Planning Council were pushing the anti-
national park agendas of ‘those who want timber, those who want the minerals, and those who 
want roads ... to exploit the tourist possibilities.’46  By October, the Washington Planning 
Council had added yet another demand to undermine the park, saying, ‘municipal and 
industrial ... water power (dams) ... should be permitted even within the park area, if 
necessary.’47  Summarizing these various points in November, the Planning Council stated the 
national park should have no more than ‘an ample area of big trees,’ and it expected ‘controlled 
use of other resources.’48    
     Marshall’s response to this array of ‘economic sectional’ forces revealed what he considered 
the principal threat to the proposed new park.  Two memoranda from 1937 by Marshall about the 
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Wallgren Bill provide the evidence.  In the first, he discussed the merits of establishing the 
proposed park area under Forest Service or Park Service management.  In doing so, he suggested 
Congress should strengthen Forest Service powers over the Olympic wilderness, to match those 
of the Park Service.  Provided that happened, though, he judged either agency could effectively 
run the park, because they were both capable of fulfilling his number one requirement, to keep 
the park area ‘free from logging.’49 
     Earlier in the memorandum, Marshall considered timber worker job losses resulting from the 
new park.  He argued: ‘The 6,632 people who would lose employment if the sustained yield of 
the proposed forest were withdrawn would, from a national standpoint, be unnoticeable when 
compared with the 9 million people unemployed in the whole country.’50  The callousness of this 
remark should be noted.  In arguing that thousands of redundancies were ‘unnoticeable’ from ‘a 
national standpoint,’ Marshall omitted to say they would be deeply noticed by those affected.  
Marshall, in fact, knew that any substantial Olympic Park bill would have significant 
consequences for the timber industry.  On the Olympic Peninsula two timber products were 
important.  Aberdeen, in Grays Harbor, was the centre of wood production, and sawmills there 
relied on Douglas fir.  This traditional industry was severely weakened by the Depression.  In 
Port Angeles pulp and paper mills had been set up in the 1920s, which used western hemlock.  
Despite the adverse economic conditions, this new industry was flourishing.  The timber industry 
was united in its implacable opposition to all the park proposals.  For example, the final 
legislation of 1938 establishing the Olympic National Park, obviously threatened Douglas fir and 
western hemlock logging.  More insidiously, the powers given Roosevelt to enlarge the park, 
created economic insecurity, jeopardizing paper industry investment, while Douglas fir loggers 
suspected the president would appropriate large tracts of Olympic rainforest into the park. The 
Port Angeles Chamber of Commerce complained: ‘Six pulp and paper mills were induced to 
locate on the Olympic Peninsula ... by the US forestry department ... to have available a 
continuous (timber) supply ... for all time.’51  Of course, the large lumber companies attacked the 
proposed law.  More worryingly – from a New Deal perspective – the Olympic Peninsula 
Lumber and Sawmill Workers local, an American Federation of Labor (AFL) affiliate, 
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representing sawmill workers, also opposed it.  Conscious that wilderness advocates were often 
well-to-do Easterners, they protested: ‘The passage of this bill will purchase a rich man’s park 
with the laboring man’s payroll.’52 
          However, Marshall was not uncaring of the timber workers’ plight.  He was a humane 
reformer.  Just before 1937, Marshall had written to Ickes referring to the three tenets of 
progressivism as ‘the three battles.’53  He considered the ‘preservation of civil liberties’ was 
essential to achieve social justice, as well as thinking socialism should replace monopoly 
capitalism, and that wilderness areas must be preserved.  He had elaborated on these beliefs in 
his treatise A Practical Program for Economic Recovery and confirmed them during an 
interview he participated in with Ickes.54  In essence, he was greatly troubled by the societal ills 
expressed in the three tenets of progressivism, and wanted greater protection for the working 
class.  However, preservation of forest wilderness was his core belief.  Therefore, it seems likely 
that he was prepared to compromise other principles – like social justice aims – to secure the 
principle he clung to most fervently – that of wilderness preservation.   
     The historian Mowry contends that Progressive era ideology – which embraced different 
classes, economic interests, ethnic groups, and US geographical areas – was fatally flawed, 
because it claimed to speak for conflicting interests and loyalties.55  He maintained that if 
progressives achieved power they would have to favour one side against another.  The example 
of Marshall from the 1930s demonstrates Mowry’s contention in practice – not that every 
progressive would have made Marshall’s choice.  However, the stark choice forced upon him, 
between forest wilderness preservation, and social justice, acted like the ‘Bloody Question’ given 
to English Catholics during Elizabethan times, and in his decision Marshall’s truest loyalties 
were laid bare.* 
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     Certainly, the issues were not straightforward.  Many Washingtonians were hostile to the 
timber industry.  Not only had the lumbermen often ruined, with cut-over land, the aesthetic 
quality of the environment, but also its economic potential.  As Wallgren knew, the Olympic 
Peninsula experienced serious flooding partly because of de-forestation.  Consequently, the New 
Deal was able to build up a progressive consensus, which accepted that, as a result of creating 
the park, the timber industry would be weakened.  Washington Senators – Homer Bone and 
Lewis Schwellenbach – supported the park.  Congressman John Main Coffee was an enthusiast 
for it.  He illustrated how preservationist thought and limited ‘motorized recreation’ were not 
incompatible approaches.  Coffee promoted the new Narrows Bridge road link to his constituents, 
because it would make ‘Tacoma ... the gateway ... to ... the Olympic National Park.’  The urban 
and radical Democrat Washington Commonwealth Federation (WCF) backed the park, while the 
rural Washington State Grange, representing small farmers, endorsed it.  Even the Olympic 
Peninsula local of the timber worker International Woodworkers of America (IWA) championed 
the new park.56  The IWA was a Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) affiliate. New 
Dealers actively encouraged the breakaway CIO labour movement, which competed with the 
older, more conservative, AFL for membership.  It is possible that research might establish that 
CIO support involved a hidden agenda to the Olympic National Park.  Perhaps New Dealers – 
including Marshall – were less concerned about job losses because they impacted more heavily 
on AFL members, rather than the CIO.    
     Furthermore, the second memorandum from 1937 furnishes the clinching proof that, in the 
case of the Olympic National Park, notwithstanding Sutter’s argument, Marshall’s Wilderness 
Society regarded timber ‘resource development’, not ‘motorized recreation’, as the main threat to 
forest wilderness.  In fact, arguably, Marshall was willing to contemplate limited motorized 
recreation’ in the vicinity of the proposed park, as a lesser evil than timber ‘resource 
development.’  The memorandum issued by Marshall in the name of the Wilderness Society 
stated:  ‘ It is highly probable that a considerable part of the unemployment and the income and 
taxes which will be lost to the Olympics through reducing ... sustained yield forestry ... will be 
made up by the additional tourist trade which an Olympic National Park should bring to the 
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region ... The Great Smoky Mountains National Park has probably brought far more money into 
that region than the operations of the lumber ...  companies.’57  Only some compromises with 
‘motorized recreation’ could deliver these significant economic benefits, but intrusive ‘skyline 
drives’ were judged unacceptable.  One such road, dominating the skyline, Marshall had blocked 
in the Great Smoky National Park.  Marshall’s sentiments connected him directly to John Muir, 
his progressive predecessor, and demonstrate Progressive era-New Deal continuity.  Over the 
Yosemite National Park, as Righter has recently indicated, Muir made concessions to ‘motorized 
recreation.’  He did so, in order to argue that tourist revenue would offset the economic 
consequences of banning the HEP ‘resource development’ at Hetch Hetchy Dam.58  Similarly, 
over the Olympic National Park, Marshall was prepared to consider concessions to ‘motorized 
recreation.’  His position allowed him to argue that tourist revenue would offset the economic 
consequences of curbing timber ‘resource development’ on the Olympic Peninsula.  Therefore, 
New Deal preservationist opinion, and timber industry protest, 1937- 1938, demonstrated that 
timber ‘resource development’ constituted the main threat to the Olympic National Park, not 
‘motorized recreation.’ 
     The Kings Canyon National Park (1940), like the Olympic National Park, took years to 
become established in the final years of the New Deal.  As with the national park in 
Washington’s Olympic Mountains and Peninsula, the idea to found a Californian national park at 
Kings Canyon, about midway between San Francisco and Los Angeles, stretched back to the 
Progressive era.  During 1911, the Acting Superintendant of the Sequoia National Park suggested 
inclusion of adjoining National Forest land within the park’s boundaries, to unite America’s 
main giant sequoia groves.59  In 1918, Stephen Mather, founder of the Park Service, ‘studied this 
country carefully,’ including Kings Canyon and the Tehipite Valley, the latter considered the 
‘loveliest canyon ... after Yosemite in the US.’  He ‘fought for the rest of his life to preserve’ this 
area for its aesthetic value and protect the stands of giant sequoia it held.60 
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     Eventually, during the New Deal, the old Progressive Senator Hiram Johnson of California 
introduced a bill to create a national park in 1935, which consolidated the giant sequoia forests.  
It left the contiguous Sequoia National Park separate, but more important groves of giant sequoia 
nearby were placed within a new park.  The defeat of his Kings Canyon National Park Bill the 
same year as the failure of Wallgren’s first Olympic Park Bill (1935), helped energize 
preservationists to set up the Wilderness Society.  The society’s campaign to create the two 
national parks followed a similar trajectory.  The failure of the two bills in 1935 to found parks 
jolted preservationists into campaigning, through their Wilderness Society, for new legislation 
aimed at creating national parks.  The national parks were a top priority, because they comprised 
forests containing two of the three ‘giant trees’ of the West Coast.  The final legislation for each 
national park built on existing federally-owned park or national monument land.   
     In February 1939, Representative Gearhart of California introduced the John Muir-Kings 
Canyon National Park Bill.  The legislation brought together into one national park giant sequoia 
forests that extended from the Kings Canyon to the Redwood Mountains.  They included 
between the two perimeter points the Grant National Park groves, and the world’s largest giant 
sequoia forest in the Redwood Canyon.61  Like the Olympic National Park Act the previous year, 
the timber industry was loud in its denunciation of the proposed park, which prohibited logging.  
However the hot, sunny climate of California added extra complications to the Kings Canyon 
Bill.  Washington’s Olympic Peninsula was a land of grey clouds and ‘rainforest,’ in contrast to 
California’s vivid blue sky and dry soils.  Consequently, Californians, for their survival and 
prosperity, needed to trap water in reservoirs, or pump underground water to the surface, using 
power from hydro-electric power (HEP) dams – a process known as ‘supplementary irrigation.’  
Although water ‘resource development’ was an issue in parts of Washington, it bulked much 
larger in relation to California economic sectionalism.  During the 1910s, Mather had identified 
power and reclamation ‘resource development’ as being major threats to preservation in the 
Kings Canyon area.62  In 1939-40, the preservationists’ ability to reconcile the various competing 
claims on the Kings Canyon country, by forging a ‘progressive consensus,’ ensured their 
national park came into being.   
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     The details of the Gearhart Bill showed how shrewdly New Deal preservationists ‘kept on 
board’ potential opposition from water ‘resource developers’ and ‘motorized recreation.’  A 
press release from Ickes’ Interior Department (February, 1939), expressed these aspects.  The 
proposed Pine flat irrigation reservoir on the Kings River was left outside the park, while 
planned ‘power dams’ and their ‘supplementary irrigation wells’ would be located ‘on the edge 
of the park.’  If the dams went ahead, they would not be included in the park.  Should they be 
abandoned, President Roosevelt could add the land to the park by proclamation.63  Bearing in 
mind the damaging early 20th Century Hetch Hetchy Dam controversy, and progressive ‘wise 
user’ support for reclamation, these sensible concessions held together a ‘progressive consensus.’  
Accordingly, the Interior Department’s press release announced that ‘irrigation interests support 
the park.’64 
     Similarly, preservationists were able to contain ‘motorized recreation’ by ‘limiting roads to 
the valley of the South Fork of the Kings (River)’.  They further limited ‘recreational 
development’ by stipulating tourist ‘buildings may be constructed only with Government 
funds.’65  At the start of 1940, the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce attacked the Kings 
Canyon Bill, accusing Ickes of ‘attempting to control ... natural resources by getting them into 
the National Park System ... so ... Ickes ... will have a whip hand on all matters touching dams, 
power sites, mining, forestry, timber etc.’66 On the contrary, Ickes had made concessions to 
water ‘resource development,’ leaving land designated for it outside the park.  ‘Motorized 
recreation’ was minimized, but the possibility of some tourist development not entirely ruled out.  
These decisions might be viewed as in line with Hofstadter’s pragmatic New Deal.  Equally, they 
can be considered as constructing a progressive consensus where wilderness preservation, ‘wise 
user’ reclamation, and regulated tourism, could be welded together to protect unique forests 
against imminent, or future, threat of timber ‘resource development.’  In the event, minus the 
appellation of ‘John Muir’ in front of it, the Kings Canyon National Park Bill became law in 
March, 1940.   
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     California’s two senators, Sheridan Downey and Hiram Johnson, supported the Kings Canyon 
legislation.  Both were responsive – quite possibly electorally beholden – to agricultural interests, 
which stridently opposed federal government restrictions, or bans on access, to precious water 
rights.  Frank Doherty, attorney for the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, became an 
increasingly influential figure in the political background of Johnson.  He lent his support to the 
park.67  By the late 1930s, the old Progressive Johnson had fallen out with Roosevelt, judging 
him over-powerful and too willing to use his power.  Johnson’s support of the Kings Canyon Bill, 
therefore, amounted to an exception at a time when he was opposing practically any New Deal 
legislation.  Johnson’s and Doherty’s support was testimony to the effectiveness of the 
concessions to water ‘resource development’ in the Kings Canyon Bill.  For example, Doherty, 
far more right wing than Johnson’s previous Californian advisors, attended the 1940 Los Angeles 
Chamber of Commerce meeting at which the national park proposal was attacked.  Yet, he 
repudiated the Chamber of Commerce’s attitude, and commended Johnson for supporting the 
national park.68 
                                                  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
     By 1940, the New Dealers on the West Coast could be pleased with the advances made for 
forest wilderness through the realization of the Olympic and Kings Canyon National Parks in 
Washington and California respectively.  The preservationists’ joy, though, was tinged with 
sadness.  Bob Marshall did not see the culmination of the preservationists’ campaign.  In October, 
1939, Marshall had enjoyed a convivial dinner with keen New Deal supporter, Gardner Jackson.  
He was recovering from a health-scare, which Jackson put down to Marshall’s ‘long hikes, 
coupled with his constant mental activity.’69  Later that night, he left Jackson’s home in 
Washington DC, and took the midnight train to New York.  On the train he suffered a heart 
attack, and was found dead in his sleeping car the following morning.  Marshall had loved to 
roam freely over the West’s wildernesses.  In a strange twist of fate, he died in a cramped 
sleeping berth on a train bound for the crowded Eastern metropolis of New York.  John Main 
Coffee, the pro-preservationist Washington Congressman articulated the esteem Marshall was 
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held in by many West Coast progressives for his wilderness work.  He commented: ‘Bob, one of 
the finest fellows into which God ever breathed life.’70  Despite Marshall’s death, his legacy 
seemed secure by 1940, and, in many respects, the New Deal consolidated preservationist gains 
that year.   
                                                  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _   
The Queets Corridor Episode 
In January, 1940, the fears of the lumber industry materialized.  Roosevelt added 187,411 acres 
of rainforest to the Olympic National Park.  Then at the end of March, the same month the Kings 
Canyon Bill became law, Ickes used residual powers from the defunct National Industrial 
Relations Act (NIRA) to enlarge the park again.  Along the Queets River, he created a narrow 
two mile wide, sixteen mile long corridor of parkland, which widened when it reached the 
Pacific Ocean, and took in a fifty mile strip of coastline.  The coastal area included scenic Lake 
Ozette, and envisioned a ‘parkway’ up to Cape Flattery.  Ickes’ action potentially increased 
access to the Olympic National Park because of the parkway, and allowed limited ‘motorized 
recreation.’  Yet again, the concession to ‘motorized recreation’ was a small price paid for a big 
preservationist gain – this time the Queets Corridor.  
     These Olympic Park extensions were, nonetheless, high risk.  Supporters of the park on the 
Olympic Peninsula were chiefly concerned with economic improvement for their locality.  For 
instance, the Port Angeles Evening News, fully endorsed by its publisher Charles Webster 
backed both the 1937 and 1938 Wallgren bills, but their support was predicated on the need to 
accommodate wilderness, timber, and ‘motorized recreation’ interests.  By 1940, the New Deal 
appeared unsympathetic to the Olympic Peninsula’s timber industry, and, as events showed, 
although Webster’s paper stayed supportive of the New Deal it was more critical than on 
previous occasions.  In an election year, the Administration was naturally apprehensive if even 
its local allies began criticizing New Deal initiatives. 
     Significantly, the Wilderness Society had urged full federal protection over the Queets River 
area since, at least, November, 1936, when an article in The Living Wilderness discussed the 
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issue.  At that stage, prior to the successful Olympic National Park Bill, discussion concentrated 
on the Forest Service, which had reserved in 1935 a large part of the Olympic forest.  The article 
disclosed, however, that the reserved area was ‘lacking in Douglas fir stands of the higher class ... 
On the west the entire super-forested valleys of the (adjacent) Bagachiel, Hoh and Queets, which 
show the Douglas fir in ...full perfection ... are conspicuously not included.’71  Marshall kept up 
the pressure, when he became Director of Recreation and Lands in the Forest Service.  A 
memorandum dated June 1937, from, or influenced by, Marshall, stated: ‘I would ... extend the 
north west corner of the primitive area on the Queets, north and in a direct line to the present 
monument including the largest body of fir and spruce located in the entire Queets drainage.’72  
Therefore, Ickes’ action in 1940 to incorporate the Queets Valley into the Olympic National Park 
responded to a specific demand by the Wilderness Society pressure group.  (Later in the 1940s, 
the Bogachiel Valley was taken over by the Forest Service, and during the 1950s became part of 
the Olympic National Park). 
     In this way, the Olympic National Park extensions of 1940 fulfilled Wilderness Society aims, 
and conceded limited ‘motorized recreation.’  They represented a penultimate example, to cite 
against Sutter’s contention, that forest wilderness was being preserved primarily from timber 
‘resource development’ rather than ‘motorized recreation.’  As with preservationist sentiment in 
the Progressive era, preservationists during the New Deal were willing to make some limited 
concessions to ‘motorized recreation’ to achieve federally controlled protection of the most 
important wilderness – in this case prize Douglas fir forest.  The preservationists’ traditional foe 
remained the timber industry.  ‘Motorized recreation’ was far from being the preservationists’ 
enemy, and, if limited by restrictions, could offer ‘intellectual cover’ – because of its economic 
benefits – for their actual goal: ‘wilderness recreation.’        
     However, the Queets Valley extension assumed a much larger significance – albeit briefly - 
which placed in jeopardy not only preservationist objectives, but also the New Deal itself.  1939 
to 1940 were years of unusual ideological tumult.  In foreign affairs, the Nazi-Soviet Neutrality 
Pact, August, 1939, astounded democratic political establishments.  The two diametrically 
opposite ideologies – Nazism and Communism – reached an agreement to avoid war.  Having 
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apparently reconciled their differences, Germany and Russia were united against representative 
democracy – America’s political system – and free to expand without being countered by the 
other.  In September, 1939, Germany invaded the ‘Polish Corridor,’ a contested territory, which 
gave Poland access to the sea.  Germany’s rapid occupation of Poland, using the fearsome tactic 
of blitzkrieg, plunged Europe into war, and reverberated around the world.  Two months later, in 
November, 1939, Russia invaded Finland.  Airborne troops led the attack, the first time in history 
troops had parachuted into battle. 73 The war in Finland was inconclusive over the winter of 
1939-40, but during the spring came fresh offensives by both aggressors.  In March, 1940, the 
Russians seized Finnish territory near Leningrad.  On April 9, Germany invaded Denmark and 
Norway.  These events had repercussions even in distant Washington State.     
     Meanwhile, domestically, the presidential election of November, 1940 would set the USA on 
a momentous ideological path.  Either the New Deal would survive in essentials, or expand.  
Alternatively, a Republican, or conservative Democrat, president might dismantle some, or all, 
of it.  In the spring of 1940, it was unclear whether Roosevelt would run for an unheard-of third 
term.  If he did, and won, America would have, arguably, the same ideology, and certainly key 
personnel, like Ickes, holding power for over a decade.  Through newspaper and radio reports, 
1939-40, the public were conscious of Hitler’s blitzkrieg in the ‘Polish Corridor,’ Russia’s 
invasion of Finland, and the ideological uncertainty hanging over American politics.  In this 
febrile atmosphere, Ickes incorporated the ‘Queets Corridor’ into the Olympic National Park. 
     Ickes’ action soon became a focus of fierce protest and opposition, from March to April, 1940.  
In part, the opposition was due to local issues, but additionally shot through with the foreign 
affairs and domestic tensions already mentioned.  As accusations flew thick and fast against the 
national park extension, we can observe the ideological problems the New Deal was exposed to 
during this election year.  For example, opponents of the Queets Corridor were adept at turning 
against the New Deal its own progressive ideas.  The Queets Corridor incident was about 
‘contested ideas’ as well as a ‘contested space.’  Yet unlike the Progressive era, 1919-20, reform 
was not halted in the closing years of the New Deal.  In a number of crises that occurred, 1939-
40, over the three tenets of progressivism, New Dealers did not lose the argument, or surrender 
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to un-progressive policies.  Instead, in the instance of the Queets Corridor, they made small 
concessions for bigger objectives, and were able to withstand attacks, which called into question 
the New Deal’s public image.    
     New Deal reformers, like those in the Progressive era, used Turner’s frontier thesis as 
intellectual justification for federal intervention to protect wilderness.  Wilderness provided the 
archetypical frontier experience, so preserving these conditions allowed modern Americans to re-
connect with their ‘rugged individualism,’ which Turner claimed defined US character.  
However, this argument could be turned against the New Deal.  In the Queets Corridor, a small 
number of pioneer settlers opposed their territory being taken into the national park.  They 
owned land, which they had ‘carved out of the wilderness at great personal labor and hardship.’74  
The settlers feared being evicted from their homes, so the federal government could create 
wilderness conditions along the Queets River.  The message was abundantly clear.  These 
opponents of New Deal reform believed they were the authentic custodians of America’s frontier 
spirit, not the preservationists who were often affluent Easterners.  They resented ‘being forced 
to sell their homesteads back to Uncle Sam “for the benefit of a few rich tourists,” as one put 
it.’75  In this manner, the frontier thesis, which was employed to legitimize New Deal initiatives 
over forest wilderness, could be used to de-legitimize them. 
     The Port Angeles Evening News reported how hostile local papers attempted to subvert other 
stereotypes of the New Deal.  Roosevelt’s New Deal, and previous progressive administrations, 
placed great emphasis on helping the poor and unemployed - the ‘forgotten man’ – rather than 
the more affluent.  Likewise, from TR onwards, progressives were interested in uniting the 
sections of America, bringing Easterners and Westerners together, especially as historically the 
East was richer than the West.  FDR was particularly proud that the young men of the CCC, 
mainly from Eastern cities, had succeeded in improving the West’s environment.  For example 
between 1937 and 1938 there were fifty CCC camps in the forests of Washington State.76  
However, undoubtedly, the Olympic National Park resulted in thousands of job losses in the 
timber industry, and the Queets Corridor might lead to settlers in that territory being evicted.  In 
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these circumstances, anti-New Dealers parodied the Wilderness Society, and New York’s 
Emergency Conservation Committee, which were shaping national park policy, as privileged 
East Coast organizations.  When Dan McGillicuddy, Secretary of the Grays Harbor Industrial 
Council in Aberdeen, addressed the Queets Corridor settlers, his words dripped with timber 
industry venom against the New Deal.  The Washingtonian eagerly quoted McGillicuddy saying 
that the settlers were being made refugees by a group of ‘New York window box farmers and 
society (ladies) who wouldn’t get out of their car for fear they’d get a run in their stockings.’77  
Obviously, during an election year, there were serious dangers in New Deal enemies subverting 
the public image of the New Deal.  Rather than the New Deal being for the poor and the 
cohesion of the economically disparate sections of the USA, it might be transmuted into a set of 
policies against ordinary Americans, whereby Eastern values were imposed on the West.  That 
latter interpretation of the New Deal found a receptive audience among people in Aberdeen, the 
Grays Harbor timber town, who watched events involving the Queets settlers with keen interest.  
     The Queets situation took on more incendiary dimensions when the local press compared 
New Deal actions with those of foreign dictators.  They reported how Queets Valley settlers, 
with a whiff of the frontier, or possibly the 21st Century ‘Tea Party Movement,’ began 
organizing themselves ‘for a fight ... with the long arm ... of federal government,’ and paraded 
through Aberdeen in a caravan en route to Olympia, the state capital.78  Once there, they 
demanded Governor Martin, an enemy of the New Deal, send in the National Guard ‘to protect 
them against federal officers’ who might seize their land.  At time of peace, a state governor was 
commander-in-chief of his National Guard units.  Press stories suggested that, as in the Soviet 
airborne invasion of Finland, the New Deal might occupy the Queets Valley ‘by plane.’  An 
Aberdeen newspaper detailed that one settler brandished a placard saying ‘This is not Russia.’79  
That message would have resonated with the sizable Finnish-American community in 
Washington State. 
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     The next day, the Queets Corridor was likened to the Polish Corridor.80  Webster’s paper 
relayed the inflammatory local press claim that Queets Corridor settlers ‘fear they may be 
victimized in the next Ickes’ blitzkrieg on the frontier.’81  Once more, a highly-charged foreign 
policy analogy, involving dictators, was used to stoke up feeling against the New Deal.  
Roosevelt did not wish such views, suggesting the New Deal acted like an ‘elected dictatorship’ 
to take root with the public and close down the prospect of a third term presidency.  Indeed, 
Roosevelt’s original actions against the Depression probably headed off dictatorship, by 
sustaining the belief of most Americans in democracy.  America remained a bastion of 
democracy, when across the globe countries succumbed to violent dictators.  Yet, during the 
Queets Corridor episode, the New Deal found itself compared with dictatorial political systems – 
Nazism and Communism – the very ideologies it had combated in the Depression years. 
     Nevertheless, the New Deal had extended the reach of federal government, to take action 
against the Depression, and for conservation.  In the process, the New Deal often challenged 
states’, and local, rights.  In 1935 most of the NIRA was ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme 
Court, because it impinged on ‘states’ rights.’  Significantly, Ickes used a remaining power under 
the NIRA to extend the Olympic National Park in 1940.82  Opponents could claim he was 
enforcing an act associated in the minds of the public with the New Deal overstepping its powers, 
to enlarge the national park.  Such an accusation was damaging to Roosevelt, and press reports 
specifically named not simply Ickes but Roosevelt as being behind the creation of the Queets 
Corridor.83  FDR did not decide finally until May, 1940, to run again for the presidency.  Even 
then, he was slow to tell the Democratic Party and the public of his controversial decision.  He 
knew his enemies would accuse him of acting ultra vires.  Therefore, he did not wish the Queets 
Corridor, and similar incidents to encourage the opinion that he was becoming dictatorial.  
Roosevelt’s New Deal had portrayed itself as the liberator of the people from the Depression and 
other oppressive forces.  Contrariwise, the Queets Corridor protesters formed part of a loosely-
knit opposition which portrayed Roosevelt’s government as a tyrant, extending its reach too far 
over their lives. 
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     On March 26, Webster published ‘an open letter’ to Ickes in the Port Angeles Evening News 
about the Queets Corridor.84  While he still backed the Queets initiative, and was dubious about 
the wilder accusations hurled at Roosevelt’s government, Webster felt the New Deal had 
mishandled matters.  He suggested two solutions, to rectify this ‘unfortunate situation.’85  Firstly, 
the federal government’s plan to buy out the settlers underestimated ‘the intense attachment 
developed by (them) for lands which they have cleared ... out of this frontier wilderness.’  With 
the European crisis in mind, he remarked ‘these people ... do not want to leave their homes (and) 
are just as naturally distressed as refugees abroad.’  Consequently, Webster urged that when 
Ickes purchased their land for the Corridor, the settlers should be granted lifetime leases so they 
would not have to move.  Secondly, the area’s main employer – the timber industry – repeatedly 
maintained, despite being told otherwise, that the Queets Corridor constituted a barrier against 
hauling logs to Grays Harbor.  Webster believed an official statement from Ickes that lumbermen 
retained rights-of-way across the Queets Valley would counteract this ‘unnecessary alarm.’86   
     That issue returns the argument to resource developers as the preservationists’ principal 
enemy.  The timber interests strenuously opposed valuable timber stocks being ruled off-limits 
by the Olympic National Park, and enlargements to it.  They additionally claimed the Queets 
Corridor would impede hauling logs to timber mills.  While it would be wrong to impugn the 
motives of the settlers opposed to the Queets Corridor, timber interests were active in stirring up 
their opposition.  If we strip away extraneous layers, an underlying argument about ‘resource 
development’ is reached.  Lena Fletcher, whose husband John Fletcher headed the settlers’ 
organization, which forty settlers had joined in the previous week, stated that the neighbouring 
densely forested ‘Hoh and Bagachiel valleys are (also) alarmed by developments.’ 87  John 
Huelsdonk from the Hoh Valley, mentioned at the start of this chapter, asserted that timber in the 
Queets Corridor was ‘ripe’ for logging.88  He represented timber industry interests, the settlers, 
and also Finnish-Americans.  Lena Fletcher was ‘outspokenly opposed’ both to the Queets 
Corridor and more generally to the Olympic National Park.  She said that ‘subversive influences, 
interested in having the strategic resources of the nation locked up, might be behind the park 
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program.’89  In the ideological tension and confusion of the late 1930s conspiracy theories 
abounded.  Lena Fletcher was suggesting that there were elements within the New Deal in league 
with hostile foreign powers.  The strategic resources she alleged they might lock up were timber 
stocks and manganese deposits.  Although she possibly had links with resource development 
interests, it was undeniable her views reflected theirs.  Consequently, the opponents of the 
Queets Corridor, like the original enemies of the Olympic National Park, ultimately attacked the 
New Deal preservationists’ plans on the basis of the need to have access to ‘resource 
development.’  At the end of the New Deal, ‘resource development’, not ‘motorized recreation’ 
was the undeviating constant in opposition to West Coast national park wilderness policy, 
whatever other attacks were levelled at Roosevelt’s government.  
     The settlers’ and the timber industry attacks might have diverted the government from its 
progressive path in the Queets Corridor.  In a wider sense, the threats to the New Deal’s self-
image could have destroyed the election prospects of a liberal presidential candidate.  However, 
as with ‘motorized recreation,’ New Dealers made concessions, and moreover clarified their 
position, to further the protection of forest wilderness.  The New Deal reiterated that timber 
industry rights-of-way across the Queets Corridor would be upheld, nullifying a contentious 
issue.  The progressive Senator Warren Magnuson wrote to Webster of the Port Angeles Evening 
News, April 2, assuring him that the government would grant the settlers lifetime leases.90  Final 
public confirmation came from the Seattle Post-Intelligencer, the most influential newspaper in 
Washington State.  On April 28, the paper reported: ‘It was revealed (yesterday) that some of the 
old settlers who would be loathe to leave the wilderness of the Olympic Peninsula’s “last frontier” 
will be allowed to live out their lives in their wooded retreats.’ 91 John Boettiger owned the Post-
Intelligencer.  He was married to Anna Roosevelt, FDR’s daughter.  In the political background 
of the New Deal, he helped, with others, to put out political ‘wild fires’ that broke out during 
1940, the presidential election year.  Each ‘wild fire’ crisis threatened to engulf the New Deal 
and destroy the prospects of a progressive being elected president.  Perhaps New Dealers were 
acting with the consciousness in 1940 that progressivism must not surrender its gains, as 
happened under the old Progressives, 1919-20.  Appropriately, on the rain-drenched Olympic 
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Peninsula the Queets Corridor ‘wild fire’ crisis was soon damped down.  However, over the 
other two tenets of progressivism, as will be seen, crises occurred which menaced the New Deal 
with even more combustible material.   
The Preservationists Adapt to War-Time Conditions 
Although many pieces of New Deal legislation survived 1940, for example the two West Coast 
national park Acts, most historians would argue that the New Deal had stopped advancing, as 
FDR, from that year, became increasingly preoccupied with preparing for war.  There is an 
alternative interpretation.  In the lead up to, and start, of World War II progressive policies were 
precipitated or consolidated.  Forestry and national park policy provide useful examples at a 
federal and state level.  Dedicated New Dealer, Culbert Olson, the Democrat governor of 
California, used the imminence of war to achieve an objective in conservation that the state 
legislature had blocked during peacetime conditions.  Therefore, the New Deal in California 
continued to advance.  His objective concerned ‘wild fires’ in a literal sense.  He stated: 
‘California is confronted with the toughest overall fire suppression problem in the United States.’  
In response to this situation, which  placed in jeopardy the state park Redwoods, ‘one of the first 
acts of the ... State Board of Forestry, appointed by Governor Olson (during 1938) , was to 
sponsor ... a State-wide forest fire control plan.’  ‘Several times’ the plan was submitted to the 
Legislature and rejected.  Nonetheless, ‘this plan formed the sound foundation upon which, in 
1941, as a defense measure, the city, county, and State fire-fighting forces joined in creating the 
State-wide “California Fire Disaster Plan.”’92  It was organized centrally from an office in 
Sacramento, the state capital, which supervised different districts, both rural and urban areas that 
voluntarily offered each other fire-fighting aid.  Equipment was ‘designed for use against ... 
forest fires, but also completely useful on city fires.’  In January, 1942, the state legislature 
appropriated $4 million for the Fire Disaster Plan.93  Therefore, Olson had used the argument of 
defence to achieve a preservationist goal – protection of California’s Redwoods.   
     Nationally, preservationists also adapted to war time conditions, consolidating national park 
gains for forest wilderness.  The Queets Corridor incident had shown how easily the New Deal’s 
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opponents could lay claim to the frontier thesis.  In March, 1942, an article in The Living 
Wilderness, ‘The War and the Wilderness’ demonstrated how preservationists were able to 
regain ownership of the frontier thesis, thereby justifying wilderness at time of war.94  It argued 
that war had entered a new phase.  World War I was characterized by the trench ‘warfare of 
position.’  World War II would be characterized by ‘warfare of movement,’ of which blitzkrieg 
was an example.  The former required ‘regimented obedience and deference,’ the latter stressed 
‘initiative and self-reliance.’  Forest wilderness was the ideal setting for those who wished to 
attain self-reliance.  It became ‘second nature to the man who divests himself of the 
conveniences ... of city life and ... goes out to face nature on his own.’  The writer argued ‘those 
qualities which the wilderness develops ... are qualities of value to all, from the humblest private 
to the greatest general, and among civilian (war workers) as well.’95  This argument gave 
wilderness national parks war-time relevance – for developing American character – which 
would contribute to winning the war.   
     In government, Ickes appreciated that national parks must adapt to the war.  However, he was 
not pragmatically altering national park policy to suit the war emergency.  Instead, he was 
maintaining the preservationist policy of forest wilderness, but justifying it with new arguments.  
He feared the war would become a threat to wilderness.  As he wrote in The Army Navy Journal, 
April, 1942: ‘Under the ... war program, public lands are being withdrawn so as to permit the 
establishment of military ranges.’96  National parks could be devastated by becoming sites for 
military manoeuvres, shelling, and bombing practice.  When Ickes wrote to the Secretary of the 
Navy, November, 1942, he suggested a purpose for national parks entirely consistent with forest 
wilderness.  He wrote: ‘It seems to me that such a park as Yosemite ... would be an ideal place to 
send soldiers and sailors for rest and convalescence. I am advised that the Navy already proposes 
to make use of Timberline Lodge on Mount Hood in Oregon.  I can think of no better place to 
serve such purposes ... than whatever national parks may be available.’ 97  
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     In these ways, New Deal forestry and national park policy abided by Progressive era 
preservationist aims over forest wilderness, and survived the Queets Corridor crisis, and even the 
war-time emergency.  Gary Gerstle wrote about ‘The Protean Character of American 
Liberalism.’98  By that phrase he meant progressivism, which he said was synonymous with 
liberalism, could re-invent itself, applying different policies to Progressive era concerns, from 
1900 to the 1960s.  He was especially persuasive as to how progressivism, or liberalism, changed 
its policies over race, aiming to achieve a more cohesive society.  However, progressivism was 
protean in another sense, at least in the instance of forest wilderness.  It showed an ability to 
change arguments, not policy.  Preservationists – notwithstanding Hofstadter and Sutter – wanted 
the same policy in the Progressive era, the 1920s, and during the New Deal.  In the late 1930s 
and early 1940s, they had more influence, for the reasons already explained.  At this time, they 
finally achieved their dream to protect the finest forests that contained the three giant trees of the 
West Coast.  Even when they made concessions, as in the past, the essentials of forest wilderness 
remained.  During the lead into war, though, they needed to adapt their arguments to preserve 
forest wilderness.  Then their protean character consisted of a facility for new arguments to serve 
an old policy.  In the later New Deal, they had founded and preserved the Olympic and Kings 
Canyon National Park forest wildernesses, but justified them with new arguments at time of war.  
Under the guise of a war time defence argument, their New Deal ally, Governor Olson, gave the 
California state park Redwoods an effective protection against the ever-present hazard of fire.  
 Reclamation 
Ickes was also in charge of the conservation area of water reclamation on the West Coast during 
the later New Deal, through the Interior Department’s Bureau of Reclamation.  In contrast to 
forestry or national park wilderness, Ickes’ reclamation policy pursued a more ‘wise user’ ethos.  
Socio-economic issues took priority in irrigation schemes because ultimately lives and 
livelihoods depended on securing sufficient water supply.  These considerations left no scope for 
a preservationist approach, in an area of policy which was based around transforming, not 
preserving, land.  Although irrigation schemes were necessary in parts of Oregon and Eastern 
Washington, California’s hot climate and dry soils made irrigation imperative there.  However, 
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once its soil was irrigated, California could produce the greatest variety and abundance of crops 
in all America.  Since the Progressive era and TR’s Reclamation Act (1902), irrigation dams and 
reservoirs were locked into a multiple-use agenda.  Water supply, hydro-electric power, social 
justice, agricultural, and industrial purposes were all promoted.  However, the environmental and 
related socio-economic aspects of reclamation provide the most meaningful continuities between 
the Progressive and New Deal eras in a conservation policy context. 
     California’s $265 million Central Valley Project (CVP) was ‘the largest conservation project 
in the history of man.’99  Despite this ambitious reclamation scheme having Progressive era 
origins, it was officially begun as a federal scheme, with significant central funding, in 1937.  
Donald Worster acknowledged the Progressive era lineage of the CVP.  He mentioned that in 
1919 Robert Bradford Marshall of the Reclamation Service came up with a blueprint for the 
scheme, which was eventually started during the New Deal.100  However, Worster implies that 
the CVP’s development deviated from progressivism of any sort, because eventually the Bureau 
of Reclamation ‘empire’ compromised with the big farmer elite of the Central Valley.  Through 
utilizing water, they jointly dominated its environment, enabling the big farmers to entrench their 
socio-economic ascendancy over other groups.101  In giving water access to the agribusiness of 
large farmers, the New Deal also hastened the day when Californian water supplies would be 
catastrophically depleted.  However, other dimensions of the CVP support Progressive era/New 
Deal ideological continuity.  Furthermore, although there is much truth in Worster’s argument, it 
can be challenged.    
     With those thoughts in mind, it is necessary to understand what the CVP entailed.  The CVP 
encompassed the twin environmental goals of reclamation – to irrigate dry areas, and, as 
importantly, to prevent elsewhere damaging floods.  The water problems of the West did not 
merely comprise a lack of water, but inequitably distributed water.  Located inland, and south of 
San Francisco, the Central Valley included the San Joaquin and Sacramento Valleys.  The San 
Joaquin Valley was very dry, and, because of intensive agriculture, 200,000 acres there required 
irrigation to prevent it reverting to desert.  In contrast, the smaller Sacramento Valley was 
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afflicted by floods.102  To resolve these problems, the CVP began the Friant Canal, February, 
1937.  That canal, and the Contra Costa Canal, begun in October, 1937, would help re-locate 
water in the Central Valley.  The centre-piece of the CVP, though, was the Shasta Dam, started 
in September, 1938.103  It would collect huge quantities of water from the Sacramento River, 
near its source.  The extracted water would then be stored in a vast reservoir, to prevent floods in 
the Sacramento Valley.  Water released from another dam, the Friant Dam, into the Friant Canal 
would replenish the water supply of the parched San Joaquin Valley. 
     Culbert Olson, the Democrat governor of California, 1938-42, was an arch-disciple of the 
New Deal, but his general approach to the CVP revealed a Progressive era lineage.  He presented 
his New Deal, and progressive, credentials to the voters in October, 1938, when he declared: 
‘Ours is the larger purpose of bringing the New Deal to California, to the end that the 
government will serve all the people all the time.’104  The CVP was one of several federal, or 
state, interventionist schemes underway in California during his administration.  Yet, throughout 
his term as governor, Olson was harried and hampered by an ‘Economy Bloc’ in the state 
legislature, which opposed large-scale government spending – whether federal or state.  
Essentially, Olson took a moral stand whereby government intervention was a duty that would 
transform lives.  In the case of the Central Valley, he alleged the ‘Economy Bloc’ was in the grip 
of private power interests, which did not want cheap government-controlled HEP, produced by 
the CVP, competing with them.  In 1940, Olson stated during an NBC radio address: ‘The CVP ...  
was delayed by private power interests, which succeeded year after year in killing ...  move(s) to 
get it under way ... they have fought every move by the people of California to get flood control, 
irrigation, and cheap hydro-electric power.’105  Olson, and most Californian progressives, 
represented a political tradition that believed government intervention to create water projects in 
the West would deliver broad-based benefits.  In 1942, an Olson re-election booklet conveyed 
how he believed the CVP would release the far-reaching social and economic potential of the 
Central Valley, as well as transforming its environment.  It stated:  ‘benefits will be measured in 
terms of ... increased employment, new lands brought under cultivation, freedom from flood and 
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drought, heavy increases in farm production ... (and) industries ... based upon the so-called 
“strategic metals” in which California is so rich.’106  There was a moral and socio-economic 
purpose in advocating that government had a duty to finance a scheme to transform the lives and 
environment of the Central Valley. 
     However, underpinning Olson’s ideological views on the CVP in the later New Deal was his 
Progressive era past.  At the end of the Progressive era in 1919, Olson was a state senator in Utah, 
the western state east of California.  A local newspaper commented in January, 1919, ‘Olson of 
Salt Lake is fast gaining the reputation as the “recognized radical leader” on the floor of the 
Senate.’ 107 During the spring of 1919 a number of bills were tabled about reclamation.  The first 
measure of the water rights bill aimed to provide government to irrigation districts, empowering 
them to construct irrigation works.  The bill’s second measure related to drainage districts which 
were sanctioned to build flood defences.108  An accompanying bill in the house would have 
appropriated state government money for dams to protect ‘Mount Pleasant and its inhabitants 
from the flood waters of Pleasant creek.’  The newspaper reported: ‘Mount Pleasant suffered 
severely from flood damages last summer.’109  These pieces of legislation were in keeping with 
Turner’s progressive axiom, that individual water schemes would be insufficient to solve the 
West’s water problems.  Only group, state, or federal government schemes could finance 
substantial projects.   
     If Olson was the ‘recognized radical’ in the Utah state senate, state senator Joseph Chez might 
be termed the ‘recognized reactionary.’  He vehemently opposed progressive legislation that 
Olson sponsored or supported.  For example, with the water rights bill he attempted to obstruct it 
with ‘a long list of proposed amendments.’ 110 Yet, even when the bill to fund flood protection 
for Mount Pleasant was passed by the house and senate, the un-progressive governor vetoed it.  
Governor Simon Bamberger argued: ‘To approve the bill ... would mean ... opening ... the doors 
of the state treasury to similar demands from scores of other towns and communities in the 
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future.’ 111 In the 1930s, Olson encountered the same pattern of behaviour, as in the Progressive 
era, from his political opposition.  They desired low government spending, and were alert to the 
electoral advantages of that stance.   
     Robert Burke, Olson’s biographer, alluded to his earlier Progressive era career as a Utah state 
senator when explaining Olson’s strong beliefs over monopoly reform.112  He overlooked, 
though, Olson’s Progressive era lineage in the conservation issue of reclamation.  Olson brought 
a hardened ideological resolve to the late New Deal CVP, partly because of his Progressive era 
political career when reclamation projects to create irrigation schemes and flood defences were 
delayed, blocked, or vetoed.  As evidence of their significance to him, Olson kept clippings of 
these earlier events in his political scrapbooks.  He faced in the CVP the same type of ideological 
struggle he experienced during his earlier Utah political incarnation.  Consequently, the ‘wise 
user’ ethos of Olson and Ickes in reclamation policy was consistent with a Progressive era moral 
purpose – that government intervention could transform environments and lives.  Furthermore, 
the later New Deal pattern of behaviour of their opponents in reclamation policy, intent on an 
economically reductionist argument, which emphasized economy in government, demonstrated 
continuity from the Progressive era.         
     Worster’s central accusation against the Bureau of Reclamation, whereby the CVP eventually 
consolidated the power of the large farmer elite, deserves analysis.  Even on Worster’s own 
reckoning, New Deal reclamation on the West Coast often worked towards promoting the small 
farmer’s interests.   As pointed out in the last chapter, sometimes FDR envisioned a West Coast 
reclamation project embracing social justice aims – something Worster noted himself.  The 
Grand Coulee Dam on the Columbia River would reclaim a million acres in an arid area of 
Eastern Washington State.  Roosevelt considered in 1934 that small farms could be established 
on this land, for victims of the Depression from the East coast states.113  By the end of the decade, 
Roosevelt saw the Grand Coulee project in the Pacific Northwest as the answer to the 
resettlement of desperate displaced small farmers from the Dust Bowl, who had flocked to the 
West Coast during the 1930s.  FDR said he would ‘like to see the Columbia Basin devoted to the 
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care of the 500 thousand people represented in “Grapes of Wrath.”’114  Likewise, in the election 
year of 1940, Olson made a speech before the Oregon Commonwealth Federation in which he 
compared the CVP with ‘similar projects in the Northwest, which are even larger, farther 
reaching, and far more spectacular.’  Among other issues, he discussed opening up ‘thousands of 
acres of fertile land to settlement.’115  In 1944 the ideological intent of FDR and Olson was given 
substance.  The Columbia Basin Project authorized a large programme of farm settlements, each 
one restricted to 160 acres. Worster himself stated: ‘this ... was explicitly to be a programme in 
the redistribution of wealth.’ 116 Consequently, in this case, TR’s Progressive era objective of 
encouraging small farms in the West by federal reclamation schemes was continued under FDR.   
     Regarding the CVP specifically, the New Deal compromise with large farmers ran against 
that trend, and the continuity argument.  However, a closer examination of the CVP’s 
development yields evidence for Progressive era/New Deal continuity.  In the CVP, Ickes’ 
Bureau of Reclamation at first adhered to Progressive era rules on federal reclamation schemes.  
Only later did the Bureau of Reclamation compromise.  TR’s 1902 Reclamation Act restricted 
water access from federal irrigation schemes to small farmers of a maximum 160 acres.  Worster 
records that Ickes and Roosevelt explicitly applied that rule in the legislation setting up the CVP 
– the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1937.117  However, he neither emphasizes FDR’s and Ickes’ 
Progressive era past, nor acknowledges that TR’s 1902 Act had a socio-economic sub-text - to 
counteract monopolistic land practices on the West Coast.  The New Deal had two socio-
economic routes to choose from in the CVP.   ‘Acreage limitation liberals’ wished to influence 
the Central Valley’s large farmers gradually towards smaller farms by application of the 160 acre 
rule.  Alternatively, Californian ‘community’ New Dealers, e.g. Walter Packard or Carey 
McWilliams wanted to break up the big land holdings there, and turn them into socialized co-
operative farms.118  Undoubtedly the stakes were high.  The CVP did not only seek to save 
200,000 acres of farmland from becoming desert; it aimed to transform a massive 3 million acres 
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of desert, much of it owned by large landowners, into farming land.119  Whatever general socio-
economic benefits might result in the Valley, both ‘acreage reduction liberals’, and ‘community’ 
New Dealers saw the anomaly in spending large sums of federal money on the CVP to benefit 
the few, not the many.  Acreage restrictions to CVP water, or socialized farms in the Central 
Valley were their solution to that anomaly.  However, these competing progressive visions were 
never equally represented in CVP policy.  Worster implies that a closely contested debate about 
policy was going on between their adherents.  In fact, the ‘Progressive era’ ‘acreage reduction 
liberals’ controlled policy right up to 1945.   
     It is instructive to look briefly beyond the supposed boundaries of the New Deal, and this 
study, for a rounded understanding of the CVP’s ideological thrust.  When the CVP finally 
compromised with large farmers, Worster once more ignores the Progressive era past of those 
with a role in these events.  Senator Robert La Follette Jr., son of the great Progressive era leader, 
‘Fighting Bob’ La Follette, on two occasions during 1944 stopped attempts to make large 
farmers exempt from the 160 acre rule in California.  Firstly, in the Senate, he defeated the 
‘Elliott rider’ to the new Rivers and Harbors Act, which would have scrapped that rule in 
California, and then he struck down the findings of a CVP report into ‘Problem 19,’ which would 
have resulted in the same outcome for the Central Valley itself.120 
     La Follette Jr. was a progressive who viewed the issue of water rights and the small farmer as 
totemic.  He believed restricting water access to small farmers was not just incidental, but at the 
heart of government reclamation schemes.  When he intervened decisively to stop the ‘Elliott 
rider’ his words could have been spoken forty years previously, and echoed the concerns of the 
Progressive era.  He asserted that reclamation schemes ‘should inure ... to the ... largest number 
of people,’ and pledged himself to ‘the maintenance of the family-sized farm ... because ... it is 
one of the cornerstones upon which our ... democracy rests.’  La Follette declared: ‘This conflict’ 
(over large farms) ‘runs back into the history of the ... development of California’, a reminder 
that TR’s Reclamation Act expressly aimed to roll back the trend towards land monopolization in 
California.  Senator La Follette ended by stressing the ‘interest ... I have in this matter stems 
from my deep concern about the future ... development of agriculture in the United States.  I 
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consider the matter paramount in importance.’121  Significantly, on both occasions in 1944, 
Worster merely notes La Follette’s part in stopping changes to the 160 acre rule.  He does not 
consider either the Progressive era, or the New Deal ideological origins of La Follette’s thinking, 
or the ideologically-charged words he used.  Through these omissions, the opportunity to make 
the continuity argument in reclamation is left unexplored. 
     Likewise, the abandonment of acreage limitation in the CVP is considered by Worster 
through the prism of the Reclamation Bureau’s organizational imperatives.  Pragmatically, the 
bureau needed the large farmers’ co-operation to secure necessary federal funds for the CVP’s 
completion.  Large farmers constituted the most obvious recipients of CVP water, and delay over 
who should benefit from the scheme would give the Administration and Congress an excuse to 
withdraw funding. 122 Yet, just as significantly, the shift to abandon acreage restrictions in the 
CVP coincided with Roosevelt’s death and Ickes’ resignation as head of the Interior Department.  
The two Progressive era-inspired politicians in charge of the 160 acre policy both exited during 
1945, and immediately a change of policy became possible.  There was no need for Michael 
Straus, the new Bureau of Reclamation commissioner, to follow a Progressive era-inspired 
leadership, and in 1947 he compromised with the large farmers.  He declared that only ‘technical 
compliance’ with the 160 acre rule would be necessary in the CVP.  Essentially, landowners 
would be able to deed land, and lease it back, to get around the Reclamation Act.123          
     The continuity argument has considerable validity in reclamation schemes on the West Coast 
at the end of the New Deal.  The concept of the CVP, which turned into the New Deal’s biggest 
reclamation scheme, came from the Progressive era.  Its execution involved large-scale 
government intervention, transforming lives and the environment.  In that sense, the CVP was a 
fulfilment of Progressive era ‘wise user’ beliefs.  Governor Olson brought to the CVP a hardened 
ideological resolve, because of his Progressive era past.  Reclamation schemes on the West Coast, 
like that at Grand Coulee Dam in Washington applied the Progressive era Reclamation Act by 
restricting water access to small farmers of a maximum 160 acres.  That principle was also 
written into the legislation establishing California’s CVP.  The Progressive era-inspired La 
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Follette Jr. staunchly defended that principle twice in 1944, to encourage social justice for small 
farmers in the CVP.  The 160 acre rule was only abandoned there when the two Progressive era-
inspired politicians, who ultimately controlled reclamation schemes – FDR and Ickes – were no 
longer in charge of policy. 
                                                  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
          During the late New Deal on the West Coast the Progressive era was still a significant 
presence.  Conservation policy achieved central objectives in progressivism by protecting the 
three giant trees of the West Coast, and furthered forest wilderness.  Resource development still 
remained the greatest threat to wilderness.  The Queets Corridor episode showed how a 
European crisis could stir up ideological tensions within American politics - what had 
contributed to progressivism’s defeat, 1919-1920.  Reclamation schemes that upheld the 
principles of TR’s Reclamation Act, alongside other conservation policies, were sustained deep 
into the war years. 
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 Chapter Five: Monopoly Reform on the West Coast, 1937 – 1942 
 
In 1948, Daniel Ogden Jr., an assiduous PhD student was researching the New Deal campaign 
against private utility monopolies on the West Coast during the late 1930s.124  Who better to 
contact about this policy, he thought, than the former Washington US Senator Homer T. Bone?  
He was instrumental in developing public power – the main New Deal strategy for countering 
the private utilities.  Writing to Bone, Ogden asked when he originally became interested in the 
power question – to which Bone answered ‘1908.’  The events of that year, reinforced by 
experiences during the rest of the Progressive era and 1920s, instilled in Bone a single-minded 
dedication to public power.  As he said himself: ‘I came to know what it meant to put one’s 
hands on the plow handles ... not daring to ... remove them.’  Clearly, Bone, the young 
Progressive era lawyer, had undergone at that time a political awakening.  Ironically, he had not 
been by inclination a progressive.  Bone commented: ‘Looking back into these ... shadows of the 
past, I sometimes wonder what would have happened ... had I not been ... stirred by the attacks 
on ... men whose only purpose was to have their ... city produce power ... Probably I would have 
been the orthodox type of lawyer trying to lead a ... somewhat conservative existence.’125 
     We know already that during the Progressive era reformers became preoccupied with 
monopoly reform, something the Bone anecdote alludes to.  The realization that, year by year, 
industries, utilities, transport, agriculture, and finance were in the grip of fewer and fewer people 
helped launch the progressive movement.  Without checks, any monopoly or quasi-monopoly 
could exploit at will.  For example, those Americans having access to electricity discovered that 
the company which supplied their power dictated its price.  Arguably, all other aspects of 
progressivism pivoted on the issue of monopoly reform.  It readily connected the three tenets of 
progressivism – having implications for market competition, the conservation of natural 
resources, as well as employee, and consumer social justice.  Progressives believed that unless 
government regulated, dismantled, or curbed monopolies (i.e. trusts) they were in danger of 
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stifling the economy, trampling on civil liberties, and, with their wealth, subverting democracy.  
This chapter contends that late New Deal monopoly policy was permeated with Progressive era 
influence, and it is best understood by looking at utility reform on the West Coast. 
     The historiography, post-Hofstadter, largely denies or ignores Progressive era influence on 
late New Deal decision-making in utility reform.  Overviews, as in Schlesinger Jr. or Brinkley, 
stressed the practical considerations that drove monopoly reform decisions.  Ficken’s localized 
account of the Grand Coulee HEP dam in the Pacific Northwest – despite fully acknowledging a 
Progressive era tradition there – judged that ultimately pragmatism determined New Deal policy.  
Ellis Hawley’s classic work, The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly, because of its 
academic standing, calls for the closest scrutiny.126  He doubts the effectiveness of New Deal 
monopoly reform in general, stresses the limitations of utility reform and, of great relevance to 
our purposes, does not recognize a coherent Progressive era ideology.127  Furthermore, he rejects 
the central importance of utility reform to monopoly policy.  He says utility reform was 
‘essentially a skirmish on the flanks.’128 
     This chapter puts forward an alternative view.  It shows that Progressive era ideological 
influence significantly shaped West Coast utility reform policy in the late 1930s, which 
constituted a vital part of the New Deal’s anti-monopoly campaign.  The chapter divides into 
four sections, which are steps to reaching a convincing re-appraisal of this area of study in terms 
of progressive ideology.  Step one explains the impetus for utility reform – the Progressive era-
inspired public power movement nationally and locally, and quite why utility reform was so 
important especially on the West Coast.  Step two considers how that public power movement 
shaped and implemented policy over the Bonneville Dam, 1937-1938.  Step three shows that the 
challenges public power faced locally and nationally, 1939-1940, are only fully explicable in the 
light of a Progressive era context.  Step four explains how the public power movement and the 
New Deal retained their relevance in the lead into war, 1941-1942.  Therefore, the following 
pages aim to broaden understanding of New Deal monopoly reform, and progressivism. 
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The Public Power Movement and Utility Reform’s Importance to Late New Deal Monopoly 
Policy 
The public power movement on the West Coast would never have flourished as it did from 1937 
onwards without New Deal initiatives, and the encouragement of a national public power 
movement active within Roosevelt’s Administration.  Firstly, municipalities received financial 
help from Ickes’ Public Works Administration (PWA) in order to compete with private utilities.  
Secondly, a series of HEP dams on the West Coast were started, mainly by the PWA, from 1933. 
Thirdly, the Rural Electrification Administration (REA) funded farm co-operatives to electrify 
the countryside.  Fourthly, by the Public Utility Holding Company Act (1935) large Eastern 
private utilities, which controlled subsidiaries in regions like the West Coast, faced 
dismantlement with a starting date of 1940.  The leading New Deal figures associated with these 
policies had a Progressive era past, which gave their 1930s actions a clear ideological pathway.  
FDR advocated public power in the Progressive age and as governor of New York during the 
1920s.  Harold Ickes’ experience of Insull’s Commonwealth Edison utility empire in Chicago 
1907 onwards made him an anti-trust crusader.  Morris Llewellyn Cooke, in charge of the REA, 
was an ideological survivor from the Progressive era, and had worked for Gifford Pinchot on 
public power in Pennsylvania throughout the 1920s. 
     Although the federal government forwarded the utility reform initiatives, the West Coast 
possessed a vigorous public power movement of its own whose origins lay in the Progressive era.  
Therefore, the West Coast public power movement was readily ‘wired into’ the New Deal 
national campaign.  It interacted with the New Deal nationally and locally, shaping and 
implementing policy.  Members of this movement subscribed to an ideological worldview that 
was recognizably derived from the 1900-1920 period.  It conveyed a Manichean message in 
which democratic public companies, devoted to the common good, were pitted against tyrannical 
and exploitative private utilities.  Freshman Democrat US Senator Homer Bone made a statement 
about water-powered electricity and utility reform in 1933.  He charged that because of 
exploitative big business ‘our great public domain, with its timber, coal, and oil lands, has been 
frittered away.  There is left, inexhaustible and most valuable of our resources ... water-
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power.’129  He was committed to saving the great Columbia River system in Washington and 
Oregon for ‘the people’ as a public power source, which ‘would be like owning oil wells that 
never run dry.’130  Bone’s missionary zeal was representative of public power advocates on the 
West Coast during the 1930s.  
     These public power advocates also shared the anti-monopoly lexicon of Progressive era 
reformers.  The emotive image of monopoly as an incubus oppressing society was a staple trope 
in the writings and speeches of the Progressive era and the New Deal.  Arguably, it has provided 
a progressive continuum right up to the present day – applied to monopolies in railroads, power, 
or finance.  In 1901, Frank Norris wrote a novel called The Octopus about the railroad monopoly 
in California.131  TR talked about the ‘large swollen trusts’ during the 1910s.  In 1937, JD Ross, a 
leading public power advocate on the West Coast, attacked ‘the blood-sucking activities of the 
power trust.’132  The following year Bone referred to the ‘power trust octopus.’133  In 2009, 
during the ‘credit crunch’ crisis, a commentator described a finance house as ‘a great vampire 
squid.’ 134 Actually, the private utility, with electricity lines like tentacles spreading inexorably 
from huge power stations, conveniently fitted the image of a greedy monster, which held its 
customers in captivity.   Of course, progressive rhetoric should not be confused with policy 
reality.  Nonetheless, it can be assumed that the revulsion Progressive era and 1930s West Coast 
reformers felt towards monopolies helped inform their policy decisions and actions. 
     Progressive era heads of West Coast municipal companies remained in post during the 1930s, 
and pushed hard for public power.  They proselytized that electricity – America’s future energy 
source – must be publicly owned, supplied cheaply to the people, and kept from the clutches of 
private utilities.  JD Ross and Ezra Scattergood exemplified this outlook.  Ross headed Seattle’s 
City Light municipal company, and Scattergood was chief engineer for Los Angeles’ Bureau of 
                                                 
129 Bone quotations from biographical note in Terry Slatten, ‘Homer T Bone, Public Power, and Washington State 
Progressive Politics in the 1920s’ (MA, Western Washington University, 1980), Allen Library, University of 
Washington, Seattle, WA 
130 Ibid. 
131 Frank Norris, The Octopus: A Story of California (New York: Doubleday, Page, 1901) 
132 JD Ross KOL radio broadcast, January 15, 1937, box 127, Seattle Lighting Department Records, Allen Library, 
University of Washington, Seattle, WA 
133 Bone’s speech to State Democratic Convention, July 13, 1938, Tacoma News Tribune, John Main Coffee Papers, 
Allen Library, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 
134 Matt Taibbi, ‘The Great American Bubble Machine’ Rolling Stone (July 9, 2009) 
178 
 
Power and Light.  Both men had led their companies since 1911.  The aptly-named Scattergood 
believed that electricity dispensed by his company would transform Los Angeles, stimulating 
population growth and industry.  In 1936 he built a 266 mile transmission line to Boulder 
(formerly Hoover) Dam, Arizona, so that Los Angeles could receive the dam’s electricity when it 
came on-stream.  By constructing the longest transmission line anywhere over deserts and 
mountains, he had placed his public power company in a better position to distribute Boulder 
Dam electricity than his private utility rivals.  In 1937, Scattergood’s company consolidated to 
become the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP), the biggest municipal 
utility in the world. 
     On the West Coast and nationally, public power leaders displayed a like-minded ideology, 
and formed a progressive network.  At a national level, Carl Thompson’s pressure group – the 
Public Ownership League of America – gave public power advocates a mouthpiece.  In the 
1930s, Ross, Scattergood, and Bone were all active members of Thompson’s organization.135  
The Public Ownership League was both a forum in which public power supporters could 
exchange ideas, and a political lobbying organization.136  Founded during the Progressive era in 
1914, it sought, among other aims, to influence federal HEP dam projects, and their recipients, 
towards public power.137  For example, in 1928 Thompson contacted the California-based 
Boulder Dam Association early in the Colorado River project, to argue the case for public 
production of power, a considerably more radical stance than publicly distributed electricity.138  
Ross, Scattergood, and Bone brought to the Public Ownership League direct public power 
experience.  The latter had served as attorney for the Tacoma municipal company in the early 
1920s.139  The Washington city of Tacoma, located on Puget Sound – like nearby Seattle, and 
Los Angeles in southern California – manifested a strong public power tradition.  Tacoma Light, 
its municipal company, had charged the lowest electricity rates in the United States since 1914, 
and continued that record into the late 1930s.140  By 1937, the Pacific Coast Public Ownership 
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League – an offshoot of Thompson’s national organization – united the three West Coast states 
behind the public power campaign.141 
     However, public power on the West Coast was far from being a ‘top-down’ exercise by 
prominent individuals.  It had genuine grassroots support, and was expressive of a popular 
movement.  In cities, municipal companies enjoyed a democratic mandate, and attracted 
consumer investment.  Perhaps more significantly, in the countryside of Washington and Oregon 
the State Granges, representing small farmers strongly supported public power.  State Granges 
were reborn as radical organizations during the Progressive era, and retained their radicalism 
through the New Deal.  An Oregon progressive went so far as to say they were the ‘backbone’ of 
the 1930s public power movement in those states.142  Small farmers viewed public power as a 
way of electrifying the countryside, and having a say in electricity prices, rather than ceding that 
control to private utilities.143 
     Indicating Bone’s rapport with the wider public power movement, in the 1920s he was not 
only the attorney of Tacoma Light, but also of the Washington State Grange.  Therefore, he had a 
foot in both public power camps – the urban municipal companies, and the rural Granges.  With 
this experience, Bone, a man of legislative energy, was ideally placed to channel the public 
power movement’s views into law.  While a state senator in 1930, he sponsored the Public 
Utility District (pud) law.  The legislation gave rural areas a structure to organize electricity 
districts.  Bone pointed out the law he drafted reproduced the recommendations of the 
Washington State Grange in 1919 at the end of the Progressive era.  When he was a US senator, 
Bone enacted a law in 1934 permitting the sale of municipal electricity to rural areas.  Again, he 
referenced the Progressive era in putting forward this legislation.  The Washington State 
legislature had passed a similar law in 1911, at the request of the municipal companies, only to 
see utility interests overturn it subsequently.  At a national level, Bone regarded his 1934 federal 
law as restoring the original Progressive era situation in Washington.  In these various ways, the 
highly motivated public power movement on the West Coast exhibited a Progressive era 
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consciousness, which enabled successful engagement with New Deal initiatives coming to 
fruition 1937 onwards. 
     Although a vigorous public power movement existed nationally and on the West Coast, did 
utility reform rank as a significant monopoly issue?  At a national level, Hawley downplays New 
Deal utility reform, and argues that federal action was taken against the power trust, not because 
of its central importance in the anti-monopoly campaign, but due to flagrant abuses perpetrated 
by it.144  Doubtlessly, he had in mind instances like power trust attempts to corrupt the 1926 and 
1934 mid-term elections.  However, Hawley surely underrates the importance of utility reform, 
and therefore electricity.  He contends that transportation, which had similar monopoly problems, 
needed the sort of reforms that were directed at utilities.145  He implies railroad transportation 
was an equally important issue, and that the New Deal was remiss in failing to tackle its 
monopolies.  More recent research has argued that the shrewdness of railroad monopoly owners, 
not New Deal policy weakness, prevented successful regulation of railroads.  Management 
granted railroad unions concessions, so they presented jointly an insurmountable opposition to 
continuing New Deal regulatory measures beyond 1936.146    
     Furthermore, although during the Progressive era railroads were a massive monopoly problem 
– for example, on the West Coast Northern Securities and Southern Pacific– by the interwar 
period trucks and automobiles were relentlessly replacing rail transport.  Conversely, in the 
1930s, electricity was the emergent and future energy source for America.  Roosevelt’s 
government was quick to grasp that fact in its utility reform program, and encouraged public 
power as the ideological means to achieve the end of America’s electrification.  As a follower of 
Hofstadter, Hawley typically judges that New Deal monopoly reform in the late 1930s was 
characterized by ideological contradictions, containing policies that both encouraged and 
discouraged big business.147  More to the point, the New Deal could not fight every anti-trust 
battle.  By choosing to concentrate on utilities, as it had done earlier with finance, the New Deal 
acknowledged their primacy in monopoly reform.  In doing so, utility reform would give succour 
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to a traditional Progressive era objective – public power – and head off private utility monopolies 
becoming the exclusive beneficiary of US electrification.  After 1937, utility reform on the West 
Coast, with that region’s vast potential for electricity production, assumed a pre-eminent position 
in New Deal policy. 
     Richard Neuberger was an Oregon journalist, who operated in the background of the public 
power movement, and provided a useful commentary on it.  A 1938 article by him put across the 
high stakes involved in utility reform on the West Coast.  Instead of Hawley’s utility reform 
‘skirmish,’ Neuberger’s article predicted ‘warfare’ ‘to control the world’s greatest single source 
of electricity’ – the Columbia River.  Neuberger dismissed the previous New Deal struggle 
against private utilities waged by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), as a prelude to ‘the real 
battle.’  The New Deal dams on the West Coast would harness almost unimaginable amounts of 
electricity.  Neuberger stated: ‘in the turbulent Columbia, as it surges through granite canyons ... 
there is more water power than in any other three rivers of the continent combined.’148  Looking 
back on these years, Bone estimated that Washington State alone possessed 20% of US HEP 
potential.149  The companies and geographical areas that secured this electricity expected to 
achieve a golden age of prosperity.  Outside Washington and Oregon, similar prodigious supplies 
of electricity were at issue between private and public companies in California, from New Deal 
dams on the Sacramento and Colorado rivers.  Therefore, the construction of HEP dams by the 
New Deal on, or near, the West Coast, which would be ready to deliver electricity after 1937, 
galvanized an existing progressive movement there.  It resolved that the electricity would go to 
public power not private utilities.  In this manner, the West Coast became the most promising 
region for the realization of New Deal utility reform objectives.                          
     Furthermore, unfolding events increased the importance of the West Coast to the New Deal.  
Historians often regard 1937 as the year when the New Deal began to go awry.  Fortified by the 
decisive 1936 presidential election, Roosevelt was keen to press on with progressive initiatives.  
However, at a macro-level his reforms were often frustrated by an obstructionist Congress.  In 
monopoly reform, 1937 had appeared propitious for the achievement of public power nationally.  
Roosevelt appointed a National Power Policy Committee, in January, 1937, headed by Ickes, 
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which envisaged eight regional planning authorities to bring about public power across America.  
Moreover, Congressional legislation was introduced to duplicate the TVA, the New Deal’s only 
fully-developed regional public power scheme.  The ‘seven sisters’ proposal would have meant 
another six regional schemes added to the TVA.150  However, both initiatives failed, the 
legislation rejected by an increasingly anti-New Deal Congress, critical of Roosevelt’s Court 
fight, his labour policy, as well as the monopoly reform campaign.  By the close of 1937, New 
Dealers could not expect public power to be boldly rolled out nationally.  Consequently, the 
West Coast’s highly motivated public power movement enjoyed a raised profile as it engaged 
with federal government power schemes coming to fruition at this time.  In practice, how did the 
Progressive era beliefs of this movement shape and implement policy regarding a particular West 
Coast dam, 1937-1938?    
Progressive Era Influence on the Shaping and Implementation of Bonneville Power 
Legislation, 1937-1938  
Bonneville Dam (Oregon) on the Columbia River became crucial to the objectives of the public 
power movement, because in 1937 it was nearing completion, and decisions taken about its 
electricity supply would set the pattern for the other West Coast dams. Almost certainly, New 
Deal difficulties nationally strengthened the determination of West Coast progressives to achieve 
a successful public power policy in their region.  In March, 1937 the Bonneville Power Bill was 
presented to the Senate.151  On the Democratic side, Bone, with his connections to the West 
Coast public power leaders and the wider movement, helped shape policy.  As with conservation, 
the co-operation of Republican minority leader Charles McNary of Oregon was also vital for 
New Deal monopoly reform success on the West Coast.  McNary had originally proposed the 
Bonneville Dam in 1933, and was so much associated with it at the time that FDR, who enjoyed 
good relations with this progressive politician, declared, ‘I’ve got to give Charlie his dam.’152  
Bone and McNary led the group of senators who introduced the Bonneville Power Bill.  
Progressive era ideology significantly shaped this legislation. 
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     It is immediately apparent that the Bonneville Power Bill overtly championed the progressive 
principle of public power.  In the distribution of Bonneville electricity, ‘priority’ would be given 
to ‘public bodies and co-operatives.’153  Accordingly, ‘not less than 50% ... of the electric energy’ 
produced at the dam, was allocated to urban or rural public power bodies.  The progressive 
concept that reform should assist the ‘many, not the few’ was also recognized.  Bonneville would 
be ‘operated for the benefit of the general public.’  Therefore, the contracts of private utilities, 
which had secured distribution rights, could be cancelled ‘upon five years notice,’ if the public 
wanted a switch to a public provider.154  An Administrator was to oversee this whole strategy, in 
charge of a new body – the Bonneville Power Authority.  He would fulfil the progressive 
‘stewardship’ role, acting in the best interests of the public.  For instance, private utilities would 
be required to charge the consumer ‘reasonable’ prices and keep the Administrator reliably 
informed of electricity rates.155   
     As the Bonneville legislation progressed towards becoming law, Bone succeeded in reaching 
a ‘progressive consensus’ with two New Deal agencies at odds over the dam’s electricity.  The 
PWA constructed West Coast dams located upstream on river systems, like Grand Coulee on the 
Columbia, or Shasta on the Sacramento.  However, the Corps of Engineers built Bonneville 
because their duties included downstream dams.  Unlike Ickes’ PWA, the Corps of Engineers 
invariably sold electricity to the highest bidder, which frequently meant industry or private 
utilities.  True to his progressive convictions, Ickes was keen to have the new Bonneville Power 
Authority produce and sell the dam’s electricity, because it would promote public power.  In 
May 1937, Ickes wrote to McNary to enlist his support for that position.  Ickes enclosed a press 
statement in which he argued that dividing responsibility for Bonneville electricity between the 
Corps of Engineers and the Power Authority invited ‘discord and trouble.’156  Yet, Ickes’ 
intervention was in many ways unwelcome. Ickes’ sincere but conspicuously undiplomatic 
progressivism often alienated his colleagues – his feud with Wallace over the proposed 
Department of Conservation was a typical case in point.  Indeed, someone once described Ickes 
as having the ‘soul of a meat ax’ in his dealings.  Fortunately, Bone was strongly conscious that 
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public power in the Progressive past was seriously weakened by ‘factionalization,’ which private 
utilities readily exploited.157  He therefore arrived at a sensible compromise with the Corps of 
Engineers, in the final analysis a New Deal agency.  He proposed that they ‘should operate the ... 
power producing facilities and deliver the current to the (Bonneville Power Authority) 
substation,’ which would negotiate electricity sales.158  Bone maintained the goodwill of the 
Corps of Engineers by making a small concession to them.  That allowed him to achieve bigger 
concessions for public power.  Not for the first time, a 1930s reformer learned from the 
Progressive era – that a progressive consensus was essential to achieve policy success.  The 
‘Bone Compromise,’ or ‘Bone red line,’ was written into the final legislation – the Bonneville 
Power Act, August, 1937.159   
     Although Bone shaped the Bonneville Power Act, he was undoubtedly interacting with the 
wider public power movement, especially in Washington.  They desired two main concessions to 
give Washington public power companies access to Bonneville power.  Firstly, electricity sales 
should be based on ‘widest possible use’ i.e. regardless of distance from the dam site, electricity 
should be sold at one rate. Secondly, public power should be promoted over private utilities.  
Bone and his close ally Washington Congressman Magnuson received a heavy mail-bag about 
the Bonneville legislation from the wider public power movement.  However, two letters stand 
out because of the public power messages they convey.  In January 1937, CC Garland of the 
Tacoma Chamber of Commerce, on behalf of municipal companies, wrote to Bone.  Garland 
warned that Pepco, the private utility in Portland, Oregon, might secure a preferential electricity 
rate, because of its proximity to Bonneville.  If that happened, he feared: ‘It will ruin the 
municipal plants in this part of Washington’ (i.e. Tacoma Light and City Light).160  The 
Bonneville Power legislation decisively rejected the ‘zone system’ Pepco lobbied for, and 
Bonneville’s ‘widest possible use’ rate assisted Washington’s municipal companies founded in 
the Progressive era.  During February, MM Moore, of the Washington Public Utility District 
Association, backed by the State Grange, contacted Congressman Magnuson.  Following Bone’s 
1930 law, Washington public utility districts (puds) proliferated in rural areas.  By 1937, they 
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covered 75% of Washington’s population, and were hungry for electricity.  Moore’s letter urged 
that in federal schemes like Bonneville ‘public agencies’ (should) ‘be granted a ... right of 
priority ... to electric ... power.’161  The next month the Bonneville legislation pledged that 
‘priority’ would be given to public power in Bonneville Dam electricity.  Washington puds, 
based on a Progressive era structure, therefore, became major beneficiaries of Bonneville power.  
It is difficult to assess the wider public power movement’s influence in shaping the Bonneville 
legislation.  At the very least, it pressured progressive politicians who shaped policy.  At most, 
the wording of its demands found direct expression in policy decisions.  
     Nonetheless, sometimes the aims of the public power movement were unsuccessful over 
Bonneville.  During 1937 California progressives attempted to insert a Boulder Dam provision 
into the Bonneville legislation, which would have given public power priority access to Boulder 
Dam electricity.  Senator Hiram Johnson, perhaps the most important surviving old Progressive, 
was heavily involved in this endeavour.  By 1937 he was an arch critic of Roosevelt’s New Deal, 
but in his home state he still continued to promote progressive New Deal ideas like public power.  
However, the House rejected the Boulder Dam proposal in July 1937, and the Senate looked 
likely to follow suit.162  At the start of August, Scattergood, always resourceful about his 
company’s interests, arrived in Washington DC, and audaciously tried to turn opinion towards 
the provision.163  With his years of political experience, Johnson told Scattergood that his belated 
intervention would not succeed.  Johnson rather ruefully commented: ‘But Scattergood knew 
better ... and gave a dinner to everybody.’  Apparently, even the force of Scattergood’s 
personality – and his hospitality – failed to change enough minds.164  Nonetheless, the attempt by 
California utility reformers to plug their plan for Boulder Dam electricity into the Bonneville 
legislation demonstrates the interconnectedness of the West Coast public power movement.  
     The West Coast public power movement also contributed to the selection of the Bonneville 
Administrator – the man who would implement the policy.  JD Ross quickly became the 
favourite for the post.  Ross was born in Oregon, had spent most of his working life heading 
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Washington’s City Light Company, and in the mid 1930s was a commissioner nationally for the 
New Deal’s anti-monopoly body, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).  These 
national New Deal contacts extended to FDR.  For example, Ross thanked Roosevelt for a gift of 
trees from his Hyde Park estate to landscape City Light’s Skagit Valley dam development.165  
Nevertheless, the choice of Ross as Bonneville Administrator was, in part, as a result of local 
pressure.  Neuberger, the Oregon journalist, a close ally of McNary and other Oregon 
progressives, campaigned hard for Ross’s appointment.  He had met Ross in Seattle during 1936 
in company with Washington public power enthusiasts, Congressman Lewis Schwellenbach and 
Howard Costigan.166  Neuberger cultivated Ross’s acquaintance, and provided a ‘running 
commentary’ of the campaign.  In July, 1937, Neuberger wrote to Ickes, saying that Ross was 
‘ably qualified to be Bonneville Administrator.’167  The next month, the Oregon Commissioner 
of Public Utilities suggested Ross for the job to Roosevelt.168  On August 19, Neuberger 
telegrammed Ross that Robert La Follette Jr., of the Wisconsin Progressive era political dynasty, 
was supporting ‘Jaydee for Administrator.’169  The power trust tried to stop Ross’ appointment, 
but, in the opinion of Neuberger, they were not ‘getting to first base with the people.’170  When 
Neuberger contacted Ross, October 10, 1937, to congratulate him on his appointment as 
Bonneville Administrator by Ickes, the public power movement had in place a man who would 
represent their ideas.171  Ross was now emphatically in the foreground of the New Deal.  Ross’ 
implementation of the Bonneville Power Act, and related public power issues, 1937-1938, are 
now looked at, in order to supplement the historiography, which largely ignores a Progressive era 
influence on his actions as Bonneville Administrator. 
                                                  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
     There are several views about Ross’ implementation of policy at Bonneville (1937-1938).  
The most detailed version of events, a PhD by Wesley Arden Dick, considers Ross achieved a 
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balanced system, but does not delve deeply into Ross’ Progressive era background.  According to 
him, Ross attempted to create a balance between competing claims – so no one interest would 
prevail.172  This approach might be considered a very progressive concept.  However, we need to 
realize that utility reform policy since the Progressive times was radical.  For example, Robert La 
Follette Snr. believed in state ownership of utilities.  Dick’s account supplies key facts about 
Ross’ implementation of Bonneville power policy.  In a November 1937 address to business 
leaders, Ross ‘suggested that ... 20% of Bonneville’s initial energy supply should be utilized’ for 
industry.  This concession placated pro-business elements in Portland, including Pepco, the 
Oregon private utility monopoly.  Ross honoured his promise in 1938.173  Nonetheless, in March, 
1938, Ross announced the general principle of the ‘widest possible use’ rate for the vast majority 
of Bonneville electricity.174  That decision appealed to municipal companies, and rural puds, 
especially in Washington.  In line with the Bonneville legislation, Ross was going to favour 
public power, without giving it exclusive access.  Over conservation, Ross showed a ‘wise user’ 
progressive sensibility, arguing for industry in the Columbia River Gorge near Bonneville.  
However, he aimed to raise economic standards ‘without impairing the aesthetic values that 
make life full and rich.’175 Therefore, he ruled out a ‘Pittsburgh of the West’ beside the dam, 
quoting from Roosevelt, who had visited Bonneville the previous year.  In Dick’s account, Ross 
achieved the difficult balancing act of recognizing the needs of not only consumers, but also 
industry; public power and private utilities; conservationists and resource developers; Oregon 
and Washington.  In Dick’s opinion, Ross did not force the public power issue beyond what the 
legislation required.    
     A second view of Ross agrees with Hofstadter’s view that the New Deal was essentially 
pragmatic.  Ficken contended that New Deal public power policy at Grand Coulee, and on the 
West Coast generally, was mainly concerned with creating sufficient demand for electricity to 
justify the capital outlay on the big dams.  Consequently the ‘widest possible use’ principle 
needed to apply, and Washington, as well as Oregon, should benefit from Bonneville or Grand 
Coulee power.  Above all else, the delivery of electricity to centres of population, like Seattle 
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and Tacoma, resulted in sufficient uptake of power to validate the New Deal’s dam building 
policy.176  Certainly, Governor Olson of California in 1940 pointed out that ‘when the Bonneville 
project was completed in 1938’ ...  (near the dam site) ‘only a private power distribution 
monopoly was prepared to bid for Bonneville power.’177  Pragmatically, it made poor political 
and economic sense to deliver power solely to Pepco, which supplied a minority of Oregon’s 
population.  The other Oregon-oriented solution would use Bonneville electricity for 
industrialization.  Governor Charles Martin of Oregon originally conceived Bonneville would 
have that purpose in 1933, saying, ‘this power is intended for metallurgical reduction plants 
whose first consideration is cheap power.’178  However, using Bonneville power exclusively for 
industrial uses seemed perverse, again from an economic and pragmatic political angle.  There 
were cities on the West Coast which could absorb much of the power, and whose customers were 
voters.  In this way, Ficken’s argument, that the New Deal’s concentration on ‘widest possible 
use’ had more to do with political and economic imperatives, although plausible, diminishes 
Ross’ role at Bonneville to that of a technocrat. 
     The third view of Ross’ behaviour, 1937-1938, that this work develops, shows him as far 
more of an ideologue – a man with a mission to promote public power.  It demonstrates he had 
another set of motives, which connected with his progressive past.  We need to understand his 
mentality for this interpretation.  It does not necessarily replace the interpretations of Dick or 
Ficken.  Rather, it supplements the motives they discovered behind implementation of New Deal 
public power on the West Coast.  True, Ross did include all major groups in his decisions, and 
the position he held as a government bureaucrat involved justifying New Deal spending on the 
West Coast dams.  Yet, these interpretations without the Progressive era context provide an 
incomplete explanation for Ross’ behaviour as Bonneville Administrator, and the West Coast 
public power situation more generally between 1937 and 1938.  Factors from the Progressive era 
give authenticity to Ross’ behaviour at this time.      
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     Photographs of JD Ross, as a youngish or middle aged man show a round, contented face and 
neatly groomed hair.  His steely-eyed look and the suggestion of a scar on his chin are perhaps 
clues to another side of Ross.  In the Progressive era, he headed a new municipal utility company 
- City Light - competing with the Eastern holding company Stone and Webster for control of 
Seattle’s electricity.  City Light, struggled for supremacy with Puget Sound Power and Light, the 
private utility subsidiary of Stone and Webster.  A report on the war of attrition waged by Puget 
Power against Ross for over ‘twenty years’ was sent to Hiram Johnson in 1928.  It is a ‘story of 
the persecution of JD Ross.’  During the Progressive era, the private utility placed spies in his 
office, and home, in an attempt to find, or plant, incriminating evidence against him.  They 
trailed ‘his every movement.’  A Dictaphone was even hidden in a room he occupied.  Half a 
million dollars was expended to try and ‘defeat the municipal movements ... (in) Seattle and 
Tacoma.’  For a period of six years, Seattle councilmen, in the pay of the private utility, 
drastically docked Ross’ salary.179  Ross exemplified one of the victims Bone referred to at the 
start of this chapter, who suffered private utility ‘attacks’ merely because they wanted ‘their ... 
city to produce power.’  Years later, in 1937, the Portland municipal company informed Ross of 
their proposed takeover of the private utility Northwestern Electric.  He replied with feeling: 
‘You have a tremendous opportunity, for you do not have the prejudice born of a bitter fight of 
35 years.’180  Ross, like many West Coast public power leaders, was a battle-scarred veteran of a 
‘bitter fight.’  To him, public power was an ideological belief, which, because of his life 
experiences, he had considerable emotional investment in.  In his implementation of the 
Bonneville legislation, Ross’ experiences were not conducive to making him conciliatory 
towards private utilities, who he viewed with enmity.   
     Ross’ progressive past incentivized him to privilege Seattle and other Washington public 
power bodies in the distribution of Bonneville electricity.  In July 1937, in the run-up to his 
appointment as Bonneville Administrator, Mayor Carson of Portland wrote to Ross.  Carson 
feared that if Ross were appointed administrator he would favour Seattle over Portland.  He drew 
attention to Ross’ remarks to Seattle City Council in 1934, that Bonneville Dam electricity could 
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both damage Seattle and be the making of Portland.181  Ross drafted a reassuring reply, saying 
Carson’s apprehensions were misplaced.  However, the letter was never sent, perhaps because 
his reassurances would bind him to a course of action – fairness to Portland – which he had no 
intention of carrying out.182  In fact, Ross did want to aid Seattle above Portland, most obviously 
because the latter’s electricity supply was mainly provided by private utility, Pepco. 
     There were additional reasons why Ross wanted to ‘provision’ City Light especially with 
cheap Bonneville electricity.  By 1937, Ross’ City Light Company of Seattle was heavily in debt, 
and envisaged further high spending during the years ahead.  Federal government had allocated 
City Light a $3 million grant for its new Skagit project – the Ruby Dam.  However, the company 
would need to raise another $5.5 million itself.  City Light also planned to take over its rival 
Puget Sound Power and Light.  It would need a massive $37.37 million for a realistic bid.183  
Ross had good reason to boost City Light’s profits by providing Seattle with cheap electricity, 
and ration Portland’s supplies, which would disadvantage Pepco, and help discredit private 
utilities.  As Bonneville Administrator, Ross had the opportunity to help both City Light and 
other Washington public companies, including the puds, to create an economically efficient 
public power system in the state. 
     An article by Neuberger in The New Republic (May 1938) described what actually happened 
after Ross became Bonneville Administrator in October 1937.  It demonstrates how Ross quickly 
finessed the administrator’s remit to favour public power into favouritism for Washington.  
Neuberger approvingly described the Washington puds as ‘the largest public power network in 
America.’  He adds ‘Ross intends to give them the first “crack” at the ultimate 500,000 kilowatts 
to be generated by the giant (Bonneville) barrier.’  Later, the article shows how Ross was 
working towards realizing the long-held Progressive era aim of an integrated urban and rural 
public power system in Washington.  Neuberger writes ‘Since Seattle and Tacoma already have 
efficient municipal plants, and with eighteen new’ (public utility) ‘districts serving the 
hinterlands, Ross believes the state of Washington will soon show the entire nation what public 
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ownership means.’184  Washington would become a beacon for public power that the rest of the 
US might emulate.  This information on Ross’ actions in 1938, together with the histories of 
Bone, Ross, the municipal companies and the puds already outlined, demonstrate the 
unequivocally ideological nature of Ross’ actions at Bonneville.          
     Ross’ actions at Bonneville also uncover unexplored broader aspects of progressivism.  An 
historian of the Progressive era, Gabriel Kolko accused progressives of succumbing to ‘political 
capitalism’ where monopoly leaders used politics to perpetuate their socio-economic status.185   
More recently, Colin Gordon has written a similar critique of the New Deal.186  Yet, perhaps 
there were also dangers when progressives went into business on behalf of the public.  Possibly, 
after a time they began acting like businessmen.  It is a matter of debate whether public power 
advocates needed to acquire the characteristics of private business to succeed against them.  
Nonetheless, the way Ross valorized Washington municipal power companies and puds is a 
possible cause for concern.  There is a suspicion he was using requirements placed upon him for: 
giving priority to public power, stimulating sufficient electricity demand, and overcoming the 
lack of Oregon puds, to serve his first loyalty – City Light.  When a progressive privileged his 
special interest above other interests, was he necessarily acting entirely for the common good?  
Certainly, Ross’ conflation of individual and corporate identity, because he was the former head 
of City Light, gave him a strong motive to assist the debt-laden company with cheap Bonneville 
electricity.  Public power practitioners, like Ross, also exposed a weakness in progressivism, if 
their corporate identity overrode the common good – the raison d’être for public power.  
     Even so, Ross fully intended that Bonneville electricity should reach farther afield than 
Washington.  On account of his progressive past, Ross conceptualized the public power question 
as a pan-West Coast issue, in which he worked with allies across the region.  This pattern of 
behaviour was well-established on the West Coast, encouraged by communication through the 
Public Ownership League, and inter-company contacts.  For example, the exchange of 
ideological ideas and methods between Washington and California dated back to 1918 when San 
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Francisco municipality exchanged information with City Light.187  These Progressive era 
contacts signified a support network for struggling public power companies, a coalition of the 
weak, if you will, against the powerful private utilities.  After 1913, San Francisco built the 
contentious O’Shaughnessy Dam in the Hetch-Hetchy Valley, part of Yosemite National Park.  
This issue became even more iconic to progressives when in the 1920s private utility Pacific Gas 
and Electric (PG&E) gained control of the dam.  Correspondence reveals City Light was still 
vexed by this issue in 1936 when it sought from San Francisco municipality information about 
an enlargement of the dam.188  In the sympathetic environment of the New Deal, Scattergood had 
attempted to utilize the Bonneville Dam Power Bill for the benefit of California public power, 
and Ross used California examples to bolster the public power case in Washington.  In a January 
1937 radio speech, Ross cited a legal ruling (December 1936), giving Scattergood’s Los Angeles 
municipal company the go-ahead to take over their private utility rival, Southern Californian 
Edison.  Ross argued that the ruling justified City Light’s planned buy out of their enemies, 
Puget Sound Power and Light.189  The pan-West Coast dimension of public power company 
contacts stretching back to the Progressive era, promoted by Ross among others, deserves 
emphasis because it challenges many assumptions.        
     Too often research assumes that California was fundamentally different from the other West 
Coast states.  Over monopoly reform – and indeed all three tenets of progressivism – California, 
in many ways, was surprisingly similar to its neighbouring states.  Therefore, regarding public 
power, California’s exceptionalism needs to be queried.  Since Frederick Jackson Turner, and 
indeed before him, exceptionalism became a useful academic tool to fashion explanations for 
American society.  Thus, America itself was portrayed as exceptional among nations, the South 
deemed exceptional compared with the rest of America, and California judged exceptional when 
set against the other West Coast states.  There were, and are, good grounds for these claims; 
nonetheless in many areas the alleged exception had numerous commonalities with the whole.  
Accordingly, the Progressive era and New Deal public power movement, to an extent 
unacknowledged by scholarship, bound together the three West Coast states, and California was 
not a state apart.  In implementing the Bonneville Power Act, Ross sought to build on that 
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existing state of affairs.  Furthermore, Turner reinforced the belief in a west-east axis to explain 
American history.  Previously, the Eastern seaboard and Europe beyond were considered the 
dominant influences on America and the American West.  Turner reconfigured this thinking to 
show the influence of the West on the East of America and the nation as a whole.  In 1992, 
Donald Worster argued that greater attention should be given to the north-south geographical 
axis in explaining American history, both within America, e.g. the Northern Tier states, and 
trans-nationally.190  The present argument – showing Washington, Oregon, and California 
connections – contributes something to Worster’s exhortation to develop this historiographical 
approach.     
     Accordingly, during 1937, Ross made a speech at a Portland mass meeting which showed he 
wished to ‘key’ Bonneville power into a pan-West Coast system.  He was able to think in terms 
of a pan-West Coast framework largely because in this region public power advocates since 
Progressive times were ideologically aligned and used to co-operating.  Ross’ West Coast 
regional power grid would not only facilitate electricity supply, but also solidify ideological ties.  
He outlined his vision of how it would mutually benefit municipal companies.  Ross described 
how ‘Bonneville and’ (Grand) ‘Coulee’ (dam electricity) ‘should be inter-tied as part of the 
Columbia system ... From Bonneville a line would go through Portland’ (municipality) ‘down as 
far as Eugene’ (Oregon) ... ‘That would tie-in the municipal plants of Seattle and Tacoma and 
would go southward into California ... to tie later with the’ (municipal) ‘plants all down the coast 
to Los Angeles.’191  Similarly, in the name of efficiency, private utilities were already integrating 
state wide systems, to allow exchange of electrical current.  For instance, in July 1937, the 
Federal Power Commission approved a merger between Chelan Electric Company and 
Washington Water Power Company which ‘owns ... an extensive interconnected transmission 
system ... This ... network makes interconnection with Pacific Power and Light Company ... at 
Taunton, Washington ... and also connects with Puget Sound Power and Light Company near the 
Chelan River.’192  Therefore, the plan to construct a pan-West Coast public power system, reliant 
on Bonneville, and other New Deal dam, electricity was a natural response to contemporaneous 
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state-wide developments among private utilities, for example, involving City Light’s rivals Puget 
Sound Power and Light.  However, the West Coast public power ideological network, with its 
Progressive era origins, made that regional grid network far more likely.  The intellectual 
meeting of minds between the public power leaders assisted and encouraged the tie up of their 
power operations in a regional grid. 
                                                  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
     Consequently, the years 1937 to 1938 demonstrated how public power movements with a 
Progressive era lineage on the West Coast and nationally co-operated to advance the New Deal’s 
agenda.  Ross, a public power leader with a progressive past, established a prototype at 
Bonneville for how electricity would be distributed from the West Coast dams.  It involved 
‘widest possible use,’ raising the prospect of a Washington municipal and rural public power 
system, and more ambitiously a pan-West Coast grid for municipal companies.  The West Coast 
public power movement maintained its focus even in the difficult year of 1938. 
     The ideological tenor of the West Coast’s public power movement also dictated responses by 
Ross and others to developments in 1938.  At the time, public power seemed to be both 
advancing and becoming stalled.  Cuts in New Deal spending, in part as a result of congressional 
pressure, helped prompt the ‘Roosevelt Recession,’ and ate into PWA funding.  Meanwhile, the 
utility reform campaign nationally showed signs of slowing, as Roosevelt avoided provoking 
anti-government power trust propaganda before the mid-term elections.  Additionally, 
momentous foreign policy developments increasingly diverted the government’s attention.  In 
these circumstances, Bone delivered a series of speeches during the spring and summer of 1938 
that helped legitimize Ross’ unapologetic pro-public power policy at Bonneville.  At the same 
time, they argued for a continuation of the national public power campaign, because private 
utilities were portrayed by him as the main danger to US democracy.  For Bone, the power trust 
was no longer just the monster with tentacles reaching into society – the Progressive era and 
New Deal trope – by 1938 it had become a dangerous predator, preying on public power and 
democracy itself.  In March 1938, Bone stated: ‘It is tied in with all the other exploiters, but 
because of its vast resources ... it has become the leader of the wolf pack.’193  During July of the 
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same year, he argued before the Washington State Democratic Convention that only public 
power competition against power monopolies could meet their threat, because attempts ‘to 
regulate the (power) monopolies were as futile as ... attempt’(ing) ‘to regulate the appetite of a 
Bengal tiger.’194  Bone’s demonization of private utilities was a rehearsal for similar language 
used, 1939-1940, inspired by public power fear and loathing of the power trust.    
     In the event, New Deal spending was gradually restored from spring 1938, and eventually 
surpassed in 1939 previous levels.  However, progressives remained apprehensive about federal 
government resolve to sustain a reformist agenda throughout 1938.  A right-wing commentator 
on the eve of disappointing mid-term elections in November 1938 accurately noted their mood.  
He said progressives were worried about Roosevelt’s ‘recent gestures towards the (private) 
utilities and private industry.  They fear they may lose him as their radical ancestors lost 
Woodrow Wilson twenty years ago through the impact of a foreign war.’ ’195  Even so, against 
the trend of the 1938 election set-back, new hope illuminated the West Coast public power 
movement.  In November, Culbert Olson was elected California’s governor – the first 20th 
Century liberal Democrat governor of that state.  Olson’s progressive beliefs were not only a 
product of his time as a state senator in California during the 1930s; they went back to 
Progressive era experiences when he was a Utah state senator.  Furthermore, Olson’s biographer, 
Robert Burke, considered that the California governor’s commitment to the public power 
movement outstripped all his other political beliefs.196  Burke calls public power Olson’s 
‘favourite cause.’197  The ascendancy of a progressive governor in California, at a time when 
decisions about power supply from Boulder and Shasta Dams were imminent, together with an 
increasingly orchestrated anti-public power campaign by private utilities, set the scene for a new 
phase in the utility reform struggle.  In 1940, the New Deal re-dedicated itself to public power, 
and the private utility interests went from posing a political threat regionally, on the West Coast, 
to the national level, in the presidential election of that year.  Bone’s 1938 warnings about the 
dangers of the power trust to democracy assumed a new relevance in 1940. 
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Challenges to West Coast Public Power, 1939-1940 
The public power movement, 1939-1940, faced a series of challenges that only assume full 
clarity in a Progressive era context.  Firstly, a searching discussion occurred within the public 
power movement about its future direction, and the need for that debate and the nature of it 
connected with the Progressive era.  Secondly, the power trust mounted a concerted attack on 
public power at this time concerning a Progressive era funding device – revenue bonds – that 
revived memories of earlier conflicts.  Thirdly, the public power versus private utility struggle 
reached a climax in the 1940 presidential election, which vindicated Progressive era-sourced 
warnings about the dangers of the power trust. 
     The successes of public power on the West Coast, 1937-1938, prompted a debate among 
progressives, 1939-1940, about how far to take public power.  This debate reveals a new self-
confidence in the public power movement, as it was discussing future directions for public power, 
not merely attempting to survive against the power trust.  This evidence runs counter to recent 
historiography, which views the later New Deal as a retreat from a reformist agenda.  Alan 
Brinkley in The End of Reform argued that ‘reform liberalism’ i.e. progressivism, after 1937 was 
gradually supplanted by ‘new liberalism.’198  He contended that up till then many New Dealers 
although muddled in their thinking about adopting a single Progressive era approach to 
monopoly reform, nonetheless, wanted to restructure capitalism.  Either the ‘planners’ approach 
or ‘trust-busters’ would have achieved that objective.  ‘New liberalism’ abandoned that quest, in 
favour of creating a mass consumer society.  The combination of efficient business, and 
economic stimulus by federal government, delivered increasing affluence in wartime and post-
war American society.199  Brinkley’s work follows Hofstadter’s paradigm of a pragmatic New 
Deal.  It articulates important truths about the origins of American consumer society, yet also 
perhaps exaggerates the extent the New Deal lost its reformist drive, 1937-1942. 
     Brinkley’s argument, as with Hofstadter’s, under-estimate Roosevelt’s and more widely New 
Deal fidelity to progressivism.  For these historians, Roosevelt was the master politician, with the 
implication that Roosevelt abjured ideological consistency because it got in the way of winning 
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elections, maximizing his voter base, and entrenching presidential and Democratic Party power.  
Yet, FDR’s expediency was largely a product of a flexible progressive ideology.  Roosevelt’s 
heterogeneous use of New Nationalism and New Freedom in monopoly reform was neither 
necessarily muddled thinking, nor signifying a politician without an ideological compass.  
Instead, different methods towards quasi-monopolistic US business were a recognition that no 
one approach was suitable across the gamut of large business.  As argued earlier in this work, 
both TR and Wilson, the progressive presidents associated with New Nationalism and New 
Freedom respectively, employed the two methods simultaneously, and paradoxically ended up 
favouring their rival’s method when in power.     
     Brinkley argues that reform liberalism i.e. progressivism, wished to re-shape the structure of 
capitalism, and so did many New Dealers until c.1937.  However, progressivism was ultimately 
about re-shaping behaviour, and resorted to restructuring capitalism as a last resort.  Therefore, 
sometimes big business needed regulation – New Nationalism – to persuade its unruly elements 
into acting responsibly.  Other business so abused the public, the market, the political process, 
(and in some instances, the environment), it needed restructuring – New Freedom.  The financial 
sector, and the private utilities, from the early and later New Deal were cases in point.  In the 
latter example, trust-busting was not only deployed against utility holding companies well 
beyond 1937, but public bodies encouraged to compete with private utilities as a countervailing 
power.  Other Progressive era devices were also brought into play, like utility commissioners 
recommending electricity rates to power monopolies.  Consequently, New Deal progressivism, 
facing the myriad problems of US business in the Great Depression context, could only ever 
realistically tackle the most flagrant monopoly abuses.  New Deal monopoly reform did address 
the problem of over-powerful private utilities as America electrified, and was enabled to do so 
successfully on the West Coast because federal government controlled the destiny of the great 
dams. 
     The evidence indicates that by 1939-1940 in utility  reform on the West Coast the New Deal 
did not retreat from curbing the private utilities, but was debating how far to take federal 
government intervention.  All ideologies have a harder and more moderate wing, and therefore 
progressivism was not alone in that characteristic.  In progressive utility reform there was a 
‘statist’ and a ‘localized’ tradition.  However, in progressivism’s case it had never formed an 
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enduring party or achieved sustained power, so neither tradition had gained a clear ascendancy.  
After the successes of 1937-1938, between 1939 and 1940 progressives debated the way forward 
for public power.  As I have contended already, the intellectual contours of progressives 
followed three principal tenets.  Bearing out that contention, those who participated in this public 
power debate constructed their arguments within the framework of those three tenets.  
          The most ‘statist’ form of public power involved nationalization, and at this time some 
proposed reforms pointed in that direction.  Washington Congressman John Main Coffee 
presented the National Natural Resources bill to Congress, and delivered a radio broadcast in 
April 1939 on its aims.200  It would have set up a Natural Resources Corporation ‘to acquire all 
coal, water-power, oil, and natural gas properties of the United States.’  He based his argument 
for this legislation on the three tenets of progressivism.  It involved monopoly reform, because 
‘the sources of power ... were in the control of a(n) ... ever-narrowing group.’  That group 
threatened conservation and ‘had gutted our mines and drained our oil wells.’  In social justice 
terms, the power trust’s workers and consumers were frequently the same people, and, therefore, 
‘those who are underpaid are also overcharged.’201  Presumably, like fellow-Tacoman Bone, 
Coffee’s sweeping reform envisaged only nationalization of production e.g. public power 
companies would still distribute electricity.  Coffee’s bill, which he described as part of his 
‘progressive program’ eventually failed.  In a similar vein, during 1940, Ickes also contemplated 
federal government control of water power, this time on the Columbia River.  His Columbia 
River Authority would have assigned Grand Coulee and Bonneville Dams, along with other 
proposed dams on the Columbia River, to the Interior Department, so that although municipal 
and private companies, and puds, distributed the electricity ultimately Ickes would make all 
decisions on the dams’ electricity allocations.202 
     Significantly, Ickes’ suggestions put him on a collision course with the main public power 
leaders on the West Coast; another example perhaps of Ickes the progressive ‘meat ax.’  Ross 
died in April 1939, but his views were sustained by public power advocates like Bone and 
Scattergood.  These progressive leaders had no intention of substituting their own ‘local’ public 
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power control of West Coast electricity with federal government monopoly.  A shared sense of 
‘states’ rights,’ home rule, and the great distance between the West Coast and Washington DC 
caused them vehemently to oppose such moves.  Of course, in the case of Scattergood and Ross 
their strong commitment to municipal companies was also a business interest.  In a City Light 
report to Seattle City Council during 1934, Ross had summarized their ‘localized’ public power 
position succinctly: ‘We want City and District control of power.  There is no possible need or 
excuse for a State or Federal power system west of the Cascades.’203 
     Bone re-entered the legislative fray in 1940, putting forward the Bone-Smith bill to establish a 
Columbia Power Authority controlled within the West Coast, rather than from Washington DC.  
In this way, he hoped to forestall Ickes’ bill.  However, as with Coffee, Bone, a progressive 
speaking to a progressive constituency, couched his arguments for the Columbia Power 
Authority in the framework of the three tenets.  He rejected the monopoly of federal government 
control, which envisaged operating ‘a vast business enterprise from three thousand miles away ... 
Cities ... such as Tacoma and Seattle ... do not want the Authority to run their affairs for them.’  
Bone raised social justice concerns that the Ickes’ bill did not provide unions with collective 
bargaining, so negotiations would take place across ‘the width of the continent.’  On 
conservation, the Bone bill, unlike Ickes’, provided ‘a definite formula for ... a portion of the 
power revenues from Grand Coulee Dam to aid (in) ... reclamation of basin lands.’204 
     Likewise, the progressive Dr. Paul Raver, who took over as Bonneville Administrator in 
August 1939, continued Ross’ policies of assisting public power through puds and municipal 
companies, and creating a Washington public power grid.  Raver’s outlook accorded with the 
localized Progressive era stance of Ross, Scattergood, and Bone. The Oregonian reported that 
‘(Bonneville) engineers and line crews drove desperately throughout the year to complete vital 
parts of the transmission grid ... toward Puget Sound ... to Grand Coulee for a hook-up this 
summer, and ... into south-west Washington to serve puds.’205  At times, Raver appeared to be 
making extra concessions to private utilities, for instance, at the end of 1939 extending 
Northwestern Electric’s contract, and signing a deal with Pepco for electricity supplies to 
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Portland.206  However, when those two companies announced an electricity rate below City 
Light’s, as the newspaper article reveals, their rate reductions were ‘on the order of the public 
utilities commissioner.’207  Therefore, localized pressure was being exerted on private utilities 
both by the Progressive era-inspired public companies, and recommendations by a commissioner 
– very Progressive era means for achieving reform.  
     Moreover, in a speech during September 1939, Raver typically located his policies within a 
the tradition of the three tenets.  With an edge to his remark, in more ways than one, he stated: 
‘As to the private utility (monopolies) ... I have no ax sharpened for any of them ... if ... they can 
meet the rates of the public systems, they will survive ... If not, they will be their own 
executioner.’  He stated about social justice: ‘Coming west with my family two weeks ago, we 
saw car after car of families heading this way.  They want another chance’ (of developing 
farms) ... ‘At Grand Coulee, power will help ... pay for irrigation ... With Bonneville power I 
hope ... we can encourage ... supplemental irrigation by providing a low rate.’  In conservation, 
he declared: ‘the phosphate beds of the North-west area are far greater than ... any other region, 
and there is a desperate need for a vastly expanded fertilizer industry to preserve the soil of the 
nation.’208   
     Consequently, the public power movement had made such gains it was motivated to discuss 
its future, 1939-1940.  That debate was challenging, as it revealed very different ways forward – 
the ‘statist’ or ‘localized’ solutions.  Like all ideologies, progressivism showed it had two wings, 
but its ideological options were also products of its Progressive era past.  Participants in the 
public power debate demonstrated the Progressive era mentality by following the intellectual 
contours of the three tenets.  In contrast to Brinkley’s standpoint, the public power movement 
certainly showed no sign of being on the wane, 1939 -1940.  On the contrary, it was ready for yet 
further challenges. 
     In 1940, the power trust mounted a new offensive against public power.  Aware New Deal 
responses would be more cautious during an election year, to avoid the charge of federal 
government extremism – a vote loser – private utility interests began a major campaign aimed at 
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undermining the public power movement.  This public power and power trust struggle in West 
Coast states was centred on public power funding of rural electrification.  The area of conflict 
related back to the Progressive era.  In West Coast states, rural puds or their equivalent needed to 
raise money for electricity distribution infra-structure.  Gail Radford has recently pointed out, 
since Progressive times revenue bonds became the main funding mechanism for public power on 
the West Coast, initially by cities, and in the 1930s also for rural districts.  She singles out Los 
Angeles municipal company and Seattle’s City Light as leading exponents of this method from 
the Progressive era.  As she writes: ‘In 1916, Seattle issued millions of dollars of revenue bonds 
to develop the vast utility empire known as City Light.’209 Essentially, revenue bonds were 
popular with the public.  They would finance power projects, and bring good returns for 
investors.  Moreover, the debt that the municipal company incurred would be paid off out of the 
company’s profits, rather than being a municipality debt passed onto the taxpayer.  Similarly, 
pud debts would be paid for out of the companies’ revenue.  However, if revenue bonds were 
outlawed or rendered ineffective for puds, rural areas would again be made dependant on private 
utilities for electricity. 
     During 1940, Bone once more became pivotal.  As with Ross, 1937-1938, so with Bone in 
1940, an understanding of the Progressive era assists making sense of unfolding events.  The 
linkage between the Progressive era and the New Deal was clear.  Bone stated at the outset of 
this chapter that 1908 was the starting date for his interest in public power.  In 1937, Ross wrote 
to the Portland municipal company of the ‘bitter fight’ between public power and private utilities 
in Seattle lasting thirty-five years.  Bone described attempts by private utility interests in 1908 to 
stop Tacoma producing its own electricity as ‘a bitter fight.’210  That ‘bitter fight’ continued into 
the 1910s and 1920s.  Indeed, during the 1920s it inflicted on Bone the most traumatic 
experience of his life.  Like Ross, Bone’s life experiences gave him a hardened ideological 
resolve.  When in 1940 he found himself confronted with a similar situation between private and 
public power, and the same tactics by the power trust, he was equal to the struggle. 
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     In 1911 Washington municipal companies were given the right to sell electricity to the 
countryside, freeing rural areas from dependency on private utilities.  By 1913, legislation 
instigated by the power trust ended that freedom, and in 1924 private utilities upheld that 
position by successfully campaigning against a referendum – Initiative 52.  In 1930, Bone’s pud 
Act permitted rural areas to raise revenue bonds, liberating them at last from private utilities.211  
During 1940, his speech ‘Bone on Power’ alleged the power trust intended returning rural areas 
in Washington to dependency on private companies.  Initiative 139 would go before voters in the 
election year, apparently just requiring the new puds to seek democratic backing for raising 
revenue bonds.  In reality, Bone argued the Initiative would prevent puds from operating as 
going concerns.212 
     Bone’s Papers reveal parallels with the Progressive era.  Bone pointed out power trust lawyers 
in 1913 inserted ‘jokers’ into an innocent-looking irrigation bill, which re-imposed rural area 
reliance on private utilities.213  In 1940, he stated ‘jokers’ were put into Initiative 139 by the 
power trust, so an ostensibly democratic measure would result once more in rural areas 
becoming reliant on utility monopolies.214  Furthermore, in 1924, as a Washington state senator, 
Bone forwarded the referendum enabling municipal companies again to sell electricity to rural 
areas, thereby overturning the 1913 law.  A power trust pressure group, the North-western 
Electric Light and Power Association, successfully helped defeat Bone’s referendum – Initiative 
52.215  During 1940, the power trust formed a new type of pressure group, a citizens’ committee, 
the ‘Let the People Vote League,’ which campaigned on behalf of Initiative 139.216 
     Most flagrantly, in 1924, private utilities told newspaper editors all over the state that they 
would only place lucrative full-page adverts in their papers if editors agreed to ‘canned editorials’ 
written by the power trust, attacking Bone’s Initiative 52, and an anti-Bone cartoon.217  Bone 
affixed these identical editorials to a board, and at town hall meetings explained that his views 
were being traduced through a concerted campaign by the power trust.  However, he lost the 
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referendum.  Years later, in 1940, his memory of that experience had not dimmed.  Bone stated: 
‘I was held up to ridicule and scorn in every corner of the State and emerged a ruined man.’218  
During 1940, Bone seized on the fact that the power trust was using the same methods to push 
for Initiative 139, which would have hamstrung puds.  Bone’s Papers contain a pink US Senate 
memorandum slip on which he wrote: ‘Note identical Editorials in different papers.  These are 
typical.  These editorials appeared throughout the state.’  Accompanying that slip is a sheet 
covered in identical pasted on pro-Initiative 139 editorials.219  In 1940, Bone helped defeat the 
position the power trust supported.    
     The tactics of the power trust on the West Coast were the same in the Progressive era and its 
aftermath, and the later New Deal.  Over the issue of freeing rural areas from private power 
monopolies, the power trust attempted to restore their control by deception, with ‘jokers’ inserted 
into an innocent-sounding law or referendum.  It established a pressure group or citizens’ 
committee, to influence the electorate, and create the impression of higher levels of support than 
really existed for its case.  The power trust bribed newspaper editors to include their propaganda 
in identical editorials which promoted their cause.  Bone would neither have had the consuming 
interest in Initiative 139 during 1940, nor been equal to the power trust’s methods, had he not 
experienced the setbacks of the Progressive era in 1913, or the related personal humiliation of 
1924.  
     During 1940, the pan-West Coast aspect of public power once more is striking.  Scattergood’s 
Los Angeles municipal company had long posed a threat to the private utility Southern 
Californian Edison.  As early as 1927, Hiram Johnson’s colleague in the House of 
Representatives, Phil Swing, expressed a future concern that the Edison Company would oppose 
Los Angeles municipal company competing with them by selling Boulder Dam electricity to 
small towns out in the countryside.220  Therefore, the same tension between public and private 
utilities prevailed in both California and Washington over rural electricity supply.  Private utility 
fears were strengthened in 1935 when state senator Olson succeeded in passing the Revenue 
Bond bill that would have set up a pud system in California, financed from revenue bonds, to 
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match Washington’s.  Although the measure was vetoed by Governor Merriam, in 1937 Olson 
and Garrison passed similar legislation, which Governor Olson upheld in 1939.  Yet, during 
1940, approximating to the situation in Washington, California’s power trust put forward a 
referendum, Proposition 13, about rural areas being funded through revenue bonds.  Its rejection 
would return them to reliance on private utilities.221  Later on, Olson’s 1942 re-election 
organizers described the methods private utilities had used, and were using, to undermine public 
power.  ‘Their tactics,’ comparable to the Washington situation, included ‘heavy purchase of 
“institutional” or “good-will” advertising in newspapers ... in the hope of influencing the’ 
(papers’) ‘editorial policies.’222  In 1940 the public power movement helped frustrate attempts by 
the power trust to return rural areas to dependency on private utilities, through California’s 
Proposition 13 and Washington’s Initiative 139.  The marked similarities of private utility tactics 
in these referendum campaigns must surely show some co-ordination among the West Coast 
power trust against public power.  Moreover, the success of the public power movement shows 
its ideological robustness, 1939-1940, which kept the New Deal moving forward, contradicting 
Brinkley’s argument.  Finally, the struggle over public power in West Coast rural areas is a vivid 
example of ideological continuity between the Progressive era (and its immediate aftermath), and 
the later New Deal. 
     The presidential campaign of 1940 provided the culmination of the public power versus 
private utility struggle, when Wendell Willkie became the Republican presidential candidate.  
Roosevelt’s opponents were clever to choose him.  Up till then, Willkie was the head of 
Commonwealth and Southern (C&S) one of the biggest and most successful private utility 
holding companies in America, whose area of operation included the south and mid-west.  
However, Willkie’s company, in some respects, challenged New Deal perceptions of exploitative 
private utilities.  Remarkably, C&S halved its electricity rates between 1933 and 1939.223  In 
other respects, C&S had a far more chequered record, over labour relations and manipulation of 
regulatory devices.  For Olson, among others, Willkie ‘seemed ... to symbolize the “power 
trust”.’224  Many progressives believed their warning that the power trust was intent on political 
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power could no longer be dismissed as rhetorical hyperbole; rather it was a manifest reality.  If 
Willkie won, Washington and Californian progressives feared a major power trust offensive 
against public power.  In a July 1940 conversation between Bone and an Interior Department 
official, they agreed that ‘if Willkie is elected the power companies will feel that a new era is 
being ushered in’ ... (and) ‘success with putting Initiative 139 over would be indicative of the 
possibility of knocking out municipal owned systems.’225  Similarly, Olson argued in an August 
1940 radio speech from Napa Valley that if Roosevelt lost and Proposition 13 was defeated, 
private utilities, especially PG&E, would be resurgent. 226    They would gain the lion’s share of 
electricity from Central Valley Project dams i.e. Shasta and Keswick Dams.  Likewise, the 
electricity allocation to Scattergood’s Los Angeles municipal company from Boulder Dam 
would be drastically reduced in favour of Southern Californian Edison.  
      A further cause for anxiety was Willkie’s decision to select McNary as his vice-presidential 
candidate.  Undoubtedly, Willkie’s main reason for choosing McNary was the Oregon senator’s 
great influence with western farmers – a vital constituency – and McNary’s standing in the 
senate.  However, Willkie was well-aware of McNary’s strong public power views.  Willkie 
either wanted to lessen voter polarization during the election, thereby appealing to public power 
supporters through McNary, or, as likely, to muzzle McNary on the topic, in the name of party 
unity.  Willkie’s aides certainly asked McNary to avoid discussion of public power in his vice 
presidential acceptance speech.  However, McNary refused, and in his speech explicitly 
reiterated support for public power.227 
     Consequently, in the election campaign, the Republicans expressed a mixed message over 
public power, so regarding this one issue, probably McNary’s presence on their ticket aided 
Democrat electoral prospects.  Furthermore, from a non-electoral perspective, Willkie’s choice 
of McNary as his running-mate furnished evidence for the normalization of public power as a 
mainstream political view, in both political parties.  It showed public power’s continued high 
profile in the later New Deal, and the importance of the West Coast’s public ownership 
movement.  In fact, with all three tenets of progressivism in mind, Neuberger went so far as to 
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describe McNary as ‘the most progressive Republican on a national ticket since Teddy 
Roosevelt.’228 
     The 1940 election was fiercely fought, and, notwithstanding McNary’s presence on the 
Republican ticket, progressives appeared genuinely alarmed that a Willkie win would mean 
power trust control of the presidency.  Ickes was constantly supplied with anti-private utility 
information throughout the New Deal, especially from his Chicago and other mid-west contacts, 
which fed his existing public power convictions.  During 1936, a prominent mid-west academic 
reminded Ickes of their longstanding Progressive era public power experience: ‘I am writing 
because of ... the common cause for which we have labored so long in the past.’229  In November 
1939, Ickes was told of malpractices by Willkie’s C&S.  C&S had been manipulating Michigan 
Power Company share activities while pretending this C&S subsidiary was free to sell shares as 
it pleased.230  Roosevelt copied a letter to Ickes in September 1940 from nineteen congressmen 
alleging widespread political corruption by the power trust during the election.  Congressmen 
Coffee and Magnuson, and several Californian representatives, stated: ‘Private ... utility 
corporations ... are contributing very large sums of money ... to elect men to Congress who will 
vote for the(ir) interests.’231  Against this ideological back-drop, in an October speech, Ickes 
railed that the private utilities represented ‘the real power behind Wendell Willkie, and that they 
are trying to seize control of the Federal Government.’232  Another Ickes speech shortly 
afterwards directly linked Progressive era and New Deal political corruption, in a manner that 
was particularly apposite for California.  He declared political corruption’s ‘grandfather is the 
railroads of America.  Its father is the (private) utilities.’233 
     Ickes’ and Olson’s views were in harmony both over public power decisions, 1939-1940, and 
the power trust’s threat to democracy.  In December 1939, public power was prioritized for 
Boulder Dam electricity – aiding Scattergood’s Los Angeles municipal company.234  The 
following month, Ickes met Olson in a special session over the CVP, and said the Californian 
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state should be ‘ready to act as a power distributor or ... in the interests of public power 
distributors.’235  Olson’s more ‘statist’ public power outlook accorded well with Ickes’.  Olson, 
an ‘apostle of public ownership,’ ‘took great delight in fighting against Wendell Willkie.’236 In 
fact, at the July 1940 Democratic Convention in Chicago, Olson was a member of the ‘resolution 
committee,’ and ‘urged his colleagues to insert a plank in the ... (election) platform pledging the 
party to complete government ownership and distribution of electric power.’237  Although his 
proposal failed, the vehemence that Olson and Ickes brought to the public power struggle, 
directed especially at Willkie, was a legacy of their Progressive era and New Deal experiences.  
Along with the efforts of the whole public power movement, it helped defeat Willkie in 1940, 
and sustain the New Deal. 
The Relevance of the Public Power Movement in the Lead-into War, 1941-1942 
Historians conventionally regard the years 1941 to 1942 as the time when, in FDR’s famous 
December 1943 press conference phrase, ‘Dr. New Deal’ was replaced by ‘Dr. Win the war.’  
Recently, Brinkley, among others, has stressed the later New Deal and war years institutionalized 
the business- government co-operation which deprived Roosevelt’s government of its reformist 
edge, but was a vital cause of post-World War II affluence.  In a West Coast context, the 
discourse is about the reasons the region reached its ‘take off’ stage, to employ Walt Rostow’s 
term.  Opinion fluctuates between either crediting that success to the later New Deal, i.e. a direct 
result of the big dams, or the war years, during which the West Coast emerged as a crucial region 
for the military-industrial complex.  However, two other factors need emphasis in the light of 
Progressive era influence on monopoly reform.  The public power movement used the war-time 
emergency as a means to facilitate and accelerate their aims.  Progressives, always adaptable to 
new circumstances, were able to continue, or counsel the continuation, of the New Deal under 
the guise of war.  At the same time, while many, but not all, progressives became converted 
entirely to the war time struggle, ongoing public power objectives were pursued regardless of the 
war-time situation.  Therefore, the New Deal was not entirely discarded in favour of entering and 
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winning the war.  Progressives utilized the war for their own purposes, and carried on with some 
of their aims notwithstanding war time conditions.   
     Concerning utilization of the war emergency by progressives, the public power leadership and 
wider movement re-asserted the importance of the West Coast projects.  They feared these 
projects might be swept aside, or put on hold, during the transition from a peace time to war 
economy.  Conversely, they realized that New Deal projects could be facilitated by the 
emergency.  For example, Ickes wrote to Roosevelt in September 1940 referring to 
‘complications ... due to the national defence program.’  He said ‘inroads ... made in technical 
staff of the Bureau of Reclamation’ would delay ‘completion of Grand Coulee Dam, the CVP, 
(and) Boulder Dam.’  Instead, he urged extra funding ‘to expedite installations at Grand Coulee 
and Boulder Dams’ pointing out the benefits of additional electricity for ‘defence purposes.’238  
It would seem Roosevelt readily acquiesced in Ickes’ proposal, and the multiple aims behind it – 
helping defence, and public power, while combating the Depression– must have appealed to his 
supple mind.  The next month, October 1940, the Water Project Authority of California sent a 
resolution to Roosevelt ‘requesting the CVP ... be declared a national defence measure ... so that 
electric power (from Shasta Dam) for domestic, irrigation, and industrial purposes can be 
furnished to the central valley.’239  Like Ickes’ proposal, this letter also suggested work should be 
speeded up.  Roosevelt asked Ickes to prepare his reply, which stated that the New Deal had 
already re-categorized the CVP, Boulder and Grand Coulee Dams as ‘National Defence 
Projects.’240  
     John Boettiger, Roosevelt’s son-in-law, kept up pressure against private utilities into 1942, 
employing the war situation as a pretext for public power.  Boettiger was in the political 
background, but the political stance of his newspaper the Seattle Post-Intelligencer supplies 
interesting clues about Roosevelt’s opinions on the three tenets.  The Seattle P-I was a Hearst 
newspaper, at a time when Hearst had grown antagonistic to the New Deal.  Often, though, the 
paper favoured policies Roosevelt was sympathetic to.  For instance, in March 1942, an article in 
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the Seattle P-I read like a manifesto for public power and the perpetuation of the New Deal.  It 
argued for ‘the acquisition of ... Puget Sound Power and Light ... to allow their inclusion in the 
rapidly growing public power system ... because the expanding war program requires much more 
power.’241  It reasoned: ‘The public power movement ... has advanced ... as a result of ... the 
establishment of puds and municipal power plants, and ... action by the federal government.’  
The article concluded, ‘Now that war has produced demands beyond all previous imagining, the 
most hard-bitten opponents ... must admit ... in ... Washington at least public power is here to 
stay.’242 
     The proposed Columbia River (or Power) Authority was also presented as a ‘war need,’ and 
commandeered as an argument for replacing private utilities with public power in Washington 
and Oregon.  The extent FDR identified himself with the Columbia Power Authority’s aims, and 
made connections to the West Coast public power movement, was proof of his strong 
progressive ideological beliefs that reached back into the Progressive era.  He did not exercise a 
vague or remote control over this scheme, but took a decidedly ‘hands on’ approach to it.  In 
May 1941, he sent letters to Bone and McNary asking them to put forward a Columbia River 
Authority bill.243  Writing to Senator Norris, the inspirational force behind the TVA, Roosevelt 
talked about the ‘tremendous public power movement in the Northwest.’  The situation remained, 
as in 1940, that both Bone and Ickes were initiating Columbia River bills, but Roosevelt 
signalled he favoured Bone’s approach.  He wrote to Norris that he intended ‘local people will be 
distributing the power that is sold to them by the Federal authority.’244  In a June 1941 letter 
Bone said he would like to consult Roosevelt before he introduced the bill to Congress, ‘but 
hesitates to ask the President.’245  Roosevelt’s July 1941 reply stated he was ‘very much 
interested in the Columbia Power bill and will be glad to go through the Senator’s draft in 
advance of its introduction.’246 
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     As plans were finalized on Bone’s bill, in October 1941 Roosevelt supplied public power 
solutions to West Coast congressmen and senators (including Bone).  The president said he 
wanted a permanent ‘Northwest (dam) administration.’  However, he thought as a stop gap 
measure that existing legislation should be amended to allow the ‘acquisition of ... private power 
properties ... in connection with the Bonneville-Grand Coulee project.’247  When Bone 
introduced his Columbia Power bill in April 1942, Boettiger’s Seattle Post-Intelligencer gave 
resolute support for it, again using the rationale of the war emergency.  Boettiger’s newspaper 
was once more a conduit for Roosevelt’s public power views.  The Seattle P-I article asserted 
that Roosevelt supported Bone’s proposed Columbia Power Administration, and that its 
‘acquisition ... of private utility corporations ... will aid us to win this war.’248  A Seattle P-I 
editorial on this subject from the same month re-enacted themes of the Progressive era public 
power struggle, and shows how Bone attempted to ‘trump’ his longstanding enemies.  During 
1908 Bone was motivated to enter the public power struggle partly because of aspersions on the 
patriotism of those wanting municipal utilities.  The April 1942 Seattle P-I editorial quotes Bone 
saying: ‘The ... most ...efficient ... and ... patriotic way to handle the (Columbia power) problem 
is to purchase existing private systems.’249 Through the Progressive era, and intervening 1920s, 
progressives had tried to establish a public power system using revenue bonds, while private 
utilities sought ways of thwarting that effort.  In the editorial Bone stated that his Columbia 
Power bill ‘proposes a revenue bond plan for financing acquisition’ of private utilities.250   
     The fact that Bone’s Columbia Power Authority bill failed in Congress during 1942 is not a 
valid reason for saying progressivism, or the New Deal, ceased at the outbreak of war in 
December 1941.  Since 1937 the New Deal had experienced increasing difficulties in Congress, 
but New Dealers continued to attempt reforms.  Bone himself blamed ‘the fortunes of war’ for 
his bill’s defeat.251  However, he was not saying by 1942 progressives, locally or as high as the 
White House, had stopped trying to reform American society.  In reality, many factors conspired 
against his bill.  For example, the big drive for public power stirred up some localized opposition, 
either self-generated, or not entirely a product of power trust propaganda.  A Spokane newspaper 
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in Washington reported March 1941 that the 1940 elections in Seattle and Portland rejected 
proposals for the ‘further spread of public ownership.’252  Public power’s ‘bitter fight’ had 
always confronted the opposition of the power trust, and major or minor shifts in public opinion.  
Nonetheless, 1941-1942, the ‘New Deal,’ (including West Coast public power leaders and the 
wider movement, alongside the national movement), was still trying to pull all the levers at its 
disposal – new and existing ones – to expand public power, and curb the size of private utilities.  
For instance, in March 1941 Jerome Frank of the SEC contacted Bone to tell him that Puget 
Sound Power and Light fell within the purview of the Public Utilities Holding Company Act 
(1935).253  In 1934 Stone and Webster reorganized Puget Power as a result of anti-trust action.  
However, Frank had established that in this complex corporate world by 1941 Puget Power was a 
subsidiary of the large holding company Engineers Public Service Company, and therefore faced 
dismantlement.254  Referring to August 1942, the SEC informed Bone that a clutch of companies 
including Washington Water Power and Oregon’s North-western Electric were subsidiaries of 
American Power and Light.  The latter in turn was part of Electric Bond and Share Company, the 
biggest utility holding company in the United States.255  Therefore, well into World War II, 
across Washington and Oregon, power trust companies were still subject to break up by New 
Deal legislation from 1935.  Eventually, in 1943 the ‘wartime New Deal’ succeeded against 
Puget Sound Power and Light.  The private utility separated itself from holding company control 
and restructured as an entirely Washington-based corporation.   
     Likewise, public power leaders were only too alive to the possibilities of the war emergency 
as an agent for industrial expansion.  Some scholarship runs the risk of creating the false 
impression that West Coast public power was primarily concerned with electricity for domestic 
consumption as opposed to private utilities championing its industrial uses.  By 1941-1942 the 
power question had moved on from the Bonneville Dam situation where private utilities argued 
that its electricity should be used exclusively for industrial purposes, while public bodies pushed 
the case of the domestic consumer.  In fact, all public power leaders recognized the opportunities 
the war emergency would provide to the West Coast for industrial expansion, and did not view 
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industrial or domestic uses of electricity as a ‘zero-sum game.’  Quite the opposite, progressives 
welcomed wartime industrialization by the military-industrial complex as a solution to high West 
Coast unemployment, exacerbated by Dust Bowl migration. 
     Moreover, in California, for example, Scattergood had long wished to encourage the 
expansion of both Los Angeles’ population and industry.  In March 1940 he met Roosevelt to 
provide him with information about ‘National Defence Power.’256  With Scattergood’s acute 
sense of exploiting conditions to suit his municipal company and the growth of Los Angeles, his 
eager involvement in the war effort was not surprising.  Significantly, though, Roosevelt’s 
government, 1941-1942, steered National Defence Power in a public power direction.  During 
July 1941 a special power unit was established in the Office of Production Management (OPM), 
to handle all defence power problems.  Julius Krug from the TVA headed the new unit.257  
Scattergood was described as ‘actively participating in the program.’258  Harry Slattery from the 
Rural Electrification Administration also took part in its decision-making.259  Clearly, the 
continuing New Deal intended that public power leaders should have a decisive role over 
defence decisions about electricity, and not be sidelined, as happened in World War I.  Once 
more, the Progressive era provided lessons for the later New Deal years. 
     The extent progressive New Deal values were perpetuated, 1943-1945, is beyond the scope of 
this work.  The historiography argues strongly that for the duration of the war, 1941-1945, the 
military-industrial complex largely controlled the economy, and government monopoly reform 
ceased.  At first, the OPM, and, then from 1942, the War Production Board (WPB), i.e. the main 
organizations charged with co-ordinating war production, could do little against the tightening 
grip of monopoly corporations.  When Krug was appointed head of the WPB in 1944, this trend 
proved irreversible.260  Contradicting that pattern, though, there is evidence that the trajectory of 
the New Deal – opposing private utility monopolies and favouring their nemesis, public power – 
was not abandoned during the war emergency, at least up to, and beyond, 1942.  Examples 
include the speeding up of West Coast HEP projects, FDR’s steer towards public power in the 
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power unit of the Office of Production Management (1941), Puget Power’s reorganization away 
from holding company ownership (1943), and the benefits that government-aided public power 
companies derived from wartime industrialization and population growth. Especially on the West 
Coast, the spirit and substance of the Progressive era-inspired New Deal persisted. 
     As a final example of Progressive era influence, 1941-1942, another round was played out, 
almost regardless of the war emergency in perhaps California’s bitterest public power fight, 
which dated back to the Progressive era.  The Hetch Hetchy controversy (1913), whereby San 
Francisco municipality built the O’Shaughnessy Dam in the Yosemite National Park became 
iconic for public power when private utility PG&E purchased the dam (1925).  Throughout the 
peacetime New Deal Ickes pounded away with Progressive era ardour at San Francisco to 
enforce the Raker Act (1913), which should have prevented the sale of a public power facility to 
PG&E.  In 1936, Ickes forced the issue before a federal judge, who ruled in his favour (1938).261  
San Francisco appealed the decision.  During 1938, Ickes withheld PWA funding to San 
Francisco as leverage to gain their compliance with the Raker Act.262  Mayor Rossi called upon 
Hiram Johnson to intercede; pointing out San Franciscans had rejected five municipal 
referendums for buying out PG&E over the O’Shaughnessy Dam.263  In October 1939, the US 
Supreme Court definitively stated that San Francisco was in violation of the Raker Act.264  Still a 
democratic mandate could not be secured. 
     Between 1941 and 1942 the imminent completion of a New Deal project re-animated the 
progressive feud against PG&E, and the issue of Hetch Hetchy.  With the Shasta Dam due to be 
completed in 1943 as part of the CVP, the question of whether public or private utilities would 
benefit from its electricity became pressing.  PG&E dominated the northern Californian 
electricity market in and around San Francisco.  As a countervailing power Olson wanted to 
encourage Washington-style puds.  During 1942 matters came to a head.  Olson representatives 
warned that PG&E ‘need (only) ... delay ... the development of local public ownership’ to 
monopolize Shasta electricity and dictate its wholesale and retail price.265  When Ickes gave 
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evidence to the Public Lands Committee (January, 1942), which discussed relaxing the Raker 
Act because of the war, he argued successfully against such a move.266  Furthermore, he declared 
PG&E should sell the O’Shaughnessy Dam back to San Francisco municipality to help the war 
effort.267  Olson faced a gubernatorial election in 1942.  Although his opponents attacked him on 
several fronts, the CVP and Hetch Hetchy controversies certainly featured prominently in the 
election.  The power trust lobby, a major component in what Olson termed ‘the third house of the 
legislature,’ had obstructed the progressive governor throughout his administration, 1939-
1942.268  In the election year the power trust took its anti public power propaganda onto the 
campaign trail.  When Olson lost, he pointedly claimed that power trust propaganda was a major 
determinant of the election result.  The 1942 election, therefore, played its part in the latest round 
of the public power versus private utility ‘bitter fight’ that dated back to the Progressive era.  Of 
course, the war emergency exerted an enormous impact on the election.  Even so, the 
longstanding public power struggle against PG&E, which was involved in both the Hetch Hetchy 
and CVP controversies, significantly influenced the 1942 election result in California. 
                                                  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
     The West Coast in the late 1930s was a crucial part of New Deal monopoly reform, regarding 
public power.  The pan-West Coast public power movement was an ideological creation of the 
Progressive era, and exercised considerable influence shaping and implementing policy in co-
operation with the national movement.  Public power leaders: Ross, Scattergood, and Bone 
brought a hardened ideological resolve from the Progressive age to 1930s utility reform.  Bone’s 
‘bitter fight’ against private utilities, 1900-1924, was strongly paralleled by events in 1940.  
Public power advocates conducted their discourse within the intellectual framework of 
progressivism’s three tenets.  Their aims were not discarded at the start of the war emergency, 
1941-1942, but gained greater urgency, or continued unabated. 
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Chapter Six: Social Justice on the West Coast, 1937-1942 
 
In March 1939, Howard Costigan, head of the Washington Commonwealth Federation, declared: 
‘If we don’t break the back of the Associated Farmers, they will break the back not only of 
labor ... (and) the farmer, but the entire New Deal by 1940.’  Costigan was warning about the 
dangers posed by the Associated Farmers – an anti-union organization - to the farmer-labour 
voting alliance which, if successful, would destroy the New Deal in the 1940 elections.  The 
struggle against the Associated Farmers was part of a wider social justice conflict.  It centred on 
unionization, but incorporated problems associated with reformist governments since Progressive 
times:  communism, the farmer-labour alliance, and the status of the small farmer.  The conflict 
in the late 1930s was at its most explosive on the West Coast.   
     This chapter explores, in a West Coast context, why late New Deal social justice policy 
caused such conflict.  It argues that the points of disagreement are best comprehended through 
the lens of Progressive era ideology.  The chapter is in sections.  Section one concentrates on the 
period 1937 to 1938, and the fierce argument within progressivism about the direction of New 
Deal social justice policy, especially concerning CIO unionization.  Section two considers how 
the problems associated with unionization, helped produce a reactionary response, 1937-1939.  
Section three explains how these combined factors prompted an ideological repositioning of the 
La Follette Committee during the California investigation, 1939-1940.  Section four looks at a 
contemporaneous crisis in Washington State with strong situational similarities to the 
Progressive era.  Section five covers the years 1940-1942, as progressivism adapted its 
arguments during the onset of war, but still retained an influence on government policy. 
 
The Argument within Progressivism over Social Justice Policy, 1937-1938 
Hiram Johnson’s old Progressivism disapproved of late New Deal social justice policy.  Fellow 
Californian Culbert Olson, a radical progressive, strongly approved of it.  This section looks at 
these two representative progressive figures and their ideological disagreement.  It shows that 
despite the historiography, inspired by Hofstadter, recognizing a clear dividing line between the 
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Progressive era and the New Deal regarding social justice policy, the differences, as exemplified 
by Johnson and Olson, have been exaggerated.   
     Californian US Senator Hiram Johnson emerged as an implacable opponent of Roosevelt 
during 1937.  Up till then he was a New Deal ally.  For decades Johnson had harboured towering 
political ambitions.  He was vice presidential candidate in Theodore Roosevelt’s failed 1912 
election bid to become the first Progressive Party president of America.  During 1920 Johnson 
ran unsuccessfully for the Republican presidential nomination.  Previously, Johnson was an 
inspirational reforming governor of California, 1911-1917, and later became a long-serving 
progressive Republican senator, 1917-1945.  Photographs of him, and correspondence in 
Johnson’s Papers, portray a man very conscious of his own worth and political standing.  He 
even declined Roosevelt’s offer to become Secretary of Interior in 1933.269  Equally, Johnson’s 
Papers reveal his passion for furthering social justice and protecting progressive values. 
     In June 1936 Johnson suffered a cerebral vascular stroke.270  He convalesced over several 
months, unclear whether the stroke had ended his political career.  However, he made a 
remarkable recovery, and returned to the Senate at the start of 1937.  His re-induction into active 
politics coincided with Roosevelt’s ‘Court Plan.’  Johnson commented: ‘I got back just in time to 
hop into a hot fight.’271  He fought against the Court Plan with the supercharged energy of one 
granted a new lease of life, grasping the momentous issues at stake.  Johnson observed: ‘The 
struggle in which we engaged was the most important of the decade.’272  Superficially, the Court 
Plan – the reason for Johnson’s estrangement from Roosevelt – related to constitutional matters.  
At a deeper level, it was about progressivism, and especially social justice.      
     Between 1935 and 1936 the Supreme Court ruled most of the First New Deal unconstitutional.  
Roosevelt believed its decisions did not uphold the US Constitution – the Court’s role in the 
American political system – but were politically-motivated.  The Second New Deal strongly 
emphasized social justice reform e.g. the Social Security Act and the National Labor Relations 
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Act (NLRA).  The latter guaranteed unionization as a civil right, and elections held by a 
government body, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), gave the union that won a 
majority of votes in any workplace balloted exclusive bargaining rights.  As Roosevelt feared 
that the Supreme Court would strike down his new social justice legislation, on February 5, 1937 
he announced the Court Plan, to retire Supreme Court justices at seventy.  If a justice refused, he 
would be allowed to appoint replacements.273  In this way, Roosevelt sought to curb the ageing 
Supreme Court’s anti-Administration stance.   
     For Johnson, Roosevelt’s Court Plan was the bellwether of a pattern of behaviour that 
challenged progressive values.  Lawsuits had prevented NLRB assistance towards unionization 
in 1936, so up to the spring of 1937, when the Supreme Court ruled the NLRB constitutional, the 
La Follette Committee publicized the case for unionization.  However, the La Follette Civil 
Liberties Committee was only able to urge unionization, unlike the NLRB which could legally 
enforce it.  In these circumstances, the breakaway Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) 
labour movement took matters into its own hands.  On February 11, 1937 it achieved a victory as 
disturbing to Johnson as Roosevelt’s Court Plan proposal barely a week earlier. 274  The CIO’s 
United Automobile Workers (UAW) won union recognition at General Motors, the car giant, 
which built nearly half of America’s automobiles.275  This stunning victory was achieved by 
using ‘sit-down’ strikes, directly occupying factories to force acceptance of unions on hostile 
employers.  The victory over GM in the Mid West was the prelude to a spring and summer of sit-
down and conventional strikes, which were often met with violence, and edged America towards 
industrial warfare.  On progressive ideological grounds, Johnson opposed both sit-down strikes 
and the Court Plan.  Yet, other progressives, like Olson, fully endorsed these developments.  
How can we explain this disagreement within progressivism?   
     From the outset, Johnson looked upon the Court Plan and the sit-down strikes as two sides of 
the same coin.  At the end of February he wrote: ‘The other day ... (Congresswoman) O’Day let 
the cat out ... the bag (she is a great friend of old Mrs. Roosevelt) ... by saying, “of course the 
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President want(s) ... control of the Supreme Court” ... The power we are giving him ... in 
conjunction with ... the sit down strike(s), with which he is sympathetic, is mighty ominous.’276  
By March, Johnson had conceptualized these perceived threats into an argument with strong 
Progressive era overtones. He wrote to a West Coast acquaintance: ‘You are dead right about the 
labor situation.  You may think that I have been crazy in talking about dictatorship, but when 
these sit down strikes are successful, and the President has taken control of the Supreme Court, 
there is going to be a dictatorship of the Proletariat, or ... the President himself ... It will not be 
apparent at first, but just as certain as I am writing to you, it ... (will) come.’277 
     In many respects, Johnson’s opposition was puzzling.  He supported unionization, and did not 
hold judges in high esteem.  For instance, in April 1937, he remarked with typical candour: ‘I 
used to say that judges were only men after all, and damned poor men at that.’278  Rather, 
Johnson’s opposition can only be satisfactorily explained by his Progressive era beliefs.  From its 
inception, progressivism was motivated by a fear that one element in society would become 
preponderant over others.  Under the New Deal, in Johnson’s opinion, an office of state – the 
presidency – and a group – the CIO labour movement – threatened to tyrannize over society.  
Progressives had always been most exercised by the abuse of power, whether by monopolists, 
exploitative employers, or irresponsible resource developers.  Johnson believed that during 1937 
the shifts in power he was witnessing within society towards FDR and the CIO would create 
sooner or later a tyranny by an individual or a group over the majority. 
     In relation to what he viewed as the misuse of union power, and its distortion of social justice 
aims, Johnson stated bluntly in April 1937: ‘I yield to no man in adherence to union labor ... But 
I am opposed to the sit-down strike ... to the idea that a... body of men can come into my house, 
or ... yours ... and say that they will keep possession of our homes (until) ... we ... yield to 
(their) ... demands.’279  Moreover, Johnson believed that Roosevelt was implicitly supporting the 
sit-down strike campaign by failing to take forceful action against it.  Johnson kept a copy of 
Woodrow Wilson’s 1919 Annual Congressional Message, referencing Progressive era ideology 
                                                 
276 Johnson to John Francis Neylan, February 26, 1937, Letters from Johnson, Johnson Papers 
277 Ibid., March 26, 1937 
278 Ibid., April 13, 1937  
279 Congressional Record, April 1, 1937, Johnson’s speech in support of amendment condemning sit-down strikes, 
carton 8, Johnson Papers 
219 
 
as a template for presidential behaviour over the sit-down strikes.  Wilson stated: ‘No 
Government worthy of the name can “play” these elements (management and labor) against each 
other, for there is a mutuality of interest between them which the Government must seek to 
express.  The right ... to strike is inviolate ... but ... Government ... (must) assert its power ... 
against the challenge of any class.’280  
     Certainly, American society appeared to be careering towards class warfare in 1937.  
Developments alarmed progressives who prized harmony between classes.  In March, the CIO 
unionization campaign achieved a climb-down from US Steel.  However, the smaller steel 
companies resisted successfully.  In this heated atmosphere, violence, and the language of 
violence, were freely used.  Girdler, the steel boss, sneeringly said of the strikers: ‘What do you 
think (their) pickets have clubs for, to chase butterflies?’281  After the Memorial Day Massacre 
(May 30, 1937), where police shot dead ten strikers outside Girdler’s Chicago steel mill, CIO 
leader Lewis thundered: ‘Is labor to be protected or is it to be butchered?’282  Although 
Roosevelt’s Court Plan was defeated in Congress (July 1937), and the CIO retreated from its sit-
down strike tactic during 1938, the rift in progressivism remained.283  The Supreme Court ruled 
the NLRB constitutional (April 1937), but increasingly bastions of old Progressivism, like the 
craft-oriented AFL viewed the NLRB, and the La Follette Committee as pro-CIO 
organizations.284  Unionization campaigns in which the CIO and AFL unions competed 
perpetuated rancour within the labour movement during the late 1930s.  For Johnson, the New 
Deal seemed to be promoting strife.      
     The historian Otis Graham Jr. writing in An Encore For Reform considered during the 1930s 
that most old Progressives - e.g. Johnson - were stuck in a Progressive era mindset.285  They 
favoured paternalism towards the working class, and abhorred the confrontational CIO labour 
movement backed by the New Deal.  Basically, they were incapable of moving with the times.  
The views of Graham replicated Hofstadter’s work, de-emphasizing Progressive era-New Deal 
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continuity.  Hofstadter believed that over social justice the ‘real impulses’ (of Progressive era 
reformers) ‘were deeply conservative,’ aimed at heading off socialism by dispensing very limited 
concessions to a grateful multitude. 286   Graham charged that Johnson, specifically, in both eras 
stood for an  anachronistic Turneresque individualism, threatened by big business in the 
Progressive era, and, during the later New Deal, by government and militant unions. 287 While 
there is some truth in these perspectives they ignore Johnson’s longstanding belief in 
unionization, i.e. collective action.  His union links in California stretched back almost thirty 
years to 1910 when the Teamsters endorsed him.288 
     Probably, New Dealer condemnation of Johnson, and others, for breaking with Roosevelt 
during 1937, had a lasting influence on New Deal-generation historians like Hofstadter, who, in 
the post-war world, raised doubts about Progressive era reformers.  After 1937, New Dealers 
sought to diminish Johnson and portray him as reactionary.  Ironically, contradicting 
Hofstadter’s argument, Johnson’s harshest critics were often Progressive era survivors like Ickes 
and Olson, who had become radical progressives during the New Deal.  They, and younger New 
Dealers, considered Johnson a progressive apostate.  When Johnson accused the late New Deal 
of betraying progressive ideology, they countered that he had abandoned progressivism.  For 
each side, establishing ownership of progressivism necessitated legitimizing their own, and 
discrediting the other side’s, meaning of the contested term.  In 1939, Ickes commented that 
Johnson had ‘moved much further to the right than he had ever been to the left.’289  During 1940, 
Governor Olson of California, who was a progressive in Utah throughout the 1910s, went further, 
stating that Johnson ‘hasn’t a progressive hair on his head.’290  In the 1950s and 1960s, 
Hofstadter and Graham continued and completed this direction of travel, deploying an argument 
that accommodated old Progressives who had embraced the later New Deal, while excluding 
critics of it like Johnson.  They asserted with finality that Progressive reformist instincts were 
ultimately backward-looking, while the New Deal had attained an authentic progressivism, the 
source of modern ‘liberalism.’  
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     Johnson’s most recent biographer, Richard Coke Lower, rejects the allegation that Johnson 
had abandoned his progressive beliefs post-1937.  Lower asserts he retained ‘his sympathy for 
the nation’s needy.’291  Therefore, the historiography is starting to recognize Johnson, in a 
general sense, maintained his progressive convictions over social justice.  However, in the 
particular, it does not provide an ideological explanation for Johnson’s rift with Roosevelt, or 
acknowledge that Johnson’s views were consistent with Progressive era ideology over sit-down 
strikes, perhaps the most contentious social justice issue during the late New Deal.  In this issue, 
Johnson’s concern for the economically disadvantaged was not going to stop him criticizing the 
sit-down strikes, with the backing of Wilson’s 1919 Progressive era speech for his position. 
     Another layer of understanding about Johnson can be added concerning his West Coast links. 
Johnson’s convictions remained consistent, but his perceptions of Californian social justice 
realities were being gradually altered by those in the political background with whom he 
interacted.  For example, up to April 1936, his main political confidant, revealed in Johnson’s 
correspondence, was Charles McClatchy.  As editor of the Sacramento Bee newspaper in the 
Progressive era, McClatchy had campaigned tirelessly for unionization and labour rights.  Right 
up to his death, on April 27, 1936, his enthusiasm for FDR remained undimmed, when Johnson 
already was having doubts about Roosevelt’s intentions before the presidential election of that 
year.  In the robust language of the Progressive era, McClatchy wrote: ‘I have been thinking a 
great deal about Roosevelt ... There is no public battle for the president ... It is time for Roosevelt 
to ... give ... (his opponents) a ... two-fisted fight ... and knock (them) ... down.’292  From 1937 
onwards, Frank Doherty replaced McClatchy as Johnson’s principal political confidant.  Doherty 
was the attorney to the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce.  Although he resolutely opposed the 
reactionary politics of southern California, as exemplified by Harry Chandler, owner of the Los 
Angeles Times, Doherty inevitably was more business-oriented than McClatchy.   
     Likewise, Philip Bancroft was a personal friend of Johnson.  He had acted as his campaign 
secretary in Johnson’s bid for the Republican presidential nomination during 1920. 293  Bancroft 
was an alumnus of Harvard, and, like Johnson, a trained lawyer.  He farmed in Walnut Creek, 
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near Johnson’s San Francisco power base.  Bancroft ran as the Republican candidate in 
California’s 1938 US Senate election, and lost to Sheridan Downey, the radical progressive 
Democrat.  In the late 1930s, Bancroft was increasingly drawn into the anti-union stance of large 
farmers in California.  At that time, he became vice president of the Associated Farmers, the 
most notorious anti-union organization on the West Coast.  Although Johnson never supported 
the Associated Farmers of California, he was being plied with their ideas by Bancroft.  Johnson’s 
progressive convictions did not change, but inevitably his perceptions about social justice 
conditions on the ground in California, as viewed from three thousand miles away in Washington 
DC, were subtly swayed by Doherty’s business-oriented perspective, and Bancroft’s large farmer 
outlook.     
      Even with these provisos, we can acknowledge that, in spite of his detractors, Johnson 
sustained his Progressive era beliefs.  Similarly, there is a case for saying Johnson’s opponents in 
the New Deal Administration, and those espousing an even more radical progressivism 1937 
onwards, continued also to articulate values that were recognizably derived from the Progressive 
era.  Confirmation of that point establishes another Progressive era-New Deal ideological 
continuity.  
     Olson, who won California’s governorship for the Democrats in November 1938, represented 
a radical progressive outlook over social justice policy, despite his Progressive era past.  Indeed, 
he was the antithesis of Johnson, by supporting Roosevelt’s Court Plan, and the CIO’s sit-down 
strike movement.  His progressivism had been greatly radicalized by the Great Depression.  
Although Johnson fully backed Roosevelt’s programmes to combat chronic unemployment, his 
Progressive era belief that government should be a neutral referee between business and unions 
emerged intact from the 1930s experience.  For Johnson, the need for government to minimize 
social divisions was self-evident, at a time when economic conditions exacerbated them.  
However, Olson drew the opposite conclusion from the Depression – that government must 
favour unions over business to rebalance the socio-economic structure.  The Depression was 
caused by overproduction, not scarcity.  Perhaps inevitably, the ‘poverty in the midst of plenty’ 
paradox produced an intellectual response which argued that government should encourage 
unions to empower poorer groups. 
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     On the West Coast there was a group of radical progressive leaders who wanted to go further 
than the New Deal.  Culbert Olson, Howard Costigan, and Monroe Sweetland - in California, 
Washington State, and Oregon respectively - had utopian plans for an ‘economy of abundance,’ 
and ‘production-for-use.’  Apart from supporting unionization, these radical progressives 
believed government should give the unemployed the means of production to supply their needs 
on a non-profit basis, both food and manufactured goods.  They would either use the goods they 
produced –i.e. production-for-use – or exchange surplus goods in central warehouses, for those 
they were short of.  These highly idealistic, and unrealized, plans stemmed from a conference of 
the Farmer Labor Political Federation (FLPF) in Chicago during 1935, which formed the 
American Commonwealth Political Federation.294  It wanted to push the New Deal towards 
greater radicalism, or, as a party, replace it in government.  An ephemeral ‘Third Party’ initiative, 
like the short-lived Progressive Party itself (1912-1916), the ideas of the American 
Commonwealth Political Federation continued to influence radical West Coast progressives 
during the second half of the 1930s.  Costigan founded the Washington Commonwealth 
Federation (WCF) in 1935, inspired the Oregon Commonwealth Federation (OCF), set up by 
Sweetland during 1937, and advised Olson both before and after he was elected governor of 
California in 1938.  Yet, significantly, these radical progressives, notably Olson, faithfully 
followed the intellectual contours of the Progressive era.  
     Olson’s campaign speeches around his 1938 election triumph express characteristic 
Progressive era social justice beliefs.  Taken in conjunction with ideas from 1940, when he had 
two years of executive office behind him, they show that radical progressives thought within a 
Progressive era ideological framework.  For instance, Turner’s frontier thesis had provided an 
intellectual foundation for Progressive era reform, and Olson considered it was also the source of 
the New Deal.  The closed frontier deprived Americans of fertile land for settlement to escape 
social justice problems.  It transformed rugged individualism from being an independent virtue 
into an exploitative vice.  In the 1938 campaign, Olson stated, ‘As the land became settled, (and) 
wealth ... lodged in fewer hands ... we ... discovered ...  as the New Deal so strikingly showed 
us ... (that) the rugged individualism of our pioneer days ... result(ed) in millions of ... starving 
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individuals.’ 295 During 1940, Olson asserted definitively that the closed frontier constituted the 
New Deal’s intellectual basis.  He said: ‘When the American frontier disappeared in the 1890s; 
that was when the New Deal was conceived ... When Wall Street crashed in October 1929; that 
was when the New Deal was born.’296 
     Although progressives warred over social justice policy after 1937, they had not developed 
into separate political species, despite their ‘family feud.’  For instance, in both eras, 
progressives tried to awaken a social conscience among the public.  Meaningful social justice 
reform would only take place if widespread public support for it existed.  In 1938, during a 
campaign speech, Olson reasoned that people should develop broader sympathies than the old 
attitude which ‘considered ... social responsibility was discharged when ... (a man) could bar the 
door of his home against want and provide for the security of his family.’ 297  Olson was echoing 
Johnson, who in 1911 had encouraged a social conscience about the poor, saying: ‘I have ... little 
patience with the man who closes his front door and ... as he sits by his fireside thinks the whole 
world warm.’298  This attitude of mind entailed thinking beyond individual requirements to those 
of wider society; only then would the electorate be inclined to vote for reformist politicians. 
     On monopoly reform, in his post-1938 election Inaugural Address, Olson compared his 
government with Johnson’s in the 1910s.  He said, ‘There is a marked analogy in the 
circumstances of the present ... administration in California and that which occurred over twenty-
five years ago.’299  Olson wanted to drive from politics private utility interest Southern California 
Edison, as Johnson rid Californian politics of the Southern Pacific railroad.300 Both politicians 
were motivated by the political corruption of profiteering monopolies that impoverished the 
public.  Despite differences over CIO unionization, Olson’s reformist 1930s Californian 
government was following in the footsteps of Johnson’s Progressive era governorship during the 
1910s.  As governor, he even had a portrait of Johnson hanging in his office.301  
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     Olson was also committed in his Inaugural Address to the Progressive era’s three tenets.  On 
social justice, he said: ‘Unemployment and poverty ... need not prevail in bountiful California,’ 
and that he would deliver ‘ample production and distribution of the things of life.’  Over 
monopoly reform, Olson stated: ‘private corporations ... (should not be) controlling the natural 
resources of the State.’  Regarding conservation, he promised policies ‘to conserve ... our great 
natural resources ... in the common interest.’302  During1940, Olson combined the three tenets, 
graphically conveying social justice conditions.  He declared: ‘Monopolies ...  own ... our natural 
resources ... At the head of this economic blind alley, we find a wall of ... monopoly ... Huddled 
in this alley, groping for a way out ... (are) millions of small-scale farmers trying to maintain 
American agriculture ... in competition with industrialized ... farming ... and labor unions 
struggling desperately to win for workers their ... just share of the wealth they create.’303 
     By bracketing together ‘small-scale farmers,’ and ‘labor unions,’ Olson showed his awareness 
of the farmer-labour alliance, central to western progressivism.  Like all western progressives, he 
viewed it as an ideological concept and a constituency.  In the Progressive era, Johnson achieved 
a farmer-labour voting alliance during the 1910s, comprising small farmers in the San Joaquin 
Valley and the urban proletariat of San Francisco.  Therefore, across social justice policy, 
notwithstanding their fierce disagreement over unionization, progressives, as exemplified by 
Johnson and Olson, broadly agreed.  Their views coincided over: the frontier thesis; developing a 
social conscience among the public; opposition to big business political and socio-economic 
malpractice; support for the three interconnected tenets; and adherence to the farmer-labour 
alliance.  There was no dividing line in social justice policy between the Progressive era and the 
New Deal.   
 
The CIO-AFL ‘Civil War,’ and the Reactionary Backlash  
This section challenges the assumption that CIO unionization on the West Coast differed in 
ideological terms from the AFL unionization campaign.  It also shows the potency of the 
backlash by reactionary organizations which sought to exploit problems resulting from 
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unionization. On the West Coast, the CIO unionization drive produced a matching AFL 
campaign for union membership, 1937-1939.  These campaigns: put great strains on the farmer-
labour alliance, became caught up with anti-communism, and threatened to lead small farmers 
into deserting the New Deal.  The La Follette Committee had to contend with these problems in 
the California hearings, 1939-1940.  
     During 1937-1939 the CIO’s unionization drive was not confined to manufacturing industries 
which the La Follette Committee highlighted in the Mid West.  Lewis, the CIO’s leader, 
launched a multi-front assault on un-unionized areas, or those controlled by his AFL rivals, 
across the American economy.  On the West Coast, the CIO attempted to supplant an AFL union 
in the lumber industry, vital to Washington State and Oregon.  In July 1937, the International 
Woodworkers of America (IWA) was founded as a CIO affiliate.304  Moreover, throughout the 
agriculturally rich West Coast region, the CIO also targeted un-unionized sectors like food 
processing and the related transportation sectors.  In these areas, the AFL fought back with 
vigour against the rise of the CIO, and the Teamsters led the AFL counter-attack. 
     Large expanses of California and Central Washington State contained some of America’s 
most fertile land, provided they were irrigated.  California in the 1930s had developed a farming 
industry of staggering variety.  Terms like ‘peach bowl,’ ‘rice bowl,’ and ‘salad bowl,’ 
encompassed some of the state’s farming activities.  There were also vineyards and cotton lands, 
as well as dairying, livestock, cereal and vegetable production.  The Yakima Valley in Central 
Washington was similarly blessed with an abundance of agricultural products.  This agriculture 
was mostly labour-intensive on extensive farms, so large workforces were necessary to harvest 
crops, as well as process, and transport them.  Highly perishable products could easily be 
destroyed by strikes. 
     Dave Beck, the AFL leader on the West Coast, controlled Teamster operations from 
Seattle.305  Business, and many farmers, viewed his long-established truckers union as the lesser 
of two evils compared with the CIO.  Johnson had good relations with the Teamsters.  Beck’s 
great rival in transport unionization was Harry Bridges, the militant Australian left-wing leader 
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of the CIO International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union (ILWU), based in San 
Francisco.  Already, Bridges had won negotiating rights for all West Coast ports, but he had 
greater ambitions in the interior of the Pacific states.  During 1937, as West Coast Director of the 
CIO, Bridges persuaded national leader Lewis to permit an aggressive unionization drive across 
West Coast states into food processing by the CIO’s United Canning, Agricultural, Packing and 
Allied Workers of America (UCAPAWA).306  Bridges of the ILWU, and the UCAPAWA leader 
Donald Henderson were both Marxists, so there was a class struggle dimension to their 
unionization.  In the same year, according to West Coast CIO organiser, Richard Francis, AFL 
President William Green had selected Washington, and the wider West Coast, for a showdown 
against the CIO, with the Teamsters taking the lead.307  
     During 1938, Bridges’ plans for the UCAPAWA campaign entailed unionization of canneries, 
packing houses, dairies, and haulage.  Once UCAPAWA controlled the fate of produce off the 
farms, the CIO could force upon the farmers the unionization of their poorly paid farm labour.  
As Bridges expressed his scheme, unionization would ‘march inland ... from the packing sheds to 
the fields.’308  In 1939, as reported by the La Follette Committee, UCAPAWA was associated 
with two Californian stoppages: the Marysville fruit pickers strike and the Madera cotton strike 
in the San Joaquin Valley. 
     In 1938, the Teamsters pan-West Coast campaign spread to California.  For example, they 
began a unionization drive in the Imperial Valley.  Across this prosperous valley, field workers 
faced an eighteen hour day, for a pittance, in temperatures that reached 130 degrees Fahrenheit.  
The Teamsters first attempted to seize control of all transport in and out of the valley.  They 
could then unionize the packing sheds by threatening transportation of food, and bring 
unionization to the exploited fieldworkers.  A farmers’ leader in the Imperial Valley, Hugh 
Osbourne, stated later to the La Follette Committee that in 1938 Teamsters said ‘they were not 
overlooking the agricultural industry, and proposed to unionize it through transportation.’309 
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     The farmer-labour alliance originated in the Progressive era, and involved the ‘mutuality’ of 
industrial labour and small farmers, whose poverty was a world away from wealthy Californian 
large farmers.  Both groups wanted higher incomes.  During the late 1930s, unionization of food 
processing and transport, and, by implication, farm labourers, threatened the farmer-labour 
Progressive era alliance.  Through much of the west the alliance between small farmers and 
labour unions had persisted since the Progressive era.  It held for Johnson in California; it was 
the basis of La Follette Jr.’s power in Wisconsin.  However, as soon as unionization drives began 
c. 1937 in food processing and transport, farmer-labour mutuality was put under pressure, which 
caused La Follette’s California investigation major problems during 1939-1940. 
     That the farmer-labour alliance began to unravel during the later New Deal did not signify an 
ideological discontinuity from the Progressive era.  In some respects, this alliance was always a 
marriage de convenance based on shared poverty, rather than a precise congruence of interests.  
Small farmers owned their means of production unlike industrial workers; while unionization of 
food processing and transport would inevitably hit farm income as employers faced with 
unionization costs paid farmers less for their produce.  The farmer-labour alliance was always 
vulnerable and a flawed progressive concept. 
     Likewise, the CIO, a product of the New Deal, did not represent a unique threat to the farmer-
labour alliance, as the Progressive era-oriented AFL claimed.  Large farmers in California and 
Washington’s Yakima Valley were never the natural constituency of the farmer-labour alliance.  
Yet, in parts of California’s San Joaquin Valley, most of Washington, and all of Oregon small 
farmers predominated and supported the alliance.  The aggressive CIO unionization drive in food 
processing and transport undoubtedly created severe problems.  In May 1937, Kelly Loe, editor 
of the ‘Oregon Labor Press,’ accused the OCF and CIO of destroying good relations between the 
AFL and the small farmers’ Oregon Grange organization.  He warned that if the farmer-labour 
alliance fragmented, poorer people would lose the ‘balance of power to determine elections.’ 310    
However, the AFL Teamsters’ campaign posed similar problems.  Richard Neuberger disclosed 
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in 1939 that throughout Oregon small farmers believed the Teamsters would force them to hire 
union truck drivers to haul their produce to market.’ 311  
     Ironically, radical progressives who supported or represented the CIO were as ideologically 
committed to the farmer-labour alliance as the AFL.  ‘Underconsumptionist theory’ influenced 
Second New Deal union policy.  It argued that unionization would benefit the ‘nation as a whole’ 
by forcing up wages, which would stimulate demand, solve the depression, and create an 
economy of abundance. 312   Radical progressives maintained that underconsumptionist theory 
and the farmer-labour concept were in harmony.  Costigan’s WCF was termed the ‘triple alliance 
of labor, farmers, and progressives.’ 313  Sweetland, head of the OCF, had come into radical 
politics from the Oregon Grange. 314  CIO leader Lewis contended that the ‘interdependency in 
purchasing power’ of small farmers and labour would allow them to raise incomes, buy each 
others’ goods, and create economic prosperity.315  In this manner, he hoped to preserve the 
mutuality of the farmer-labour alliance which his unionization drives were, in other ways, 
jeopardizing.  Both union movements adhered to this progressive alliance, but their unionization 
campaigns jointly undermined it with unintended consequences for the New Deal.      
     Unionization campaigns helped inspire a powerful reactionary movement.  As a result of the 
Court Plan and Roosevelt’s failure to condemn outright CIO militancy, a conservative bipartisan 
bloc emerged in Congress composed of southern Democrats and ‘stalwart’ Republicans.  
Significantly, the southern Democrat Congressman Martin Dies proposed a congressional 
resolution to investigate CIO sit-down strikes in March 1937.316  This conservative movement 
became a legislative barrier against further New Deal reform.  It also spawned anti-New Deal 
committees, for example, the Dies Committee, which was formed in June 1938 to investigate un-
American activities.  Although Dies’ task was to expose Nazi and Communist groups which 
endangered US democracy, his principal interest was directed against communists.  In fact, his 
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committee became an instrument for the conservative bloc, to allege communist infiltration of 
New Deal agencies and CIO unions.  In the Dies Committee’s first hearings during August 1938, 
the La Follette Committee was arraigned for employing communists and having communist 
sympathies.  Some Popular Front Communists were unknowingly employed by La Follette Jr., 
because they infiltrated New Deal agencies which critiqued capitalist behaviour.317  Nonetheless, 
as an ardent New Deal opponent, Dies shrewdly realized that communism stirred popular 
emotions like few other issues.  His revelations about communism impacted negatively on New 
Deal results during the 1938 mid-term elections, and promised to continue causing progressives 
difficulties. 
     Western progressives – e.g. La Follette Jr., Herbert Hoover, or Culbert Olson – typically 
viewed accusations of communism in the workplace as largely a specious charge, or as 
inappropriate to US labour relations.  John Steinbeck’s iconic novel, The Grapes of Wrath, about 
farm labour in 1930s California, showed that unscrupulous large farmers, when facing union 
resistance to wage cuts, always claimed ‘red agitators ... (were) spark-pluggin’ the thing.’318  At 
the University of Wisconsin, La Follette had imbibed John Commons’ teachings which argued 
that Marxism was irrelevant to American workers, who were ‘wage conscious’ not ‘class 
conscious.’319   Accordingly, La Follette led Senate opposition against Dies’ bill to deport 
foreign communists resident in America (August 1938).  The law would have considerably 
weakened two key CIO West Coast unions, by deporting Harry Bridges, the Australian head of 
the longshoremen (ILWU), and Harold Pritchett, the Canadian president of the woodworkers 
(IWA).  However, by 1939, the year of the California hearings, La Follette was not only facing 
escalating anti-communism by reactionaries, but also questioning his own stance towards the 
communist issue.   
     Between 1937 and 1938, West Coast farming groups also coalesced against the unionization 
threat to agriculture.  The Associated Farmers of California were founded during 1934 in the 
trough of the Depression to protect the interests of large farmers.  The unionization drives, 1937-
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1939, resulted in an expansion and re-direction of the tactics of this reactionary organization.  
During 1937, the Associated Farmers began a membership campaign in the other Pacific states.  
A Farmers Protective Association was set up in Washington’s Yakima Valley, March 1937.  
Within months, it was rebranded the Associated Farmers of Yakima County.320  In December 
1937, delegates from Washington and Oregon attended the convention of the Associated Farmers 
of California.  As a result, the Associated Farmers of the Pacific Coast was formed.321  The 
Associated Farmers, at first, had their greatest success with large farmers.  However, small 
farmer apprehension about unionization in agriculture, and allied industries, meant the policies of 
the Associated Farmers began to have a wider appeal.  Indeed, the Associated Farmers adapted 
their policies to win over small farmers, who they tried to prise away from the farmer-labour 
alliance.322  The Associated Farmers broadened their appeal to business as well by a pan-West 
Coast campaign against unions.  Referendums sponsored by the Associated Farmers were put 
forward during 1938 in Oregon; Washington, Initiative 130; and California, Proposition One.  
They aimed to sabotage the effectiveness of strikes.  In Oregon, the referendum succeeded; 
Washington’s Initiative 130 failed, as did Proposition One in California. 
     By the end of 1938, despite AFL and CIO commitment to the Progressive era farmer-labour 
alliance, perversely their unionization campaigns had undermined this vital western electoral 
grouping.  Moreover, reactionary forces, like the Associated Farmers, were attempting to destroy 
the farmer-labour alliance, exploit anti-communist sentiment, and win over small farmers.  La 
Follette had to grapple with these problems when his committee began its California hearings.   
 
The La Follette Committee in California 
The La Follette Civil Liberties Committee held the California hearings between December 1939 
and January 1940, to look at civil liberties violations by employers in the agricultural, food 
processing, and transport sectors.  In California, La Follette’s committee was also deployed to 
counter the ideological message of the anti-New Deal Dies Committee.  Senator La Follette had 
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not only to cope with the consequences of unionization and reactionary organizations, but also 
his own ideological responses to developments within and outside America.  Historians have had 
difficulty pinning down La Follette Jr.’s personality and motivations.  This fundamentally 
cautious man was overshadowed by his father and brother whose daring, combative characters 
had defined western progressivism in the 1900s and 1930s respectively.  His father ‘Fighting 
Bob’ La Follette attempted, unsuccessfully, to push progressivism in more radical directions 
during 1912, 1917, and 1924.  Philip La Follette, the governor of Wisconsin was defeated during 
1938 attempting to recreate a national Progressive Party.  In Robert La Follette Jr., the tension 
was palpable (1939-1940) between a sense of ideological commitment, and a realization that 
both the careers of his father and brother self-destructed.  The dynamic between La Follette’s 
caution and ideological commitment, in the face of unfolding circumstances, meant he 
repositioned his committee from a radical ideological stance to a more moderate progressivism.  
This section considers how that repositioning affected the outcome of the California hearings, 
and presents a new interpretation of them.   
     The La Follette Committee California hearings were judged harshly by opinion at the time.  
Carey McWilliams, an expert on California’s migrant farm labour problems, had castigated 
employers for their treatment of farm workers in his 1939 book Factories in the Field.323  During 
the La Follette Committee hearings, McWilliams was dubious about their effectiveness.  He 
wrote: ‘The Liberals in California have pinned great hopes upon the La Follette Committee 
during the last year ... it is likely this hope will soon be dissipated.’324 After the hearings ended, 
McWilliams judged them a failure, saying ‘the basic weakness of the (California) investigation ... 
was its failure to connect the waterfront situation’ (about transporting farm produce) ‘with the 
farm labor problem.’325 
     McWilliams’ 1940 commentary influenced the historiography, which considers the California 
hearings a failure.  Jerold S Auerbach’s monograph on the La Follette Committee, and Patrick J 
Maney’s biography of La Follette Jr. draw attention to the California investigation’s pragmatic 
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organizational problems.326  The committee was ineffective in California because of under-
funding, and failure to compete with the sensationalist Dies Committee.327  Moreover, Maney 
mentions that La Follette wanted to terminate the Civil Liberties Committee, so he could 
concentrate on opposing US entry into war.328  Kevin Starr’s history of 1930s California shows 
America’s preoccupation with defence issues, caused by the start of war in Europe rendered La 
Follette’s findings irrelevant.329  Auerbach makes very important general ideological 
observations about the La Follette Committee’s significance in the shift from individualistic 
citizens, to group-oriented citizens.330  However, the historiography omits any Progressive era 
ideological influence on La Follette’s committee in California.  That ideological interpretation 
posits that the hearings were a strategic success.  
     In their aftermath, La Follette confessed he had been ‘an outsider from Wisconsin who had 
everything to lose and nothing to gain by coming to sunny California.’331  This chance remark 
conveys a situation in California that was bristling with dangers for La Follette, e.g. his 
committee’s vulnerabilities over communism, and his own electoral reliance on farmer-labour 
support.  Another comment by La Follette is equally revealing.  Towards the end of 1940, La 
Follette wrote to Harry Fowler, the committee’s attorney, an influential background figure during 
the lead-up to the California hearings, and in their conduct.  La Follette congratulated Fowler on 
‘the splendid job which you helped to make possible in California.’332  La Follette writes as 
though, in his estimation, the California hearings were successful.  How then was La Follette 
able to convert such an unpromising situation into a success, over: communism; the farmer-
labour alliance; and the Associated Farmers? 
                                                 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
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     Indisputably Californian agriculture merited an investigation because of its dire social justice 
needs.  Indeed, there was official concern that Dust Bowl migrants might resort to communism, 
something that might have happened had they not generally-speaking clung to an individualistic 
creed.333  The ‘chronic powerlessness of farm-workers in California’ was particularly 
noticeable.334  Indigenous Californian food processing workers were badly paid, and Mexican 
field workers experienced among the lowest wage rates in America.  Entering this labour market, 
a huge influx of Dust Bowl migrants from the mid 1930s onwards considerably worsened 
conditions.  It was a pan-West Coast phenomenon.  As Leuchtenburg writes: ‘By the end of the 
decade, a million migrants, penniless nomads ... had overrun small towns in Oregon and 
Washington and pressed into the valleys of California.’335  In California, the ‘Okies’ often 
struggled to survive in sun-baked ditch camps by the side of the road, and their desperate despair 
is summed up in this migrant workers’ song: 
‘Rather drink muddy water  
An’ sleep in a hollow log 
Than to be in California 
Treated like a dirty dog.’336 
Sometimes, the same workers picked fruit crops through California’s valleys, and made the 
strenuous journey into Oregon and Washington, ‘working the hop and beet fields of the north.’337  
Un-unionized West Coast farm labourers fell outside the provisions of the NLRA.  However, the 
First Amendment to the US Constitution protected freedom of association as a civil liberty, so 
the La Follette Committee could advocate farm labour unionization.  With more authority, the La 
Follette Committee was able to call for the enforcement of the NLRA in food processing 
industries and transport involving inter-state commerce.  
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      Auerbach observes that the Dies Committee ‘sparked ... (Roosevelt’s) appreciation of the La 
Follette Committee ... as a political instrument.’338  On January 4, 1939 Ickes suggested to 
Roosevelt at a cabinet meeting that a West Coast investigation by the La Follette Committee 
would counteract the impact of Dies.339  If the Dies Committee was smearing New Dealers with 
the charge of communism, La Follette would show the public that the reactionary Associated 
Farmers were depriving workers of their rights.  Therefore, La Follette and Dies led partisan 
committees, respectively for the New Deal and against it.  For example, Johnson wrote that the 
La Follette Committee ‘went after one thing and tortured its testimony (to find it).’340  In 
California, though, the La Follette Committee did not act as a flagrant propaganda tool. 
                                                  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
     Auerbach considers the California investigation ineffective because the public was more 
interested in the Dies Committee.  In an interview conducted by Auerbach, Robert Wohlforth, 
secretary of the La Follette Committee, contended ‘Dies had a real going thing; everybody is 
absolutely afraid of communism.  We’re dominated by this fear.  No other country is as fearful 
as we are.’341  However, it is an incomplete explanation for the failure of the California 
investigation as a propaganda device to say simply that the public had a greater fascination with 
the communist menace than employer abuses against labour.  More to the point, the Dies 
Committee contributed to the La Follette Committee’s changing its behaviour over communism, 
as La Follette appreciated that the communist issue could be electorally disastrous. 
     At the start of August 1939, progressive Senators Schwellenbach and Downey of Washington 
and California, strongly backed by Oregon’s Senator McNary, introduced a resolution to fund a 
West Coast investigation, although Congress voted only half the sum they requested - 
$50,000.342   By the end of the month, an extraneous factor altered the course of the investigation.  
On August 30, 1939, the Nazi-Soviet Pact was signed, which brought about co-operation 
between the two European dictatorships, and committed them to the conquest of Poland, a 
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democracy.  Almost overnight, America’s ideological atmosphere was transformed.  If the Dies 
Committee helped change La Follette’s behaviour over communism, the Nazi-Soviet Pact 
triggered that change.  Mid 1930s Popular Front communism had believed in class struggle, but 
was pledged to working with democratic institutions for social justice and against the right-wing.  
By the end of 1939, the American Communist Party (CPUSA) clearly backed the Nazi-Soviet 
Pact, and manifested a renewed hostility to democracy.  La Follette’s progressive belief in 
democratic reform meant he decried US communism’s reversion to a revolutionary path, and this 
last of cumulative pressures caused him to change the ideological position of his committee.  
     The Dies Committee was considerably enhanced by the developments in Europe, and the 
CPUSA.  Its warnings about the security risks of communists suddenly achieved heightened 
credibility and traction with the public.  From a patriotic and democratic standpoint, the Dies 
Committee seemed to be on the right side of history.  In a throwback to the Progressive era, FBI 
head J Edgar Hoover announced to Congress in November 1939, that he had revived the General 
Intelligence Division, which was used to seize suspected communists during the ‘Red Scare’ 
Palmer Raids of 1919.343  On January 5, 1940, Hoover revealed that he had compiled an ‘index’ 
of people he would seize during a state of emergency.344  Consequently, as the La Follette 
Committee was planning and conducting its hearings in California, the situational similarities 
between the Red Scares of 1919-1920 and 1939-1940 became abundantly clear.   
     Harry Fowler was sent to California in the fall of 1939, to decide areas the hearings would 
investigate, and witnesses to be subpoenaed.  Fowler’s reports sent back to the Education and 
Labor Committee, but mainly addressed La Follette, show how the communist issue was 
shunned.  Costigan, as head of the WCF, visited Fowler – weekly report October 1-7 – and urged 
the committee to investigate ‘agricultural and processing industries’ in Washington’s Yakima 
Valley.345  The following week, his colleague, Dennett reinforced that message when he saw 
Fowler. 346 Although costs might have prohibited inclusion of Washington, Fowler probably also 
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wished to keep the committee clear of Costigan’s WCF, around which pro-communist 
allegations swirled.  Instead, between October 15-22, Fowler welcomed Neal Haggerty, the 
AFL’s chief in California, a pivotal figure in Johnson’s 1940 re-election campaign, and an arch-
critic of CIO tactics and communist links.347  Fowler told Haggerty the committee was 
‘anxious ... to receive any information upon violations of civil liberties that they (the AFL) had 
to submit.’  While La Follette did not denounce radical progressives over unionization, Fowler, 
on his behalf, was edging the committee towards Johnson’s progressivism. 
      When the hearings began, in December 1939, McWilliams presents the failure to connect the 
‘waterfront situation’ and ‘farm labor’ almost as an oversight.  However, this contention is 
untenable.  La Follette was quite aware of the connection that McWilliams pointed out.  On 
December 15, 1939, Dr. Theodore Norman, the committee’s economist, explained at the 
hearings: ‘One of the most interesting features of ... Californian agricultur(e) ... is the extent ... it 
is part of an integrated system ... The shippers (and) canners ... of Californian farm products ... 
reach back to control ... their raw materials ... through ... contracts by which farmers ... deliver all 
produce ... to a certain canner (or) shipper.’348  Further proof was provided to the committee of 
the extent large farming interests were tied in with business two days later.  A table of 
contributions to the Associated Farmers for the five years up to October 1939, showed the 
Industrial Association of San Francisco, and the Canners League, as their biggest donors.349 
     The first half of the committee hearings, December 1939, was held in San Francisco, and this 
fact demonstrates how La Follette avoided the waterfront situation because of the communist 
issue.  A 53 day long water front strike by ship clerks was raging throughout the hearings in San 
Francisco.350  Bridges had ‘tied up’ the whole harbour of San Francisco with this strike. 351  It 
interrupted movement of farm produce, and caused great criticism of Bridges by employers.  Yet 
during the entire San Francisco hearings the committee made no attempt to discuss the strike, 
and when the hearings resumed in Los Angeles just over a week later, on January 2, again the 
‘waterfront situation’ was avoided.  Only on the last day of the hearings, January 29, did Bridges 
                                                 
347 Doherty to Johnson, November 17, 1939; March 11, 1940; August 31, 1940, box 35; Johnson to Doherty, March 
23, 1940, Letters from Johnson, Johnson Papers 
348 San Francisco Chronicle, December 15, 1939 
349 Ibid., December 17, 1939 
350 Los Angeles Times, January 3, 1940 
351 McWilliams, ‘Civil Rights in California’ 
238 
 
make a belated appearance.  Even then, he gave no spoken evidence, but was merely sworn in, 
and submitted to the committee a written statement about labour relations in the port of San 
Francisco.352 
     During the hearings, reactionary forces kept up a Greek chorus about communism.  The 
Associated Farmers attempted repeatedly to steer the hearings towards the communist issue, and 
their evidence about it ‘bookended’ the hearings.  A few days in, Philip Bancroft, Vice President 
of the Associated Farmers, stated: ‘I have not done anything in the past twenty years except try 
to keep the communists from taking over our farms.’353 On the final day of the California 
hearings, John Watson, the newly-appointed President of the Associated Farmers, claimed that 
the Associated Farmers were formed in 1934 after riots organized ‘in almost every instance ... by 
communists.’354  Outside the hearings, the Dies Committee also hammered home the communist 
theme.  The anti-New Deal Los Angeles Times reported, December 24, 1939, Dies’ statement 
that his committee had discovered on the West Coast ‘the most serious situation.’  It comprised 
‘communistic ... and “alienistic rings” involving ... CIO strikes, and Federal and State 
administrations on the West Coast.’355  At the same time, California’s ‘mini Dies Committee,’ 
the Metzger Committee, accused Governor Olson’s State Relief Administration (SRA), for the 
unemployed, of hiring communists.  In January 1940, the Dies Committee announced that 
communist leadership was entrenched in leading West Coast unions: UCAPAWA, IWA, and 
ILWU i.e. the CIO farm labour, food processing, timber, and transport unions.356  While the 
California hearings proceeded, reactionary forces methodically inflamed anti-communist feeling. 
     La Follette had lived through the Progressive era, and knew the potency of the ‘Red Scare’ in 
1919.  Between 1939 and 1940, reactionary forces were inflicting electoral damage on the New 
Deal by connecting it and its agencies to the emotive issue of communism.  As importantly for 
La Follette, the Nazi-Soviet Pact transformed relatively innocuous Popular Front communists 
into ideologues plotting the destruction of democracy at home and abroad.  In these 
circumstances, La Follette and Fowler positioned their committee midway between the 
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reactionary forces and Bridges over the communist issue.  During the California hearings, 
McWilliams noted to Auerbach friction between ‘red tinged’ progressives on the committee and 
Fowler over this behavioural departure.357  Nonetheless, Fowler’s strategy of repositioning the 
committee away from the toxic issue of communism was sensible and limited damage to the 
New Deal, without denouncing Bridges’ legitimate demands. 
                                                  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
     The problems of the farmer-labour alliance also involved an ideological repositioning, as the 
issue of food processing unionization proved especially controversial to La Follette.  As shown 
in chapters three and four, La Follette supported small farmers as archetypical Jeffersonian 
citizens, and the poorer dairy farmers of Wisconsin were La Follette’s most loyal voters.  
McWilliams disclosed during 1939 that the Associated Farmers had spread their membership to 
small farmers in La Follette’s mid-west, and intensified their threat level.358  At the start of 1940, 
Watson, their head, announced plans for a national organization.359  La Follette realized that 
small farmers were vulnerable to the Associated Farmers because of their unease at food 
processing unionization.  He understood that this problem added to their sense of crisis.  Small 
operators were already unable to compete with large farmers, and increasingly became tenants 
and farm labour.  The Dust Bowl speeded up this process.  After the California hearings, La 
Follette held follow-up hearings in Washington DC (May-June, 1940) covering national 
agricultural problems.  On behalf of small farmers, he made an impassioned plea, saying: 
‘Farming as a way of life is threatened ... New... opportunity (must be provided to) preserve the 
native values of our traditional system.’360   
     In the California hearings, McWilliams described La Follette as ‘quixotically indulgent’ 
towards the Associated Farmers.361  Certainly, when the Associated Farmers claimed that they 
had reduced farm wages because of their economic situation, La Follette was decidedly 
conciliatory.  He conceded: ‘I fully realize that ... (the position of the farmer) was ... the same (as) 
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or even worse ... than the industrialist during the depression.’362  However, La Follette was 
conscious that the remarks of the Associated Farmers were seeded with anti-progressive 
messages.  At the start of 1940, Bancroft stepped down as vice president of the organization, but 
instead took charge of public relations.363  La Follette knew that on the West Coast, and in the 
wider west, they were trying to destroy the farmer-labour alliance.  If small farmers gravitated to 
the politics of the Associated Farmers, Roosevelt, La Follette, and the West Coast congressional 
delegation would be defeated in 1940.  Costigan’s dire warning, which opened this chapter, that 
the Associated Farmers might ‘break the back ... of ... the entire New Deal’ would come true.   
     La Follette resorted to political contortions to protect the farmer-labour alliance.  His family’s 
newspaper in Wisconsin, The Progressive, denied there was any affinity between the Associated 
Farmers and small farmers.  The Progressive stated: ‘Labor strife in the agricultural areas of 
California does not involve average, workaday farmers, but centres almost exclusively on huge, 
industrialized ranches.’364  Likewise, La Follette did not attend most of the hearings in California 
on food processing, which occurred during the second half of January, 1940.  He departed 
California, January 18, because of the imminent death of fellow progressive Senator William 
Borah.  However, after Borah died, La Follette did not return, but left his co-chairman Senator 
Elbert Thomas in charge of the hearings until they ended, January 29.365  La Follette’s absence 
was very convenient for him, as he was spared having to confront controversial subjects like the 
unionization of dairying, and The Progressive ceased to report the hearings as soon as he left 
California.   
     Wisconsin was recognized as America’s most important dairy state.  It was less well-known 
that dairying comprised California’s largest food processing industry.366  In the California 
hearings, a farmer accused the CIO Dairy Workers Union of intimidating un-unionized workers.  
He said: ‘They ... would break their hands, so they couldn’t milk anymore.’367  In turn, the 
Associated Farmers tried to prevent Teamster unionization in the dairying industry by using 
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violence to deter employers from signing union contracts.  Milk distributors were so fearful of 
the Associated Farmers’ retaliation that they resorted to secret agreements with the Teamsters.  
The committee discovered that one involved a milk company in Los Angeles.368  In another case, 
a clandestine agreement between the Teamsters and Golden State Creamery in the San Francisco 
area was only broken when the Associated Farmers learned of the situation, and threatened the 
company.369  An Associated Farmers spokesman stated, ‘Our fears have been more than 
substantiated that unionization of dairy farms will come from milk distributors in towns.’370  
These words would have resonated with small dairy farmers across the West, but they remained 
unreported by La Follette’s news outlet The Progressive in Wisconsin.   
     Small western dairy farmers did not receive the generous government financial support to 
reduce production that large arable farmers had secured.  Moreover, monopolistic milk 
distributors like Bordens slashed prices paid to them.  In these circumstances, they formed co-
operatives to try and compete with the large distributors.  Golden State in San Francisco – the 
company that made a secret agreement with the Teamsters – was a farmers’ co-op.  Unionization 
put co-ops under extra economic pressure.  Angry Wisconsin farmers in 1938 forced dairy co-op 
workers to resign from a union they had joined.371  During 1940, economic conditions caused 
Wisconsin’s celebrated Milk Pool, which was run on a co-operative basis, to collapse in August 
of that year.372  La Follette understood the plight of small dairy farmers squeezed out by big 
distributors, large farmers, and mass unions. 
     La Follette’s work on the Civil Liberties Committee proved his commitment to industrial 
workers.  Furthermore, in 1939 he introduced into the Senate the abortive Oppressive Labor 
Practices Bill to criminalize anti-union practices by industrial employers.373  La Follette’s 
commitment to industrial workers was great.  However, his ideological commitment to small 
farmers was greater.  In truth, La Follette was caught on the horns of a dilemma regarding the 
farmer-labour alliance.  Over unionization of food processing, his first loyalty was to small dairy 
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farmers, but his role as chairman of the Civil Liberties Committee obliged him to support unions. 
In California, he had side-stepped the issue, by absenting himself from the relevant hearings.  
     Yet, several months previously, La Follette clearly valorised small farmers over industrial 
labour.  Under the Walsh-Healey Act companies doing business with the federal government had 
to guarantee their workers minimum wage and maximum hour protection.  In spring 1939, an 
amendment to this Act proposed companies selling canned milk to the government should be 
exempt from these regulations.  La Follette feared this amendment would mainly aid large 
processors, and distributors.374  Instead, he argued that only farm co-operatives should be 
exempted from the act. On a pink Senate memorandum slip, he wrote: ‘Co-ops could be 
excluded by saying “the provision of this act (should not) apply to contracts awarded to bona fide 
co-op(erative) ass(ociatio)ns of farmers.”’375  Consequently, La Follette was prepared to deprive 
industrial workers in co-ops of their labour rights, to give struggling dairy farmers a competitive 
edge.  When La Follette contacted the Administrator in charge of Public Contracts at the Labor 
Department about his proposal, Metcalfe Walling provided information on three Washington 
State and two Californian co-ops which sold canned (evaporated) milk to the government.  They 
included the Golden State Company in San Francisco.  However, Walling rejected La Follette’s 
suggestion for exempting co-ops, for instance on the West Coast, from Walsh-Healey.  He stated 
that as co-ops ‘compete with non-co-operative(s) ... and ... employ persons under factory 
conditions ... any action for this purpose would ... deprive (their) employees from the protection 
of ... the Act.’376   
     As we saw in chapter one, FDR demonstrated, over a canning industry law in the Progressive 
era, greater ideological commitment to small farmers than industrial workers.  La Follette 
showed the same pattern of behaviour in the late New Deal.  Therefore, La Follette would have 
been reluctant to support dairying unionization in the California hearings.  Instead, Senator 
Thomas conducted those January 1940 hearings with a ‘balance’ that minimized alienation of 
either side in the farmer-labour alliance.377   
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                                                          _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
     The repositioning of the La Follette Committee in California produced a final positive 
outcome.  Only well after World War II, did Cesar Chavez’s campaign transform migrant farm 
labour conditions.  However, the committee’s impact on the Associated Farmers can be deemed 
a success.  Before the hearings, Fowler briefed The San Francisco News about the imminent 
hearings.  The paper reported ‘the findings of the inquiry ... (will be) made in the light of ALL 
the evidence, claims and counter-claims.  The conclusions will be the more influential, because 
they have come from a fair search for truth.’378  Labour relations on the West Coast in the late 
1930s had generated more heat than light, something Fowler wished to put right with the 
California hearings. 
     When McWilliams was interviewed by Auerbach in the 1960s that dichotomy still existed.  
Looking back at conditions in the New Deal era, McWilliams stated large farmer representatives 
‘would discuss farm labor problems with a candour that would curl your hair.  If you ... sat in 
on ... the agricultural committee of the State Chamber of Commerce ... you couldn’t become 
aware of that attitude without beginning to run ... a temperature yourself ... because ... their 
attitudes were so outrageous.’ 379 However, McWilliams also assessed the California hearings, 
with the knowledge of hindsight, and mellowed by age.  He stated that La Follette was ‘very well 
advised to demonstrate his own fairness about the Associated Farmers.’  He elaborated: ‘I’m 
quite sure in my own mind that the Associated Farmers never fully recovered from the La 
Follette investigation.  They had had things their own way to such an extent ... that they’d 
become used to engaging in rough stuff ...  that the shock of coming up against the La Follette 
Committee ... of having ... to sit there in the witness chair and answer some questions for a 
change ... I think that they never really recovered from it.  They were never as ... powerful as 
they were prior to the La Follette Committee investigations.’380  Perhaps La Follette’s committee 
was effective in California merely because it shone a light on the Associated Farmers.  The 
committee did not need to exaggerate the evidence about the Associated Farmers, or present a 
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one-sided version of events.  The Associated Farmers violent behaviour was enough to shock 
many Californians, and helped discredit them.  
     In particular, their vigilante actions were exposed by the California hearings, and reported in 
the press.  It emerged that the Associated Farmers kept a permanent arsenal of weapons for 
strike-breaking purposes in the San Joaquin Valley.381  During the UCAPAWA Madera cotton 
strike there in October 1939, they threatened ‘to take the law into their own hands if the strike 
leaders were not arrested.’  Then the Madera County Park riot took place.  Three hundred 
Associated Farmers armed with pick handles and auto cranks savagely attacked strikers and their 
families in a public park.  Law enforcement agencies, including the National Guard initially 
stood idly by as the violence unfolded.382  This incident outraged even the sober-minded 
Fowler.383  Just before the hearings, Johnson began himself to comprehend the nature of their 
activities, after two AFL men told him the Associated Farmers represented   ‘the various 
associations ... that are bitterly opposed to labor.’ Johnson confided uneasily that he condemned 
them unequivocally ‘if they have interfered with the civil liberties of any man in California.’384 
     La Follette achieved much in California with few advantages.  He prevented his New Deal 
committee becoming a target for anti-communism, but upheld labour’s legitimate claims.  The 
fragile balance of the farmer-labour alliance was maintained, due to Thomas’ moderation in the 
sessions on food processing unionization.  Fowler’s policy of ‘light’ rather than ‘heat’ served 
progressivism well, as the hearings enabled the public to see the disreputable side of the 
Associated Farmers clearly, which dissuaded them from further vigilante actions against Dust 
Bowl, and other, farm labour. 
 
The Climax of Anti-Communism in Washington State, 1939-1940 
This section looks at a crisis in the Washington town of Aberdeen, Grays Harbor, which centred 
on the timber industry, and again involved vigilantism.  The crisis reached its apogee while the 
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California hearings were being held.  It demonstrated the virulent nature of the progressive 
versus reactionary clash on the West Coast before the 1940 elections.  The events evinced strong 
situational similarities to the Progressive era, particularly its tail end, 1919.  That observation 
was remarked on at the time, and the same forces were doing ideological battle on the West 
Coast.  During the later New Deal, Costigan’s radical progressives were not defeated, though, as 
happened to their Progressive era predecessors.  Indeed, this crisis, in some ways, vindicated 
them. 
     Howard Costigan was one of the most singular characters to emerge from 1930s West Coast 
progressivism.  Although trained as a teacher, in the early 1930s he was a barber, who became 
interested in Seattle’s waterfront situation while talking to and cutting the hair of Fred Shorter, a 
radical Australian Christian.385  Costigan went onto lead the WCF, host a radio show, and gained 
a reputation as a mob orator haranguing crowds on Seattle’s Denny Way.  At the start of 1939, 
Costigan enjoyed national attention, albeit briefly, as he attempted, unsuccessfully, to organize a 
western states conference to campaign for a progressive candidate, preferably Roosevelt, in the 
1940 presidential election.  In January, 1939, Costigan embarked on a whirlwind tour of 
Washington DC.  Having been introduced to Ickes, Costigan then met Roosevelt.386  New Deal 
journalists Pearson and Allen called Costigan ‘the dynamic young crusader’ as he was courted by 
politicians.387  Roosevelt was intrigued by the west, especially the Pacific states, as a ‘hinterland 
of liberalism’ which could help New Deal interests in 1940.388  Acena, the historian of the WCF, 
tends to view Costigan as a fantasist, who exaggerated the importance of his organization in 
Washington State, and ‘craved to be the behind-the-scenes liberal string-puller in the West.’389  
Subsequent to 1939-1940, Costigan admitted he had belonged to the communist party in those 
years.  His organization contained other communists, and supported the woodworkers union 
(IWA) led by the Marxists Harold Pritchett, and Vice President OM Orton.  Orton was 
Costigan’s neighbour in Seattle.  Rumours of the WCF’s communist links were rife in the late 
1930s.  Costigan’s fleeting national prominence at the start of 1939, gave way to the New Deal 
distancing itself from him by the end of the year because of the communist issue.  Costigan 
                                                 
385 Acena, ‘The Washington Commonwealth Federation,’ 3. 
386 John Boettiger to Ickes, December 27, 1938, box 17, John Boettiger Papers, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NYS 
387 Acena, ‘The Washington Commonwealth Federation,’ 284. 
388 Ibid., 294. 
389 Ibid., 304. 
246 
 
receded into the political background of the New Deal.  However, he was still able to lead the 
progressive cause at Grays Harbor, December 1939-January 1940, in a crisis that involved mob 
violence and a murder. 
     Omens were good for radical progressives in Washington for much of 1939, with a 
Progressive era-New Deal overlap.  Rappaport, the WCF strategist, who was a member of the 
International Workers of the World (IWW) during Progressive times, must have contemplated a 
bright future for their cause.  In February, the WCF appointed a liaison officer, Mrs. Marion 
Bachrach, to work in Washington DC with her state’s congressional delegation.390  Acena 
downplayed the WCF’s political influence in Washington State’s politics, but during the 1980s 
Costigan’s former lieutenant Dennett told Costigan’s daughter Barbara that, on the contrary, by 
the late 1930s the WCF drew support from one third of Washington Democrats.391  Certainly, 
despite the reactionary backlash, radical progressivism had a momentum on the Pacific Slope.  In 
January, 1939, Tom Mooney was pardoned by California’s Governor Olson.  Mooney was the 
IWW ‘martyr,’ who had been ‘framed’ by reactionary forces over the Progressive era 
Preparedness Day bombing in San Francisco, 1916.  In September, Ray Becker was released 
from prison in Washington, and, Shorter, the radical Christian, greeted him at the penitentiary 
gates.392  Becker was the last surviving member of the IWW ‘murderers,’ found guilty in the 
notorious Centralia massacre, 1919.  During the summer of 1939 Norman Littell, the Assistant 
Attorney General, a Washingtonian, received a message from Roosevelt praising his efforts 
towards Costigan’s western conference to elect a progressive president.393  It would have 
involved eleven states, with the three West Coast states as its driving force. 394 The conference 
was set to cover: ‘conservation of natural resources’; ‘resettlement of shifting populations’; 
‘public development of water and power,’ i.e. the three tenets.’395  Radical progressives opposed 
American involvement in war, and in September, Costigan warmly welcomed John Boettiger, 
the Seattle P-I owner, and his wife Anna, Roosevelt’s daughter, to a Seattle peace conference.396  
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Sweetland noted to Barbara Costigan that the Boettiger connection gave Costigan access to the 
White House.397  Anna subscribed to the WCF paper, The Washington New Dealer.398  
     However, reactionary forces were also gaining ground, 1939-1940.  Big business, and 
Californian corporate farming interests, controlled economic life, and greatly influenced politics 
on the West Coast.  This reality gave substance to the radical progressive and communist 
dialectic that poorer people, and other disadvantaged groups, were engaged in a liberation 
struggle.  Modelled on ‘Red’ Hynes Los Angeles Intelligence Bureau, police Red squads 
employed a policy of using the communist issue to crush independent unions.399  Although the 
Los Angeles Red squad was disbanded in 1938, by the end of 1939 the Portland Oregon Red 
squad was leading the fight for Bridges’ deportation.400  In March 1939, an organization to 
extirpate communist influence in Washington was set up by timber employers in Grays Harbor.  
The Better Business Builders announced ‘that the red element (in organized labor) ... (must) be 
removed or subdued.’401  As La Follette prepared to investigate farm labour abuses involving the 
Associated Farmers of California, there were a clutch of other reactionary organizations on the 
West Coast.  They represented an entrenched power structure, confident in its economic and 
political reach.  In this context, the confrontational attitude of Bridges, and Costigan’s ‘selfless 
sincerity’ for a re-ordered society become comprehensible.402  
     Radical progressivism in Washington suffered several hammer blows, from August 1939 
onwards.  The first blow was the Nazi-Soviet Pact, which intensified feeling against communist-
led unions.  Bridges’ longshoremen were condemned in Washington for a proposed September 
30 pan-West Coast waterfront strike, which would have impeded recovery of timber exports, 
even though Bridges called the strike off.403 On Grays Harbor three timber mills re-opened 
during October, and the anti-New Deal press raised fears that Pritchett’s International 
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Woodworkers of America (IWA) were intent on halting production.404  Changed circumstances 
made communism a byword again for subversion.  Indeed, the same month, a Grays Harbor IWA 
local No 2 initiated opposition to the Marxists Pritchett, Orton, and local figure Dick Law at the 
union’s Klamath Falls convention.405  In this atmosphere, Costigan’s personality did not help 
progressivism.  His haranguing style too often alienated people.  The CIO leader Lewis ‘loathed’ 
Costigan after he met Lewis to discuss the western conference, and lectured him on political 
ideology.406  The wives of Littell and Boettiger provide an insightful womens’ perspective on 
late 1930s West Coast labour relations.  Katherine Littell wrote to Anna Boettiger that she 
believed there was too much ‘one man domination’ in West Coast union politics.407  
Significantly, at this time, Labor Secretary, Frances Perkins, an old Progressive, wanted to open 
an educational extension service in Seattle helping inter-union dialogue to promote ‘progressive 
legislation.’408  Having acknowledged the tough environment that Beck, Pritchett, Bridges, and 
Costigan inhabited, they never overcame the macho posturing that went with 1930s union affairs.  
It helped cause and prolong divisions among progressives and left them vulnerable to reactionary 
attacks.   
     These reactionary forces became menacing in November 1939.  Crow’s Pacific Coast Lumber 
Digest was the timber industry’s official journal, and it demonstrated the pan-West Coast nature 
of the anti-union movement.  On November 15, an editorial in it urged ‘action independent of the 
federal government ... because the Pacific Coast has been selected as the nursery of 
Communism ... There should be an interstate vigilante society (to) act ... from the Canadian 
border to the Mexican line ... (so) that Harry Bridges and ... his like (shall) be removed.’  The 
editorial went on: ‘the time has come for ... militant action (so) ... that a vigilante group ... may 
go to their ... regional law-enforcing officers and not only ask for protection ... but demand it 
                                                 
404 Ibid., October 14, 1939 
405 Ibid. 
406 Acena, ‘The Washington Commonwealth Federation,’ 313; Barbara Costigan interview with Dennett, box 2, 
Costigan Papers 
407 Katherine Littell to Anna Boettiger, November 30, 1939, box 2, Costigan Papers 
408 Ibid. 
249 
 
(from) federal-backed reds (who) are bulldozing the ... people of the Pacific Coast into 
bankruptcy.  Oregon, Washington and California have never had a better common cause.’409 
     On November 30, the Soviet Red Army invaded Finland, and this event delivered a second 
hammer blow to progressivism, which resulted in the violent action that Crow’s editorial 
threatened.  The large Finnish American population in Aberdeen was already split into two 
factions, the socialist Red and the conservative White Finns.  In the timber industry, the Whites 
often belonged to the AFL’s Sawmill and Timberworkers Union, while Red Finns were mostly 
in the radical IWA.  White Finns were infuriated by the Soviet invasion, and held a rally and 
dance at their meeting hall on Saturday night, December 2, to raise money for Finland.  Their 
opponents were also to hold a dance at the ‘Red Finn Hall,’ but cancelled it due to the gravity of 
the war in Finland.  Later that night a mob of marauding White Finns, but reportedly containing 
many non-Finns, stormed the Red Finn Hall in Aberdeen.  They ransacked it and burned its 
contents over three or four hours.  No police appeared to stop the mob, even though there was a 
police station down the road from the Red Finn Hall.410    
     There were several echoes from the Progressive era in the storming of the Red Finn Hall. 
Some months previously, Better Business Builders announced that workers in Grays Harbor 
needed to emulate their Progressive era counterparts, saying: ‘A quarter of a century ago good ... 
Americans of Grays Harbor took drastic action to clean out the IWW s who had kept up 
continual disturbances.’411  After the event, US Senator Bone, ‘referring to the outbreak of 
vigilantism,’ declared ‘that the recent destruction of the Finnish Workers’ Hall was not the first 
attempt to suppress the workers’ meeting place.  In the bitter shingle weavers strike in 1912, 
lumber operators tried unsuccessfully to bar union meetings (at) ... the Finnish Workers’ Hall 
(which) was the only hall in Aberdeen where the ... shingle weavers could meet.’  In this 
                                                 
409 Crow’s Pacific Coast Lumber Digest, November 15, 1939, included in ‘Report on Abrogation of Civil Rights in 
Grays Harbor,’ Grays Harbor Civil Rights Committee to US Attorney General, Robert Jackson, 1940, box 23, 
Caughlan Papers 
410 John C Hughes and Ryan Teague Beckwith, On the Harbor: From Black Friday to Nirvana (Las Vegas: 
Stephens Press LLC, 2005) 
411 Better Business Builders statement quoted in ‘Report of Abrogation of Civil Rights in Grays Harbor,’  box 23, 
Caughlan Papers  
250 
 
Progressive era dispute, Bone acted as the union’s lawyer, and won a legal judgement to keep the 
hall open.412 *  
     The crisis worsened at the start of 1940, with the murder of Laura Law in her own home.  She 
was the wife of Dick Law, the IWA leader in Aberdeen, and had been formerly president of the 
IWA women’s auxiliary.  On the evening of January 5, she was attacked with an ice pick which 
smashed her skull in four places.413  Law said he was at the union offices when the murder 
occurred.  The police suspected Law, and accused him of murder.  The coroner’s inquest, during 
January, became the focus of the struggle between reactionary forces and radical progressives.  
In fact, it resembled Law’s trial.414  Costigan headed the Grays Harbor Civil Rights Committee 
that included John Caughlan, the Seattle lawyer who was defence counsel for Law.  The 
committee was able to turn the case into a cause célèbre, locally and nationally.415 
     The prosecution claimed that Laura Law, a Finnish American, was furious about the Soviet 
invasion of her old homeland.  They charged that she had either been killed by Law, an alleged 
Communist, or Soviet agents, for threatening to expose communist activities in the IWA.  As a 
fall-back theory, Dick Law was accused of an affair with his secretary in the IWA.  Bruises were 
found on his wife’s limbs, which dated from before the murder, according to the coroner.  
Although an autopsy rejected this finding, the prosecution suggested a domestic row over Law’s 
alleged affair might have resulted in murder.  For their part, the defence argued that agents of 
reaction had killed Laura Law.  They said that after her killing the Law home was ransacked by 
anti-communists seeking evidence of IWA communist activity to pass onto the Dies Committee.  
In his defence, Law also suggested that anti-communists might have been attempting to seize 
information he had collected about their involvement in the storming of the Red Finn Hall.  He 
said they wanted ‘to break the Labor movement.’416 
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     Costigan, in a December 1939 radio broadcast, had already compared the storming of the Red 
Finn Hall with Centralia (1919).417  In a series of newssheets, three of which are extant, the 
Grays Harbor Civil Rights Committee alerted the public to numerous parallels between events in 
Grays Harbor, 1939-1940, and the Progressive era.  The first newssheet from January 25, 1940 
stated that ‘murder and lawlessness in Grays Harbor county must be halted ... or this community 
will soon enter the ... the economic depression that almost ruined Centralia (during the 
Progressive era) following a similar reign of terror.’418  Yet, again the Centralia massacre, and its 
aftermath, were referred to when the Civil Rights Committee wrote to the US Attorney General 
calling for his intervention.  The committee warned that ‘the ... call to vigilante action against 
organized labor in the entire West Coast lumber regions ... (will) recreate the general abrogation 
of civil rights which followed the failure to guarantee civil rights in Centralia in 1919.’419  The 
committee’s fourth newssheet, February 3, asserted that ‘a public officer’ had told Dick Law, 
‘they plan to make another Tom Mooney out of you.’  The newssheet compares Law’s treatment 
to Mooney’s Progressive era trial, and imprisonment.  It says that Mooney was ‘an innocent man, 
a fighter for toiling humanity, (who) was framed ... by forces who sought to destroy labor.’420 
     However, the position of radical progressives was significantly stronger in the 1930s than 
during the Red scare (1919-1920).  Most importantly, federal government – the Justice 
Department – and New Deal agencies - the La Follette Committee – did not become hostile to 
radicals, despite anti-communist pressures.  On January 13, 1940, The Timber Worker, the 
official journal of the IWA declared: ‘The reign of terror in Grays Harbor must end before it 
spreads.’  The journal called for ‘the La Follette Civil Liberties Committee to go to the roots of 
the terrorism in that community.’421  This plea by the IWA was a forlorn hope, due to funding 
shortage in the Civil Liberties Committee, and La Follette’s ideological repositioning of the 
committee away from the communist issue.  However, Washington radicals drew comfort from a 
national government which remained progressive, and regionally they were emboldened by the 
La Follette Committee’s spotlight on vigilantism in California.  For example, during questioning 
at the coroner’s inquest, prosecution counsel Manley continually harassed Law and made 
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insinuations against him.  State Senator Morgan for the defence team interrupted, and pledged ‘to 
see the Constitution of the United States (is) supported, and that the officers of the law don’t ... 
violate the rights of ... men ...  in this case.’422   
     On this occasion, progressivism stood firm.  Law was effectively acquitted, and radical 
unions were not suppressed, as happened in the Progressive era.  There were too many old 
Progressives, nationally e.g. Roosevelt, Perkins, and Ickes, who determined that progressivism’s 
retreat in 1919, which led to its electoral rout in 1920, was not repeated, 1939-1940.  The federal 
government did not participate in a Red Scare during 1940.  Locally, radical progressives like 
Congressman Coffee, but also old Progressive Senator Bone, Coffee’s father-in-law assisted in 
Law’s acquittal.  The WCF did collapse later in 1940, but not as a result of police or government 
repression.  Costigan became disillusioned with American communism’s support for a non-
democratic route.  He disbanded the WCF, but not before he had contained anti-communism in 
Law’s ‘trial.’  As Costigan claimed to have witnessed the Centralia massacre of 1919, his 
achievement in 1940 must have afforded him particular satisfaction.  Progressivism learned by 
the mistakes of 1919-1920 when a reactionary backlash began in Centralia and spread to the rest 
of the West Coast.  In 1939-1940, the storming of the Red Finn Hall and the murder charge 
against Law did not result in pan-West Coast vigilantism.  Costigan helped prevent that, as the 
La Follette Committee combated a similar threat from the Associated Farmers in California. 
 
Social Justice on the West Coast in the Onset to War 
Most of the historiography considers war displaced the New Deal’s social justice objectives, and, 
in Brinkley’s phrase, caused ‘the re-legitimization of capitalism,’ that shifted attention onto 
higher consumer spending.423 More recently, Klausen has argued that because war greatly 
increased government’s capacity to direct the economy, scope for New Deal-sourced social 
reform expanded.424  Both interpretations accept that either the later New Deal or Roosevelt’s 
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wartime government shaped post-war America, and are intuitively as we would expect.  
However, something else happened, especially on the West Coast, in the years, 1940-1942.  The 
following points should be emphasized.  Even before America entered World War II at the end 
of 1941, radical progressives viewed an upcoming war as an opportunity to advance reform on 
the West Coast.  Then, and later on, they employed a Progressive era argument – mutuality – to 
achieve aims that were derived ultimately not from the war experience or even the New Deal, but 
from the Progressive era.  Those aims were upheld or realized – if only imperfectly – as the war 
ended or in post war America. 
     Two apprehensions weighed on progressives in the lead up to war.  Firstly, that, as in 1917-
1918, war would disrupt domestic reform.  Secondly, a post-war crash would reproduce the 
conditions of 1919, which caused progressivism’s defeat.  Consequently, progressives intended 
war should be used not as an excuse to slow reform, but as an opportunity to accelerate it.  
Exemplifying these attitudes was a letter from Gardner Jackson to John L Lewis, in October 
1940.  Jackson cited conversations in which they agreed that during a war ‘social and labor 
standards’ must not be rolled back.  Instead, Jackson said ‘the crisis must be utilized to develop a 
far wider ... social and economic programme ... founded upon increased production and ... 
national income.’425  The economy of abundance ideas so important in the 1930s on the West 
Coast would not be abandoned. 
     The question of unemployment probably most exercised progressives during the 1930s.  Even 
when all the New Deal programmes were deployed, unemployment remained stubbornly high.  
War mobilization solved the issue of unemployment on the West Coast, 1940-1942, and 
absorbed most Dust Bowl migrants into the burgeoning armaments industries.  However, 
progressives at that time were convinced unemployment would return at chronic levels with 
peace, so war might be the time to prevent its re-emergence.  The West Coast states played a 
particularly prominent part in the war effort, both as the biggest centre of war industries, and the 
area from which the Pacific war was fought against Japan.  Therefore, West Coast Americans 
were very conscious of their region’s contribution to the home front and the battle field, 
regardless of their political persuasions.  This shared perception helped progressives encourage 
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mutuality - what amounted to a ‘war contract’ - whereby Americans would fight and labour for 
victory in return for a better future developed during and after the war.  It allowed conservative 
patriots and progressives to unite behind socio-economic advances.  Nonetheless, the social 
justice aims of progressives were not the product of war but derived from Progressive era origins.  
Progressives believed that only with raised incomes and potential among poorer people would 
the economy thrive long-term.  Moreover, they envisaged government permanently prioritizing 
full employment in economic policy.  Often their plans were thwarted by the war; sometimes, 
though, the war enabled the partial realization of progressive beliefs. 
     Sheridan Downey of California was a moving force behind solutions to unemployment during 
1940.  Worster labels him reactionary because in the 1940s he abandoned restricting water rights 
from federal irrigation schemes to small farmers.  Yet, Downey was Upton Sinclair’s running 
mate during his failed bid for California’s governorship in 1934.  Downey was still exchanging 
mutually supportive letters with the old Progressive Sinclair about economic revival as late as 
1939.426  There is evidence to suggest Downey maintained the substance of his progressive 
ideology at this time, e.g. his sponsoring of La Follette’s investigation in California.  During 
August 1940, in the US Senate Downey argued that a massive public works project ‘of 
supersafety highways throughout the United States’ would both alleviate youth unemployment 
and speed up military transport.  However, the debate ranged beyond the immediate issue, as 
America made contingencies for war, to Downey’s view on federal government’s post-war 
responsibilities.  He contended that unless people have a real chance of employment when they 
return from war America will not get the fullest commitment from US soldiery.  He continued: 
‘we are assuming a correlative duty ... on the part of Government (to servicemen) ... We ... ask 
military service of you ... but we ... (will) provide you with ... guaranteed opportunity to work... 
when you come (home).’  Other notable West Coast senators gave support to Downey’s 
proposals – Bone from Washington, and Oregon Senator McNary.427 
     The post-war Employment Act (1946) is conventionally considered a product of World War 
II.  It committed federal government to full employment as its number one economic priority.  
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The Employment Act certainly stemmed from the wartime National Resources Planning Board 
(NRPB), which began a debate about economic prospects after the war, and an awareness of 
government’s new capacities.428  However, one of the NRPB’s leading economists was Alvin 
Hansen, who strongly adhered to Turner’s ‘closed frontier’ theory, and advocated an economy of 
abundance as its remedy.429  Although Congress abolished the NRPB (1943), worried about the 
powers it was granting Roosevelt, Congressmen responded to the NRPB’s concerns in the 
Employment Act.  Yet, that legislation was not wholly a product of World War II.  Downey and 
Hansen subscribed to economy of abundance ideas during the 1930s, aimed at solving 
unemployment.  In ideological terms, Downey had anticipated the Employment Act in the 
August 1940 Senate debate, before the US entered World War II.  Hansen’s NRPB pamphlet 
After the War – Full Employment (1942) was not a product of war, but echoed his 1938 tract Full 
Recovery or Stagnation.430  War was the enabler of progressivism. 
     Downey’s fellow Californian Democrat, Olson adopted a similar posture, using mutuality in a 
war emergency as a persuasive technique, when seeking a second term as governor of California 
in 1942.  During May 1941, Olson vetoed the Hot Cargo Bill, and, after the legislature 
overturned his decision, he put the issue to a 1942 referendum.431  This industrial legislation, 
lasting during the war emergency, prevented secondary strike action, whereby a union could 
strike at one business to prevent it trading with another already in a labour dispute.  Olson 
opposed the legislation on two grounds.  Firstly, it violated Taft’s 1921 US Supreme Court 
decision.  Taft said that a strike was a ‘lawful ... struggle’ between labour and capital about what 
they jointly produced, and that an effective strike would ‘extend beyond one shop.’  Taft was a 
Progressive era US president, 1909-1913, and served as Chief Justice on the Supreme Court, 
1921-1930.  During the 1920s, when the forces of reaction had revived, Taft contested their 
power with a broad interpretation of union powers to strike.  Olson followed Taft’s lead.  
Secondly, Olson’s campaign quoted Progressive era President Wilson to legitimize his position 
over the hot cargo legislation.  In 1917, Wilson stated during World War I that the ‘best form of 
efficiency is the spontaneous co-operation of free people,’ and in this spirit all parties ‘agreed the 
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rights of labor should be preserved.’  In World War II unions banned strikes, so Olson argued 
that the Hot Cargo Act, by curtailing union rights ‘only serves to raise an issue which should 
not ... exist when there is unity of labor and management.’432  Olson emphasized wartime 
mutuality to keep the hot cargo legislation off the statute book.   
     Similarly he pushed for ‘labor-management committees’ across all industries, at a time of 
high mutual trust, to give unions a say in businesses. 433  In the event, Olson was defeated at the 
elections of 1942, and lost the referendum over the hot cargo legislation.  Nevertheless, the 
principle of mutuality was not relinquished during the war, in part because progressives had 
popularized it.  Californians rejected a 1944 referendum allowing non-union labour at unionized 
plants, and even the State Chamber of Commerce campaigned for its rejection ‘in the interest of 
national unity, (and as) ... a considered response to labor’s wartime no strike pledge.’434  
     La Follette Jr.’s active interest in the West Coast continued, 1940-1942, and his progressive 
ideas also helped ‘incubate policies’ and new attitudes.435  In 1940 La Follette enunciated the 
principle that ‘to make America strong from within we must build up our human resources.’436  
His emphasis on people as resources echoed FDR’s beliefs, and reflected Johnson’s Progressive 
era comment that ‘the supreme duty of government ... is the conservation of its human 
resources.’437  Yet, ultimately mutuality provided the glue which would hold society together 
during war.  In an October 1940 speech, La Follette counselled ‘we must learn the lesson taught 
by France’s collapse, that our ... people constitute a domestic front as important as our military 
front.’ 438  Although La Follette was an arch-isolationist, like a number of western progressives - 
e.g. Johnson - he urged a robust defence of America.  He directly credited the tradition of 
government social reforms, i.e. stretching back to Progressive times, with binding Americans to 
the defence of their country.   
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     Finally, in speeches (1941-1942), and his published report into the California hearings, La 
Follette revisited the issue of migrant farm workers, and argued that American democracy would 
be more secure for helping them.  His ideas on this subject bring together progressive truths and 
misconceptions in social justice policy.  In the early 1940s, progressives were still trying to 
convince Americans, as in 1900-1920, that the US was no longer a frontier land.  Certainly, the 
vigilantism of the Associated Farmers etc. was akin to the ‘frontier justice’ which Turner tacitly 
approved of – ‘sudden and effective justice’ – but it had no place in a modern society.439  
Similarly, in 1941, La Follette said farm workers were ‘truly the forgotten men of our economic 
democracy,’ contending their inferior work status, ‘encysted in law,’ had exclusively frontier 
origins.  In particular, Western states regarded rural migrants as in the process of finding new 
land or urban jobs, and therefore unjustly excluded them from workplace, and other, 
protections.440  This analysis typifies western progressivism’s over-emphasis on the frontier 
thesis.  Recently, Katznelson has updated understanding of the New Deal.  He explains that 
American farm labour during the 1930s was kept disadvantaged for another reason: because the 
powerful southern bloc imposed its racial and economic imperatives on Congress.441      
     The progressive analysis of society linked to the closed frontier theory was also guilty of 
other misconceptions.  La Follette predicted after the war permanent high levels of people 
surplus to the west’s rural labour requirements – the surplus stood at five million during 1940.442  
Progressives consistently under-estimated capitalism’s dynamism – its ability to discover new 
products, processes, and markets.  Post-World War II, West Coast capitalism proved itself 
conspicuously innovative and inventive.  On the other hand, progressives like La Follette with a 
social conscience had detected capitalism’s biggest flaw – its continued reliance on a rural and 
urban underclass, however much sections of the working class underwent embourgeoisement.  
Perhaps La Follette addressed the far off future in his 1941 speech, when he said that the 
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desperate plight of ‘trailer life’ Americans must be tackled by progressive government action, 
which included educational, workplace, and medical protection.443 
     A trend in New Deal historiography has shown how Roosevelt’s government anticipated and 
encouraged post-war developments.  Equally, in the years 1940-1942, progressives concerned 
with the West Coast promoted forward-looking social justice policies derived from the 
Progressive era past.  They employed the concept of mutuality, and their attempted reforms often 
influenced government policy as the war ended or later in peacetime, even if sometimes their 
ideas overstated realities.  
                                                  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
     Progressive era influence on the late New Deal deepens understanding of social justice issues.  
Essentially, old Progressives and New Dealers remained committed to Progressive era social 
justice objectives, only CIO unionization divided them.  Both AFL and CIO union movements 
supported the Progressive era farmer-labour alliance, although paradoxically their unionization 
campaigns jeopardized it.  The repositioning of the La Follette Committee only makes sense by 
considering La Follette Jr.’s Progressive era beliefs about communism, and small farmers.  Both 
the La Follette Committee and the Grays Harbor Civil Rights Committee helped contain 
vigilantism that had caused progressivism’s defeat on the West Coast during 1919-1920, and 
threatened the New Deal, 1939-1940.  Progressives, focused on the West Coast, ‘incubated’ 
social justice policy into the war emergency, which bore fruit in the mid 1940s or much later. 
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 Conclusion 
 
During the 1970s, Rex Tugwell, a leading agricultural reformer in the New Deal, cast his mind 
back to that era.  He commented: ‘The progressive tradition ... was the furniture of ... (Franklin 
Roosevelt’s) mind ... and his mind was never entirely purged of these preferences.’444  This 
thesis has attempted to show that the Progressive era was not just a vague background, but a 
vivid presence in the late New Deal.  Roosevelt’s New Deal was strongly motivated by 
Progressive era ideology in conservation, monopoly reform, and social justice.  The West Coast 
in the later New Deal was the arena in which this ideology found perhaps its most eloquent 
expression.  In chapter one, my work showed that ‘ideological’ Progressive era presidential 
leaders were more pragmatic than the historiography suggests.  Chapters three through six 
demonstrated that the ‘pragmatic’ New Deal was considerably more influenced by Progressive 
era ideology than the Hofstadter ‘discontinuity school’ indicated, establishing the basic 
continuity between the two periods.   
     The continuity of the ‘discontinuity school’ deserves a final comment.  That Hofstadter’s 
contention of discontinuity between the 1900s and 1930s has survived in such rude health is 
remarkable, despite first being mooted in 1955.  Of course, it contains many truths, and was 
intellectually daring in challenging what appeared to be intuitively obvious.  It also permitted 
numerous permutations on the theme that these chronologically close historical reformist epochs 
were fundamentally different.  By deploying Progressive era intellectual tools, we can go a step 
further into exploring the longevity of Hofstadter’s discontinuity idea.      
     Of all the many reasons for the survival of the discontinuity school, one is particularly 
striking – the strong influence of Columbia University historians - Hofstadter onwards - who 
perpetuated the discontinuity idea.  Although they often became eminent and original historians 
in their own right, successive cohorts of Columbia academics quaffed at the fount of Hofstadter’s 
wisdom.  Leuchtenburg added to his view of a pragmatic New Deal.  Graham Jr. judged old 
Progressives as out of temper with the New Deal.  Auerbach ignored the effects of the 
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Progressive era on La Follette Jr. and the Civil Liberties Committee, even though this politician 
was steeped in progressivism.  Weinstein’s New Left ideas portrayed a backward-looking 
Progressive era.  Brinkley pointed the late New Deal forwards to influencing post-war America.  
Most recently, Katznelson has shown the validity of extending the New Deal to 1953.  The 
ingenuity of Columbia University historians, who developed Hofstadter’s hypothesis, is 
impressive, and established a distinctive tradition in New Deal history.  As Turner adapted the 
frontier thesis throughout the Progressive era, the discontinuity theory shows how to sustain a 
single arresting idea over time, with numerous valuable accretions. 
     Nonetheless, the intellectual importance of Hofstadter in American historiography was reason 
enough for his great influence on generations of historians.  Columbia academics did not benefit 
exclusively from Hofstadter’s many historical contributions, although his Alma Mater must have 
nurtured, for instance, the discontinuity idea.  Historians from elsewhere, like Hawley, Worster, 
or Sutter reached conclusions that accorded with Progressive/New Deal discontinuity.  To be 
sure, they might have arrived at their arguments uninfluenced by Hofstadter, but we can probably 
accept that Hofstadter’s discontinuity model had a significant impact on academia. It is also 
likely to have served a function in wider society. 
     Hofstadter wrote The Age of Reform at the height of the Cold War.  Americans felt they were 
slaying ogres.  They had helped defeat German Nazi ideology in World War II.  During the 
1950s, they were locked in a struggle with Soviet Communist ideology.  The notion that the New 
Deal and post-war American society were free from the taint of ideology was an attractive 
proposition.  Hofstadter found a receptive audience with the Right, initially, reassuring it when 
McCarthyism made many Americans think America was anything but un-ideological.  The Right 
was less content with his 1960s work on McCarthy-like episodes in American history.445  
Equally, and perhaps of more enduring significance, Hofstadter’s ideas received a warm 
reception from the Left.  The Progressive era formulated the need for a ‘usable past.’446  
Hofstadter’s discontinuity idea served the purposes of the Left and Right, and that facilitated its 
survival.    
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     Hofstadter’s ‘idea’ and Graham Jr.’s reinforcing of it created the impression that the New 
Deal began a Left tradition.  When Graham Jr. showed the divergence between the late New 
Deal and old Progressives, many of whom were Republican, the New Deal was recast as 
overwhelmingly a Democratic Party phenomenon.  The Democratic Party devoured 
progressivism and liberalism, and gained stature in the process.  If the New Deal is re-connected 
to the Progressive era, showing its bi-partisan political complexion, we can appreciate the long 
progressive tradition in the Democratic and Republican Parties.  Twenty-first Century American 
politics is characterized by deep rifts and widening polarities, often caused by fundamental 
disagreements over policy, but also misconceptions.  In that discourse, progressive commonality 
provides some small bridge of understanding.  The continuity argument can assist the present, 
but how does it aid understanding of the late New Deal on the West Coast? 
     By denying continuity between the two eras, a rich intellectual terrain is blocked from our 
vision.  A few instances will illustrate that point.  Using an ideological analysis, the late New 
Deal can be credited with more policy success than is normally conceded.  What was deemed 
peripheral becomes central to the New Deal project.  In conservation, preservationists achieved 
key objectives stemming from Muir’s Progressive era ideology.  Regarding the Olympic and 
Kings Canyon National Parks, they protected two of the three giant trees of the West Coast.  
Olson’s ‘Fire Disaster Plan’ helped secure the welfare of the third – the Redwood.  Similarly, 
utility reform was not a ‘skirmish on the flanks,’ to quote Hawley, but ideologically central to 
progressive monopoly reform.  The public power movement, in Washington and California 
especially, manifested a hardened ideological resolve derived from the Progressive era that 
achieved the aim of prioritizing public power from the giant West Coast dams.  Over social 
justice, La Follette Jr.’s Progressive era background enabled him to negotiate a safe passage 
through serious threats to the New Deal that built up before the 1940 elections; the kind that had 
defeated progressivism in 1920.  Accordingly, the La Follette Committee in California was more 
significant than previous historians suggest; it helped the New Deal win through into the war 
years.  
     An ideological approach reveals that often where the post-1937 New Deal appears to have 
different concerns from the Progressive era, on closer inspection, they were the same.  In 
conservation, Sutter’s dichotomy between ‘motorized recreation’ and ‘wilderness recreation’ 
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seems to present a new situation during the 1930s.  However, an ideological interpretation posits 
that the old Progressive era dichotomy persisted between ‘resource developers’ and progressives.  
The greater attention given to railroad cartels in Progressive era monopoly reform apparently 
contrasts with the New Deal’s concentration on utility reform.  Yet, while railroads declined and 
electricity surged, it was the Progressive era public power tradition that drove late 1930s New 
Deal policy.  Where larger differences were evident, for example, over social justice, the Great 
Depression was the chief cause.  The scale of this socio-economic disaster caused a divergence 
in progressive thinking.  New Dealers like Olson exhibited urgency in forcing unionization and 
higher wages on employers.  Johnson, an old Progressive, viewed partisan government action as 
a dangerous misstep for progressivism.  Yet, regarding a range of progressive metrics, Olson’s 
and Johnson’s progressivism converged. 
     As mentioned in chapter five, Worster suggested the need for more regional understanding of 
America on a north-south axis.  The Progressive/New Deal connection reconstitutes the three 
West Coast states as an ideological unit, but not a reconstruction by artifice, rather a working 
reality in the 1930s.  Progressives gained national parks in California and Washington State, but 
their Progressive era conservation objectives depended on support from McNary of Oregon, the 
Republican leader in the Senate.  Progressivism achieved public power aims over the New Deal 
dams in monopoly reform, but their victory rested on a pan-West Coast public power movement 
established in the Progressive era, and the Pacific Coast Public Ownership League.  In the social 
justice area, the ideological conflict of 1919 on the West Coast re-emerged during 1939-1940.  
At that time, radical ‘commonwealth federation’ progressives formed a West Coast network.  
Reactionaries were pitted against them, similarly configured – the Associated Farmers of the 
Pacific Coast, and the Pacific Coast lumber interests.  La Follette Jr. was alert to the lessons of 
1919 and the pan-West Coast dimensions to the struggle in 1940. 
     A last word is merited on the wider New Deal and how the Progressive era perspective alters 
perceptions of it.  The concept of an ‘ideological’ New Deal does not deny the New Deal’s firm 
adherence to electoral realities.  A reformer in a democracy must often make policy 
compromises to achieve ideological objectives, or defer reform until such time as the electorate 
accepts it.  Equally, the need for pragmatism does not preclude an ideological thrust behind 
policy.  The New Deal government appealed to the ‘vital centre’ both for electoral survival, and 
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as a means of achieving its Progressive era beliefs.  In1954, a year before Hofstadter’s The Age 
of Reform, Freidel interviewed Eleanor Roosevelt.  She recalled her husband FDR chiding her 
impatience at the slow pace of reform.  He said: ‘one must wait until the electorate was ready to 
support a change; otherwise if it was rammed through too soon the voters will go back on it.’447 
     Frequently, compromise was necessary to attain ideological aims, and avoid electoral 
pushback.  New Dealers made concessions to ‘resource developers’ and ‘motorized recreation’ 
to create national parks.  They granted private utilities and industrial users access to West Coast 
dam electricity, because their public power objectives were realized.  La Follette repositioned his 
committee, but still dealt a decisive blow against the Associated Farmers.  Moreover, as FDR 
recognized, sometimes progressives should ‘incubate’ reform, and gradually acclimatize the 
public and the peoples’ representatives to a reform proposal.  During the early 1940s, 
Progressive era-influenced individuals – the West Coast politician Downey and the economist 
Hansen – advocated government should prioritize full employment in economic policy.  These 
proposals only became feasible in the Employment Act (1946), and the Humphrey-Hawkins Full 
Employment Act (1978).  Pragmatic means, or more accurately tactics, did not negate the 
ideological purpose behind the policies of the later New Deal.  Tugwell stated: ‘Historians ... 
might consider Roosevelt’s habit of differentiating means and ends; his carelessness about the 
one, his adamant holding to the other.’448 
     Indeed, Tugwell’s comment supplies one more Progressive era resonance for the New Deal.  
In chapter three it was observed that the Progressive era provided the New Deal with, at least, 
two policy options for each of the three tenets: wise user or preservationist beliefs in 
conservation; regulation or trust-busting regarding monopoly reform; the path of radical or more 
capitalist-friendly trade unionism over social justice policy.  These policy options remained fluid 
partly because no enduring Progressive Party arose from the Progressive age to crystallize beliefs.  
This apparent weakness was transmuted by progressives, during both eras, into a strength.  For 
example, Roosevelt’s New Deal, when pushed into tight corners by Congress, the Supreme Court, 
or foreign policy, demonstrated an ability to renew itself with fresh policies, derived from the 
                                                 
447 Frank Freidel interview with Eleanor Roosevelt, July 13, 1954, 21- B1, p2, Frank Freidel Research Interviews, 
Roosevelt Library 
448 Tugwell, In Search of Roosevelt, 30. 
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Progressive era.  Most historians consider such flexibility evidence of pragmatism, rather than 
ideological intent. Alternatively, each policy area presented a radical or gradualist means to the 
same end aimed at, respectively, greater responsibility: towards the environment, in business 
practice, and over the welfare of poorer workers.  Accordingly, the New Deal developed a policy 
agility lacking among the majority of Republicans and conservative Democrats during the 1930s. 
     In various ways, my thesis has attempted to achieve its purpose – of showing Progressive era 
influence on the West Coast in the late New Deal.  However, having reached this particular 
destination, I am aware that the exploration of connections between these two eras has not ended, 
but is only just beginning.  
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